¹ Pannikar, K. M., Asia and Western Dominance (London: George Allen & Unwin, New Ed., 1959).Google Scholar

² Parry, J. H., The Establishment of the European Hegemony: 1415–1715 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, Third Ed., 1966).Google Scholar

³ NcNeill, W. H., The Rise of the West (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).Google Scholar

⁴ Pannikar, , op. cit., p. 13.Google Scholar

⁵ Cipolla, Carlo M., Guns and Sails in the early Phase of European Expansion 1400–1700 (London: Collins, 1965), p. 1 of the preface.Google Scholar

⁶ Parry, , op. cit., Chap. 1.Google Scholar

⁷ McNeill, , op. cit., p. 730. See also pp. 655–6 for a similar formulation. On p. 569, however, McNeill lists European pugnacity, naval technology, and a popu-lation inured to disease, as the major forces in the sixteenth-century expansion of the West.Google Scholar

⁸ See Parry, , op. cit., Chap. 6 for a good summary of these relations.Google Scholar

⁹ Cipolla, , op. cit., p. 81.Google Scholar

¹⁰ There is a rich and often recent literature on the revolution of warfare and the relation between military and political change. Roberts, Michael, The Military Revo-lution 1560–1660 (Belfast: Queens University Press, 1956),Google Scholar provides a succinct and comprehensive survey of the changes in military technology and organization and the impact of these changes on larger political organization, linking the military revolution to the dissolution of estate society. Oman, Charles, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages (New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1898),Google Scholar presents a detailed analysis of the changes just preceding the sixteenth century revolution. This is especially useful for its illustration of the contrasts between what we later call heroic and bureaucratic armies and for the similarities observable between the Moghul armies and the western “pre-modern” armies. Samuel, P. Finer, “State- and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military, ” in Tilly, Charles, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 84–163,Google Scholar refines Robert's analysis by showing how the variance in military format is related to variance in large-scale political changes in the process of modern European state-making. Vagts, Alfred, A History of Militarism (New York: The Free Press, 1959), Chap. 1,Google Scholar and Ropp, Theodore, War in the Modern World (London: Collier Books, 1959), Chap. 1,Google Scholar both provide summaries of the change in military technology and organization in the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries. Andreski, Stanislav, Military Organization and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), is an attempt at formulating a general theory that links social stratification to military organization.Google Scholar

¹¹ One event in this conflict provides a preview of future events. This was the easy manner in which the French dealt with the army of the Nabob. In several ac-tions “the cavalry of the Nabob was swept aside in the face of the French advance.” Against the disorganized native cavalry charge the French “troops kept their ranks and reserved their fire” (Dodwell, , p. 122; see note 12). All indications point to the fact that the Nabob's troops were as well-armed as the French. Thus the traditional military proved a poor match for European discipline and determination. This was one of the first times that a European organized army faced an Indian army, and the ease of the French victory came as something of a surprise.Google Scholar

¹² Dodwell, H. H., ed., The Cambridge History of India, Vol. IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929), p. 150.Google Scholar

¹³ lbid., p. 149.

¹⁴ Irvine, W., The Army of the Indian Moghuls: its Organization and Administra-tion (London: Luzac & Co. 1903).Google Scholar

¹⁵ lbid., p. 57–8.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 235. In this same passage, p. 236, Irvine cites Sir Eyre Loote's account which attributes the victory at Plassey to the “loss of one Meer Noodur, Siraj-ud-Daulah's head general” who was killed in a fall from his elephant when it was struck by a British cannon ball.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 182.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 161–2.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 187.

²⁰ Wilks, Lt. Col. Mark, Historical Sketches of the South of India Mysore: Gov't. Branch Press 1930–1932, Vol. III, p. 392.Google Scholar

²¹ Irvine, , op. cit., p. 188.Google Scholar

²² Ibid., p. 118.

²³ Oman, , op. cit.Google Scholar, Book VI. Also by the same author, The Sixteenth Century (New York, 1937), Chap. XI,Google ScholarPubMed provides a good summary of the wars of the period leading to the military revolution. It should also be noted that the elements de-scribed by Irvine do not appear totally unique to Moghul rule in India. Hopkins, E. W., “The Social and Military Position of the Ruling Caste of Ancient India, ” Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. xiii, 1889, provides accounts of the traditional “epic” battle of ancient India that appear strikingly familiar. When the battle is joined there is great disorder and confusion; the masses of infantry are helpless and imbecile; the knights are reckless and foolhardy; when a knight is slain or flees, his soldiers run away, “since they fight not for a cause but a leader” (p. 223).Google Scholar

²⁴ Quaritch-Wales, H. G., Ancient Southeast Asian Warfare (London: Bernard Quaritch Ltd., 1952).Google Scholar

²⁵ Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), especially Chaps. 1 and 2.Google Scholar

²⁶ Callahan, Raymond, The East India Company and Army Reform 1783–1798 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972),Google Scholar especially Chaps. 1 and 2. Here we come upon another remarkable character of the British conquest of India. As Callahan points out for the army officers, and Furber, Holden in The John Com- pany at Work (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951) points out for the civilian as well as military officers, corruption and personal gain were in epi-demic proportions in the Company. Army officers' salaries were inconsequential (as were those of the civilian officers) and gain was made in allowances, licenses sold to the bazaar merchant that supplied troops, revenue funds, and private busi-ness transactions that were highly coercive and exploitative. The bazaar fund may be counted as potentially the most detrimental to military operations as officers stood to gain greatly from troop purchase and consumption of opium and alcoholic spirits. What is remarkable is that the British military prevailed so easily over Indian troops despite this pervasive corruption. It appears likely, however, that Indian armies suffered from similar, and perhaps even greater degrees of corruption. This further emphasizes the decisive importance of military organization in the battle-field.Google Scholar

²⁷ Pannikar, , op. cit., p. 78.Google Scholar

²⁸ Irvine, , op. cit., p. 218.Google Scholar

²⁹ Sen, Siba P., The French in India 1763–1816 (Calcutta: Finna K. L. Muko-padhyay, 1958).Google Scholar

²⁸ Irvine, , op. cit., p. 218.Google Scholar

²⁹ Sen, Siba P., The French in India 1763–1816 (Calcutta: Finna K. L. Muko-padhyay, 1958).Google Scholar

³⁰ Dodwell, , op. cit., p. 365.Google Scholar

³¹ McMunn, Maj. G. F., The Armies of India (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1911), p. 49.Google Scholar Also Sheppard, Maj. Eric W., A Short History of the British Army (London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1926), p. 176.Google Scholar

³² McMunn, , op. cit., p. 44.Google Scholar

³³ Ibid., p. 49.

³⁴ Sheppard, , op. cit., p. 176.Google Scholar

³⁵ The one war not mentioned in the narrative is the Gurkha War, which consti-tutes something of an anomaly. It is doubtful that the Gurkhas had any Europeans in their employment, especially considering the relatively isolated nature of Nepal in the lower ranges of the Himalayas. However, two authors who do not cite one another claim that the Gurkhas successfully used the European method of trainingand organization (Furber, , p. 109,Google ScholarFortescue, , p. 109). Unfortunately little more isknown. The Gurkha War 1813–16 is most noteworthy in that it is the only warfought in this period in which the British had to outnumber the enemy in order towin. In this case mere superiority in numbers was not even sufficient, since theBritish required an overwhelming advantage to win. The total number of Nepaliswas 12, 000 men whereas the British force that went on the expedition numbered34, 000. It is possible, of course, that the unfamiliar and very difficult terrain placeda major disadvantage upon the British.Google Scholar

³⁶ Singh, Kushwant, Ranjit Singh: Maraharjah of the Punjab (London: GeorgeAllen & Unwin 1962), pp. 56, 58, 93.Google Scholar

³⁷ Ibid., p. 124.

³⁸ Wilks, , op. cit., p. 234.Google Scholar

³⁹ The Sikh artillery was slightly larger in number and in weight than the Britishguns for many of the battles of the two Sikh wars. One author maintains that the“Sikh artillery was as good as our own; their guns were more numerous and theirinfantry muskets were the same as ours …” Sir Gough, Charles J. S., The Sikhsand the Sikh Wars, London: A. D. Innes, 1897, p. 67.Google Scholar At the battle of Ferozashah, the Sikhs had artillery of “considerable superiority both in number of guns andweight of metal” (Gough, p. 91). At the other battles, Moodkee, Aliwal, Sobraon, and Chillianwalla, Sikh artillery was slightly superior to that of the British. It wasnot until the battle of Gujerat, which was the last battle of the war that the Britishgained any superiority in artillery. The Sikhs were not unique in this respect. TheMahrattas have already been shown to have been in possession of large numbers offield batteries. The traditionally organized armies also had large quantities of heavyguns. A specific example, the Burmese, will be discussed later.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Fortescue, John, The Empire and the Army (London, Cassel & Co., 1928), p. 253.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Banerjee, Anil Chandra, The Annexation of Burma (CalcuttaA. Mukherjee & Bros., 1944), passim.Google Scholar

⁴² Banerjee, , op. cit., puts the figure at 25, 000.Google ScholarHall, G. D. H. in A Short History of Burma (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1950), puts the figure at 32, 000 plus 8, 500 military police.Google Scholar

⁴³ Sheppard, , op. cit., p. 187.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ The quotations are from Banerjee, , op. cit., pp. 103 and 107.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Quaritch-Wales, H. G., op. cit., pp. 166 and 170 mentions the tradition of guerilla warfare among the Burmese.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ On the Dutch in Indonesia see among others, Hyma, Albert, A History of the Dutch in the Far East (Ann Arbor: George Wahr Publishing Co., 1953);Google ScholarPalmier, Leslie H., Indonesia and the Dutch (London: Oxford University Press, 1962);Google Scholar and DeKlerck, E. S., History of the Netherlands East Indies (Rotterdam: W. L. & J. Brusse, N.V., 1938).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Quaritch-Wales, , op. cit., p. 100 for the Chinese impact on the Khmers, pp.166 and 170 Burmese and p. 182 for Thai guerilla tactics. On the Chinese injunctions against the use of magic in Southeast Asian armies, see Chapter II.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Roberts, , op. cit., p. 10–11.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ On France see especially, Herbert, I.Priestley, France Overseas Through the Old Regime, and France Overseas: A Study of Modern Imperialism, both published in New York by Appleton, 1939 and 1938, respectively.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ There are interesting modern parallels of this rule. The two successful warsagainst the Communist insurgency of 1948ff, in Malaya and the Philippines, weremarked by a radical reorganization of military and political operations. In bothcases political and economic reform were combined with extensive decentralizationof military operations to provide an effective counter-insurgency campaign. Criticalaccounts of military and political operations in Vietnam from 1945 through 1970agree that neither the French nor the Americans learned these important lessons ofreorganization.

⁵¹ Janowitz, Morris, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 21–38 calls attention to the persistent internal organizational tension in themilitary establishment between three different types of leaders: the fighter and themanager, who have been recognized by others, and to which he adds the technolo-gist. He argues that however much organizational imperatives may demand man-agers, the martial spirit continues to give the military its distinctive character andeven to mold the orientations of the managers. A new managerial leadership maywell emerge, but the military can never dispense with heroic leadership. It seems tome quite possible to accept this argument while still recognizing that a change fromthe aggregate of heroes to the organization of roles has constituted one of the majorrevolutions in military history.Google Scholar

⁵² On the Philippines war see Wolff, Leon, Little Brown Brother (Manila: Ereh-won, 1960).p-53Google Scholar For a brief interpretation of the larger historical role of metropolitan powersin the decline of empires see Ness, Gayl D. and Ness, Jeannine R., “MetropolitanPower and the Decline of Overseas Empires, “ paper rzead at the American Socio-logical Society Meetings, New Orleans, August 1972.Google Scholar