Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 June 2008
In a recent study, I sought to analyze political and cultural patterns across mainland Southeast Asia during roughly a thousand years, from c. 800 to 1830.1 In brief, I argued that each of mainland Southeast Asia's three great north-south corridors experienced a pattern of accelerating integration. This process was territorial in the sense that some twenty-three small polities in the fourteenth century were assimilated, gradually or convulsively, fully or partially, to three overarching imperial systems by the early 1800s. Integration was administrative insofar as within each imperial system mechanisms of provincial control, economic extraction, and manpower organization became more penetrating, stable, and efficient. Integration was cultural in the sense that hitherto self-sufficient communities across each of the three principal zones came to accept linguistic, ethnic, and religious norms sanctioned by imperial elites.
1 Lieberman, Victor, Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830, Volume One: Integration on the Mainland (Cambridge, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Mainland Southeast Asia comprises the modern countries of Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.
2 By these three criteria, southeastern Europe could be included in the “exposed zone.” “Southwest Asia” includes Persia, Transoxania, and the Ottoman lands. The three defining features of the exposed zone do not all apply as completely to Transoxania and Persia as to China and South Asia. In its civilizational precocity and subjection to Inner Asian influence, Persia, for example, clearly had much in common with other exposed zones, but along with Transoxania, Persia had a population and territory on the same modest scale as many protected rimlands. What is more, although the three defining features of the exposed zone all apply to the Ottoman lands, in those lands as in Persia and Transoxania, Islam displaced/camouflaged pre-Islamic charter-era cultural legacies far more substantially than in South Asia. The Ottoman lands were distinct too in that they escaped fresh post-1500 Inner Asian incursions such as transformed Persia, South Asia, and China. In short, depending on criteria, between the “exposed zone” and the “protected rimlands” one can find a degree of overlap, while both categories contain internal variations.
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4 Huntingdon, Samuel, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York, 1996)Google Scholar, chapter 8, endorses this opposition, as in varying degrees and guises do Landes, David, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (New York, 1998)Google Scholar; several contributors to Harrison, Lawrence and Huntingdon, Samuel, eds., Culture Matters (New York, 2000)Google Scholar; and Immanuel Wallerstein and his disciples.
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6 Much as Southeast Asia looked to India for cultural inspiration, South India looked to North India. By this criterion, though not in terms of insulation from Inner Asian incursions, South India could be categorized alongside Southeast Asia.
7 On Pagan, Angkor, and Dai Viet, see Lieberman, Strange Parallels, I, chs. 2–4 and sources therein. On Kiev, I have relied in part on Martin, Janet, Medieval Russia 980–1584 (Cambridge, 1995)Google Scholar; Franklin, Simon and Shepard, Jonathan, The Emergence of Rus 750–1200 (London, 1996)Google Scholar; Franklin, Simon, Writing, Society, and Culture in Early Rus, c. 950–1300 (Cambridge, 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Miller, David, “Monumental Building and Its Patrons as Indicators of Economic and Political Trends in Rus, 900–1262,” Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas 38 (1990): 321–55Google Scholar. On Carolingian/Capetian France, see Geary, Patrick, The Myth of Nations (Princeton, 2002)Google Scholar; McKitterick, Rosamond, The Frankish Kingdoms under the Carolingians (London, 1983)Google Scholar; McKitterick, Rosamond, ed., The New Cambridge Medieval History, c. 700–c. 900 (Cambridge, 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hallam, Elizabeth, Capetian France 987–1328 (London, 1990)Google Scholar; Bull, Marcus, ed., France in the Central Middle Ages 900–1200 (Oxford, 2002)Google Scholar; and Duby, Georges, France in the Middle Ages 987–1460 (Oxford, 1991)Google Scholar. On early Japan, see Piggott, Joan, The Emergence of Japanese Kingship (Stanford, 1997)Google Scholar; Farris, William Wayne, Heavenly Warriors (Cambridge, Mass., 1992)Google Scholar; idem, Japan's Medieval Population (Honolulu, 2006)Google Scholar; von Verschuer, Charlotte, Le Riz dans la Culture de Heian, Mythe et Realite (Paris, 2003)Google Scholar; Shively, Donald and McCullough, William, eds., The Cambridge History of Japan, Volume 2: Heian Japan (Cambridge, 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Totman, Conrad, A History of Japan (Malden, Mass., 2000)Google Scholar, pts. 1, 2. Arguments for Russia, France, and Japan are set forth in detail in Victor Lieberman, Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800–1830, Volume Two: Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands (forthcoming, Cambridge, 2009), chs. 2–4.
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10 Japan fit this pattern less well insofar as trade and cultural contacts with the continent tended to decline c. 900–1200.
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13 I take the period between Carolingian collapse and early Capetian consolidation as the first interregnum. If we start with the Hundred Years War and proceed through the Wars of Religion to the Revolutionary upheavals, the ratio, depending on definitions of breakdown, would be in the order of 116:36:2.
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