¹ On the specificity of western and southwestern European absolutism, see Anderson, P., Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: New Left Publications, 1974).Google Scholar

² Oligarchic parliamentarism functioned relatively stably in Greece from 1864 to 1909, in Argentina from 1853 to 1916, and in Chile from 1891 to 1924. The “relative stability” of oligarchic rule in these periods refers to that of the regime, not to governmental stability.

³ When in this article I contrast ACG to northwestern Europe or, even more broadly, to the “West,” the “capitalist centre,” etcetera, I have primarily in mind countries like England, Belgium, Denmark, and Switzerland, which have not only developed a welfare state but which have also solved in a relatively smooth and egalitarian manner the problem of the distribution of political rights between rulers and ruled. In other terms, development in those countries was characterised by a successful (from the point of view of the consolidation of bourgeois parliamentary democracy) resolution of both the economic and political distribution problems, this double success leading to the formation of a strong civil society which operates as bulwark against state arbitrariness.

⁴ Banks, A. S., Cross-polity Time Series Data (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971), 48, 69.Google Scholar

⁵ Ibid., 59, 62, 72.

⁶ Dertilis, G., “Social Change and Military Intervention in Politics (Ph.D. diss., University of Sheffield, 1976), table 14.Google Scholar

⁷ League of Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1927 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1928), table 7.Google Scholar

⁸ For a view of populism as a means for breaking up the oligarchy's monopoly of power, see Malloy, J., ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 8ff.Google Scholar

⁹ See, for instance, Alexander, R. J., Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962), 67ff.Google Scholar

¹⁰ For instance, as late as 1948 Yugoslavia still had 77.8 percent of the labour force in agriculture, and the figure for Bulgaria in 1946 was 75.5 percent. Deldycke, T.et al., The Working Population and Its Structure (Brussels: Université libre de Bruxelles, Publications du Centre d'Economie politique, 1968), part I.Google Scholar

¹¹ For an analysis of Balkan peasant movements and ideologies, see Péseltz, B., “Peasant Movements in Southeastern Europe” (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1950).Google Scholar

¹² Mouzelis, N., Modern Greece (London: Macmillan, 1978), chs. 1, 5, 6.Google Scholar

¹³ For the development of this very important point in the Latin American context, see Véliz, C., The Centralist Tradition in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980),CrossRefGoogle Scholar chs. 1–5. For the Greek case, see Mouzelis, , Modern Greece, ch. 1.Google Scholar

¹⁴ In Greece in 1909, in Chile, 1924.

¹⁵ Rouquié, A., Pouvoir militaire et saciété politique en république argentine (Paris: Presse de la Foundation national des Sciences politiques, 1978), 700ff. Other historians ascribe less importance than does Rouquié to this factor.Google Scholar

¹⁶ After the Balkan Wars and World War I, the size of the Greek army increased spectacularly. At the same time, as more middle-class people were accepted into the military academy and as, because of losses in the war years, upward mobility on the ladder of the military hierarchy was eased, the officer corps lost its aristocratic orientation and emerged as a pressure group anxious to promote the economic and professional interests of its members. The army's interventionist role was particularly enhanced after the military coup that followed Greece's military defeat by Turkey in 1922. This crucial intervention led to the execution of the members of the proroyal civilian leadership deemed responsible for the military fiasco. From 1922 onwards, civilian control over the military was greatly weakened as army officers kept interfering in politics, directly by replacing one set of civilian leaders with another, or indirectly through threat and pressure. See Veremis, T., “The Greek Army in Politics” (Ph.D. thesis, Trinity College, Oxford, 1974).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Before 1930 it was civilian politicians who called the tune, even when they sought the support of the military; since 1930 the situation has been reversed, with civilians as the junior partners in civilian-military ventures. Goldwert, M., Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930–1966 (Austin and London, University of Texas Press, 1977), 35ff.Google Scholar

¹⁸ The widely accepted view of the post-1932 Chilean army as a model of democratic ethos and of professional neutrality in politics is to a large extent a myth. As Jorge Nef points out, “The first fact which puzzles students of the Chilean military, particularly historians, is that its attempts to intervene in politics have been more frequent than many are willing to admit. Leaving aside the period of overt participation between 1924 and 1932, almost all the governments between 1932 and 1970 faced abortive military uprisings.” Nef, J., “The Politics of Repression: The Social Pathology of the Chilean Military,” Latin American Perspectives, 1:2 (1974), 235.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Nunn, F., The Military in Chilean History (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976), 235ff.Google Scholar

¹⁹ For instance, in 1978 the contribution of the agricultural sector to the gross national product was only 10 percent in Chile, 13 percent in Argentina, and 17 percent in Greece. In the same year, industry's contribution was 29 percent in Chile, 45 percent in Argentina, and 31 percent in Greece. World Bank, World Development Report (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 115,Google Scholar table 3. For figures concerning the shifts in exports in the southern-cone countries, see Kadar, B., Problems of Economic Growth in Latin America (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 81;Google Scholar and for Greece, see Mouzelis, , Modern Greece, 28.Google Scholar

²⁰ World Bank, World Development Report, table 20.Google Scholar

²¹ As far as the industrial sector is concerned there are, on the one hand, a few, very large, capitalist enterprises which employ a considerable section of the wage earners and contribute by far the largest share of total industrial output; on the other hand, there is a plethora of small, family-oriented artisanal units with very low productivity and with loose and/or precarious linkages to the dynamic capitalist sector. In fact, one of the most striking characteristics of ACG industry is the persistence and even proliferation, especially in the more traditional industrial branches, of small, inefficient, simple commodity-production units existing side by side with huge firms (usually state- or foreign-controlled) which exercise a quasi-monopolistic market control. For instance, in the middle of the 1960s, of all industrial establishments with five or more workers, those employing more than a hundred accounted for 6 percent of the total sample in Chile and 10 percent in Argentina. These relatively large units employed more than half of the industrial labour force in Chile and Argentina. In both countries they also contributed more than 65 percent of the total industrial value added. Lambert, D. C. and Martin, J. M., L' Amérique latine (Pans: Armand Colin, 1971), 325.Google Scholar For similar data concerning Greece, see Ellis, H.et al., Industrial Capital in the Development of Greek Industry (Athens: Center for Planning and Economic Research, 1965), 197–204.Google Scholar

²² Cf. Economic Commission for Latin America, The Process of Industrial Development in Latin America (New York: United Nations, 1966), 36ff.Google Scholar

²³ For further comparative data on labour employment in early industrial Europe and present third world countries, see P. 'impasse (Paris: Gallimard, 1971).Google Scholar

²⁴ On inequalities in several Latin American countries, see Zuvekas, C., Jr., Income Distribution in Latin America: A Survey of Recent Research (Milwaukee: Centre for Latin America, University of Wisconsin, 1976),Google Scholar 17ff. See also Ahluwalia, M. S., “Growth and Poverty in Developing Countries,” Journal of Development Economics (09 1979).CrossRefGoogle Scholar For the Greek case, see Karageorgas, D., “The Distribution of Tax Burden by Income Groups in Greece,” in Economic Journal, (06 1973).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁵ On this point, see Schweinitz, K., Industrialisation and Democracy (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1914).Google Scholar On the long-term pattern of inequalities in western Europe, see also the classic article by Kuznets, S., “Economic Growth and Income Inequality,” American Economic Review, no. 49 (03 1955).Google Scholar

²⁶ I distinguish strength from autonomy because the two dimensions do not always vary in the same direction. For instance, trade unions in Argentina became stronger (in terms of numbers and resources) after the rise of Perón, but they were more strictly controlled by the state.

²⁷ See Skopol, Theda, States and Social Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge, London, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 51–66, 81–98.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁸ Urban guerilla activities have, of course, developed extensively both in Argentina and Uruguay, but these activities have never, despite their disruptive effects, posed a really serious threat to the bourgeois state.

²⁹ For the development of this point, see Kuhl, J. M., “Urbanization and Political Demand Measurement in Latin America,” Latin American Research Review, 24:1(1979).Google Scholar

³⁰ For the relative importance of the party system of Chile and Argentina in relation to other Latin American countries, see McDonald, R. H., Party Systems and Elections in Latin America (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1977), 2ffGoogle Scholar

³¹ See on this point Cardoso, F. H. and Faletto, E., Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 66ff. As far as Greece is concerned, an additional important factor reinforcing the argument is that capital coming from abroad in the nineteenth century was Greek diaspora capital.Google Scholar

³² See Trimberger, E. K., Revolution from Above (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978).Google Scholar

³³ See Menaud, J., Les forces politiques en Grèce (Montreal: 1965);Google ScholarLegg, K., Politics in Modern Greece (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).Google Scholar

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³⁵ See on this point Valenzuela, A., “Political Constraints to the Establishment of Socialism in Chile,” in Chile: Politics and Society, Valenzuela, A. and Valenzuela, J. S., eds. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976), 13ff.Google Scholar

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³⁷ See Angell, A., Politics and the Labour Movement in Chile (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), 210ff.Google Scholar

³⁸ For example, the considerable development of rural organisation and the radical mobilisation of the peasantry in Chile during the past decades clearly indicates the weakening of the landlords' clientelistic controls over the peasants. See, e.g., Petras, J., Politics and Social Forces in Chilean Development (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1969),Google Scholar 166ff. A similar weakening of clientelistic controls has occurred in the Greek countryside during the last two decades. See Comninos, M., “The Development of the Patronage System in Aitolo-Akharnania and Kavala” (Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics, 1984), ch. 6.Google Scholar

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⁴⁰ See on this point Grew, R., “The Crises and the Sequences,” in Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United States, Grew, R., ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 28ff.Google Scholar

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⁴² On this social pact, see Loveman, B., Chile (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 248ff.Google Scholar

⁴³ On the revival of Peronism, see Rouquié, , Pouvoir militaire, 454ff.Google Scholar

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⁴⁵ For all these points, see Nunn, , Military in Chilean History, 266ff.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ For an analysis of this type, see Mouzelis, N. P., Politics in the Semi-periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Southern American Cone (London: Macmillan, forthcoming), ch. 3.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁷ For an analysis of the major structural features of this type of military dictatorship, see Donnell, G. A. O'Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ See, for instance, Portantiero, C., “Dominant Classes and Political Crisis,” Latin American Perspectives, 1:3 (1974);CrossRefGoogle Scholar for the Greek case, Nikolinakos, M., Resistance and Opposition, 1967–74 (in Greek) (Athens: Nea Sinora, 1975).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Nun, J., “The Middle Class Military Coup,” in The Politics of Conformity in Latin America, Véliz, C., ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 66–118,Google Scholar and also his “The Middle Class Military Coup Revisited,” in Armies and Politics in Latin America, Lowenthal, A. F., ed. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1976), 68ff.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Mouzelis, , Modern Greece, 129ff.Google Scholar

⁵¹ O'Donnell, , Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism.Google Scholar O' Donnell has restated or reformulated his basic arguments in numerous articles; see, e.g., his “Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State,” Latin American Research Review, 8:1 (1978),Google Scholar O'Donnell's work has also generated a great deal of research and debate: see, e.g., various articles by Cardoso, F. H., Cotter, J., Hirschman, A., Kaufman, R., and others in The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, Collier, D., ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979);Google ScholarReyna, J. L. and Weinert, R., eds., Authoritarianism in Mexico (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977);Google ScholarErickson, K. P. and Pepper, P. V., “Dependent Capitalist Development, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Repression of the Working Class in Chile and Brazil,” Latin American Perspectives, no. 1 (1976).Google Scholar

⁵² For an exposition and detailed critique of O'Donnell's thesis, see the articles in Collier, , ed., New Authoritarianism,Google Scholar cited in note 51, and particularly that by Sena, J., “Three Mistaken Theses Regarding the Connection between Industrialisation and Authoritarian Regimes,” 111ff.Google Scholar

⁵³ See, e.g., Cohen, G. A., Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980);Google ScholarMerton, R. K., Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: Social Press, 1963).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ As a matter of fact, the explanation adopted in this study by no means excludes economic determinations; it simply introduces them into the analysis in a different manner. If it is accepted that the postwar military interventions must seriously take into account the army's reaction to a growing political mobilisation that was threatening the incorporative/exclusionist character of the relations of domination (and hence its own privileged power position within the state), there are at least two ways in which economic factors enter into the analysis; (I) The incorporative nature of the state-civil society relationship in the semiperiphery is related to both the timing of capitalist industrialisation and its more restrictive and unequal character; and (2) the massive postwar mobilisation and radicalisation and the higher levels of societal inclusion are also strongly, although not exclusively, related to the rapid and highly unbalanced capitalist growth in these formations.