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Empire Loyalism and Minority Nationalism in Great Britain and Imperial Russia, 1707 to 1914: Institutions, Law, and Nationality in Scotland and Ukraine

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 April 2012

Stephen Velychenko
Stephen Velychenko
Affiliation:
State University of New York, Buffalo
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Extract

In 1812 a Russian army inflicted two decisive defeats on the Persian army. The resulting Treaty of Gulistan shifted tsarist borders 250 miles south and secured Russian control over Georgia and the Caspian Sea littoral. The commanding general, Piotr Kotliarevsky, received a second St. George Cross (the equivalent of the Victoria Cross) for this accomplishment—wounded in the battle, surgeons removed forty pieces of bone from his skull to save his life. The Persians were allied to Britain, who, fearing Russian and French designs on India, had sent a mission in 1810 headed by General John Malcolm, to the Shah. Charles Christie, a military advisor on the mission was killed in battle. Whereas Malcolm was an important agent of British policy in Central Asia and India, Christie was one of the first Europeans to travel and map the Afghano–Persian frontier. These achievements are normally logged into Russian and English history, but the men behind them were not native Russians nor Englishmen. Kotliarevsky was born into a lesser Ukrainian noble family in Kharkiv (Kharkov) province, while Malcolm and Christie were Scots. Like thousands of their countrymen, they served and made careers in the empires that ruled their native lands. A Ukrainian was Peter I's principal panegyrist. Scots wrote Rule Britannia and created “John Bull.”

Type
Routes of Nationalism
Information
Comparative Studies in Society and History , Volume 39 , Issue 3 , July 1997 , pp. 413 - 441
Copyright
Copyright © Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History 1997

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39 In Britain after 1628, seditious words were no longer tried as treason, and after 1650 hearsay evidence was inadmissable in court. By the 1720s torture was no longer part of the criminal procedure. C. Emsley, “Repression. ‘Terror,’ and the Rule of Law in England during the Decade of the French Revolution,” English Historical Review (October 1985), 801–25; Gilmour, I., Riot, Risings and Revolution (London, 1993), 139–13Google Scholar; Mond, Jacobitism, 234. In Russia a separate judiciary was formed in 1713, but anything deemed a political offence was dealt with by one of two separate chancelleries subject only to the tsar. Cracraft, J., “Opposition to Peter the Great,” in Mendelsohn, E. and Shatz, M. S., eds., Imperial Russia 1707–1917 (DeKalb, IL, 1988), 24–26Google Scholar. Torture was formally abolished in 1801.

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42 Legal ambiguities were fully exploited. For instance, in cases not covered by existing statutes. Ukrainian law permitted applying any other “Christian law”—and. of course, the Russians were Christian, Similarly. Peter interpreted the act of 1654 as providing cossacks with a legal right of appeal to Russian military governors and thereby justified his establishment of a supervisory body over the hetman in 1721 (“The Little Russian College,” in Vasylenko. Materiialy do isotorii Ukrainskoho vii, xiii. B. Nolde, “Essays in Russian State Law,” The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US no. 3 (Winter–Spring 1955), 873–903: Iakovliv, Ukrainsko-Moskovski dohovory, 138–60. On treason and homage, see Subtelny, O., “Mazepa, Peter I and the Question of Treason.” Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 2 (1978), 158–83Google ScholarMaitland, F. and Pollock, F., The History of English Law (Cambridge, UK. 1968), I: 296–307, II: 462–511)Google Scholar. Backus, O.P., “Treason as a Concept and Defections from Moscow to Lithuania in the Sixteenth Century,” Forschungen zur Osteuropaischen Gescliichte. 15 (1970), 138–41Google Scholar; Alef, G., The Origins of the Muscovite Autocracy (Berlin, 1986), 73–76Google Scholar.

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54 The “highlandization” of Scotland is intriguing and ironic, since it occurred at a time when commercialization was destroying the northern Scottish clan order and was sponsored by men who preferred to be modern landlords rather than traditional clan chiefs. Prebble, J., The King's Jaunt (London, 1988)Google Scholar. On the social and intellectual background to the transformation, see Clyde, R., From Rebel to Hero. The Image of the Highlander 1745–1830 (Edinburg, 1995), 116–49Google Scholar.

55 The Association demanded better local government under a renewed Scottish office, not political separation. In the face of the Crimean War and Indian Mutiny, it decided it was more patriotic to dissolve itself than to press claims. Pittock. The Invention of Scotland, 99–115; G. Morton, “Scottish Rights and ‘Centralisation’ in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” Nations and Nationalism, no. 2 (1996), 270–3.

56 Ingraham, Political Crime in Europe, 168, 210; J. W. Daly, “On the Significance of Emergency Legislation in Late Imperial Russia,” Slavic Review, no. 4 (winter 1995), 614–28. Between 1881 and 1905, over 46,000 persons were banished from the Petersburg and Moscow provinces alone. In Ireland, between 1867 and 1903, roughly 200 were arrested for political crimes.

57 These issues are mentioned only in passing in Ohloblyn, O., A History of Ukrainian Industry (Kiev, 1925Google Scholar; reprinted, Munich 1971); Slabchenko. Materiialy; Rieber, A. J.Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia (Chapel Hill, NC, 1982)Google Scholar. Throughout the nineteenth century, at least 50 percent of the government officials in Ukraine were Ukrainian. See S. Velychenko, “Identities, Loyalties and Service in Imperial Russia: Who Administered the Borderlands?” Russian Review, no. 2 (1995), 188–208.

58 Cited in Luckyi, G., Between Gogol and Sevcenko (Munich, 1971) 99Google Scholar.

59 Liberal eighteenth-century Ukrainian as well as Russian nobles opposed the immediate abolition of serfdom and differed from their conservative counterparts primarily by their wish to ameliorate the peasant's lot through enlightened tutelage. By 1905. forty-four years after peasant emancipation, the percentage of private land held by nobles in eastern and southern Ukraine had fallen from 80 to 45, while the percentage of noble landowners had fallen from over 90 to 25. Kozlovsky, V. I., “Krytyka V. N. Karamzina pansnchyny ta ioho proekty anrarnykh reform v Rosii i Ukraiini,” Istoriia narodnoho hospodarstva ta ekonomichnoi dumky Ukraiinskoi RSR, 7 (1972), 101–10Google Scholar; Teplytsky, V. P., Reforma 1861 roku i ahrarni vidnosyny na Ukraini (Kiev, 1959), 112, 159, 163Google Scholar. Becker, S., Nobility and Prvilege in Late Imperial Russia (DeKalb, 1985) 114Google Scholar.

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61 In 1832, for the first time since the seventeenth century, the tsarina appeared at court wearing a Muscovite costume, and Nicholas introduced a standard green dress uniform for the nobility. Against this, one must consider that Official Nationality had not yet been adopted as policy nor had its proponent, Sergei Uvarov, been appointed a minister. Leading Ukrainians were still well connected at court. Gogol in particular, having just become the rage with his Evenings on a Farm Near Dikanka, was close to the royal tutor, V. A. Zhukovskyi, as well as to a maid of honour, Alexandra Smirnov, of whom Nicholas was immensely fond. Thanks to her intervention he allowed the publication and performance of “The Inspector General: Luckyj, Between Gogol and Sevchenko, 25–88; Troyat, H., Gogol (London, 1974), 58–86, 135Google Scholar; Kohut, Russian Centralism, 282–4. The Foreign Ministry probably did have a report about George II's trip to Scotland, since one of his closest confidants was Princess Lieven, the wife of the Russian ambassador to London.

62 The Brotherhood advocated a political federation of Slavic nations, not Ukrainian separatism. D. Saunders, “Russia's Ukrainian Policy 1847–1905: A Demographic Approach,” European History Quarterly, no. 2 (April 1995), 181–208, identifies fear as a reason that inclined the ministers towards repressing rather than tolerating difference. Fear stemming from weak administrative control is also mentioned by Rieber, A. J., “The Reforming Tradition in Russian History,” in Rieber, A. J. and Rubinstein, A. Z., eds., Perestroika at the Crossroads (New York, 1991), 4–17Google Scholar.

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66 Ivan IV (the terrible) summarily killed at least 4,000 people as “traitors.” The victims included all the members of a given family who could be caught. The courts of Henry VIII executed 308 individuals for treason. Eiton, G. R., Policy and Police. The Enforcement of the Reformation in the Age of Thomas Cromwell (Cambridge, 1972), 292, 385–99Google Scholar; R. Hellie, “What Happened? How Did He Get Away With It?” Ivan Groznyi's Paranoia and the Problem of Institutional Restraints,” Russian History (Winter 1987) 214.

67 Marshall, P. J., “A Nation Defined by Empire,” in Grant, A. and Stringer, K. J., eds., The Making of British History (London, 1995), 215Google Scholar; Webb, S. S., The Governors-General. The English Army and the Definition of Empire 1569–1681 (Chapel Hill, 1979)Google Scholar. Once out of office, ex-governors were liable to civil suits for official actions unless they had managed to obtain a royal pardon.

68 Cited in Pittock, The Invention of Scotland, 132; Gerus, O. W., “The Ukrainian Question in the Russian Duma 1906-1917,” Stadia Ucrainica, 2 (1984), 157–76Google Scholar. Criminal statistics suggest that either the radicalization of Ukrainians on the issue of nationality was slow or that the government did not consider political nationalism as great a danger as radical socialism. Next to the death penalty, the harshest punishment was penal exile to Siberia. Ukrainians comprised only 2.3 percent of those sentenced to this fate between 1906 and 1909—the first years for which police statistics were broken down by nationality. Gruszczynska, B. and Kaczynska, E., “Poles in the Russian Penal System and Siberia as a Penal Colony (1815–1914),” Historical Social Research, 4 (1990), 120Google Scholar.