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The Duplicity of Paper: Counterfeit, Discretion, and Bureaucratic Authority in Early Colonial Madras

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 March 2012

Bhavani Raman
Bhavani Raman*
Affiliation:
Department of History, Princeton University
*
[email protected]
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Extract

Shifts in writing technology are usually taken to mark a shift from discretionary to rule-bound, impersonal forms of government. Equating writing technology with rules, however, obscures how counterfeiting, both alleged and real, and the exertion of official discretion can consolidate a government of writing. In his important study of Yemeni scribal culture, The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society, Brinkley Messick modifies Weberian models of domination by calling for the study of textual domination that intersects in diverse ways with other dimensions of authority. Messick relates the demise of the calligraphic state to the advent of legal codification and print technology. With the arrival of impersonal documents of government and a form of rational law, he argues, writing itself ceased to be the “non-arbitrary mark of the person” and the relationship between the sign and signified was no longer connected by an intermediary figure. Similarly, the notion that the innovations of disciplinary writing constituted a new assemblage of control exercised through the “unavoidable visibility of subjects” has been extremely productive in delineating the colonial career of modern infrastructural power. Following the work of Bernard Cohn, the colonial state's “investigative modalities” have been shown to be integral to colonial command and the production of an ever-accumulating corpus of reports. Statistical surveys, reports, and censuses in colonies did not create a uniform template of rule but did enable the operation of inherently selective, targeted, and differentially articulated projects of governance. These gains notwithstanding, the debates over colonial governance have remained limited to differing estimations of the state's successful mastery of information, and whether its taxonomies were collaboratively authored by intermediaries or imposed upon the colonized. We need to give more attention to the complex articulation of records and reports with the law under conditions of exogenous rule.

Type
Research Article
Information
Comparative Studies in Society and History , Volume 54 , Issue 2 , April 2012 , pp. 229 - 250
Copyright
Copyright © Society for the Comparative Study of Society and History 2012

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References

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57 “Improper Use of Collector Garrow's Facsimile,” Coimbatore District Records, 27 June 1816, vol. 584, TNSA.

58 “Letter from I. Hepburn, Tanjavur Collector to the Madras Board of Revenue,” 12 Sept. 1816, Records of the Tanjavur District, vol. 3279, pp. 54–61, TNSA.

59 Ibid.

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71 Regulation IV, 1821, x, Regulations of the Government, 416.

72 Regulation IV, 1816, x, Regulations of the Government, 254–55.

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77 The regulations introducing jury trials simultaneously empowered judges to dispense with writing down depositions and rely on their notes of the evidence. Regulation X, 1827, ii, Regulations of the Government, 474.

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79 Ibid., 24.

80 Eventually, the Company had to accommodate the refusals to take oaths. In 1840, it changed its laws to permit individuals to take an “affirmation” rather than an “oath.” Regulation V, 1840, Regulations of the Government, 614.

81 There were many regulations issued on the summoning of witnesses. In 1816, special powers were given to Indian judges, like the district munsiff, to force witnesses to attend court and give evidence. See Regulation VI, 1816, xxviii and xxix, Regulations of the Government, 272–73. In 1841, new rules were introduced to take the evidence of “absent witnesses”: Regulation VII, 1841, Regulations of the Government, 621–24.

82 I borrow this phrase from Kalpagam, U., “Counterfeit Consciousness and the Joy of Abandonment,” Sarai Reader 7 (Delhi: Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, 2007), 92Google Scholar.

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