¹ See for example, Almond, Gabriel and Coleman, James, eds., Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University, 1960).Google Scholar

² The definitive works in this genre can be found in Gutkind, Peter and Wallerstein, Immanuel, eds., Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (London: Sage, 1985).Google Scholar See also Baron-go, Yolamu, ed., Political Science in Africa (London: Zed, 1983).Google Scholar

³ This approach was pioneered by Rothchild, Donald and Curry, Robert L., Scarcity, Choice, and Public Policy in Middle Africa (Berkeley: University of California, 1978).Google Scholar See also, Bates, Robert H., Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Berkeley: University of California, 1983)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and the World Bank publication, Towards Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program for Action (Washington: World Bank, 1983).Google Scholar

⁴ This larger trend has been described in Ronald Inglehart, “The Renaissance of Political Culture,” American Political Science Review, 82 (12 1988), 1202–29.Google Scholar

⁵ This subject is studied in depth by Staniland, Martin, What is Political Economy? A Study of Social Theory and Underdevelopment (New Haven: Yale University, 1985).Google Scholar

⁶ Recent collections include Ergas, Zaki, ed., The African State in Transition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985)Google Scholar; Markovitz, Leonard, ed., Studies in Power and Class in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University, 1987)Google Scholar; and Nyang'oro, Julius E. and Shaw, Timothy M., eds., Corporatism in Africa (Boulder: Westview, 1989).Google Scholar

⁷ Among the most significant early works of this nature, see Fallers, Lloyd A., Bantu Bureaucracy: A Century of Political Evolution among the Busoga of Uganda (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1965)Google Scholar; Zolberg, Arstide R., Creating Political Order: The Party States of West Africa (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966)Google Scholar; Whitaker, C. S., The Politics of Tradition, Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria, 1946–1966 (Princeton: Princeton University, 1970)Google Scholar; Willame, Jean-Claude, Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo (Stanford: Stanford University, 1972).Google Scholar

⁸ Bratton, Michael, “Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa,” World Politics, 41 (04 1989), 407–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ This definition is taken from Hyden, Goran, No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective (Berkeley: University of California, 1983), 8.Google Scholar See also, Ryden, Goran, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry (Berkeley: University of California, 1980).Google Scholar Since the original presentation of this thesis, a healthy amount of debate has been generated as a result of this formulation and its related implications. Most criticism has centered on contentions that this approach ignores the rational behavior of individuals, engages in unproductive reductionism, and ignores the dialectical transformation of African society. See Bates, Robert H., “Some Conventional Orthodoxies in the Study of Agrarian Change,” World Politics, 36 (01 1984), 234–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kasfir, Nelson, “Are African Peasants Self-Sufficient?,” Development and Change, 17 (1986), 335–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lemarchand, Rene, “African Peasantries, Reciprocity and the Market: The Economy of Affection Reconsidered,” Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, 29 (1989), 33–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mamdani, Mahmood, “A Great Leap Backward: A Review of Goran Hyden's No Shortcuts to Progress,” Eastern Africa Social Science Review, 1 (01 1985), 79–99Google Scholar; and Williams, Gavin, “Primitive Accumulation: The Way to Progress?,” Development and Change, 18 (1987), 637–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ For reflections on this theme, see Sandbrook, Richard, The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rothchild, Donald and Chazan, Naomi, eds., The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa (Boulder: Westview, 1988)Google Scholar; Wunsch, James S. and Olowu, Dele, eds., The Failure of the Centralized State: Institutions and Self-Governance in Africa (Boulder: Westview, 1990).Google Scholar

¹¹ The existence of a cognitive, reason-giving “semistructure” positioned between social structure and individual action that confers certain predefined dispositions on social action has been well established. See Bourdieu, Pierre, Outline of a Theory of Practice, Nice, Richard, trans., (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1977)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Bhaskar, Roy, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvestor Press, 1979)Google Scholar; and Etzioni, Amitai', The Moral Dimension: Toward A New Economics (New York: Free Press, 1988).Google Scholar

¹² For an elaboration of this “third dimension” of power, see Gaventa, John, Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley (Chicago: University of Illinois, 1980).Google Scholar For a discussion of the varying manner in which communities react toward outside forces and political entrepreneurs, see Taylor, Michael, “Structure, Culture and Action in the Explanation of Social Change,” Politics and Society, 17 (07 1989), 115–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³ Chilton, Stephen, “Defining Political Culture,” Western Political Quarterly, 41 (09 1988), 419–45, at 427.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴ A viable community can be said to exist where a group of persons are drawn together by both a sense of mutual solidarity and meaningful participation (significance) in reciprocal exchanges within the group. See Clark, David B., “The Concept of Community: A Re-Examination,” Sociological Review, 21 (1973), 397–416.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For an exposition on the nature and function of rules, see Calhoun, C. J., “Community: Toward a Variable Conceptual-ization for Comparative Research,” Social History, 5 (1980), 105–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

The concept of community has suffered from neglect in much formal social theory over the past fifty years, largely because theorists as diverse as Karl Marx, Ferdinand Tonies, Max Weber, and Karl Polanyi all suggested that the expansion of capitalism would effectively marginalize community or “affectual” values in whatever institutional framework they might appear. They attributed this to the overarching authority of the twin forces of self-interested individualism and organizational bureaucratization. Ironically, these assumptions still underlie much of contemporary political economy analsyls.

¹⁵ Smith, M. G., “A Structural Approach to Comparative Politics,” in Smith, M. G., ed., Corporations and Society (London: Duckworth Publishers, 1974), 91–105.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Other approaches derived directly from Tonníes and Weber have utilized such terms as association and society to represent essentially similar concepts.

¹⁷ Etzioni, , The Moral Dimension, 101.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Most social behavior attributed to “instrumentally rational” motivations is influenced by prevailing normative and moral considerations—a distinction made in the consideration both of advanced industrial and developing societies. See McPherson, Michael S., “Limits on Self-Seeking: The Role of Morality in Economic Life,” in Colander, David C., ed., Neoclassical Political Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1984).Google Scholar The existence of such normative exchanges has been identified as crucial to the effectiveness of authority in the functioning of organizations in a number of settings. See Etzioni, Amitai, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: Free Press, 1975).Google Scholar For an elaboration of this in the context of third world societies, see Rudolph, Lloyd I. and Rudolph, Susanne H., “Authority and Power in Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Administration,” World Politics, 31 (01 1979), 195–227.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁹ Nieuwaal, Emile A. Van Rouveroy van, “Chiefs and African States,” Journal of Legal Pluralism, 25–26 (1986), 1–29.Google Scholar

²⁰ This has been convincingly demonstrated at the local level by Barry, Sara S., Fathers Work for Their Sons: Accumulation, Mobility and Class Formation in an Extended Yoruba Community (Berkeley: University of California, 1985).Google Scholar

²¹ See Hyden, , Beyond Ujamaa, n.10Google Scholar; and Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine, “The Political Economy of the African Peasantry and Modes of Production,” in Peter Gutkind and Wallerstein, Immanuel, eds., The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa, 94–116 (London: Sage, 1985).Google Scholar

²² It has been shown that where communities possess the means of subsistence or control over land, the progressive penetration of capitalist relations of production is inhibited. See Brenner, Robert, “The Serial Basis of Economic Development,” in Roemer, John, ed., Analytical Marxism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).Google Scholar For Africa, see Okoth-Ogendo, H. W. O., “Some Issues of Theory in the Study of Tenure Relations in African Agriculture” (Paper presented at the Twenty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Madison, Wisconsin, 10 20–11 3, 1986).Google Scholar

²³ This has been demonstrated for a number of diverse African states. See Downs, R. E. and Reyna, S. P., eds., Land and Society in Contemporary Africa (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1988).Google Scholar

²⁴ Guyer, Jane I., “Household and Community in African Studies,” African Studies Review, 24 (06/09, 1980), 87–137Google Scholar; and Moock, J. L., ed., Understanding Africa's Rural Households and Farming Systems (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986).Google Scholar

²⁵ See the essays in Stren, Richard E. and White, Rodney R., eds., African Cities in Crisis: Managing Rapid Urban Growth (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989).Google Scholar

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²⁷ For an expansion on this concept, see the essays in Kopytoff, Igor, ed., The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1987).Google Scholar

²⁸ Kasftr, Nelson, “Explaining Ethnic Political Participation,” World Politics, 31 (04 1979), 365–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Young, Crawford, “Patterns of Social Conflict: State, Class and Ethnicity,” Daedalus, 1982 (spring), 71–98.Google Scholar

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³⁰ For a review of this literature, see Forrest, Joshua B., “Defining African Peasants,” Peasant Studies, 9 (Spring, 1982), 242–49.Google Scholar

³¹ Examples of these forms of alternative social organization are given particularly close attention in Chazan, Naomi, “The New Politics of Participation in Tropical Africa,” Comparative Politics, 14 (01 1982), 169–89;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and “Patterns of State-Society Disengagement in Africa,” in Rothchild, Donald and Chazan, Naomi, eds., The Precarious Balance, 121–48.Google Scholar

³² Weber, , Economy and Society, 25.Google Scholar See also Swidler, Ann, “The Concept of Rationality in the Work of Max Weber,” Sociological Inquiry, 43:1(1973), 35–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 35. This is supported by the many examples Weber provided to illustrate that prevailing material conditions and value orientations would not permit the uniform penetration of instrumental rationality. See Giddens, Anthony, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 127; and Hindess, Barry, “Rationality and the Characterization of Modern Society,” in Lash, S. and Whimster, S., eds., Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 137–153, at 145–6.Google Scholar

³³ Eckstein, Harry, “A Culturalist Theory of Political Change,” American Political Science Review, 82 (09 1988), 789–804CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 790. Etzioni shares this sentiment as well, “rationality is best viewed as a continuous variable; people are more or less rational depending on their abilities, the strength of the activating forces… and the environmental circumstances that help or hinder these forces” (Etzioni, , Moral Dimension, at 140).Google Scholar

³⁴ Swidler, , “The Concept of Rationality,” 36.Google Scholar

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³⁶ See for example, Graf, William D., The Nigerian State (London: James Currey, 1988)Google Scholar; and Ihonvbere, Julius O. and Shaw, Timothy M., Towards a Political Economy of Nigeria (Brookfield, VT: Avebury, 1988).Google Scholar

³⁷ See Ake, Claude, “The Nigerian State: Antimonies of a Periphery Formation,” in Ake, Claude, ed., Political Economy of Nigeria (London: Longman, 1985).Google Scholar See also Chikwendu, Ebitimi, “The African Peasantry: Neglected by African Political Science,” in Barongo, Yolamu, ed., Political Science in Africa, 37–47 (London: Zed Press, 1983).Google Scholar

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³⁹ See Berry, , Fathers Work,Google Scholar n.13; and Trager, Lilian, “The Hometown and Local Development Efforts: Implications for Civil Society in Africa” (Paper presented at the Conference on Civil Society in Africa, Jerusalem, 01 5–9, 1992).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ These misapplications are typical of these accounts. The so-called “political class” is blamed for their penchant to squander national resources:

It has generally been the strategy of the Nigerian bourgeoisie to take the easy path to enrichment through power, rather than the much more demanding path of genuine entrepreneurship, with its substantially larger risks and longer pay-back periods (Diamond, Larry, “Cleavage, Conflict, and Anxiety in the Second Nigerian Republic,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 20 (12 1982, 629–68, at 663).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

See also Dudley, Billy J., Instability and Political Order: Politics and Crisis in Nigeria (Ibadan: Ibadan University, 1982)Google Scholar; and Graf, William D., The Nigerian State: Political Economy, State Class and Political System in the Post-Colonial Era (London: James Currey, 1988).Google Scholar

⁴¹ See for example, Onimode, Bade, Imperialism and Under-Development in Nigeria (London: Zed Press, 1982)Google Scholar; and lhonvbere, Julius O. and Shaw, Timothy M., Towards a Political Economy of Nigeria: Petroleum and Politics at the (Semi-) Periphery (Brookfield, VT: Avebury Press, 1988).Google Scholar

⁴² A recognition of this point may be found in several works that include Joseph, Richard A., “Affluence and Underdevelopment: the Nigerian Experience,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 16 (06 1978), 221–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schatz, Sayre P., “Pirate Capitalism and the Inert Economy of Nigeria,” Journal of Modern African Studies, 22 (03 1984), 45–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Forrest, Tom, “The Political Economy of Civil Rule and Economic Crisis in Nigeria,” Review of African Political Economy, 1986 (05), 4–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴³ Julius Nyerere still serves as chairman of the ruling party, renamed “Chama cha Mapinduzi” (Party of the Revolution) in 1978. This body remains the supreme political institution according to the constitution.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Using available household survey data collected between 1969–1984, it has been estimated that the total decline in living standards was as high as 50 percent, and 60 percent for urban residents. See Bevan, D. H., Bigsten, A., Collier, P., and Gunning, J. W., “The Decline in Tanzanian Incomes During the ‘Nyerere Experiment’: Evidence From Household Surveys,” in Ginneken, W. van, ed., Trends in Self-Employment Incomes: Case Studies from Developing Countries (Geneva: International Labor Office, 1988).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Smith, William E., Nyerere of Tanzania (Nairobi: Transafrica Publishers, 1974)Google Scholar; Pratt, Cranford, The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945–68: Nyerere and the Emergence of a Socialist Strategy (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1976).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See for example, Lionel Cliffe and Saul, John, eds., Socialism in Tanzania vols. I-II (Nairobi: East Africa Publishing House, 1973 and 1974)Google Scholar; Shivji, Issa, Class Struggles in Tanzania (London: Heineman, 1975)Google Scholar; and Freyhold, Michaela von, Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania: Analysis of a Social Experiment (London: Heinemann, 1978).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Boeson, Jannik et al., Tanzania: Crisis and Struggle for Survival (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1986)Google Scholar; and Lofchie, Michael, The Policy Factor: Agricultural Performance in Kenya and Tanzania (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ For a discussion of the significance of cultural values in the context of social change, see Cohen, Anthony P., The Symbolic Construction of Community (London: Tavistock Publications, 1985).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁹ See for example, Olorunsola, Victor A., ed., The Politics of Cultural Sub-Nationalism in Africa (New York: Doubleday, 1972).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ This dimension of ethnic politics has been explored at length by Donald Rothchild. See for example, “Interethnic Conflict and Policy Analysis in Africa,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 9 (01 1986), 66–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and “Complex Bargaining Coalitions: State and Societal Groups in Africa” (Paper presented at the Thirty-First Annual Meeting, African Studies Association, 10 28–31, 1988).Google Scholar

⁵¹ A “prebendal system” is described by the most outspoken proponent of this concept as not only one in which the offices of state are allocated and then exploited as benefices by the officeholders, but also as one where such a practice is legitimated by a set of political norms according to which the appropriation of such offices is not just an act of individual greed or ambition but concurrently the satisfaction of the short-term objectives of a subset of the general population (Joseph, Richard A., Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic [Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1987], at 67).Google Scholar

⁵² As one study aptly suggests, the continuity of traditional rule, with its deeply embedded ‘indigenous’ links and affective relationships to the people-despite compromises and changes effected by colonialism and since-invests it with a certain stability and legitimacy not yet enjoyed by the barely quarter of a century old modern political system (Graf, William, “Nigerian Grassroots Politics: Local Government, Traditional Rule and Class Domination,” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 24 [1986], 99–130, at 108).Google Scholar

⁵³ Examples of this prevailing sentiment are given in Olayiwola Olurode, “Grass Roots Politics, Political Factions, and Conflict in Nigeria: The Case of Iwo, 1976–1983,” Rural Africana (spring-Fall, 1986), 113–24, at 123Google Scholar; and Miles, William, Elections in Nigeria: A Grassroots Perspective (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988), at 69–70.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Diamond, Larry, “Social Change and Political Conflict in Nigeria's Second Republic,” in Zartman, I. William, ed., Political Economy of Nigeria (New York: Praeger, 1983), 25–84Google Scholar; and Adebo, Ademola, “The Legislature: Overview and Performance,” in Ayeni, Victor and Soremekun, Kayode, eds., Nigeria's Second Republic: Presidentialism, Politics and Administration in a Developing State, 85–97 (Apapa: Daily Times, 1988).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Coleman, James S. and Rosberg, Carl G., eds., Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California, 1964).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Nyerere, Julius, Freedom and Socialism (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University, 1969).Google Scholar See also Bienen, Henry, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development (Princeton: Princeton University, 1970).Google Scholar

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⁵⁸ See for example, Crawford Young, “The African Colonial State and Its Political Legacy,” in Rothchild, Donald and Chazan, Naomi, The Precarious Balance, 25–66Google Scholar; and Ranger, Terence, “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa,” in Hobsbawm, Eric and Ranger, Terence, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1983).Google Scholar

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⁶⁰ See for example, Schatzberg, Michael G., The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988)Google Scholar; and MacGaffey, Janet, “How to Survive and Become Rich Amidst Devastation: The Second Economy in Zaire,” African Affairs, 82 (07 1983), 351–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶¹ See Lonsdale, John, “Political Accountability in African History,” in Chabal, Patrick, ed., Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; and Chabal, Patrick, Power in Africa: An Essay in Political Interpretation (New York: St. Martins, 1992).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶² Bayart, Francois, L'Etat au Cameroun (Paris: Presse de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1979)Google Scholar; and Dunn, John, “From Democracy to Representation: An Interpretation of a Ghanaian Election,” in Dunn, John, ed., Political Obligation in its Historical Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶³ Donald Rothchild and Michael W. Foley. “African States and the Politics of Inclusive Coalitions,” in Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan, eds., The Precarious Balance.

⁶⁴ See the essays in Hyden, Goran and Bratton, Michael, eds. Governance and Politics in Africa (Boulder: Lynn Rienner, 1991).Google Scholar

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⁶⁷ Agbaje, Adigun and Adisa, Jinmi, “Political Education and Public Policy in Nigeria,” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 26 (03 1988), 22–37, at 25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶⁸ Agbaje, and Adisa, , “Political Education,” at 29. See also,Google ScholarJoseph, Richard A., “Principles and Practices of Nigerian Military Government,” in Harbeson, John W., ed., The Military in African Politics, 67–91, at 79 (New York: Praeger, 1987).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Olayiwola, Peter O., Petroleum and Structural Change in a Developing Country: Nigeria, at 144 (New York: Praeger, 1987).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See the essays in Ekeh, Peter P. and Osaghae, Eghosa E., eds., Federal Character and Federalism in Nigeria (Ibada: Heinemann, 1989).Google Scholar

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⁷⁴ Barker, Jonathan, Rural Communities Under Stress: Peasant Farmers and the State in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1989), at 145.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ See Nellis, A Theory of Ideology, and Pratt, The Critical Phase in Tanzania.

⁷⁶ See Martin, Denis C., “The Emergence of Original Political Cultures in Africa: The Case of Tanzania” (Unpublished monograph. Centre de recherche et d'etude sur les pays d'Afrique Orientate °Universite de Pau, 1988]).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ A special decree to this effect was issued in 1971 caned the Mwongozo.

⁷⁸ For a thorough elaboration on the progression of economic decline, see Hyden, , Beyond Ujamaa, 129–53.Google Scholar

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⁸⁰ This was first recognized by Hodgkin, Thomas. See “The Relevance of Western Ideas for the New African States,” in Pennock, J.R., ed., Self-Government in Modernizing Nations, 50–80 (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964).Google Scholar

⁸¹ See Jackson, Robert H. and Rosberg, Carl G., Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California, 1982).Google Scholar

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⁸⁴ The major justification for General Murtala Muhammed's intervention was given as the need to restore democracy. A number of authoritative sources, however, claim that rampant corruption was perceived to be dishonoring the officer corps and that Gowon was perceived to have lost control (see Yahaya, A.D., “The Struggle for Power in Nigeria, 1966–1979,” in Oyediran, Oyeleye, ed., Nigerian Government and Politics Under Military Rule, 1966–1979 [New York: St. Martin's, 1979], 259–75 at 264Google Scholar; Adebayo, Augustus, Principles and Practice of Public Administration in Nigeria [New York: Spectrum, 1981], at 81–82).Google Scholar

⁸⁵ This has been reflected in a number of studies done in the period between the First and Second Republics. See Lloyd, Peter C., “The Rise of New Indigenous Elites,” in Duigan, P. and Gann, L. H., eds., Colonialism in Africa, 546–65 at 563 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1975)Google Scholar; Ajibola, W. A. and Oyejide, T. A., “Local Government System in Western Nigeria: A Comparative Evaluation Performance Under Civilian and Military Regimes,” Indian Journal of Political Science, 36 (04–06 1975), 123–35.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ This can be seen in the activities of Yoruba cocoa farmers in the Agbekoya crisis of 196769, and Hausa peasant villagers displaced by agricultural development projects in the 1980 Bakolori riots in Sokoto state.

⁸⁷ A good illustration of the role played by these bodies during the first decade of military rule is provided in Barnes, Sandra T., Patrons and Power: Creating a Political Community in Metropolitan Lagos (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1986), at 158.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Early primaries and elections at both the state and national levels have demonstrated a return to communitarian politics, with battles erupting into violence over control of the two parties by dozens of competing ethnic blocs. Newly elected governors have in turn offered a host of bombastic promises to their communities that stretch limited state resources far beyond reason.

⁸⁹ Bienen, Henry, Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development (Princeton: Princeton University, 1970).Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1965).Google Scholar

⁹¹ Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa.

⁹² Tripp, Ali Man, “Defending the Right to Subsist: The State Vs. the Urban Formal Economy in Tanzania,” WIDER Working Papers (Helsinki: WIDER, 1989)Google Scholar; and “Local Institutions and Grassroots Party Dynamics in Urban Tanzania” (Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Meeting, Atlanta, GA, 08 31–09 3, 1989).Google Scholar

⁹³ For evidence of the rise of community values in the context of advanced capitalist societies, see Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics (Princeton: Princeton University, 1977)Google Scholar; and Henderson, Hazel, “Post-Economic Policies for Post-Industrial Societies,” Revision, 7 (1984), 20–29.Google Scholar For insights into current research on institutions and community relations, see March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P., “The New Institution-alism: Organizational Factors in Political Life,” American Political Science Review, 78 (09 1984), 734–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Wildaysky, Aaron, “Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation,” American Political Science Review, 81 (03 1987), 3–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar