^{page 114 note 1} In this place, however, and some others (see the conclusion of this article) λ⋯γος may rather mean reasoning. But, as opposed to ‘definition,’ the translation is still ‘Reason.’ ‘Reason,’ like λ⋯γος, often stands for reasoning. In the familiar expression ‘to listen to reason,’ this is often the case. Cf. ‘When I am resolved, I always listen to reason, for then it can do no harm’ (Goldsmith's Good-natured Man). It is, of course, sometimes impossible to say which exactly is intended.

^{page 115 note 1} It must be observed that λ⋯γος sometimes—as, e.g., in VI. viii. 9, 1142^a 26; xi. 4, 1143^b 1, but by no means always—is restricted to discursive reason.

^{page 117 note 1} I find that Peters has ‘rational ordinance.’