THE surviving century of epigrams by this tedious writer was edited with a commentary by J. Geffcken in 1896, and they were included in A. Veniero's Poeti de l'Antol. Pal. (1905) and A. Olivieri's Epigrammatisti Gr. d. Magna Grecia (1950?), but the inquirer who is not content with Geffcken's explanations or with his frequent silences will rarely find satisfaction in Veniero, and Olivieri's comments are almost exclusively translated from Geffcken. I have not a great deal to offer by way of supplement, but as a preliminary it may be worth while to consider the five epigrams which have been held to throw light on the poet's date, and first A.P. 6. 334, on which the authorities rely with varying degrees of confidence for placing his birth in or before 315 B.C.

All students of the classical languages are aware that, in referring to intervals of time, the Greeks and Romans often employed a method of reckoning which was inclusive and consequently different from our own. The Greeks, for example, refer to the period between two celebrations of the Olympic games (e.g. 776–772 B.C.) as a though we should call it a four-year interval. One instance of this kind of usage in Latin is the stereotyped formula employed in expressing a date: ante diem quintum Id. Mai. is 11 May, though we should say that there was an interval of four days only between 11 and 15 May. Another instance is the use of tertiana and quartana as applied to fevers which recur on alternate days and on every third day respectively. The ramifications of this mode of expression are extensive, but I am only concerned here with one, namely the use of quisque with ordinals.

In a paper where we tried to show in how many different meanings the term is chiefly used in the philosophy of Aristotle, we discussed the relation between and , but neglected the relation between and , which seems to be yet more important. The neglect, however, was purposeful; for to answer the question what the latter relation is requires a special research. This we are now going to carry out.

VOL. i, Reitz 88, Indicium Vocalium 5. The so called ñμίÞωνα are given as ίΧνΡΑ Σ Σ and if by Dionysius Hal. Comp. 14

AT the beginning of the third part of the Theaetetus (201d–2O2c), Socrates entertains an interesting theory of knowledge in the form of a ‘dream’. In Cornford's translation, it reads as follows:

I seem to have heard some people say that what might be called the first elements () of which we and all other things consist are such that no account () can be given of them. Each of them just by itself can only be named; we cannot attribute to it anything further or say that it exists or does not exist; for we should at once be attaching to it existence or nonexistence, whereas we ought to add nothing if we are to express just it alone. We ought not even to add ‘just’ or ‘it’ (‘that’) or ‘each’ or ‘alone’ or ‘this’, or any other of a host of such terms.

Odysseus' man, disguised as the captain of a merchant ship, is explaining to Neoptolemus how he chanced unexpectedly to meet Neoptolemus' sailors. Jebb's note, ‘the same land (Lemnos); not, strictly, the same “spot” ’, and his rendering, ‘off the same coast’, somewhat contradict one another.

Greek literature embodies a number of instances of the optative in main clauses that are acknowledged either definitely or probably to have a reference to past time. These are mostly well known, but the object of this article is to reconsider them and to attempt an explanation. They are certainly commonest in the Homeric period, but later examples are by no means wanting.

That after that is just too ghastly. Jebb's citations are no parallels; the difference is that (‘as to which things’—J.) and (‘that prospect’—J.) have both precisely the same reference. Read ‘which reflections … time-honoured as they are’. In this well-known construction a term (often substantive, sometimes adjective) which logically belongs to the antecedent is deferred and inserted in the relative clause—‘for emphasis’ (M. Tierney, rightly, on E. Hec. 771).

All editors have taken the words to mean ‘thou wouldst anger a very st ne’. So did the scholiast.

The pseudo-Ciceronian Epistula ad Octavianum enjoys the unmerited distinction of being preserved not only in most of the manuscripts which contain the AdAtticum letters but also in some of those which contain the second half of the Ad Familiares letters; the former tradition is usually designated Ω, the latter I shall designate X. It was on the Ω tradition that the earliest printed texts were based. In the sixteenth century Cratander (1528) and Turnebus (1565) introduced a number of readings from the X tradition; some of these were incorporated in the vulgate, but the printed editions from that of Lambinus (1565) to that of Purser (1902) still continued to be based mainly on Ω. In 1913, in an article in Eranos, xiii. 136–46, Sjögren set himself to prove that the value of Ω had been overrated in the establishment of the text, and that greater importance should be attached to X than to Ω; and in accordance with this view, in his 1914 Teubner text, Sjögren follows X, as against Ω, about twice as often3 as Purser does. This view of Sjögren's, I believe, will not stand examination, and to disprove it is the purpose of the present article.

It is not my purpose to discuss the authorship of this work; I shall only say that I do not believe it was written by Quintus Cicero. The question of authorship cannot be brought into a discussion of the problems raised by the text, because, even if it were the product of Quintus' pen, it would obviously be unjustified to apply to Quintus the same canons of Latinity as can be applied to his brother.

THE stage of Alexander's great drama is thronged with minor characters playing their walk-on parts or acting as heroes or villains in their own little scenes. Their names, often unknown to–or ignored by—our main sources, have been gathered with monumental diligence by Berve, who has provided a basis for some akribeia in a study traditionally befogged with generality and prejudice. In this country the study of Alexander is necessarily under the spell of Tarn's masterly work, based on a thorough discussion of the sources. To agree or to disagree, we must always come back to him; and disagreement, in the main, has been confined to details.

In writing the following notes on some passages in Aeschylus' Persae I have consulted mainly the editions of Schiitz, Blomfield, Hermann, Paley, Vitelli–Wecklein, Sidgwick, Prickard, Wilamowitz, Mazon, and Italie (but not that of Groeneboom, which has been inaccessible), and the Index of Italie. The text quoted is that of Murray (ed. alt. 1955).

THE following further instances and parallels, and additional usages, may supplement the colloquialisms, &c, in Plato's dialogues which were listed and studied in a former article.

1. Colloquialisms

(a) More examples and parallels for usages previously noted:

Charm. 154 b 4, Crat. 418 b 8, Phaedo 92 d 4, Parm. 126 c 6, 127 b 1, Polit. 290 d 7, Laws 630 b 7.

In these notes I propose to discuss only those passages where I can offer either a new solution or new arguments in favour of a neglected one. Where I am wrong I hope to be told so before my proposals are enshrined in my text.

The purpose of this article is to re-examine the more important extant manuscripts of Livy 21–25 with special reference to omissions and significant errors, and on this basis to try to establish their interrelationship in stemmatic form. A stemma for Books 26–30 has already been drawn up by Professor S. K. Johnson in O.C.T. vol. iv, but, since the tradition for those five books is slightly different from that of the first half of the third decade, it has seemed worth while to draw up a stemma for Books 21–25 independently. The manuscripts to be considered, and the sigla to be employed, are as follows:

Cornford's interpretation of Anaxagoras' theory of matter (C.Q. xxiv [1930] 14 ff. and 83 ff.) was an attempt to solve the apparent contradiction between the Principle of Homoeomereity, as he calls it, and that which asserts that ‘there is a portion of everything in everything’; and also, perhaps, to assign a more definite place in the system to the qualitative ‘Opposites’ which Tannery and Burnet had asserted, in rather vague terms, to be Anaxagoras' elements. In effect he solves the problem by applying the former principle to the phenomenal world and to the Seeds which are the elements for Anaxagoras, and confining the latter, the principle of Universal Mixture as we may call it, to the Opposites, which are the substantial but inseparable constituents of the Seeds. By this tidy and ingenious solution he avoids not only the above-mentioned contradiction but also what he calls the grotesque and gratuitous absurdity of holding that a Seed of gold contains mostly gold, but also flesh and all other natural substances, in order to explain the possibility of various changes, the great majority of which never occur anyhow (gold, for instance, does not turn into flesh).

This famous passage has given rise to much discussion and some perplexity. Theodoras the mathematician is represented by Theaetetus as proving the irrationality of the square roots of the (non-square) numbers from 3 to 17:

‘He took the separate cases up to the root of 17 square feet; and there, for some reason, he stopped.’ (Transl. Cornford.)

The passage is of great importance in the history of Greek mathematics for more than one reason. Theaetetus is said to have generalized the proof of the irrationality of square roots of non-square integers; and thus his connexion with this passage is important because Plato here obviously implies that Theodorus was not giving a generalized proof—otherwise, why should he go up to 17 ? If Theodorus did not know the generalized proof, he clearly had to proceed by enumeration and proof of particular case

Mr. Bishop's article in C.Q., xlix (vi. 3/4). 187–92 on Palatine Apollo calls for an answer from me, since I am still alive to give it, though my own study dates from 1910 and was published in J.R.S. for 1914, pp. 193–226. So far away is this publication, and my offprints have for so long been exhausted, that scholars of my generation need to go to university libraries to refer to it, and recent generations do not know it at all. From Lugli's book on Rome they do not gather the details which convinced Boni that I was right, because he omitted some of the most cogent from mention.

It is generally stated that diaeresis after the first metron, obligatory in recitative dimeters, is not the rule in catalectic dimeters, or paroemiacs. An examination of the material, however, yields the following results. The paroemiacs of Tyrtaeus' consistendy observe metron-diaeresis. Out of a total of 348 recitative paroemiacs in the Attic dramatists, only 34 disregard metron-diaeresis altogether. A further 75 overlap metron-diaeresis by one short syllable (the licence of which the dramatists sometimes avail themselves in full dimeters). Apparently, the practice with regard to metron-diaeresis is fundamentally the same in paroemiacs as in full dimeters, only the licences are a little more frequent. The poets occasionally take advantage of the interruption in the movement produced by the catalectic colon in order to break away still farther from regular anapaestic rhythm. Aristophanes, in particular, rather likes to round off an anapaestic period with a rattling, and often abusive, polysyllable: Vesp. 326: