Zeller argued that the ‘innumerable worlds’ mentioned in accounts of Anaximander's system must be an endless succession of single worlds, not (as in the Atomists' doctrine) an unlimited number of coexistent worlds scattered through infinite space, some always coming into being while others are passing away. Zeller pointed out that a succession of single worlds is grounded in the principles of the system. ‘Things perish into that from which they had their birth… according to the order of Time,’ a cycle of birth, existence, and destruction. A world ends, and the living divine stuff begets a new world to take its place. On the other hand, there is much in the system to contradict the idea of coexistent worlds. Anaximander's successors, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Diogenes, show that this idea is not a necessary consequence of the unlimitedness of the original world-stuff. Nothing in the appearances of Nature suggests it. Anaximander is a monistic hylozoist, whereas Democritus is a pluralist with his innumerable independent atoms producing, by similar processes, independent world-systems in different parts of an infinite void.

The myths which Plutarch has included, after the Platonic manner, in his dialogues de sera numinis vindicta, de genio Socratts, and de facie in orbe lunae constitute our main source for his views on the nature and fate of the soul. But before we use this material in the reconstruction of Plutarch's philosophy we must come to some conclusion on the question how Plutarch intended the myths to be regarded. Did he mean the peculiar doctrine of the nature of the soul expressed in the myths of the de genio and the de facie and implied in the myth of the de vindicta to be taken seriously, and is there any criterion which will enable us to answer this question? The object of this paper is to suggest that such a criterion may be found by examining the relation of the myth of the de facie to theTimaeus of Plato.

After reading the article by Professor R. S. Conway, ‘Vergil, Probus and Pietole Again,’ I should like to make certain observations on the points that concern me.

The first refers to the Mons Virgilii. Professor Conway, who is evidently satisfied with the edition of the Vita Probiana published by Sabbadini, and with the notes Sabbadini has added to it, speaks in particular of the testimony of Bremio: ‘Locum appellant incolae Montem Virgilii,’ etc. I do not propose to discuss here the accuracy or the critical acumen of Sabbadini as shown in the preparation of this mediocre edition, nor to repeat what I have already said on this subject; but I cannot refrain from noting that the reading of milia passuum XXX certainly takes us outside of what can be conjectured to have been the ager Mantuanus, whether in the direction of Brescia or in that of Verona. That Egnatius corrected this error in his text is a purely arbitrary conjecture on the part of Sabbadini, who has not perceived that the Venetian edition, on careful examination, shows a much greater fidelity to the uetustas of the Codex of Bobbio than VPM and the Roman edition of Bussi. In proof of this it will be sufficient to cite the fate that befell the lacunae, which Egnatius respected, and the strange inversion of the phrase bellum, ueteranis post mutinense which would make the most humble schoolmaster smile, but which on the contrary pleased Sabbadini! Again, his estimate of the value of the Vatican Codex, is undermined by the observations of Monsignor Giovanni Mercati, who not only affirms that the Cod.

Most recent critics of Alcman's Partheneion have assumed that it was composed for a festival of Artemis Orthia, and have strengthened their case by adopting the scholiast's reading of Ὀρθίᾳ at 61 and assuming that ᾈώтι at 87 can only refer to Artemis. The case for Artemis has been made more popular by the excavations of her shrine, which have revealed copious evidence of a rich and popular cult with which festivals of maidens must have been connected. But on a closer examination the case for Artemis Orthia is seen to be based on fallacious evidence. First, let us consider the scholiast's suggestion of Ὀρθίᾳ which Bergk read at 61.

InC.Q. XXVII. 178–181 Mr. S. G. Owen has raised some interesting questions, but it may be doubted whether he has in every case discovered the correct solution.

Panntalia 30, 6: quaeque sine exemplo in nece functa uiri. Mr. Owen's pronece removes the hiatus, but I think has no other merit. The sense ‘a death for a death,’ even if not necessarily or best represented by repetition of the same term, is at least not happily represented by such combination of euphemism with dysphemism; ‘in place of the slaughter of her husband, she finished her days.’ Read funere, and you get an expression characteristic of this school; Paulinus of Pella (whose poem is readily accessible in the Loeb Ausonius) applied it to death; patris de funere functi 236, ‘of my father's death,’ i.e. funere defuncti, cf. 241 defuncti patris. But Paulinus of Nola applied it also to a vicarious death, Christus … morte mea functus, carm. 31, 191 (35, 189 Migne). Both were pupils of Ausonius (the grandson unofficially).

By the courtesy of the editors I have been allowed to see Mr. A. Y. Campbell's “observations on two emendations of Ausonius suggested by me in C.Q. XXVII. (1933) 178 ff. Meanwhile I have learned from Mr. E. Harrison, of Trinity College, Cambridge, that, in the Cambridge Philological Society's Proceedings, 1924, p. 27, since Alcestis is meant, cp. Juv. 6, 652 spectant subeuntem fata mariti / Alcestim et, similis si permutatio detur, morte viri cupiant animam servare catellae, he had already proposed to ‘read pro nece (or funere) functa viri,’ thus anticipating my pro nece and Mr. Campbell's funere. As the Cambridge Phil. Soc. Proc. are inaccessible to me and are not to be discovered in theBodleian Library, I was ignorant of Mr. Harrison's proposal. I am glad that we concur.