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VALUATION DRIFTS, MEANING ENDURES: THUCYDIDES 3.82.4
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 September 2022
Abstract
Arguing against the long-standing belief that Thuc. 3.82.4 refers to words changing their meanings, this article shows that, according to the passage, the way in which people value actions and apply value-words to actions in peace differs from how they value and apply value-words to the same types of actions in stasis. But the meaning of the value-words themselves remains the same in both circumstances. The passage is about neither meaning nor the propagandistic manipulation of language but about the distorting effect of stasis on the moral assessment of actions.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association
Footnotes
This paper originates from a series of lectures delivered at Bowdoin College in the spring of 2019. I thank Robert Sobak for the invitation and his generous hospitality. For feedback, I am grateful to him, to my fellow presenters, Nicholas Rynearson and Geir Thorarinsson, and to the audience at Bowdoin, as well as to CQ's reader and the Editor for comments on the finished paper.
References
1 See Hogan, J.T., ‘The ἀξίωσις of words at Thucydides 3.82.4’, GRBS 21 (1980), 139–50Google Scholar; Wilson, J., ‘“The customary meanings of words were changed” – or were they? A note on Thucydides 3.82.4’, CQ 32 (1982), 18–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
2 Jowett, B., Thucydides, Translated into English with Introduction, Marginal Analysis, Notes and Indices in Two Volumes (Oxford, 1881)Google Scholar.
3 Crawley, R., Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War (London and New York, 1910)Google Scholar.
4 Smith, C. Foster, Thucydides (Cambridge, MA and London, 1958)Google Scholar.
5 τά τε εἰωθότα ὀνόματα ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι λέγεσθαι μετατιθέντες ἄλλως ἠξίουν αὐτὰ καλεῖν (29.30–1). I follow the Latin translation published by I.I. Reiske (ed.), Dionysii Halicarnassensis opera omnia Graece et Latine (Leipzig, 1777), 6: ‘Quae vero vulgo rebus vocabula tribuebantur, ea ipsi immutantes, alia nomina rebus imposuerunt.’ This takes Dionysius to pair Thucydides’ ‘words’ (ὀνομάτων) with ‘things’ (τὰ ἔργα). Pritchett, W.K., On Thucydides (Berkeley, 1975), 23Google Scholar, however, pairs ‘words’ (ὀνομάτων) with ‘deeds’ (τὰ ἔργα): ‘changing the names as ordinarily applied to acts, they claimed the right to call them by other names’. On the pairing of words with things or deeds/actions, see (1.3) below. On Dionysius’ criticism of Thucydides’ style, see Ross, J.G.A., Die Μεταβολή (Variatio) als Stilprinzip des Thukydides (Amsterdam, 1968), 49–68Google Scholar; R. Hunter, ‘Dionysius of Halicarnassus and the idea of the critic’, in id. and C.C. de Jonge (edd.), Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Augustan Rome: Rhetoric, Criticism and Historiography (Cambridge, 2019), 37–55.
6 “ἀξίωσιν” μὲν τὴν σημασίαν εἶπε … Φ(MFφC3Pl2) βούλεται δὲ εἰπεῖν, ὅτι μετέθεσαν τὰ ὀνόματα. οὐ γάρ, ὡς νενόμιστο πρόσθεν, ἐχρῶντο κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ μεθήρμοσαν κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν κρίσιν … Φ(FφC3Pl2); from Kleinlogel, A. and Alpers, K., Scholia Graeca in Thucydidem, Scholia vetustiora et lexicum Thucydideum Patmense (Berlin and Boston, 2019), 666CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
7 τὴν κειμένην, φησί, τῶν ὀνομάτων χρῆσιν ἀντήλλαξαν Θ(C ABFM PlUd), Kleinlogel and Alpers (n. 6), 666.
8 περιφραστικῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰπεῖν τὰ ὀνόματα εἴρηκεν τὴν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων … (MφC2), Hude, K., Scholia in Thucydidem ad optimos codices collata (Leipzig, 1927), 211Google Scholar. This scholium is not in Kleinlogel and Alpers (n. 6); they presumably thought it belonged to the scholia recentiora. (Stefano Valente has communicated to me that this is also his opinion.) Notice that Dionysius thinks that ἡ “εἰωθυῖα τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀξίωσις” … περιφράσεως ποιητικῆς ἐστιν οἰκειοτέρα (Thuc. 29.34).
9 According to Wilson (n. 1), 18, the traditional interpretations are inconsistent with Thucydides’ examples, because ‘unless the words retained their usual meaning this alteration of descriptions would have no point’. Wilson is right, but the inconsistency is more profound.
10 For the etymologies of ‘nice’ and ‘silly’, see E. Klein, A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language: Dealing with the Origin of Words and their Sense Development thus Illustrating the History of Civilization and Culture (Amsterdam and New York, 1971). See also Murray, J.A.H., Bradley, H. and Craigie, W.A., The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford, 1989 2), 10 and 15Google Scholar.
11 Wilson (n. 1), 19 is aware of this issue. However, he uses scare quotes (“”) instead of single quotation marks (‘’) and does not employ the ‘use’ and ‘mention’ terminology.
12 Wilson (n. 1), 19.
13 The ‘kulak’ and the ‘proletarian’ examples are from B. Russell, ‘An outline of intellectual rubbish’, in The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell (London and New York, 2010), 58; originally published as Russell, B., An Outline of Intellectual Rubbish: A Hilarious Catalogue of Organized and Individual Stupidity (Girard, KS, 1943)Google Scholar, subsequently reprinted in Unpopular Essays (London and New York, 1950); to be reprinted by Routledge in The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell. Volume 23: The Problems of Democracy, 1941–44.
14 Hogan (n. 1) considers what I call word change and semantic drift, but does not perceive their relationship.
15 Gomme, A.W., A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (Cambridge, 1956)Google Scholar, 2.384 translates ἐνομίσθη as ‘call’ and forces ἐνομίσθη into the semantic understanding of the passage. On this point, see Wilson (n. 1), 18. Hogan (n. 1), 145 is aware that Thucydides’ use of ἐνομίσθη, and not of ἐκλήθη, represents a problem for Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ reading. Solmsen, F., ‘Thucydides’ treatment of words and concepts’, Hermes 99 (1971), 385–408Google Scholar, at 396 points out that Thucydides first speaks of ὀνομάτων at 3.82.4, but loses touch with ‘names’, since he uses ἐνομίσθη instead of ὠνομάσθη.
16 See Ex.1 to Ex.9.
17 Hogan (n. 1), 147 points out that the examples in 3.82.4 exhibit abstract nouns, whereas those in 3.82.5 deploy more active participial forms and amount to a general description of how humans behave in stasis. Ex.7, Ex.8, Ex.17, Ex.22 and Ex.24 each involve a pair of examples, both of which explicitly introduce an ‘exchange’ or ‘substitution’.
18 See Ex.10, Ex.12, Ex.13, Ex.16, Ex.17, Ex.19, Ex.20, Ex.22.
19 See Ex.11, Ex.14, Ex.15, Ex.18, Ex.21, Ex.23, Ex.24.
20 F.R. Adrados, Diccionario Griego-Español (henceforth, DGE) (Madrid, 1991), 3 translates ἀξίωσις in the stasis-passage as ‘significado, sentido’. F. Montanari, The Brill Dictionary of Ancient Greek (Leiden and Boston, 2015) places ἀξίωσις in the stasis-passage and in Heliod. Aeth. 8.4.2 under the heading ‘value’. But it translates ἀξίωσις in Aeth. 8.4.2 as ‘significance of words’. ‘Significance’ is ambiguous between ‘meaning’ and ‘importance’. I think that ἀξίωσις in Aeth. 8.4.2 means ‘dignity’: εἰρήνην δὲ καὶ πόλεμον οὐχ ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀξίωσις ἀλλ’ ἡ τῶν χρωμένων διάταξις ἀληθέστερον γνωρίζειν πέφυκε, ‘but [it is] not the dignity of words, but the disposition of those who use [them which] naturally makes peace and war truly known’ (Aeth. 8.4.2.1–3). M. Stahl, Thucydidis De bello Peloponnesiaco libri octo (Leipzig, 1875), 2.146 takes ἀξίωσις in the stasis-passage to mean signification or meaning: ‘propria aestimatio hic significationis vim habet’. He commented: ‘usitatam vocabulorum significationem in rebus (propr. quod attinet ad res, ut supra ἐς τὸ καινοῦσθαι) arbitratu suo immutarunt.’ Solmsen (n. 15), 395 and 397 reads ἀξίωσις in the stasis-passage as ‘value’, but is inconsistent, insisting that Thucydides makes a semantic point about substitution and innovation in linguistic usage. J. Diggle et al., The Cambridge Greek Lexicon (henceforth, CGL) (Cambridge, 2021) lists ‘prestige’, ‘social status’, ‘claim’, ‘assessment’, ‘evaluation’ as meanings of ἀξίωσις in Thucydides, not ‘meaning’. It is unclear whether ἀξίωσις at Thuc. 2.65.8 has the passive meaning ‘value’, ‘worth’ (as at 2.34.6, 2.37), or the active meaning ‘valuation’, ‘evaluation’, ‘assessment’, ‘appraisal’ (as at 3.9.2, 2.88). See Hogan (n. 1), 140–1.
21 Chantraine, P., Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque: histoire des mots (Paris, 1968), 94Google Scholar.
22 Hobbes, T., Eight Books of the Peloponnesian Warre Written by Thucydides the Sonne of Olorus, Interpreted with Faith and Diligence Immediately out of Greek (London, 1629)Google Scholar; Schlatter, R., Hobbes's Thucydides (New Brunswick, 1975).Google Scholar.
23 Connor, R., Thucydides (Princeton, 1984), 101Google Scholar.
24 Mynott, J., The War of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians (Cambridge, 2013)Google Scholar.
25 Wilson (n. 1), 20.
26 See LSJ. Strictly speaking, δικαίωσις is (1) the activity of claiming (or judging) a right or what is right, (2) or the activity of doing justice (e.g. punishing or condemning). In Thucydides we find δικαίωσις (1) at 1.141.1, 3.82.4, 4.86.6, 5.17.2; and δικαίωσις (2) at 8.66.2.
27 Connor (n. 23).
28 Bloomfield, S.T., The History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides (London, 1842), 515Google Scholar.
29 Hobbes (n. 22). CGL (n. 20) does not list ‘arbitrary’ or anything similar under δικαίωσις.
30 Marchant, E.C., Thucydides Book III (London, 1909)Google Scholar.
31 Gomme (n. 15), 384.
32 Jowett (n. 2).
33 Foster Smith (n. 4).
34 Mynott (n. 24).
35 Wilson (n. 1), 20.
36 Gomme (n. 15), 354.
37 Marchant (n. 30); Solmsen (n. 15), 393. Marchant, however, takes δικαιώσει to mean ‘arbitrary’.
38 Hogan (n. 1), 41; Wilson (n. 1), 19.
39 Hogan (n. 1), 143 translates ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων as ‘evaluative power of words’ and forces the subjective genitive into a case of means or instrument. He thinks that Thucydides assumes a distinction between the meaning of a word and its evaluative power, which attributes value to the meaning of the word. And while the evaluative power may change, the meaning may remain the same. See also Worthington, I., ‘A note on Thucydides 3. 82. 4’, LCM 7 (1982), 124Google Scholar and Price, J.J., Thucydides and Internal War (Cambridge, 2001), 41CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Pace Hogan, words may be instrumental to valuation, but they are not agents of valuation. In the stasis-passage, people are the agents (note ἀντήλλαξαν and ἐνομίσθη). Moreover, Thucydides is not committed to analysing words into phonetic/written marks and semantic content, let alone moral connotations. For a similar criticism of Hogan's interpretation, see Wilson (n. 1), 19–20.
40 On Soph. OT 44 and its genitive, see Finglass, P.J., Sophocles Oedipus the King (Cambridge, 2018), 181–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
41 Adrados, F.R., Nueva Sintaxis del Griego Antiguo (Madrid, 1992), 132Google Scholar.
42 See also Τροίης ἱερὸν πτολίεθρον (Hom. Od. 1.2), Θήβης ἕδος (Il. 4.406) and Καύστρου πεδίον (Xen. An. 1.2.11). For apposition in general and its different forms, see E.E. Boas et al., The Cambridge Grammar of Classical Greek (Cambridge, 2019), 27.13–14.
43 This is a formulaic phrase with many instances in Homer: Il. 4.350, 9.409, 14.83; Od. 1.64, 3.230, 5.22, 10.328, 19.492, 21.168, 23.70.
44 Adrados (n. 41), 137.
45 See also ἄθρα τῶν … κύκλων, ‘socket of the eyes’, i.e. ‘eyes’ (Soph. OT 1270); and βουκόλοι τῶν βοῶν καὶ οἱ ὑπποφορβοὶ τῶν ἵππων (Xen. Cyr. 1.1.2). Grammars classify these genitives as genitives of apposition because they derive from genitives such as the one in θανάτοιο τέλος. However, this instance of βοῶν can be an objective genitive. See Adrados (n. 41), 139.
46 See also ποταμοῦ σθένος, ‘the powerful river’ (Soph. Trach. 507).
47 R. Kühner and B. Gerth, Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache (Darmstadt, 1898), 2.1.265–6, §402.d; 2.1.333, §414.g.
48 See also ἄελλαι | παντοίων ἀνέμων, ‘blasts [formed] of winds of every sort’ (Hom. Od. 5.304–5, 5.292–3). Smyth, H.W., A Greek Grammar for Colleges (Cambridge, MA, 1920)Google Scholar, §1322.
49 For this translation of the genitive, see Landmann, P., Thukydides, Geschichte des Peloponnesischen Krieges (Munich, 1993)Google Scholar: ‘bis die Gefahr vorüber wäre’.
50 See Marchant, E.C., Thucydides Book VII (London and New York, 1893)Google Scholar. Smith, C.F., Thucydides Book VII (Boston, 1886)Google Scholar compares πέρας … τοῦ ἀπαλλαγῆναι with πέρας ἡμῖν τοῦ διαλυθῆναι, ‘final settlement’ (Dem. 40.40), τέλος δὲ τῆς ἀπαλλαγῆς τοῦ Αἰθίοπος, ‘the final end of the Ethiopian’ (Hdt. 2.139.1), and τερπνὰν γάμου … τελευτάν, ‘delightful consummation of marriage’ (Pind. Pyth. 9.66).
51 Wilson (n. 1), 20 in (T11) understands τῶν ὀνομάτων as I do, translating ‘verbal valuation of deeds’. CGL (n. 20), s.v. ἀνταλλάσσω translates ‘verbal valuation’. I would retain the etymology of ὀνομάτων. Hornblower, S., A Commentary on Thucydides. Vol. I, Books I–III (Oxford, 1991), 483CrossRefGoogle Scholar follows Wilson's translation: ‘they exchange their usual verbal evaluation of actions for new ones, in the light of what they thought justified’ (T11).
52 Price (n. 39), 40 is correct to say that reckless daring ‘will always be reckless daring, no matter what expression is used to describe it’. This implies that the expression ‘reckless daring’ will similarly always express condemnation. C.W. Macleod, ‘Thucydides on faction (3.82–3)’, PCPhS 205 (1979), 52–68, at 54 = Collected Essays (Oxford, 1983), 123–39, at 125, however, thinks that the stasiôtai brought about a revolution in language as well as in morality.
53 The qualification ‘in the protection of partisan interests’ gives a new meaning to ‘courage’, Hogan (n. 1), 141. A similar analysis applies to Ex.1, Ex.2, Ex.3. Other examples are more straightforward: e.g. (Ex.4) ‘being intelligent at everything [was considered] to be lazy in everything’ (3.82.4.), and see also Ex.17, Ex.21. But in general the examples indicate an inversion of values, social practices and the dictates of common sense: Ex.5, Ex.6, Ex.7, Ex.9, Ex.11, Ex.12, Ex.13, Ex.14, Ex.18, Ex.19, Ex.20, Ex.22. Some examples describe the supremacy of cunning, lack of judgement, and treachery over rationality and intelligence in stasis: e.g. (Ex.8) ‘who succeeded at plotting [was considered] intelligent and who anticipated [the plot] even more intelligent’, and also Ex.10, Ex.15, Ex.16, Ex.23, Ex.24.
54 For a modern example involving a collective pathology, see n. 59 below.
55 Wilson (n. 1), 20.
56 S. Bloch and P. Reddaway, Soviet Psychiatric Abuse: The Shadow over World Psychiatry (Boulder, 1985); S. Bloch and P. Reddaway, Russia's Political Hospitals: The Abuse of Psychiatry in the Soviet Union (London, 1977).
57 The KGB deliberately organized these policies and pressured psychiatrists, who were aware of their political character, to implement them. See Koryagin, A., ‘The involvement of Soviet psychiatry in the persecution of dissidents’, The British Journal of Psychiatry 154 (1989), 336–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Voren, R. van, ‘Political abuse of psychiatry—an historical overview’, Schizophrenia Bulletin 36 (2010), 33–5CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed. Some members of the general public and police forces manipulated by state propaganda may have sincerely believed that the dissidents were mad.
58 Price (n. 39), 47 is aware that the passage is about unintentional and sincere distortion of social values.
59 I do not mean that Thucydides describes a phenomenon strange to the modern world. We find something uncannily similar in Orwell, G., ‘Notes on nationalism’, Polemic, Magazine of Philosophy, Psychology, and Aesthetic 1 (1945), 141–57Google Scholar = Essays (London, 2014), 865–84, at 883: ‘The point is that as soon as fear, hatred, jealousy and power worship are involved, the sense of reality becomes unhinged.’ However, we must distinguish Orwellian Newspeak (an invention of a well-established totalitarian regime, which is in principle intentional, systematic and conscious, though it may become non-conscious) from the spontaneous, genuine and unconscious phenomenon Thucydides reports in 3.82.4. (I owe this point to Geir Thorarinsson.)
60 Though usually ἄτη in Aeschylus means ‘disaster’ and most of the time ‘disaster a human being brought to themselves’ (Ag. 1124, 1192, 1432–6, Cho. 382–5). See A.H. Sommerstein, ‘Atê in Aeschylus’, in D.L. Cairns (ed.), Tragedy and Archaic Greek Thought (Swansea, 2013), 1–15, at 5–6, 9–10, 11–12.
61 Adam, J., The Republic of Plato: Edited with Critical Notes, Commentary and Appendices (Cambridge, 1921)Google Scholar calls attention to the similarity between Pl. Resp. 260d–e, Isoc. Aeropagiticus 20.1–10, Panath. 131.1–133.11 and Thuc. 3.82.4. However, Resp. 260d–e uses an analysis of the democratic man to explain the features of the democratic form of government, and in this respect strongly differs from Thuc. 3.82.4. Isocrates’ texts are about πολιτεία and δημοκρατία respectively.