No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Thucydides 5.26.3–5: the verb ἰσχυρίζεσθαι and a contrast in methodology*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
Extract
Scholarly opinion has been divided over the interpretation of τοîς ἀπò χρησμῶν τι ἰσχυρισμένοις μóνον δὴ τοῦτο ἐχυρῶς ξυμβáν at Thucydides 5.26.3. On one hand, Dover and others maintain that Thucydides emphasizes the oracle's fulfilment, and adopt a somewhat neutral definition for ἰσχυρισαμένοις (‘venture to affirm’), while Marinatos argues that ‘By ἰσχυρισαμένοις Thucydides is diverting attention away from the oracle and instead focusing on those who made claims based on it.’ This paper studies the interpretations of ἰσχυρισαμένοις and will suggest a more precise understanding of the word.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Classical Association 1999
References
1 Powell, A., ‘Thucydides and divination’, BICS 26 (1979), 45–50Google Scholar; Dover, K. J., The Greeks and Their Legacy: Collected Papers vol. 2 (Oxford, 1988), 71–2;Google ScholarMarinatos, N., Thucydides and Religion (Königstein, 1981), 51–2Google Scholar; Marinatos, N., ‘Thucydides and oracles’, JHS 101 (1981), 138–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 The scholiast interprets ἰσχυρισαμένοις as ‘those asserting something strongly’ (προτείνουσί τι ἰσχυρóν). Compare also Warner, R. (trans.), Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War (New York and London, 1972), 364Google Scholar: ‘for those who put their faith in oracles, here is one solitary instance of their having been proved accurate’; Smith, C. F. (trans.), Thucydides vol. 3 (Cambridge, MA and London, 1952), 51Google Scholar: ‘in the case of those who have made any assertion in reliance upon oracles, that this fact alone proved true’.
3 Marinatos (n. 1), 140.
4 Dover (n. 1), 72.
5 My study does not include ἀπισχυρισάμενοι at 1.140.5, which connotes a ‘firm refusal’ (cf. LSJ I on ἀπισχυρίζομαι) rather than the assertion and argumentation we find associated with ἰοχυρίζεσθαι.
6 For a rare exception, see Heraclitus, fr. 114. Here, Heraclitus urges those who would speak ‘with sense’ (ξùν νóω) to ‘rely on’ (ἰσχυρίζεσθαι) what is ‘common to all’ (τῷ ξυνῷ πáντων), with even greater reliance (πολù ἰσχυροτέρως) than a city puts on its laws. Quoted portions of this fragment are from the translation of Barnes, J., Early Greek Philosophy (Harmondsworth, 1987), 109.Google Scholar
7 The same holds true for ἀντισχυρίζεσθαι (LSJ: ‘to be stiff in maintaining a contrary opinion’), which I have found only at Thucydides 3.44.3, Plutarch, Moralia 535el, and Theodoretus, Historia religiosa, Vita 2.11.3). ἀπισχυρίζεθαι (LSJ I: ‘oppose firmly, give a flat denial’), which appears first at Thucydides 1.140.5; διισχυρίζεσθαι (LSJ I: ‘lean upon, rely on’; LSJ II: ‘affirm confidently’), which is common in Plato and the orators; and ἐνισχυρίζεσθαι (LSJ: ‘rely upon’), which I have found only in Demosthenes 44.8 and 44.16, and Eusebius, Commentaria in Psalmos vol. 23, 448, line 34.
8 For ἰσχυρίζεσθαι, see Antiphon 5.76; Demosthenes 33.32, 40.41, 44.3, 44.11, 44.15, 56.31; Dinarchus 1.8; Hyperides 3.18, 3.31; Isaeus 1.3, 1.18, 4.26, 11.1; Isocrates 17.24; Lysias 6.35, 13.88; Plato, Theaet. 172b, Soph. 249c, Crat. 428a, Gorg. 495b; Xenophon, Cyrop. 3.1.19. For occurrences of ἰσχυρίζεσθαι in a non-debate context, see Aeschines 3.56; Aristotle, NE 1124b23; Hyperides 4.4; Plato, Gorg. 489c; Xenophon, Cyrop. 6.14.18. For διισχυρίζεσθαι as the assertion of an antagonist, see Aeschines 1.176; Andocides 2.4; Antiphon 5.33; Aristotle, Rh. 1389b6; Isaeus 1.49; Lysias 13.85 (twice), 13.86; Plato, Euthyph. 5c, Tim. 49d, Phaedo 86a, Theaet. 154a, 177c, 180e, Soph. 246a, 247c.
9 See Demosthenes (ἰσχυρίζεσθαι, 15.13), (ἐνισχυρίζεσθαι, 44.8). For διισχυρίζεσθαι and assertions made by the protagonist, see Isaeus 5.23; Plato, Phaedo 63c, Tim. 51c, 72d, Letters 317c, 335e, Rep. 416b, 533a, Laws 641d, 712e, 799d, 812a, 859d, Epin. 896e, 992b.
10 For διισχυρίζεσθαι and speakers who say they will not make an assertion or suggest avoiding an assertion, see Plato, Phaedo 63c, 100d, 114d, Meno 86b, Theaet. 158d, 163b, Charm. 168a, 169b, Soph. 231c, Crat. 440c.
11 ἰσχυρίζεσθαι with an accusative object is not frequent in the fifth and fourth centuries. Other than three occurrences in Thucydides at 3.44.3, 5.26.3, 7.49.1, I have found only four other places in this period where ἰσχυρίζεσθαι has an accusative object (Demosthenes 15.13, 44.11; Plato Crat. 428a, Gorgias 495b). I have found no example of the construction paralleling 5.26.3 (i.e. with ἀπò) and the citations which Dover (n. 1), 72 offers do not appear relevant since they contain words other than ἰσχυρίζεσθαι.
12 Compare the anger associated with ἰσχυρίζεσθαι at Isaeus 1.3, 1.18.
13 Marinatos (n. 1), 140 writes: ‘It is the polloi who accept the interpretations of the chresmologoi and manteis, notorious frauds in the fifth century and objects of ridicule by many intellectuals including Thucydides himself (2.8.2; 21.3; 8.1).’ Dover (n. 1), 72 is right to reject this, saying that ‘ὑπò πολλῶν is not ὑπò τῶν πολλῶν’ and that ‘“ὑπò πολλῶν means simply what it says, ‘by many’ ’. If by polloi Marinatos means ‘the masses’, as opposed to an intellectual like Thucydides, then into which group would a person like Nicias (cf. 7.50.4) fit?
14 As a ‘catch-word’ of Thucydidean methodology in both introductions of the Historia (cf. ἀĸριβεῖ at 1.10.1; ἀĸρίβειαν at 22.1; ἀĸριβεία at 22.2) cognates of ἀĸριβές occur twenty-three times in the Historia.
15 ἐχυρῶς and its cognates occur fourteen times in the Historia. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who quotes 5.26.3 from ĸαì τοîς ἀπò χρησμῶν to the end of 26.6 (De Thucydide 12.15), reads ὀχυρῶς instead of ἐχυρῶς. ὀχυρῶς would be the lectio difficilior since neither this term nor any of its cognates appears anywhere in Thucydides.