¹ Kahn, C. H., ‘Proleptic Composition in the Republic, or Why Book I was never a Separate Dialogue’, CQ 43 (1993), 131–2CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² Reeve, C. D. C., Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato's Republic (Princeton, 1988), p. 41Google Scholar.

³ A further supplement to Kahn's list is the opening exchanges between Polemarchus and Socrates, where the latter proffers persuasion as an alternative to force (327c). This contrast between two ways of achieving an end, through persuasion or through compulsion or force, is a recurring theme (see e.g. 361b, 365d, 399a-c, 41 Id, 414b, 519e, 548b, 554d). Force and persuasion are of course associated with thumos and reason respectively—see below. The question with which Polemarchus responds to Socrates, how to persuade if the other will not listen, may be part of what underlies the change of approach that we witness in the Republic.

⁴ The translation I use is Bloom, A., The Republic of Plato, 2nd ed. (New York, 1991)Google Scholar.

⁵ With ‘reason’ substituted for Bloom's ‘speech’.

⁶ Note the use of the term ‘harsh’ (χαλεπς) in relation to Thrasymachus (336e, and cf. 337a), applied also to thumos (410d). At 354a Socrates comments that Thrasymachus has become gentle and has ceased to be harsh.

⁷ It is generally assumed, from references elsewhere in antiquity, that it is a wolf that Plato has in mind here. Note that the guardians must keep watch lest an enemy, like a wolf, should attack the flock (415e), that the worst thing would be if the auxiliaries were themselves reared so as to become like wolves instead of dogs (416a), and that when a leader is transformed into a tyrant it is as if he were turned from a human being into a wolf (565d-566a).

⁸ Shorey, P., Plato: The Republic, Vol. I (London, 1930)Google Scholar, ad loc.

⁹ Adam, J., The Republic of Plato, Vol. I (Cambridge, 1902)Google Scholar, ad loc.

¹⁰ If Glaucon's snake confirms that we are meant to associate Thrasymachus with the thumos, his statement may also shed light on why Socrates later describes the thumos as snake-like as well as lion-like. The thumos, like a snake, is something that can be charmed—through the process of ‘musical’ education (cf. 411b).

¹¹ In ‘Thrasymachus' Theory of Justice’, Polis 3 (1980–1981), 2–13Google Scholar, I addressed two of the main questions to which an interpretation which preserves consistency must provide an answer. First, is Thrasymachus' initial concern merely with justice in the political sphere, or does he mean from the start to characterize justice wherever it occurs? Secondly, how can the assertion that justice is the advantage of the stronger be reconciled with the later assertion that justice is another's good? On the first count, I argued that Thrasymachus' account is meant from the start to apply to private as well as to public relationships, and that his reference at 338d-339a to the practice of political regimes is intended as evidence for his theory, not as a restatement of its content. On the second count, I argued that for Thrasymachus the two justice formulae are equivalent, because of his factual belief that, in any human encounter, the stronger party will invariably profit at the expense of the weaker. It is against this belief that Socrates' argument from 338c to 347e, an argument which he takes to be countering Thrasymachus' theory of justice, is chiefly directed. Some interpretations of Thrasymachus' position would render this argument beside the point.

¹² There is of course a third conception, rooted in reason.

¹³ For a similar view, see e.g. Sparshott, F. E., ‘Socrates and Thrasymachus‘’, Monist 50 (1966), 421–59, at p. 426CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Maguire, J. P., ‘Thrasymachus…or Plato?’, Phronesis 16 (1971), 142–63, at p. 146CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ For interesting discussions, see Robinson, R., ‘Plato's Separation of Reason from Desire’, Phronesis 16 (1971), 38–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar, Stalley, R. F., ‘Plato's Argument for the Division of the Reasoning and Appetitive Elements within the Soul’, Phronesis 20 (1975), 110–28Google Scholar, Penner, T., ‘Thought and Desire in Plato’, in Vlastos, G. (ed.), Plato, II (New York, 1971)Google Scholar, Annas, J., An Introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford, 1981), pp. 137–42Google Scholar, and Woods, M., ‘Plato's Division of the Soul’, Proceedings of the British Academy 73 (1987), 23–7Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Penner, , op. cit., p. 111Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 113.

¹⁷ Loc. cit.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 96.

¹⁹ Cornford, F. M., ‘Psychology and Social Structure in the Republic of Plato’, CQ 6 (1912), 246–65Google Scholar.

²⁰ Annas, , op. cit., pp. 140–41Google Scholar.

²¹ Sparshott, , op. cit., pp. 427, 439–40Google Scholar.