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A Textual Note on Galen, On the Powers of Foodstuffs I 1.3 (P. 202.17 Helmreich)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Philip van der Eijk
Philip van der Eijk
Affiliation:
Leiden
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Extract

In De alimentorum facultatibus, Book I, Ch. 1, Galen begins his discussion of the powers of foodstuffs by a rough sketch of the opinions of earlier physicians on this subject. He says that according to some of them these powers are only known (γνσθαι) on the basis of experience (πεῖρα), according to others on the basis of a combination of experience and reasoning (λογισμς), whereas a third group gave priority of importance to reasoning (202.4–6 Helmreich). Galen proceeds to say that there is considerable disagreement between these physicians on the topic in question and that, consequently, an unbiased testing of their opinions is necessary; this testing should operate by means of argumentation (πδειξις). Now there are two different starting-points for argumentation, i.e. perception and ‘distinct thinking’ (ἢ γρ ξ αἰσθσεως ἢ κ νοσεως ναργος). Then the text printed by Helmreich runs as follows: κα μς ναγκαῖν στιν ἢ θατρῳ τοτων ἢ μφοτροις χρσασθαι πρς τν το προκειμνου σκμματος εὕρεσιν: ‘It is necessary for us, too, to use either one of these (i.e. either perception or thinking) or both of them in order to find the question under discussion.’

Type
Shorter Notes
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 43 , Issue 2 , December 1993 , pp. 506 - 508
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1993

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References

1 As far as I know, no instances of σκμμα in the sense of ‘solution’ or ‘answer’ are found: the word signifies either the subject of investigation or the investigation itself.

2 Helmreich refers to Galen's Thrasybulus where we read: ρχ τονυν εὑρσεως οὐ τοτῳ μνῳ τῷ νν προκειμνῳ σκμματι τ γνναι, τ ποτ' στι τ ζητομενον, λλ κα τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν (Scripta Minora III, 33, 7–8), where εὕρεσις seems to mean ‘finding an answer’; but here the construction is with a dative, whereas in the present case it is the σκμμα itself which is the object of finding. Support for εὕρεσις might be found in a passage from the Commentary on the Aphorisms, I 1, 17B.346 K., but this does not provide evidence for σκμμα being the object of εὑρσκειν either: τ δ βουλμενος Ἱπποκρτης χρσατο τοιοτῳ προοιμῳ τν πορωττων στ. τχα δ' ἂν εὕροιμεν αὐτ, τ κατ μρος ἅπαντα το λγου προδιασκεψμενοι…ργνοιν τε δυοῖν ντοιν ὑφ' οἷν εὑρσκεται τ κατ τς τχνας τ μν ἔτερον, πεῖρα, σφαλερν στι, τ δ' ἕτερον, κ λγου κρσις, οὐκ εὐπετς, λλ' εἴπερ τι κα ἄλλο τν δυκολωττων…σφαλερ δ πεῖρα, δι τ τς ὕλης ξωμα, οὐ γρ δ δι τ μεταβλλειν τομως, ν γρ τῷ το καιρο βραχυχρονῳ περιχεται τοτο. τν κρσιν δ, εἰ μν, ὡς γώ φημι, τι λγον κοει τις, εὔδηλον δ που τ παλεπώτατον αὐτο μχρι τμερον ἔτ' μφισβητομενον εἰ δ', ὡς ἔνιοι τν μπειρικν ὑπονοοσι, τν τν ποβαινντων κ περας πκρισιν κα οὕτως εὔδηλον τ δυσκατρθωτον αὐτς.

3 This article was written in the course of a research project funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), project number 301–176–048.