^{page 95 note 1} Furley, David J., Two Studies in the Greek Atomists (Princeton, 1967).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 95 note 2} Op. cit., pp.186 and 231.Google Scholar

^{page 95 note 3} Op. cit., pp.194 and 231–6.Google Scholar

^{page 95 note 4} Rist, J. M., Epicurus. An Introduction (Cambridge, 1972), pp.92–4.Google Scholar

^{page 95 note 5} Martin, J., Cari, T. Lucreti, De Rerum Natura, Leipzig⁵, 1969).Google Scholar

^{page 96 note 1} Op. cit., p.139.Google Scholar

^{page 97 note 1} Rist, (op. cit., pp.92–3)Google Scholar thinks that the reading mens and Furley's interpretation of it are also supported by Cicero, , De Fato 23:Google Scholar ‘Hanc Epicurus rationem [sc. the swerve] induxit ob earn rem, quod veritus est ne, si semper atomus gravitate ferretur naturali ac necessaria, nihil liberum nobis esset, cum ita moveretur animus ut atomorum motu cogeretur.’’ Rist states (op. cit., p.92Google Scholar n.3): ‘Furley's position and the reading mens are strengthened by this passage, since Cicero is saying that the swerve is to prevent the dominance of the mind by internal necessity, that is, by weight, and that is exactly Furley's point.’’ Rist's defence of Furley seems to me to be open to two objections. First, he assumes that the weight of the atom in this Ciceronian passage is closely related to the internal necessity in Lucretius 2.289–90. This assumption appears to disagree with the position of Furley, who identifies the necessus intestinus not with the weight of the soul atoms, but rather with ‘the original constitution of the psyche’’ (op. cit., pp.232 and 194).Google Scholar That this original constitution ought to be determined by the weight of the soul atoms does not seem to be supported by the sources. Lucretius attributes the different original temperaments in living beings not to the weight of the soul atoms, but rather to their shapes (3.317–18) or, perhaps, to the shapes of groups of atoms (so Furley, , following Bailey, op. cit., p.200).Google Scholar In consequence, the Ciceronian passage does not appear to bear directly on Furley's interpretation.

Secondly, there is no need to assume that the passage of Cicero is necessarily connected, as believed by Rist, with Lucretius 2.289 ff. Its wording fits, perhaps, even better lines 2.251–7. Cicero does not have a phrase to correspond to the necessus intestinus in 2.289–90, whereas the Ciceronian liberum corresponds to the libera in Lucretius 2.256. Also, the phrase si semper occurs both in the Ciceronian passage and in 2.251. Furthermore, in Cicero the swerve-less motion of any atom is connected with the question of the freedom of the will; precisely the same connection is present in 2.251 ff. Lines 2.289 ff. resemble less the passage of Cicero, especially if mens is read. Then it is not atoms in general, but rather specifically the mind, considered as an assemblage of soul atoms, that may lack the clinamen.

^{page 97 note 2} Op. cit., p.179.Google Scholar

^{page 97 note 3} The reading res in the meaning ‘atom’’ has recently been defended by two scholars. Pancheri, Lillian U. in Apeiron 8.2 (1974), 49–55,CrossRefGoogle Scholar states that the argument against mens resides in the observation that the unexpected switch from the atoms or semina in 2.284 to the mens in 289 would constitute a mixture of referents between two levels of reality not worthy of the skill of Epicurus in the use of arguments by analogy (op. cit., p.53).Google Scholar

Mayotte Bollack in ‘Momen Mutatum’’, Cabiers de Philologie 1 (1976), 184–6 also defends res in the sense of ‘atom’’. However, I am not certain that her arguments, if I have understood them, conclusively demonstrate the superiority of the reading res over mens.Google Scholar

^{page 98 note 1} Op. cit., p.180.Google Scholar