¹ Berndt, T., De ironia Menexeni platonici (Münster, 1881)Google Scholar and id., Bemerkungen zu Platons Menexenos (Jahresbericht über das evangeliche Friedrichs-Gymnasium zu Herford, 1888), i-xi considered the dialogue as an indirect, albeit strict, criticism of Gorgias' rhetoric. A generally ironic reading results in interpretations that work it out in different ways, considering it as an implicit criticism of Athens' rhetoric and democracy as well as against Pericles (as representative of the former two elements). At the beginning of the last century this position was adopted by Taylor, A.E., Plato. The Man and his Work (London, 1926; quoted edition Cleveland, 1963), 41-5Google Scholar, and by Colin, G., ‘L'oraison funèbre d'Hypéride’, REG 51 (1938), 209-66 and 305-94, at 241-2CrossRefGoogle Scholar (who nevertheless pointed out more serious issues). This argument has been upheld by Dodds, E.R., Plato's Gorgias (Oxford, 1959), 24 n. 2Google Scholar, and Vlastos, G., ‘ISONOMIA ΠOΛITIKH’, in Mau, J. and Schmidt, E.G. (edd.), Isonomia: Studien zur Gleicheitsvorstellung im griechischen Denken (Berlin, 1964), 1-35 Google Scholar = Id. in G. Vlastos (ed.), Platonic Studies (Princeton, 1973), 164-203. Notwithstanding, the most important exegetical works in favour of such interpretation date back to the early 1980s. Clavaud, R., Le Ménexène de Platon et la rhétorique de son temps (Paris, 1980)Google Scholar considers the dialogue as a ‘war machine’ against the democratic rhetoric, and Loraux, N., L'invention d'Athènes (Paris, 1993 ²), 315-37Google Scholar states that the Menexenus is an ironic and parodic pastiche—cf. the edition by Tsitsiridis, S., Platons Menexenos. Einleitung, Text und Kommentar (Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1998), 62-92 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In addition, see Buchheit, V., Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos Epideiktikon von Gorgias bis Aristoteles (Munich, 1960), 94-5Google Scholar; Henderson, M.M., ‘Plato's Menexenus and the distortion of history’, AClass 28 (1975), 25-46 Google Scholar; Bloedow, E.F., ‘Aspasia and the mystery of the Menexenus ’, WS 88 (1975), 32-48 Google Scholar; Coventry, L., ‘Philosophy and rhetoric in the Menexenus ’, JHS 109 (1989), 1-15 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rosenstock, B., ‘Socrates as revenant: a reading of the Menexenus ’, Phoenix 48 (1994), 331-47CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² In the footsteps of von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, U., Platon (Berlin, 1920)Google Scholar, 2.126 and Harder, R., ‘Platon und Athen’, Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung 10 (1934), 492-500 Google Scholar, many scholars have considered the epitaphios a philosophical interpretation of Athens' literary forms and political history. In general, this reading can lead to two perspectives (which are sometimes combined): on the one hand, the Menexenus can be considered a paraenetic work, which aims to promote the Platonic virtue; on the other hand, it can be seen as describing an ideal Athens. Despite some minor differences, these perspectives share the idea that in the Menexenus Plato is illustrating some important aspects of his theory of ‘philosophical’ virtue and/or the ‘philosophical state’. See Huby, P.M., ‘The Menexenus reconsidered’, Phronesis 2 (1957), 104-14CrossRefGoogle Scholar (above all for what concerns the final part of the epitaphios); Scholl, N., Der platonische Menexenos (Rome, 1959)Google Scholar; von Loewenclau, I., Der platonische Menexenos (Stuttgart, 1961)Google Scholar; Kahn, C.H., ‘Plato's funeral oration: the motive of the Menexenus ’, CPh 58 (1963), 220-34Google Scholar; Kennedy, G., The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, 1963), 152-66Google Scholar; Duffy, B.K., ‘The Platonic functions of epideictic rhetoric’, Philosophy and Rhetoric 16 (1983), 79-93 Google Scholar; Monoson, S.S., ‘Remembering Pericles: the political and theoretical import of Plato's Menexenus ’, Political Theory 26 (1998), 489-513 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Collins, S.D. and Stauffer, D., ‘The challenge of Plato's Menexenus ’, The Review of Politics 61 (1999), 85-115 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tulli, M., ‘L'Atene di Aspasia: tradizione del racconto e ricerca dell'ideale nel Menesseno di Platone’, in Casanova, A. and Desideri, P. (edd.), Evento, racconto, scrittura nell'antichità classica (Florence, 2003), 91-106 Google Scholar, and Idd., ‘Epitafio e malia dell'anima: Gorgia nel Menesseno ’, in Migliori, M., Napolitano Valditara, L.M., Fermani, A. (edd.), Interiorità e anima. La psychè in Platone (Milan, 2007), 321-9Google Scholar.

³ There are several issues with which I cannot deal here. The most important is the blatant anachronism of Socrates speaking about the Corinthian War, which was only fought some years after his death; for some remarks on this, see below, p. 51. This puzzling issue has led some scholars (such as Bluck and Tigerstedt) to reject the traditional attribution of the work.

⁴ They affect in particular philosophical (that is, ethical) interpretations of the Menexenus, that is, those that deal with the themes with which I am concerned here. Of course, this dialogue can be considered in several different perspectives (from history of rhetoric to literary theory), without focussed interpretative aims; in such cases these traditional readings are only wide frameworks.

⁵ A clearer distinction will emerge in the second part of this paper: see pp. 62–69 below.

⁶ See e.g. Collins and Stauffer (n. 2), 92-3; Long, C.P., ‘Dancing naked with Socrates: Pericles, Aspasia, and Socrates at play with politics, rhetoric, and philosophy’, AncPhil 23 (2003), 49-69, at 66-8Google Scholar. Others have suggested that, by means of this reference to Aspasia, Plato hints at (and criticizes) Thucydides—see e.g. Kahn (n. 2), 220-2; Tulli (n. 2 [2003]), 98—or the model rhetoricians of his times—see e.g. Clavaud (n. 1), 95-106 and 245-59.

⁷ On this point, see also the remarks by Bruno Centrone in Centrone, B. and Petrucci, F.M., Platone. Ippia maggiore, Ippia minore, Ione, Menesseno (Turin, 2012), 407Google Scholar.

⁸ This also implies that, when in the argument I use phrases such as ‘Plato says', I am referring to him as the author of the dialogue, and this does not have any implication as to his doctrinal commitment.

⁹ Of course, there are some differences within each of these general tendencies. While the scholars who uphold the ironic reading agree on the key points indicated above, the supporters of the strict reading often focus the readers' attention on specific passages (for example, the myth of autochthony, the praise of the constitution, the final section), which would confirm the presence of Platonic doctrines. For this reason, my remarks on this reading should be seen as concerning those scholarly interpretations which address all the various sections of the dialogue (and I shall be examining these interpretations one by one).

¹⁰ That is, some fragments of Gorgias' Epitaphios and the epitaphioi by Lysias, Thucydides, Demosthenes (?), Hypereides (?). According to Aristotle, the funeral oration is one of the possible versions of the epideictic genre: it is characterized by highly sclerotic topoi that are from time to time adapted to the historical situation (see Kennedy [n. 2], 154-8 and Loraux [n. 1], 233-74). The epitaphios represents an essential stage in the development of Athenian democratic identity. The ceremony used to take place during the funerals held at the end of wars (as in the Menexenus) but also once a year as a commemoration.

¹¹ The formal peculiarities of this section have been highlighted e.g. by Harder (n. 2), 497-8 and von Loewenclau (n. 2), 51-62, as well as—for a different purpose— Salkever, S.G., ‘Socrates’ Aspasian oration: the play of philosophy and politics in Plato's Menexenus ’, The American Political Science Review 87 (1993), 133-43CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹² Autochthony emerged as a basic value for the Athenians between the sixth and the fifth centuries b.c. (see Hdt. 7.161) and became a topos of funeral orations (Lys. Epit. 17; Isoc. 4.24-5; Dem. Epit. 4-5; Hyper. Epit. 7-8). According to this theme, the Athenians had always inhabited and ruled the same land.

¹³ Scholars have claimed that Plato is paradoxically stressing the traditional topics of funeral orations (see e.g. Henderson [n. 1], 33-44), or simply that he is making a parody of them in his work (see e.g. Clavaud [n. 1], 118-19).

¹⁴ See, for instance, Scholl (n. 2), 20-4.

¹⁵ In particular, Harder (n. 2), 497-8 and von Loewenclau (n. 2), 51-62. Of course, not all the supporters of the strict reading uphold this thesis: some of them focus their attention on other parts of the dialogue (above all, the final part). Nevertheless, associating this passage with the description of Athens in the Critias (considered as an image of Plato's ideal state) lies at the core of the critical studies quoted above, which represent significant examples of the strict interpretation. The argument I shall develop is therefore directed against these readings.

¹⁶ This topic recurs frequently in funeral orations (cf. Lys. Epit. 18-19, Dem. Epit. 15-17 and 25-7; cf. also Isoc. 4.39); however, the most impressive parallel is provided by Pericles (see n. 20 below).

¹⁷ See, above all, Wilamowitz (n. 2), 2.137-42; Harder (n. 2), 500; Kahn (n. 2), 225-6; and Tulli (n. 2 [2003]), 100-3.

¹⁸ Leaving aside the general interpretations that aim to demonstrate the ironic nature of the Menexenus (for instance, Clavaud [n. 1], 119-27 and Loraux [n. 1], 196-7), Vlastos [n. 1], 188-201 acknowledges the complexity of the section, but emphasizes its historical distortions. More generally, scholars have noted Plato's critical attitude towards democratic rhetoric—see, for instance, Monoson (n. 2), 492-3.

¹⁹ It seems likely that Plato too is making a veiled critical reference to Pericles' epitaphios, where the same argument (though expressed in a less paradoxical way) plays a fundamental role (Thuc. 2.36.1). Nothing indicates, however, that this passage has only this function.

²⁰ See note 16 above. Moreover, (a) the constitution is ambiguously both democratic and ‘aristocratic’ (Thuc. 2.37.1 and Menex. 238c5-d2), and in the same passages there are some implicit remarks on the name δημοκρατία; (b) the rulers are chosen only on the basis of their moral standing, and not on the basis of their wealth (Thuc. 2.37.1-2 and 2.40.1; cf. Kahn [n. 2], 220-4 and Clavaud [n. 1], 119-21); (c) there is no mention of the drawing of lots. In addition, there are some points which are unlikely to be related to Plato's political theory: the most puzzling point is the possibility for the whole people to choose the best rulers. This possibility is clearly denied in the Republic (see, above all, 498d7-501a8), and some scholars have pointed out that here Plato uses the verb δοκέω (for instance, at 239a4) in order to allude to the weakness of the masses' beliefs (see Taylor [n. 1], 43, Dodds [n. 1], 24 n. 2 and especially Loraux [n. 1], 335; contra Kahn [n. 2], 226).

²¹ See, for instance, 238e1-239a4, where Plato states the importance of the feeling of brotherhood shared by the Athenian people: this is an important statement in the Republic (463a-464a).

²² According to the ironic reading, Plato is giving a parodic twist to Athens' history in order to show the incompetence of democratic rulers and the meaninglessness of these rhetorical celebrations (see e.g. Vlastos [n. 1], 188-201 and Coventry [n. 1], 9-10). According to the strict reading, in illustrating these historical events Plato's aim is to describe the feats of an ideal state (see Harder [n. 2], 497-8; Kennedy [n. 2], 158-66; Tulli [n. 2 (2003)], 100-3), or at any rate to exhort citizens to accomplish similar deeds—see, for instance, Kahn (n. 2).

²³ See, for instance, Leg. 698d5-699d2, where Plato claims that Athens won the Battle of Marathon without any allies. However, some of these distortions might equally stem from an Athenian source, and/or depend on the literary genre adopted (cf. Lys. Epit. 20-47 and Isoc. 4.89).

²⁴ See Tulli (n. 2 [2003]), 104-5.

²⁵ See Kennedy (n. 2), 154-66.

²⁶ See, above all, Loraux (n. 1), 202-11 and Clavaud (n. 1), 203-27.

²⁷ According to these scholars, then, this section strictly seems to illustrate Platonic ‘moral theory’ (see, for instance, von Loewenclau [n. 2], 107-26; Kahn [n. 2], 229; Salkever [n. 11], 140; Tulli [n. 2 (2003)], 105) or, at any rate, to offer a Platonic paraenesis focussing on virtue_k (Scholl [n. 2], 59-67).

²⁸ For instance, both a turn to seriousness and the introduction of Platonic themes are taken into account by Colin (n. 1), 239-41 (who detects a Platonic theory of virtue, though in a traditional context and with a style that still recalls Gorgias) and by Henderson (n. 1), 45.

²⁹ This was one of the issues traditionally related to aristocratic ethics; they were later applied to funeral orations, and thus were employed by democratic rhetoric; see Loraux (n. 1), 180-230 and, above all, Tulli (n. 2 [2007]), 322.

³⁰ This meaning of ἀρετή, then, is consistent with that used by Plato in the historical speech; cf. p. 67 below.

³¹ Socrates asks what courage is, and Laches provides him with the following first definition (190e5-6): εἰ γάρ τις ἐθέλοι ἐν τῇ τάξει μένων ἀμύνεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους καὶ μὴ φεύγοι, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ἀνδρεῖος ἂν εἴη. Socrates refutes it by means of an argument in oppositum/et alia (cf. V. Goldschmidt, Les Dialogues de Platon. Structure et méthode dialectique [Paris, 1947], 37-8): he emphasizes, then, the difference between performing a given action and having the kind of general behaviour capable of leading to the same action.

³² Theoretical compatibility does not mean here that both virtues belong to the same person, but that an ethical system can encompass both virtues as different philosophical tools.

³³ See Loraux (n. 1), 120-35.

³⁴ See Phd. 68c8-69c3: some virtuous actions could be achieved out of vice; see also below, p. 63.

³⁵ See, above all, Scholl (n. 2), 59-67; von Loewenclau (n. 2), 107-26; Kahn (n. 2), 228-9; Dean-Jones, L., ‘Menexenus–son of Socrates’, CQ 45 (1995), 51-7CrossRefGoogle Scholar; but also Henderson (n. 1), 45.

³⁶ As stated, for instance, by Loayza, D., Platon. Ménexène (Paris, 2006)Google Scholar, 132 n. 166.

³⁷ Besides in the eighth book of the Republic the possession of wealth is said to corrupt virtue, and in the Theaetetus (174e2-175b6) virtue_k leads the philosopher to reject any interest in wealth.

³⁸ See too the Platonic passages quoted in the next footnote.

³⁹ Of course, recognizing the beauty that is detectable in bodies could be the first step towards the idea of the beautiful. However, outward beauty cannot be a necessary condition for virtue, as is clearly stated at the end of the Symposium (216d7-e5) and in the Charmides (154e5-7), where Socrates exhorts Critias to leave aside the outward beauty (and wealth) of Charmides in order to start by analysing his soul; cf. Grg. 523b4-524a7 (on the moral value of both wealth and outward beauty). As a matter of fact, what Socrates looks for is a beautiful soul, that is, the soul that aims at the truth (cf. Phdr. 276e4-6).

⁴⁰ For a full demonstration of these meanings in the Platonic corpus, see É. des Places, Platon, Lexique (Paris, 1964), s.v. ἐπιστήμη and σοφία.

⁴¹ The differences between a)/b) and c) do not invalidate this reading. In particular, in c) the task of courage is assigned to virtue, because it would be meaningless to say that ἐπιστήμη without courage is πανουργία and with courage σοφία. Still, why then are justice and the rest of the virtues mentioned here? This is probably due to the semantic broadness that is here attributed to ἐπιστήμη, which can ultimately be identified with any technical skill: the statement seems to be satisfying, if it is supposed to affirm that any technique is a form of wisdom (that is, a perfect art), as long as it makes the ‘right’ use of its own means, which is to say virtuous use of them. Any technique is instead πανουργία, if it is disconnected from its right use.

⁴² See Schouler, B., ‘Dépasser le père’, REG 93 (1980), 1-24 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴³ See e.g. Pind. Pyth. 5.96 and Ol. 8.77, Soph. Trach. 1200, and among funeral orations Hyper. Epit. 35.

⁴⁴ See Coventry (n. 1), 10-15 and Collins and Stauffer (n. 2), 105-15.

⁴⁵ See Loraux (n. 1), 64-78 and 135-41.

⁴⁶ Cf. Thuc. 2.44-6; Lys. Epit. 75-80; Dem. Epit. 35-37; Hyper. Epit. 41.

⁴⁷ The saying is traditionally ascribed (including by Plato himself, Prt. 343b3) to the Seven Sages. Its mention with regard to the measured endurance of emotions is not widely recorded, but it nevertheless belongs (perhaps thanks to the Menexenus) to the rhetorical repertoire of the consolation; see, for instance, [Plut.] Cons. ad Apoll. 116c10.

⁴⁸ See especially Huby (n. 2).

⁴⁹ Cf. Thuc. 2.45, Lys. Epit. 77-81, Hyper. Epit. 42-3.

⁵⁰ In specific terms, φρόνησις as the necessary and sufficient condition for virtue had been a central point of concern for Plato since his earliest dialogues; see Prt. 332a6-b6; Lach. 192c2; Alc. 125a1-7; Grg. 493b7-c3 (cf. also Tht. 176b2-3 and Leg. 906a7-b3).

⁵¹ Whether this argument is conclusive or not (as argued, for instance, by Bostock, D., Plato's Phaedo [Oxford, 1986], 30-5Google Scholar; cf. also Frede, D., Platons Phaidon. Der Traum von der Unsterblichkeit der Seele [Darmstadt, 1999], 26-33 Google Scholar), Plato aims to distinguish two levels of virtue: one belonging to philosophers, the other to common men.

⁵² This passage represents an exegetic crux; see e.g. Ferrari, F., ‘La transizione epistemica’, in Erler, M. and Brisson, L. (edd.), Gorgias-Menon. Selected Papers from the Seventh Symposium Platonicum (Sankt Augustin, 2007), 290-6Google Scholar and Fine, G., ‘Knowledge and true belief in the Meno ’, OSAPh 27 (2004), 41-81 Google Scholar. Whichever reading is correct, it is quite clear that in this section Plato states the relation between virtue and true belief, which is in any case different from knowledge. On this section, see Petrucci, F.M., ‘Opinione corretta, conoscenza, virtù: su Menone 96d1–98b9’, Elenchos 32 (2011), 229-62Google Scholar.

⁵³ Such an approach can be detected in some ways already in Friedlaender's Platon, or more recently in the brief introduction to the dialogue by J.M. Cooper (with J. Hutchinson), Plato. Complete Works (Indianapolis, 1997), 950–1. In this perspective, however, see the more extensive interpretation by Bruno Centrone in Centrone and Petrucci (n. 7), especially 407-10.

⁵⁴ See Loraux (n. 1), 99-154, whose study is in any case the most extensive on this topic.

⁵⁵ See pp. 52–54 above.

⁵⁶ See pp. 54–55 above.

⁵⁷ A similar project is explicitly detectable, for example, at least in the Statesman and in the Laws.

⁵⁸ See the more focussed inquiry at pp. 55–56 above.

⁵⁹ This claim, by the way, corresponds probably to Plato's opinion. Here Plato distinguishes three moments of the Persian Wars, corresponding to the battles of Marathon, Salamis-Artemisia and Plataea. Then, he attributes the highest value to the Battle of Marathon; the battles of Salamis and Artemisia have a lower value, while the Battle of Plataea ranks third. Plato claims that this order depends on what these battles have taught the Athenians; however, it is likely that Plato is hinting at the absolute moral value displayed by Athens in these wars (as pointed out, for instance, by Pradeau, J.-F., Platon. Ménexène [Paris, 1997], XVIII-XXIIIGoogle Scholar; contra Tsitsiridis [n. 1], 281-2). In addition, it should be stressed that Plato confirms his evaluation in the Laws (3.698d5-699d2), where he only really mentions the Battle of Marathon. For the purposes of this paper it is important to point out that what he is ultimately interested in is the moral development of the Athenian state.

⁶⁰ See p. 63 above.

⁶¹ See the well-known passages in the Phaedrus (275d-e) and the Seventh Letter (especially 341b7-342a6): aside from the exegetical controversies concerning these sections, it is clear that Plato could not address the core of his doctrine to everyone. At the same time, Plato could still deliver a ‘philosophical speech’ that would not reveal the whole of his doctrine. As a matter of fact, we can find a parallel for this in the Phaedrus (Socrates' first speech), where Plato decides to approach a non-philosophical oration in the best way possible (see Centrone and Petrucci [n. 7], 407-10). In order to do so, he must conform to the genre's requirements, such as the praising of feats, the concealment of wrongs and the reformulation of events.