^{page 32 note 2} I use the term ‘sophists’ in this article for convenience, to refer to those thinkers whose views Plato is controverting in the dialogue.

^{page 33 note 1} Plato's project is not to show how something (e.g. an image) admitted by the sophist to be ‘not wholly real’ can have ‘some sort of existence’ (Professor Cornford's view, P. T.K., p. 215; see also p. 39 below). The sophist does not admit that it is ‘not wholly real’; he says it is ‘wholly unreal’. Plato's argument is ad sophistas; his purpose is to show that if the ‘thing’ denoted by their is, then the ‘thing’ denoted by their is just as much. Professor Cornford's error is due to his supposing that the ‘images’ dealt with in the Sophist are explicitly ‘particulars’ as contrasted with Forms; see p. 39 below.

^{page 35 note 1} It is dismissed at 241 d, after the view of as the contrary of has three times over been found to be unworkable (first in the present -passage, then in each of the two definition-passages). Later in the dialogue, at 258 e, towards the close of the main argument, the E.V. refers to the dismissal of this , when he says, ‘Let no one then say of us that we have shown to be the contrary of and that we make bold to say that this is. As for any contrary to we have long ago said good-bye to the question whether there is such a thing or not.’ He does not say, and he does not mean, that he has endorsed Parmenides' view that such a is not. He means that as such a cannot in fact avoid having attached to it in some way, it is a waste of time to attempt to deal with it. The only point worth discussing seriously is how has attached to it, i.e. how it

^{page 37 note 1} Cf. 233 d–234 a, where the ‘all ’ (called 234 b, 234 e) of which the sophis makes verbal copies are listed as ‘you and me, animals, trees, plants, sea, sky, earth. gods, and everything else’.

^{page 39 note 1} It is not necessary to decide whether in this sense was part of the ‘sophistic’ terminology, or whether Plato has deliberately added it here beside the other alternative terms (‘mixing’, ‘blending’, etc.) —as he could quite justifiably have done— because of his ultimate aim of providing a defence of his own of particulars with Forms. In view of the widely varying uses to which the term was put, it seems likely that it had in fact been used in this sense by the ‘sophists’ themselves. Quite apart from the regular Platonic usage in other dialogues (the relation of particulars with Forms) and the usage at Soph. 253 d, e, where it refers to the relation between in Division as practised by the dialectical philosopher, we find it used of the relation between vocal sounds (253 a), of the relation of the body to and the soul to (248 a), and of the association together of the physical constituents of foods (Hipp. ch. 15); cf. also the parallel use of , e.g. of the relation of God to in Parm. 134 c. The fundamental meaning of is the assertion of some relationship between the things which ‘participate’; what that relationship is depends upon the things concerned in it. therefore takes its colour from its context, as is actually pointed out by Professor Cornford in his note on Soph. 248 a (P.T.K., p. 239 n.). We must not assume that whenever Plato uses the term he means to imply some sort of metaphysical ‘participation’.

^{page 41 note 1} Incidentally, Theaetetus has already once before given die E.V. carte blanche, at 237 b, akhough diere seems to be little need for it, since at 236 d the E.V. had to say to him, ‘You say “Yes”, but have you thought what you are saying, or has some sort of momentum swept you on, through force of habit of the argument, into saying “Yes” straight away?’ In fact Theaetetus offers no resistance or criticism to the E.V. throughout. He is playing almost too well the role assigned to him at the outset, when the E.V. said he wanted a respondent who would ‘not make a nuisance of himself’and would be ‘obedient to the rein’ (, 217 d), and Socrates undertook that this should be so—‘Choose any one of us you like; they will all make dieir responses to you quite meekly ()’. I draw attention to these passages in order to forestall a possible objection to my interpretation on the ground that Theaetetus as an intelligent person ought to have complained of the E.V.'s behaviour in those parts of the argument where, as I claim, he is imitating the ‘sophistic’ methods.

^{page 44 note 1} Incidentally it may be noted that at the beginning of the attempts to define the sophist (218 d), the definiendum is described as

^{page 47 note 1} We must also remember, of course, that the sophist's factors (viz. verbal terms) are all on one level, whereas Plato's own factors (viz. physical particulars and immaterial Forms) are on two levels. This, among other reasons, is a strong justification for Plato in having chosen Parmenides as the type of the antagonists he is dealing with in this dialogue. Parmenides could work on one level only at a time, as is shown by his poem, and also by the sort of objection he is made to raise against the particular-Form relationship in the Parmenides: his objections assume that only one level is involved, not two (and therefore, of course, do not touch Plato's own theory). Just as Parmenides supposed that ‘thinking’ was a correct index to ‘being’ (‘Only that which can be thought can be’), so the sophists supposed that ‘saying’ is a correct index to ‘being’: we can deduce the nature of ‘things’ () from words.