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Plato and ‘Imitation.’
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
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InC.Q., January, 1928, pp. 16 sqq., I examined afresh the two discussions of poetry as imitation which are found in Plato's Republic. I pointed out that Plato used the term ‘imitation’ (μίμησɩς and cognates) in two senses, a good and a bad. The only kind of poetry which Plato excludes from his ideal state is that which is imitative in the bad sense of the term. He admits, and indeed welcomes, that kind of poetry which is imitative in the good sense (without discussing the question whether any such poetry is actually extant), and which he calls either imitative or non-imitative according as he is using the term ‘imitative’ in a good sense or a bad. The kind of poetry (briefly summed up in Rep. 607a as consisting of hymns to the gods and eulogies of good men) which is admitted into the ideal state is certainly imitative; and (which is the important point) it is in fact called imitative by Plato himself (e.g. in 397d τòν τοῦ ἐπɩεɩκοῦς μɩμŋτὴν ἄκρατον)—of course in the good sense of the word. Now the tenth book begins by stating that the result of the earlier discussion had been the decision to exclude ‘so much of poetry as is imitative.’ The implication is obviously that the remainder will not be excluded. (Plainly it is assumed that such a remainder either exists or will be successfully called into existence by the ideal state.) But what are we to call that remainder, unless it be non-imitative in the sense (the bad sense) in which the word is here used?
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References
page 162 note 1 Met. A. 6, 987b, 7 sqq.
page 162 note 2 Xen, . Mem. III. 10, 1 sqqGoogle Scholar.
page 163 note 1 As I wrote in C.Q. los. cit., p. 18, n. 1. They also explain why, though ‘Plato consciously drew this distinction’ (between true and false imitation), ‘he did not emphasize his meaning’ (cf. Sikes, , The Greek View of Poetry, p. 77Google Scholar), at least in the Republic (for, as we shall see, he did emphasize it elsewhere).
The distinction between the two senses of imitation was seen (but not worked out clearly) by Finsler, , Platon und die Aristotelische Poetik, pp. 19 sqqGoogle Scholar. It was also virtually seen by Adam, who, in view of the condemnation of only ἡ πρὺς ἡδονὴν ποɩητɩκή 607c, and of τῇ τοɩαύτῃ ποɩήσεɩ 608a, pointed out (n. on Rep. 608a, 6) that ‘there is another sort of Poetry which Plato would not exclude.’
This citation reminds me to add that the refusal of commentators to regard the tenth book of the Republic as supplementary to, and consistent with, the second and third is the more remarkable in that Plato in 607b (in addition to 595a) refers back to the third book and his previous decision regarding poetry. Plato certainly saw no inconsistency between the two discussions. (More proof that in writing the tenth book he had not forgotten the third is afforded by 603c, which refers back to III. 399abc.)
page 164 note 1 Aristotle's Theorv of Poetry, c. II.
page 165 note 1 Op. cit., p. 86.
page 165 note 2 P. 238.
page 165 note 3 See e.g. Whittaker, T., The Neo-Platonists, pp. 54 sqq., 264 sqqGoogle Scholar.
page 166 note 1 1. 2, 2 sqq.
page 166 note 2 C.Q., January, 1930, p. 4.
page 166 note 3 P. 238.
page 166 note 4 Phaedr. 276d.
page 167 note 1 See my analysis in C.Q., 1928, p. 18.
page 167 note 2 P. 75.
page 167 note 3 Ibid. I should like to add that my disagreement with Mr. Sikes on the points indicated does not mean that I deny the obvious merits of his book.
page 167 note 4 History of Criticism, I., p. 19.
page 167 note 5 Rep. 401c. Cf. Phaedr. 269–70.
page 168 note 1 C.Q., 1928, p. 19.
page 168 note 2 Op. cit., pp. 18–19.
page 168 note 3 Op. cit., p. 86.
page 168 note 4 Phaedr. 277–8; Prot. 347.
page 168 note 5 Cf. Laws 810–1; Prot. 326; Xen, . Symp. III. 5. IV. 6–7Google Scholar; Girard, , L' Éducation Athénienne, pp. 151 sqqGoogle Scholar.
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