^{page 221 note 1} For the list seePeck, A. L., ‘Plato's Sophist, the ’, Phronesis vii (1962), 56.Google Scholar

^{page 221 note 2} J. L. Ackrill was the first to suggest that Plato's combination ofis designed to establish pre-conditions for significant discourse (, Bull, of the Inst, of Class. Stud, of the Univ. of London ii [1955], 31–5Google Scholar). Fora convincing explanation of thepassage at 259 e 4 ff. see A. L. Peck, op. cit. 46–66.

^{page 221 note 3} Peck, A. L., ‘Theof the Sophist: a Reinterpretation’, CQ n.s. ii (1952), 32–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 222 note 1} Ross, W. D., Aristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford, 1924), p. lxxxiv.Google Scholar

^{page 222 note 2} Albinus, Didask. 10. 6.

^{page 223 note 1} Owen, G. E. L., ‘Eleatic Questions’, CQ N.S. x (1960), 93.Google Scholar

^{page 223 note 2} Raven, remarks ‘If it is necessary to translate the sentence …’ in The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1957), 269.Google Scholar

^{page 223 note 3} G. E. L. Owen, loc. cit. 91.

^{page 223 note 4} Cf. Guthrie, W. K. C., A History of Greek Philosophy ii. 20 (Cambridge, 1965)Google Scholar on the meaning of øράζειν However, despite this discussion and that on the meaning of λ⋯γειν, Guthrie (following Owen and others) is still unjust to Parmenides (p. 17). Owen claims (loc. cit. 94 n. 1) that where Parmenides is mistaken is his claim that we cannot think of the non-existent. Owen and Guthrie agree (rightly) that of course we can talk and think about mermaids or unicorns. But it should be emphasized that Par-menides did not deny we could talk about non-being—after all, he does so himself. In the Greek idiom what Parmenides denies is that we can think or speak non-being, not that we can think or speak about non-being. If knowing is envisaged as a kind of seeing and speaking as a kind of pointing, then it is not hard to see why Parmenides says we cannot ‘see’ or ‘point to’ what does not exist. It is possible to writein Greek as well as λ⋯γειν τι, but the two are not always identical in sense. What has puzzled the commentators is that ‘thinking a thing’ (accusative) is to be understood as ‘recognizing that it is there’.

^{page 224 note 1} τ⋯ ⋯ν means both ‘what is’ and ‘being’, just as so often in Platomeans both ‘what is just’ and ‘justice’.

^{page 224 note 2} Anscombe, G. E. M., ‘The New Theory of Forms’, Monist I (1966), 408.Google Scholar

^{page 224 note 3} This attitude, deriving presumably from Plato or Aristotle, is to be found (among other places) in Cornford, F. M.'s Plato and Parmenides (London, 1939).Google Scholar

^{page 224 note 4} Proclus, in Parm. 694. 23; Simplicius, in Phys. 139.8; 141. I.

^{page 226 note 1} As I argued in an earlier paper, ‘The Parmenides Again’, Phoenix xvi (1962), 1–14.Google Scholar It will be evident from my discussion below, however, that I would not now wish to stand by everything in this paper, especially parts of the material on pages 2–6 concerning Parm. 135–6.

^{page 227 note 1} There still seems no convincing reason to suppose that Plato regarded Parmenides' arguments as valid against a correctly formulated theory of Forms argued by a competent dialectician. For the methods of argument Parmenides is made to employ see especially Peck, A. L., ‘Plato versus Parmenides’, PR lxxi (1962), 159–84.Google Scholar

^{page 227 note 2} I withdraw the suggestion made in Phoenix xvi (1962)Google Scholar, 4 that εἴδους must be understood withwhile reaffirming (against Cornford) that γ⋯νος and οὐσία are not here synonymous.

^{page 227 note 3} It seems likely that the phraserefers to both philosophical and non-philosophical talk. That it refers partially to philosophical talk is suggested by its echo of Rep. 511 b 4.

^{page 228 note 1} J. M. Rist, loc. cit. 7–12.

^{page 229 note 1} It is worth observing that, although in the Phaedo and Symposium the adjective σονο-ειδής is regularly applied to Forms, which are the objects of knowledge, in the Theaete-tus (205 d) what is σονο-ειδής is held to be per se unknowable.