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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
In E.N. I. c. 5 Aristotle is considering divers views as to what constitutes Eudaimonia. He told us in c. 4, 2–3 that there are many conflicting opinions on the subject. The Many identify Happiness with some palpable good, such as pleasure, wealth, honour, but the Wise identify it with something beyond the Many, while [Plato] denied it to be any specific good at all. Of all these views we should (§ 4, cf. Michelet, p. 20) consider such as (i.) have many adherents or (ii.) are considered to be reasonable. Accordingly, the Universal Good is considered in c. 6 after consideration in c. 5 of five particular goods—pleasure in the form of bodily pleasure, honour, wealth, virtue [and, implied in the theoretic Life, wisdom]. These five goods are brought into relation with four Lives—viz. pleasure with the apolaustic; honour and virtue with the political; [wisdom] with the theoretic; wealth with the business or money-making Life; and the first three Lives are called προέχοντες. There is nothing in this introduction of the Lives to astonish us; for, as Aristotle himself tells us, τò ἀληθὲς ἐν τοȋς πρακτικοȋς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοû βίου κρίνεται (1179a 18). But there is much difference of opinion as to the argument he draws from the Lives. According to the view now submitted for consideration, the argument is that when a specific good, which some suppose to be Eudaimonia, is also the end of a ‘pre-eminent’ Life, then there is some prima facie probability in the view that that specific good is Eudaimonia.
page 85 note 1 οἱ μὲν γὰρ (1095a 22) is answered in sense, though not in form, by συνειδότες … θαυμάζουσιν. These words take the place of something like ‘but the Wise say Eudaimonia is some good that is not palpable like wealth, viz. wisdom or virtue.’
page 85 note 2 The same group of ideals and corresponding modes of living (with the omission of wisdom, which was knocked out by the later schools) appears in Hor. Epist. I. 6, 29–66.
page 88 note 1 We are perhaps warranted in finding here some reminiscences of this chapter and X. c. 6. Similarly with I. c. 4, cf. Harm. Elem. p. 30 = Westphal II. p. 57.
page 89 note 1 Clem. Al. Str. II. 130. 497 P.
page 89 note 2 In Stob. II. 144 W the reading περιττὰς of P may be right, though Wachsmuth prefers τριττὰς: βίων δὲ περιττὰς ἰδέας εϊναι, πρακτικόν, θεωρητικόν, σύνθετον ἐξ ἀμϕοȋν. τòν μὲν γὰρ ἀπολαυστικòν ἤττονα ἤ κατ' ἄνθρωπον εἶναι κτλ. These last words imply that the apolaustic Life also had pretensions to be περιττός, and so we get again the three pre-eminent Lives of our chapter; for the compound Life is not a distinct type.
page 90 note 1 The author of E.E. may have set a higher value on τιμή taken in some restricted sense: see 1232b 17 sq.
page 90 note 2 ἐξουσία is used, not as in our c. 5, but as in Pol. 1255b 35.
page 90 note 3 Similarly the reading or conjecture ἄβιος, which would, I suppose, pass easily into βαιός, requires an argument in support of it.
page 92 note 1 Similarly E.E.'s rejection of the Many (1214b 34) may be misinterpretation (due to philosophic superiority) rather than originality. We can make Aristotle dismiss the Many in the words (95a 29) ἱκανòν δὲ … λόγον if we (1) give a good sense to ἐπιπολαζούσας (Eustr. 30, 7 explains, ἅσαι μάλιστα ἐγγίζουσι τῷ ἀληθεȋ εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἐϕικνοῦνται) or (2) incorrectly take ἤ not as disjunctive but as adding δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λóγον as an explanation of ἐπιπ. Now Asp. (9, 24) simply repeats the words, and it may be that he did so because he thought δοκούσας κτλ. was itself explanatory of ἐπιπολαζούσας, since just before (9, 7) he has himself used ἤ as merely explanatory.
Again, E.E.'s epithet ϕορτικάς (1215a 28) for the arts that merely aim at δόξα may be merely E.N.'s ἐπιπολαιότερον (95b 24); since Asp. (10, 17) for οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ϕορτικώτατοι writes οἱ π. κ. ἐπιπολαιότατοι, which makes ϕορτικός and ἐπιπόλαιος synonymous. On the other hand see Theaet. 176c; also cf. E.E. 1230b 16.
page 93 note 1 This does not seem influenced by Matt, 11, 12 βιασταὶ ἁρπάζουσιν αὐτήν.
page 96 note 1 Ramsauer's conjecture βάναυσος was published in 1878 before Aspasius was published by Heylbut in 1889.
page 97 note 1 Otherwise, read βίον ≺τοῦ κατ' ἀρετὴν≻ ‘only those allow a slave can be happy who also allow he can live virtuously’: cf. Sen. de Ben. III. c. 18; Aristotle is referring perhaps to the Cynics.
page 98 note 1 If we interpret (96a 10) πρòς αὐτά ‘against them’ (see Burnet), surely we should take καὶ from Kb instead of καίτοι.