¹ See especially Notomi, N., The Unity of Plato's Sophist (Cambridge, 1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² This is proved by the almost literal quotation of ἀνθρώπων ὕβρίν τε καὶ εὐνομίην ἐϕορῶντες at 216b3–4 and the strictly literal quotations of παντοῖοι at c4 and of ἐπιστρωϕῶσι πόληας at c5–6. As for the expression τὸν ξένιον θεόν (216b2), it echoes Od. 9.270–1. Benardete, S., ‘Some misquotations of Homer in Plato’, Phronesis 8 (1963), 173–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 176–7, suggests that the verses repeated at 6.120–1, 9.175–6, and 13.201–2 could also be intended; in these, it is Odysseus himself who wonders whether the people he is about to visit are ὑβρισταί and ἄγριοι or δίκαιοι.

³ Note that Odysseus as a Stranger is sometimes suspected to be a god himself: see 7.199–206 and 16.181–5. On Greek ξενία, see notably Finley, M.I., The World of Odysseus (New York, 1977²), 99–104Google Scholar, and the thorough study of Herman, G., Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City (Cambridge, 1987)Google Scholar. I translate ξένος as ‘stranger’, although I acknowledge that it is not ideal; in most contexts, ‘visitor’ would be preferable, but it has the disadvantage of not being symmetrical, as the Greek ξένος might be – although it is generally not – since it is applicable not only to the guest but also on occasion to the host, as can be seen both in Homer (e.g. Od. 8.166) and in Plato (e.g. Meno 100b8). On the use of ξένε as an address term, see Dickey, E., Greek Forms of Address (Oxford, 1996), 146–9Google Scholar.

⁴ This parallel between the Stranger as representing the philosopher and Odysseus is hinted at by Benardete (n. 2), 177, who does not elaborate on it. It is all the more probable since Socrates was very often compared to Odysseus in the Socratic literature: see Lévystone, D., ‘La figure d'Ulysse chez les Socratiques: Socrate polutropos’, Phronesis 50 (2005), 181–214CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵ See for example Frede, M., ‘The literary form of the Sophist’, in Gill, C. and McCabe, M.M. (edd.), Form and Argument in Late Plato (Oxford, 1996), 135–51Google Scholar, at 147, who suggests that this question would imply a possible contrast with what the people of Athens think about the philosopher (this interpretation is taken up by Notomi [n. 1], 22 and n. 73).

⁶ See Cordero, N.-L., Platon: Le Sophiste (Paris, 1993), 281–4Google Scholar, who stresses that the current reading of 216a3 (ἑταῖρον δὲ τῶν ἀμϕὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ घήνωνα) is found in no manuscript but results from the choice of ἑταῖρον in place of ἕτερον, which is found in some manuscripts (but not mentioned in Burnet's nor the new OCT's apparatus, contrary to Diès's) and the excision of ἑταίρων after घήνωνα, although it is found in all the manuscripts (but not in Proclus, In Prm. 672.27–9) and was the common reading during the Renaissance. Apart from the manuscript evidence, Cordero's best argument for the reading ἕτερον δὲ τῶν ἀμϕὶ Παρμενίδην καὶ घήνωνα ἑταίρων seems to be that the presence of ἕτερον would be quite relevant in the first lines of a dialogue in which the kind of θάτερον plays such a prominent role (see 212 n. 5). On the importance of the first lines of Plato's dialogues, see Burnyeat, M., ‘First words’, PCPhS 43 (1997), 1–20Google Scholar.

⁷ Although the contrary view has recently been argued – to my mind unconvincingly – by Ambuel, D., Image and Paradigm in Plato's Sophist (Las Vegas, NV, 2007)Google Scholar. See also Benardete, S., Plato's Sophist (Chicago, IL, and London, 1986)Google Scholar, 74.

⁸ This interpretation has been suggested to me by David Sedley.

⁹ See Prt. 329b1–5, 335b7–c1.

¹⁰ For the reasons which the Stranger might have to make this distinction, which seems to cut across two activities that Plato's other dialogues present as typical of the sophist, see Dixsaut, M., ‘La dernière définition du Sophiste (Sophiste, 265b–268d)’, in Platon et la question de la pensée: études platoniciennes I (Paris, 2000), 271–309Google Scholar, at 303–4.

¹¹ For hints at the Stranger's home's being more than strictly Elea, see Benardete (n. 7), 72–4; Scodel, H.R., Diairesis and Myth in Plato's Statesman (Göttingen, 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 22 n. 4; Blondell, R., The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues (Cambridge, 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 321.

¹² See for example Diès, A., Platon: Le Sophiste (Paris, 1925)Google Scholar, 325 n. 1; Cordero (n. 6), 246 n. 227; White, N.P., Plato: Sophist (Indianapolis, IN, and Cambridge, 1993)Google Scholar, 37 n. 49. Though he is much more cautious, Boys-Stones, G.R., ‘Hesiod and Plato's history of philosophy’, in Boys-Stones, G.R. and Haubold, J.H. (edd.), Plato and Hesiod (Oxford, 2010), 41–2Google Scholar, also detects a predominantly Hesiodic touch in this passage.

¹³ As is well seen by Wieland, W., Platon und die Formen des Wissens (Göttingen, 1999²), 107–8Google Scholar, and Brown, L., ‘Innovation and continuity: the battle of Gods and Giants, Sophist 245–249’, in Gentzler, J. (ed.), Method in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford, 1998), 181–207Google Scholar, at 181. On the difference between the two myths and the Gigantomachia as a whole, see Vian, F., La Guerre des géants: le mythe avant l'époque hellénistique (Paris, 1952)Google Scholar.

¹⁴ The reasons to make this parallel are neatly summarized by Brown (n. 13), 194.

¹⁵ This is fully argued by Brown (n. 13). See also Wieland (n. 13), 108.

¹⁶ On the difference of formulation between these two passages and its significance, see Gavray, M.-G., ‘Être, puissance, communication: la dunamis dans le Sophiste’, PhilosAnt 6 (2006), 29–57Google Scholar, at 41–2.

¹⁷ More precisely, the reformed Giants, i.e. those made more tractable by way of discourse (see Soph. 246d4–e4, 247c3–8) can be compared to the more sophisticated thinkers, by contrast with the un-initiates of the Theaetetus (see Tht. 155e3–156a3). Cf. Sedley, D., The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato's Theaetetus (Oxford, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 46 n. 9.

¹⁸ Compare Wieland (n. 13), 108–12, according to whom the Heracles of the myth corresponds to Socrates and the purpose of this episode is to warn against a thematization of the Platonic Forms which would transform them into the content of a theory instead of the tools of dialectic. This interpretation is interesting, but does not seem to be sufficiently grounded on the text of the Sophist itself, where Socrates plays no explicit role in the present context.

¹⁹ See Burkert, W., Greek Religion (Oxford, 1985), 208–11Google Scholar.

²⁰ The following summary owes a great deal to three excellent articles on this subject: Brown (n. 13); Gavray (n. 16); and Teisserenc, F., ‘Puissance, activité et passivité dans le Sophiste’, Philosophie 96 (2007), 25–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²¹ Brown (n. 13), 195–203; see also Teisserenc (n. 20), 30–40.

²² Cornford, F.-M., Plato's Theory of Knowledge: The Theaetetus and the Sophist of Plato Translated with a Running Commentary (London, 1935)Google Scholar, 239 n. 1.

²³ Compare Gavray (n. 16), 47, who talks about a ‘raffinement’ of the previous definition, and Teisserenc (n. 20), 30, who writes that this definition is ‘un coup d'essai destiné à être transformé, c'est-à-dire précisé et complété’.

²⁴ This already seems to be the case at 245a1–c10, where πάθος, πεπονθός, and πεπονθέναι are used to describe the way in which the whole is ‘affected’ by the one in being one. On the fact that participation (of the sensible in the intelligible and of the Forms between themselves) is regularly expressed in terms of the capacity to act and to be acted upon in Plato, see Dixsaut, M., ‘Une dimension platonicienne de la puissance: la puissance de pâtir’, in Crubellier, M., Jaulin, A., Lefebvre, D., and Morel, P.-M. (edd.), Dunamis: autour de la puissance chez Aristote (Louvain-la-Neuve, 2008), 225–49Google Scholar, at 233–42.

²⁵ One might object that, even if this interpretation is correct, it is still a far cry from explaining why the Stranger, when asked what ‘the people where he comes from’ think about the sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher, decides to use the method of division, because this method has little to do with dialectic proper. (The denial of the method of division's being serious dialectic has a long tradition, which, in the French-speaking world, goes back at least to Rodier, G., ‘Les mathématiques et la dialectique dans le système de Platon’ [1902], in Rodier, G., Études de philosophie grecque [Paris, 1957²], 37–48Google Scholar, at 40 n. 1, and, in the English-speaking world, to Ryle, G., ‘Plato's Parmenides’ [1939], in Allen, R.E. [ed.], Studies in Plato's Metaphysics [London, 1965], 97–147Google Scholar, at 141–2. From another point of view, the legitimacy of the use of the method of division in the Sophist has also been questioned: see most recently Brown, L., ‘Definition and division in Plato's Sophist’, in Charles, D. [ed.], Definition in Greek Philosophy [Oxford, 2012], 151–71Google Scholar.) I cannot handle this objection properly here, but I think it is misguided because, in all the dialogues where Plato describes the method of division thematically, he labels it ‘dialectic’ (apart from the Sophist, see Phaedrus 265c8–266c1, Statesman 284e11–287a6, and Philebus 16c5–17a5); the burden of proof should therefore lie with those who refuse this identification. See Ackrill, J., ‘In defence of Platonic division’, in Wood, O.P. and Pitcher, G. (edd.), Ryle: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York 1970), 373–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and my discussion in L'Inventivité dialectique dans le Politique de Platon (Brussels, 2000), 29–156Google Scholar.

²⁶ For another interpretation of the use of tenses in this passage, see Teisserenc, F., Le Sophiste de Platon (Paris, 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 13.

²⁷ Five if we count only one definition at 224d4–e5, as Theaetetus seems to do at first (see 225e5); six if we count two, as he does at 231d8–11.

²⁸ See Notomi (n. 1), 156, and Teisserenc (n. 26), 59–60, though their interpretation is different. One can also think of the strange lesson in dialectic that ‘Protagoras’ teaches to Socrates at Tht. 167d5–168c2.

²⁹ Compare Notomi (n. 1), 70 and 163–6, and Teisserenc (n. 26), p. 24–5. For the philosopher as a hunter, see also Symp. 203d5–6 and Phd. 66a3 and c2.

³⁰ I cannot develop this relation between dialectic and virtue here. I have tried to show elsewhere that dialectic is the science of the good, and, as such, identical with true virtue itself. See Delcomminette, S., Le Philèbe de Platon (Leiden, 2006)Google Scholar.

³¹ See Cordero (n. 6), 226 n. 99.

³² I develop this question in Delcomminette, S., ‘Quel rôle joue l'éducation dans la perception?’, in El Murr, D. (ed.), La Mesure du savoir : études sur le Théétète de Platon (Paris, 2013), 75–94Google Scholar.

³³ Let us remember that philosophy is compared to Penelope at Phd. 84a2–7, although the context is admittedly very different.