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NOTES ON NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1173a2–5*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 August 2016

Gösta Grönroos
Gösta Grönroos*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University
*
[email protected]
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Extract

In Nicomachean Ethics (= Eth. Nic.) 10.2, Aristotle addresses Eudoxus' argument that pleasure is the chief good in his characteristically dialectical manner. The argument is that pleasure is the chief good, since all creatures, rational (ἔλλογα) and non-rational (ἄλογα) alike, are perceived to aim at pleasure (1172b9–11). At 1172b35–1173a5, Aristotle turns to an objection against Eudoxus' argument. For some object (οἱ δ’ἐνιστάμενοι) to the argument by questioning one of its premisses, namely that what all creatures aim at is the good (1172b12–15). Instead, they claim that what all creatures aim at is not good (ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ’ ἐφίεται, 1172b36). This claim is reasonably taken to mean that not everything that all creatures aim at is good. But, as we shall shortly see, Aristotle dismisses it in a way suggesting a less charitable interpretation. At any rate, the significance of this objection is that it challenges the strong claim that what all creatures aim at is the good with an argument against the weaker claim that what all creatures aim at is good (or a good). For if the weaker claim is refuted, then the strong claim is refuted as well. Aristotle takes issue with the argument against the weaker claim, but without committing himself to the strong claim.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 66 , Issue 2 , December 2016 , pp. 484 - 490
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Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 2016 

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Footnotes

*

I am grateful for the generous and helpful comments provided by the journal's referee.

References

1 The argument is notoriously inconclusive and, starting with Aristotle (1172b15–16), much questioned. For an overview, see Warren, J., ‘Aristotle on Speusippus on Eudoxus on pleasure’, OSAPh 36 (2009), 249–81Google Scholar, at 252–65.

2 A. Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle (London, 1874), 2.318 and R.A. Gauthier and J.Y. Jolif, L’Éthique à Nicomaque II, 2 (Louvain and Paris, 19702), 822 assume, without much argument, Speusippus to be the adversary.

3 For my limited purposes here, it will suffice to consult the following selection of paraphrases, commentaries and translations: the anonymous paraphrast, [Heliodor.] In Eth. Nic. paraphr. Heylbut; Michael of Ephesus, Mich. In Eth. Nic. Heylbut; Grant (n. 2); J.A. Stewart, Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1892); J. Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle (London, 1900); Gauthier and Jolif (n. 2); T. Irwin, Nicomachean Ethics (Indianapolis, 19992); R. Crisp, Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge, 2000); S. Broadie and C. Rowe, Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, 2002).

4 Grant (n. 2), 318; Stewart (n. 3), 407; Gauthier and Jolif (n. 2), 822; Irwin (n. 3), 155; Crisp (n. 3), 185; Broadie and Rowe (n. 3), 431; Warren (n. 1), 261 agree that τὰ ἀνόητα refers to non-rational animals. Against the claim of Gauthier and Jolif (n. 2), 822, the anonymous paraphrast (n. 3), 211.30–6 is non-committal on the issue. Michael of Ephesus (n. 3), 538.2–7 considers this interpretation as an option.

5 This interpretation is explicit in the anonymous paraphrast (n. 3), 211.33–4, and in Michael of Ephesus (n. 3), 538.2–7.

6 Cf. Warren (n. 1), 258–60.

7 Warren (n. 1), 263 speculates, unconvincingly, and ad hoc, to my mind, that Aristotle appeals to ‘the natural good which aims them at the good appropriate to them’ in order to accommodate the fact that non-rational animals cannot deliberate about what is good for them.

8 Eth. Nic. 7.13, 1153b25–32 may seem to lend support for the view that non-rational animals indeed are at a loss about what they pursue. But, as Aspasius points out, διώκουσιν οὐκ ἣν οἴονται οὐδ’ ἣν ἂν φαῖεν at 1153b31–2 refers to human beings exclusively, since non-rational animals do not believe and say things (Aspas. In Eth. Nic. 153.3–6 Heylbut).

9 But see Brunschwig's comments on Topics 3.1, 116a19 on the distinction between πάντες and πάντα in his Budé edition (Aristote Topiques, Tome I, ed. J. Brunschwig [Paris, 1967], 62 n. 1), and Alexander of Aphrodisias for the view that these lines refer to Eudoxus specifically (In Top. 226.16–18 Wallies).

10 According to Bekker, in Laurent. 81.11 (Kb), Marc. 213 (Mb) and Riccard. 46 (Ob), but Bywater reports it omitted only in Kb and Mb.

11 Stewart (n. 3), 407; Burnet (n. 3), 444; Gauthier and Jolif (n. 2), 822; Irwin (n. 3), 302.

12 Stewart (n. 3), 407; Bywater, in the apparatus criticus; Burnet (n. 3), 444.

13 Grönroos, G., ‘Wish, motivation and the human good in Aristotle’, Phronesis 60 (2015), 60–87 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 74–81 and G. Grönroos, ‘Why is Aristotle's vicious person miserable?’, in Ø. Rabbås, E.K. Emilsson, H. Fossheim and M. Tuominen (edd.), The Quest for the Good Life: Ancient Philosophers on Happiness (Oxford, 2015), 146–63, at 155–9.