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Moral Evil and Ignorance in Plato's Ethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

R. Hackforth
R. Hackforth
Affiliation:
Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge
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Extract

It is universally agreed that Plato inherited from Socrates, and consistently maintained to the end, the doctrine that no man does evil of set purpose—οὐδε⋯ς ⋯κὼν ⋯μαρτ⋯νει—but because he mistakes evil for good. All moral evil, therefore, for Plato, involves ignorance. There are, however, two passages, one in the Sophist, the other in Laws ix, which on the face of them appear to recognize a type of moral evil in which ignorance is not involved, a type which is indeed contrasted with that arising from ignorance. These passages have not, of course, been overlooked by scholars: they are regularly referred to in the best-known accounts of Platonic ethical theory; yet I do not think they have been sufficiently considered, nor is a clear answer forthcoming to the question whether or no in these later dialogues Plato really intends, as he seems to intend, a modification of his earlier ethical doctrine. My purpose is to show that he does not, and to account if possible for his apparent inconsistency.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 40 , Issue 3-4 , July 1946 , pp. 118 - 120
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1946

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References

page 118 note 1 441 E οὐκο⋯ν τῷ μ⋯ λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσ⋯κει σοφῷ ⋯ντι: 442 C σοφ⋯ν δ⋯ γε (sc. καλο⋯μεν ἔνα ἔκαστον) ⋯κε⋯νῳ τῷ σμικρῷ μ⋯ρει τῷ ὅ ἦρχ⋯ν τ' ⋯ν αὐτῷ κα⋯ τα⋯τα παρ⋯γγελλεν, ἔχον αὖ κ⋯κεῖνο ⋯πιστ⋯μην τ⋯ν το⋯ σνμφ⋯ροντος, κτλ.

page 119 note 1 The identification of δικαιος⋯νη as described in iv with the totality of moral virtue is attested, if attestation is to be sought in a single sentence, by the opening words of v: ⋯γαθ⋯ν μ⋯ν το⋯ννν τ⋯ν τοια⋯την π⋯λιν τε κα⋯ πολιτε⋯αν κα⋯ ⋯ρθ⋯ν καλ⋯, κα⋯ ἄνδρα τ⋯ν τοιο⋯τον. NO doubt vi–vii this assertion: they show that a man is not τελ⋯ως ⋯γαθ⋯ς merely because the πολιτε⋯α of his soul is what it should be: he must know the Good, Yet the presence of such passages as those quoted from iv might well have been felt to be misleading.

page 119 note 2 The problem of error is a frequent topic in later dialogues; in addition to Theaet. and Sophist see especially Tim. 44 B–C, 47 B–c, 90 D.

page 119 note 3 Plato's Thought, pp. 226–7.