¹ See de Strycker, E. and Slings, S.R., Plato's Apology of Socrates: A Literary and Philosophical Study with Running Commentary (Leiden and New York, 1994)Google Scholar; Ausland, H.W., ‘Forensic characteristics of Socratic argumentation’, in Scott, G.A. (ed.), Does Socrates Have a Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato's Dialogues and Beyond (University Park, PA, 2002), 36–60Google Scholar; McCoy, M., Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists (Cambridge, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Nails, D., ‘The trial and death of Socrates’, in Kamtekar, R. and Ahbel-Rappe, S. (edd.), A Companion to Socrates (Malden, MA and Oxford, 2009), 5–20Google Scholar. For forensic discourse in classical Greek thought, see Dover, K.J., Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford, 1974)Google Scholar.

² To the best of my knowledge, the only study of the notion of βοήθεια in the Gorgias is to be found in Szlezák, T.A., Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie. Interpretationen zu den frühen und mittleren Dialogen, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1985), 1.191–207Google Scholar. Christ, M.R., ‘Helping and community in the Athenian lawcourts’, in Rosen, R.M. and Sluiter, I. (edd.), Valuing Others in Classical Antiquity (Leiden, 2010), 205–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar discusses this notion within Athenian forensic discourse, but he does not consider the Gorgias as one case in point. I discuss Szlezák's interpretation in section two.

³ For the changes in legal and political procedures at the end of the fifth and at the beginning of the fourth century in Athens, see MacDowell, D.M., The Law in Classical Athens (Ithaca, NY, 1978)Google Scholar.

⁴ For the division between the three kinds of rhetoric, see Arist. Rh. I 3 1358b. For pre-Aristotelian rhetoric, see Navarre, O., Essai sur la rhétoricque grecque avant Aristote (Paris, 1900)Google Scholar; the pages on Gorgias of Leontini (79–119) are particularly useful. See also Kennedy, G.A., A New History of Classical Rhetoric (Princeton, 1994), 3–80Google Scholar; Schiappa, E., The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece (New Haven and London, 1999), 3–152Google Scholar.

⁵ Lodge, G. (ed.), Plato Gorgias—edited on the basis of Deuschle-Cron's edition, introduction and commentary by G. Lodge (Boston and London, 1891)Google Scholar—observes in relation to 452e that Gorgias, contrary to Aristotle (Rh. I 3 1358b), divides rhetoric according to its place of delivery.

⁶ This paradox may not apply to the historical Gorgias, Gorgias of Leontini: he may well have identified epideictic, forensic and political rhetoric. For the sophistic movement, see Guthrie, W.K.C., A History of Greek Philosophy, 6 vols. (Cambridge, 1962–81), 3.3–319Google Scholar.

⁷ In his account of the after-life myth (Grg. 523a1–527e7), Socrates does not refer to the δικαστήριον when referring to the tribunal in the after-life. (Here and elsewhere I use the following edition of Plato's Gorgias: Plato, Gorgias, Greek text with introduction and commentary by E.R. Dodds [Oxford, 1959].) However, he refers to its jugdes, δικασταί, namely in 523b4, 523d1, 523e7, 524d8 and 526e6. He uses the same term for those judges operating at a law court (δικαστήριον) elsewhere, for example 452e2, 478a5, 480a8, 481a2, 522a7, 522c2. Socrates also uses the term δικαστής in a non-technical and epistemological sense, for example when speaking about those children (παῖδες) who, like ‘such judges’ (τοὺς τοιούτους δικαστάς) (522a6–7), pass judgment on the medicine and cures prescribed by their doctors—medicine and cures that may at first appear unpleasant: the point being that the immature and insufficient insight among children prevents them from recognizing what benefits their health, only what appears sweet and pleasant to them. This is in parallel to those members of a law court (δικαστήριον, 521e9, 521e2) who possess insufficient insight and who are therefore seduced by smart tricks of the speakers in their verdicts (521d6–522b2). Moreover, in the after-life myth, Socrates uses the term κριτής as a synonym for δικαστής (e.g. 523e3), his discernment or judgment (κρίσις; 523c6, 523e6), and the corresponding verb for the cognitive process of judgment undertaken by the judge (523b7, 523c3–4, 523d5, 523e2, 524a5–6). Finally, Socrates uses the technical term for a court case or for a judgment passed at a law court, namely δίκη (e.g. 523b7, 523c3).

⁸ Other sophists also used the term in such a forensic context, e.g. Antiph. In nouercam 2, 3, 4, 21, 22, 24, 31. See also Christ (n. 2), 222–6.

⁹ E.g. Dem. Olynthiaca 1.2, 1.18, 1.19; Philippica 1.14, 1.32, 4.8, 4.22, 4.60; De falsa legatione 322. For Demosthenes, see also Christ (n. 2), 215–26. I owe thanks to Vincent Gabrielsen, who pointed out to me that Demosthenes used the notion of βοήθεια in his orations.

¹⁰ E.g. Dem. Meid. 43, 45.

¹¹ Grote, G., Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3 vols. (London, 1865), 2.90–151Google Scholar. For Grote's sceptical approach to Plato, see Schofield, M., ‘Platon à l’époque victorienne contre l'idée de système’, RFHIP 37 (2013), 59–80Google Scholar, at 62–71, 78–80. For Plato's so-called system of philosophy, much discussed in eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century German Plato scholarship and rejected by Grote, see Catana, L., The Historiographical ‘Concept System of Philosophy’: Its Origin, Nature, Influence and Legitimacy (Leiden and Boston, 2008), 73–94CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹² Grote (n. 11), 2.94–112.

¹³ Grote (n. 11), 2.112–18.

¹⁴ Grote (n. 11), 2.118–31.

¹⁵ This applies to Lodge (n. 5), 1–32, at 11–12, 28–9, where he bypasses the notion of βοήθεια. On page 30 he does observe it, though without connecting it with the argumentative structure of Socrates’ discussion with Callicles. Dodds (n. 7), 2–3 does not mention βοήθεια. His commentary on the Gorgias similarly bypasses the notion: it is not until we reach T4 that Dodds comments on the term, in this case with a linguistic comment (342). He ignores the term as it occurs in T5 (342–5), T6 (368–72) and T8 (384–6), only to make a second linguistic comment on the term in T7 (372). Hence, Dodds does not observe the role which the term plays on an argumentative level in the third part of the dialogue. However, he does refer to the term in a context where it is not used by Plato, namely with regard to 513c4–515b5. Dodds thus observes: ‘Having dealt with the βοήθεια which the statesman owes to himself, Socrates now turns to discuss the βοήθεια which he owes to his fellow citizens …’ (351). Here Dodds ignores the specific forensic use of the term, which is linked to the (male) citizen's ability to protect relatives and friends. Irwin, T., Plato's Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues (Oxford, 1977), 118–24Google Scholar does not analyse βοήθεια in the third part of the Gorgias. In his ‘Introduction’ to his English translation of Plato's Gorgias (Irwin, T., Plato Gorgias [Oxford, 1979], 1–13Google Scholar), Irwin discusses Socrates’ examination of Callicles’ theory of hedonism (11–12); in Irwin's commentary to 483b (at 172), however, he highlights the notion of βοήθεια and refers to 486b–c (T2), 492c (here neither βοήθεια nor its cognates is mentioned explicitly), 509b–c (T4), 522c–e (T6–7), 526a (T8), though without making much of it. Plochmann, G.K. and Robinson, F.E., A Friendly Companion to Plato's Gorgias (Carbondale, IL, 1987), 103–245Google Scholar do not articulate the theme of βοήθεια, though they occasionally comment on the theme of (self-)protection (e.g. 115, 123, 223, 227). Dalfen, J., ‘Kommentar’, in Platon, Werke. Übersetzung und Kommentar, vol. 1– (Göttingen, 1993–), vol. VI.3 (2004), 103–503Google Scholar makes brief observations on the term on 340, 478–80, 498. Andersen, Ø., Dimas, P., Emilsson, E.K., Fossheim, H., Løkke, H. and Rabbås, Ø., ‘Kommentar til Kallikles-episoden: Gorg. 481b–522e’, Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift 42 (2007), 80–150Google Scholar, at 132–4 take note of the issue of self-protection but without analysing its argumentative role in the Gorgias.

¹⁶ E.g. Kahn, C.H., ‘Drama and dialectic in Plato's Gorgias’, OSAPh 1 (1983), 75–121Google Scholar; Klosko, G., ‘The insufficiency of reason in Plato's Gorgias’, Western Political Quarterly 36 (1983), 579–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 589–91. Similarly, Tarnopolsky, C.H., Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants: Plato's Gorgias and the Politics of Shame (Princeton, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar: when commenting on the notion of shame in the third part of Gorgias—where Callicles discusses with Socrates (i.e. 79–84)—she does not highlight the notion of protection, although shame and protection occur in the same passages (e.g. 508c4–d6, 509b1–c3, 522c7–e1).

¹⁷ Vlastos, G., ‘The Socratic elenchus’, OSAPh 1 (1983), 27–58Google Scholar. For criticism of this view of Vlastos, see the survey in Scott, G.A., ‘Introduction’, in Scott, G.A. (ed.), Does Socrates Have a Method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato's Dialogues and Beyond (University Park, PA, 2002), 1–16Google Scholar. This volume contains important contributions to the disucssion of Vlastos's thesis of 1983, e.g. H.W. Ausland, ‘Forensic characteristics of Socratic argumentation’, 36–60; H. Tarrant, ‘Elenchos and exetasis: capturing the purpose of Socratic interrogation’, 61–77; T.C. Brickhouse and N.D. Smith, ‘The Socratic elenchos?’, 145–57. For criticism of Vlastos's claim that Socrates favoured deductive knowledge, see Smith, A.M., ‘Knowledge and expertise in the early Platonic dialogues’, AGPh 80 (1998), 129–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ Vlastos (n. 17), 30.

¹⁹ Vlastos (n. 17), 45 says about Grote (n. 11): ‘This interpretation had a mighty precedent in the work of that great Victorian student of Greek antiquity, whose multi-volume History of Greece (1851) and three-volume Plato (1865) are, in my opinion, still, all in all, the finest contributions ever made in any language to their respective themes.’ See also Vlastos's references to Grote's work (n. 11) in Vlastos (n. 17), 28 and 40.

²⁰ Grote (n. 11), 2.112.

²¹ It should be mentioned that Vlastos had reservations against Grote's understanding of the so-called Socratic elenchus; see Vlastos (n. 17), 45–6.

²² Cooper, J., Reason and Emotion. Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory (Princeton, 1999), 51–7Google Scholar similarly holds that the thesis that doing evil is worse than suffering evil is central to the discussion between Callicles and Socrates. Compare with the anonymous work from the sixth century c.e., Prolegomena §22.8–12 (in Westerink, L.G., Trouillard, J. and Segonds, A. [edd.], Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon [Paris, 1990]Google Scholar), which turns against those who hold that the Gorgias deals with the issue of acting or suffering unjustly, claiming, instead, that this theme only occupies a small part of the dialogue, which is mostly concerned with the foundation of well-being.

²³ Szlezák (n. 2), 1.191–2, especially at 192 n. 4.

²⁴ Szlezák (n. 2), 1.194–5.

²⁵ Admittedly, we do find one reference to ideas in Grg. 503e4, where it is the craftsman's product that receives shape (εἶδος); it is not a product that is shaped according to an idea in the mind of the craftsman. Dodds is similarly sceptical about the significance of the doctrine of ideas in this dialogue: see his comments on Grg. 467e7, 503e1, 497e1 and 506d1.

²⁶ Pl. Grg. 483a8–b4 (T1). Cited from Plato Gorgias, transl. and introd. D.J. Zeyl (Indianapolis, 1987), 53. In the following I cite this translation, unless otherwise indicated.

²⁷ For a discussion of Socrates’ thesis, see McTighe, K., ‘Socrates on desire for the good and the involuntariness of wrongdoing: Gorgias 466A–468E’, Phronesis 29 (1984), 193–236CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Weiss, R., ‘Ignorance, involuntariness and innocence: a reply to McTighe’, Phronesis 30 (1985), 314–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²⁸ For contemporary views on masculinity, see Roisman, J., The Rhetoric of Manhood: Masculinity in the Attic Orators (Berkeley, CA, 2005)Google Scholar.

²⁹ Pl. Grg. 486a6–b4. In Pl. Grg. 521c7–d4, Socrates replies that he is sure that he would not be surprised if some wicked and useless man (πονηρός) brought him to a law court and had him condemned to death. This characterization would fit with Meletos, Socrates’ accuser in the Apology; see Pl. Ap. 24c–35d. I cite the following edition, here and elsewhere: Duke, E.A. et al. (edd.), Platonis Opera, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1995)Google Scholar.

³⁰ Pl. Grg. 486b2–c2 (T2). Transl. Zeyl (n. 26), 57.

³¹ Hansen, M.H., Atimistraffen i Athen i klassisk tid (Odense, 1973), 27–30Google Scholar. The English version of this book (Hansen, M.H., Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, Atimoi and Pheugontes [Odense, 1976]Google Scholar) leaves out one chapter that is central to my argument, namely chapter 2, for which reason I cite the Danish version. MacDowell (n. 3), 73–5 provides a survey of the development of ἀτιμία from the sixth to the fourth century in Athens. For a recent discussion of the meaning and use of ἀτιμία in classical Athens, see Dmitriev, S., ‘Athenian atimia and legislation against tyranny and subversion’, CQ 65 (2015), 35–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and the references given at 35 n. 1.

³² For the legal status of children and female relatives in fifth-century Athens, see Harrison, A.R.W., The Law of Athens, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1968–71)Google Scholar, 1.passim; MacDowell (n. 3), 67–97.

³³ For friendship (φιλία) in the Gorgias, see Duncan, R., ‘“Philia” in the Gorgias’, Apeiron 8 (1974), 23–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar, who does not extend his study to βοήθεια in this dialogue. Blundell, M.W., Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics (Cambridge, 1989)CrossRefGoogle Scholar introduces the theme of helping friends in Greek literature, though she does not cover this peculiar use of βοήθεια in Plato. In Pl. Ap. 23b7, 32e3–4, 34a8, 34b2, 34b4, we find Plato using the term in one form or another. In Ap. 34a–b Socrates claims that those youngsters whom he has taught, and who should have been corrupted by his teaching, if the accusation were true, are all willing to help him at the trial (βοηθεῖν); they are all intent on helping him (βοηθοῦντες).

³⁴ In Irwin's note to Pl. Grg. 486a–c (Irwin [n. 15], 180), we find a reference to Lys. 6.24 explaining that an ἄτιμος ‘could not even execute justice when he suffered injustice from his enemies’. This is true. However, there is also an altruistic element involved in T2, which Irwin ignores; Callicles targets not only the inability of the ἄτιμος to pursue his self-interest but also his inability to defend the interests of others.

³⁵ Pl. Grg. 508c4–d6 (T3). Transl. Zeyl (n. 26), 88–9. The verb for hitting or boxing (τύπτειν) had been introduced earlier in the dialogue: Gorgias had referred to boxing in 456d4, and this verb is also used in 476b5–c3, when Socrates sums up Polus’ position in a discussion on agency and its effects. Socrates refers to the expression after T3, namely in 527a3, warning that someone might give Callicles a disgraceful knock on the jaw after he has been brought to trial at the after-life trial and stands there paralysed and speechless, much like Socrates in the hypothetical Athenian law court (486a–b).

³⁶ MacDowell (n. 3), 133–53, 256.

³⁷ At Prt. 322c5–322d5, Plato has Hermes asking Zeus whether he should distribute the sense of shame (αἰδώς) and justness (δίκη) among a few experts or among all citizens. Zeus replies that they should be distributed among all, and that anyone who does not possess these two notions should be expelled from the city. For Plato's Protagoras I cite Burnet, J. (ed.), Platonis Opera, 5 vols. (Oxford, 1900–7)Google Scholar, vol. 3. For the theme of shame in the Protagoras, see Cairns, D.L., Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature (Oxford, 1993), 353–60Google Scholar.

³⁸ Dodds (n. 7), 340—in his commentary on Grg. 508c4–509c5—points out the centrality of the term βοήθεια, observing that it is used against Callicles’ allegation in 486a–c. Dodds adds: ‘This section contains little more than a recapitulation of the theory already stated in the conversation with Polus (480a–481b) and already recalled at 507d. Plato in fact feels the need of some apology for the repetition (πολλάκις ἤδη εἴρηται, d5).’ I think that there is more going on than mere recapitulation: the passage also prepares for Socrates’ redefinition of the notions ‘shame’ and ‘protection’ in 509b–c; for the exchange between Callicles and Socrates in 522b–c; and for Socrates’ rebuttal of Callicles in 526e. Dodds (n. 7), 372 does not observe the recurrence of ‘protection’ in his notes to Grg. 522d7–8 and 522d2, nor does he observe its recurrence in 526e5 (T8).

³⁹ Pl. Grg. 509b1–c3 (T4). Transl. Zeyl (n. 26), 89–90.

⁴⁰ In the Apology Socrates is similarly asked whether he is not ashamed of his life-long engagement in philosophy, which may cost him his life (28b3–5). On the contrary, Socrates replies, it is evil and shameful (αἰσχρός) to act unjustly and to be disobedient to one that is superior to oneself, be it a god or another human being (29b6–7). If Socrates were released after the trial, he would keep asking the ordinary Athenian citizen whether or not he is ashamed (αἰσχύνη) of his interest in external goods and his lack of interest in the state of the soul (29d). Socrates’ accusers (Anytus, Meletus and Lycon) lack a sense of shame, Socrates explains (31b). If we are to believe Socrates in the Protagoras, the possession of shame (αἰδώς) and justice (δίκη) is a basic requirement to citizens—those who do not possess these social skills should be expelled from the city (Prt. 322c5–322d5). In the Apology, Socrates presents himself as the opposite—he lacks the shamelessness (ἀναισχυντίας, 38d7) that would otherwise enable him to persuade the jury, namely by appealing to the pity of the jurors (38d). For the historical context of shame, see Cairns (n. 37), especially 343–92; Konstan, D., ‘Shame in ancient Greece’, Social Research 70 (2003), 1031–60Google Scholar (especially for the distinction between αἰδώς and αἰσχύνη). For the theme of shame in the Gorgias, see Adkins, A.W.H., Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Values (Oxford, 1960), 266–70Google Scholar; Race, W.H., ‘Shame in Plato's Gorgias’, CJ 74 (1979), 197–202Google Scholar; McKim, R., ‘Shame and truth in Plato's Gorgias’, in Griswold, C.L. (ed.), Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings (New York and London, 1988), 34–48Google Scholar; Williams, B., Shame and Necessity (Berkeley, CA, 1993), 156, 215–16Google Scholar; Cairns (n. 37), 379; Kahn, C.H., Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form (Cambridge, 1996), 125–47Google Scholar; Moss, J., ‘Shame, pleasure, and the divided soul’, OSAPh 29 (2005), 137–70Google Scholar; Bensen, R.C., ‘Shame and ambiguity in Plato's Gorgias’, Ph&Rh 41 (2008), 212–37Google Scholar; Futter, D.B., ‘Shame as a tool of persuasion in Plato's Gorgias’, JHPh 47 (2009), 451–61Google Scholar; Brickhouse, T.C. and Smith, N.D., Socratic Moral Psychology (New York, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tarnopolsky (n. 16), 79–84; Trivigno., F.A. ‘Is good tragedy possible? The argument of Plato's Grg. 502b–503b’, OSAPh 41 (2011), 115–38Google Scholar; Levy, D., ‘Socrates vs. Callicles: examination & ridicule in Plato's Gorgias’, Plato Journal 13 (2013), 27–36CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴¹ Pl. Grg. 509c6–d2 (T5). Transl. Zeyl (n. 26), 90.

⁴² Compare with Ap. 24b8–9, where Socrates is charged for corrupting the young (νέοι), which usually means men younger than thirty years; see Roismann (n. 28), 11. For this charge, see also Diog. Laert. 2.40. Doyle, J., ‘On the first eight lines of Plato's Gorgias’, CQ 56 (2006), 599–602CrossRefGoogle Scholar has argued that the literary setting of the dialogue reminds the Gorgias-reader of the trial: in the opening lines of the Gorgias we are told that Socrates was kept lingering on the marketplace (ἀγορά) by Chaerephon (447a7–8). In Ap. 21a, Socrates informs us that Chaerephon had been a friend of his from his youth, and that it was he who had asked the oracle in Delphi who was the wisest man: no one was wiser than Socrates, Pythia had replied. This answer gave Socrates his mission, to interrogate citizens and strangers about their beliefs, often on the marketplace.

⁴³ Pl. Grg. 522c4–6 (T6). Transl. Zeyl (n. 26), 106.

⁴⁴ Pl. Grg. 522c7–e1 (T7). Transl. Zeyl (n. 26), 106–7, modified.

⁴⁵ Pl. Grg. 526d3–527a4. Transl. Zeyl (n. 26), 111–12.

⁴⁶ For discussions of the after-life myth in the Gorgias, see Annas, J., ‘Plato's myths of judgement’, Phronesis 27 (1982), 119–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar.