^{page 254 note 1} In addition to the general histories of Meyer and of Beloch, the following are the most important for the history of Epaminondas: Pomtow, L., Das Leben des Epaminondas, sein Charakter und seine Politik, Berlin 1870;Google Scholarvon Stern, E., Geschichte der spartanischen und thebanischen Hegemonie vom Königsfrieden bis zur Schlacht bei Mantineia, Dorpat 1884;Google ScholarSwoboda, H., R.E. v (1905) col. 2674 f.Google Scholar s.v. Epameinondas; Bersanetti, G. M., ‘Pelo-pida’, Athenaeum xxvii (1949), 43 ff.Google Scholar; Cloché, P.Thèbes de Béotie, Namur1952;Google ScholarFortina, M., Epaminonda, Torino 1958.Google Scholar

^{page 254 note 2} Cf. Aymard, A., R.E.A. lvi (1954), 15 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 254 note 3} Paus. 9. 15. 6.

^{page 254 note 4} Plut. Tim. 36, Philop. 3.

^{page 254 note 5} Cf. Peper, L., De Plutarchi ‘Epaminonda’ (Jena 1912), 129 ff.,Google Scholar and Ziegler, K., R.E. xxi col. 896.Google Scholar

^{page 254 note 6} Tusc. 1.2.4, and cf. De oratore 3. 34. 139.

^{page 254 note 7} Paus. 8. 11. 8.

^{page 255 note 1} Diod. 15.88, in contrast with Theopompus, for whom Agesilaus was the greatest man of the age (F.G.H. 115 ^F 321, though of the 390s and so perhaps without comparison with Epaminondas).

^{page 255 note 2} Hell. 7. 5. 8f., 18f.

^{page 255 note 3} Cf. Peper, L., op. cit. 16 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 255 note 4} 5.1.

^{page 255 note 5} Hell. 6. 4. 16. Xenophon writes as if he had witnessed the scene; note and , which in Xenophon are significant.

^{page 256 note 1} Cf. Ephorus' summary of his career in Diod. 15.81.

^{page 256 note 2} Diod. 15. 39. 2, 50. 6; Plut. Pel. 18. The Hellenica alludes to the Sacred Band once only (7. 1. 19).

^{page 256 note 3} 7. 1. 27 is the first mention of Messene, in connection with the mission of Philiscus.

^{page 256 note 4} 6. 5.6 alludes to the movement to found the Arcadian Federation.

^{page 256 note 5} Cf. Diod. 15. 34. 2.

^{page 257 note 1} Paus. 9. 13. 1, Plut. Pel. 4. Cf. Swoboda, R.E, v col. 2678Google Scholar, for evidence of Epaminondas before 371.

^{page 257 note 2} Nepos, , Epam. 10. 3.Google Scholar Other details of this period are more questionable (Swoboda, , op. cit., col. 2679Google Scholar). Athen. 602A, inattributing to Epaminondas the formation of the Sacred Band, which was certainly the work of Gorgidas (see p. 256 n. 2), is typical.

^{page 257 note 3} The likely explanation of Pausanias' phrase in 9. 13. 2 is that the peace of 372/1 was in large measure similar to that of 387/6 (cf. Didymus, ad Dem. 10. 34, col. 7 11. 62 ff. on the peace of 375).Google Scholar

^{page 257 note 4} Cf. Lauffer, S., ‘Die Diodordublette xv. 38Google Scholar = 50 über die Friedensschlüβe zu Sparta’, Historia viii (1959), 315 ff.Google Scholar (from much of which, however, I must dissent).

^{page 257 note 5} Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 2;Google Scholar 17 (for the four divisions). Cleombrotus' army must have been much the same as that recalled at the Peace of 375 (6. I. I; for , cf. 4. 6. 3). The four divisions would have produced a Lacedaemonian contingent of perhaps 2,000, and Cleombrotus' army outnumbered the Theban array of about 6,000 (Diod. 15. 52. 2, 53. 2; Plut. Pel. 20); so presumably ‘ the due proportion of the allies’ were there.

^{page 257 note 6} Much confusion has been caused by Xenophon's remarkable brevity on the Peace of 375 at 6. 2. 1. Cf. Accame, , La lega, 91 ff.Google Scholar Plut. Pel. 16 shows that there was a Spartan army in Orchomenus and Phocis in 375, and indeed implies that it was four divisions strong. So Xenophon's account at 6. 1. 1 is wholly acceptable. Isocrates 15. 110 shows that they were withdrawn.

^{page 257 note 7} Phocis was menaced in 375 (Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 1Google Scholar) but not dealt with until after Leuctra (Diod. 15. 57. 1) and this also suggests that the Spartans were there in 372. Cf. Xen. Hell. 6.3.2.Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 1} Cf. Lauffer, S., art. cit. 322 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 2} e.g. Ryder, T. T. B., Koine Eirene (1965), 127.Google Scholar

^{page 258 note 3} For survey of variant views see S. Lauffer, art. cit.

^{page 258 note 4} Lys. 12

^{page 258 note 5} See Jacoby's Commentary on Philochorus F152 and F151 (p. 522 11. 14 ff. and cf. p. 239 11. 37 ff). Philochorus appears to have been Dionysius' sole source for these annalistic notices.

^{page 258 note 6} For the surprise of Plataea, Paus. 9. 1. 5 f. The condition of Thespiae in 372/1 is uncertain. Xenophon Hell. 6. 3. 1,Google Scholar 5 treats it as having suffered the same fate as Plataea, and Diod. 15. 46. 6 (under 374/3) records an assault on the city (… Isocrates however in the Plataicus § 9 (the dramatic date of which is shortly after the seizure of Plataea in 373) speaks of the Thespians and Tanagrans as being treated less severely than the Plataeans, and merely forced into syntely with Thebes, and Paus. 9. 13. 8 and 14. 2, 4 shows that the city still existed after Leuctra. Cf. Fortina, , op. cit. 23 n. 33.Google Scholar Perhaps the true position was that Diodorus' did not fairly reflect Ephorus' account of an attack on the city which ended in the Thespians agreeing , thus making them in Xenophon's phrase (6. 3. 1) , and that Callias exaggerated (6. 3. 5) with

^{page 259 note 1} Xen. Hell. 3. 5. 7–25.Google Scholar

^{page 259 note 2} Andoc. 3. 24 f., 28 and Xen.Hell. 4. 5. 6Google Scholar, 9 for Boeotian attempts to come to terms between 392 and 390. Xen. Hell. 4. 3. 15Google Scholar, 5. 1. 29 for the Spartan division in Orchomenus.

^{page 259 note 3} Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 15, 27.Google Scholar

^{page 259 note 4} Isoc. 14. 29.

^{page 259 note 5} Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 20.Google Scholar

^{page 259 note 6} Tod, , G.H.I. 123 ll. 74, 75.Google Scholar This decree was in the seventh prytany of 378/7, the attack on Thespiae perhaps in the late autumn of 378 (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 42Google Scholar). The movement of the Boeotian to Thebes was before spring 377 (Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 47Google Scholar), and so must have occurred not long before the Decree of Aristotle. So if the Boeotarchy was re-established in early 377, it is understandable that Athens might protest. Her alliance was with Thebes (11. 24 and 79 of the Decree), not Boeotia; the name was important.—For the date of the restoration of the Boeotarchy, see Appendix I.

^{page 260 note 1} Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 1.Google Scholar

^{page 260 note 2} Plut. Pel. 16, Diod. 15. 37.

^{page 260 note 3} If we exempt the notice of Diodorus 15. 38, there is no evidence that Thebes did not readily submit to the Peace of 375 (cf. Lauffer, , art. cit. 318 f.Google Scholar). Sealey, B. R. I., Historia v (1956), 190 ff.Google Scholar sought to interpret Isoc. 14. 37, which speaks of an Athenian decree to make the Thebans for their conduct over Oropus, as support for Diodorus' account. He postulated that when the Peace of 375 was ‘presented to the Synedrion of the Athenian League, the Thebans claimed to swear on behalf of the whole Boeotian League; thereby they claimed to control Oropus, which the Athenians had recently won. So the Thebans were declared ’ Thus Sealey argues similarly to Judeich, W., Rh. Mas. lxxvi (1927), 182.Google Scholar But Diodorus is plainly not referring to the Athenian synedrion (Lauffer, , art cit. 320Google Scholar), and there is no reason to think that the Peace of 375 was ‘presented to the Synedrion of the Athenian League’; it was similar to the Peace of Antalcidas (Philochorus F151), which was sworn in Sparta (Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 32 f.Google Scholar), and probably similar to the peace of 372/1 which was likewise sworn (Xen. Hell. 6, 3. 18 f.Google Scholar). The troubles over Oropus must relate purely to the internal affairs of the Athenian Confederacy, and not necessarily after the Peace of 375. Nor is the phrase appropriate only to the moment when a peace is being made, although it is often so used. Cf. Dem. 23. 91, 17. 16.

^{page 260 note 4} Xen. Hell. 6. 3. 19.Google Scholar

^{page 260 note 5} Beister, H., Untersuchungen zu der Zeit der thebanischen Hegemonie, Munich 1970, 13 ff.,Google Scholar carefully calculated that Plutarch's interval of twenty days between the peace of 372/1 and the battle of Leuctra (Ages. 28. 5, Camillus 19. 2) is ample for the sequence of events.

^{page 260 note 6} Paus. 9. 13. 6f.

^{page 260 note 7} For Leuctra, cf. Wolter, J. in Antike Schlachtfelder iv (Berlin 1926), 290–316,Google Scholar and Anderson, J. K., Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon, ch. x.Google Scholar For the topo-graphy, cf. Pritchett, W. K., Studies in Greek Topography Part I (University of California 1965), ch. iii,Google ScholarBurn, A. R., ‘Helicon in History’, B.S.A. xliv (1949), 313 ff.Google Scholar, and Beister, H., op. cit. 13–59.Google Scholar

^{page 260 note 8} Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 12,Google Scholar Plut. Pel. 23. 1.

^{page 261 note 1} Cf. Thuc. 5. 68. 3.

^{page 261 note 2} There had been minor instances prior to this, but not in major encounters. Cf. Anderson, , op. cit. 179 f.Google Scholar, citing Thuc. 5. 9. 8, 6. 67. 1, and Xen. Anab. 6. 5. 9–11.Google Scholar

^{page 261 note 3} Cf. Anderson, , op. cit. 324 n. 60.Google Scholar Anderson imagines a conflict between Plutarch and Diodorus, the latter meaning that the left wing was thrust forward and so engaged the Spartan right before the Theban right could possibly engage, the former meaning that the whole line did an oblique march to the left as it advanced, the sort of march suddenly required of the Ten Thousand by Cyrus at Cunaxa. But Plutarch's words () suggest that the move to the left was in addition to having the . So Plutarch may well be using the term no differently from Diodorus (here at 15. 55. 2 and at 17.57. 6 of Gaugamela) and the later military writers. Diodorus' use here may well reproduce Ephorus.

^{page 262 note 1} Cf.Hammond, N. G. L., Klio xxxi(1938), 201 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 262 note 2} Cf. Kromayer-Veith, , Heerwesen und Kriegführung (1928), 92.Google ScholarXen. Hell. 3. 2. 16Google Scholar is typical.

^{page 262 note 3} It may be remarked that Xenophon appears quite unaware of the plan of battle which Anderson (p. 216) accepts.

^{page 262 note 4} Hell. 7. 5. 19, 6. 5. 23. Cf. Plut. Mor. 193E. That hoplite armies generally had some sort of training in drill is likely rather than certain. Given the difficulties of advancing over ground broken up by trees, huts, and ditches, and also the infrequency of experience of full-scale battle, one might presume that occasional ‘parades’ would be necessary, although in the case of Athens the evidence is not very satisfactory. Pericles in the Funeral Oration (Thuc. 2. 39) contrasts the of the Spartans with the relaxed life of the Athenians; but the Spartans were constantly training for war, and Pericles' words do not exclude some sort of drill at Athens. Evidently individuals chose to keep themselves in training with arms drill (cf. Plato, Laches 178A, 18 IE), and indeed in Xen. Mem. 3. 12. 5Google Scholar Socrates says that , but that was in a discussion of physical fitness, a different matter from orderly manœuvring. There were regular reviews at Athens (cf. Isoc. 7. 82 , I.G. II ²500 1. 12Google Scholar, Ar. Ath. Pol. 31.2, and cf. S.E.G. 14. 64Google Scholar), and it seems likely enough that they involved drill (cf. Hell. Oxy. 15. 11,Google Scholar where Conon held daily reviews in Rhodes to keep the troops from idleness, presumably more than merely presenting arms, and Xen. Anab. 1. 2. 14 f.Google Scholar where involved a battle-charge). Athens with her reliance on sea-power was probably not typical; other states may have been more assiduous. The of Greece, who regarded Spartan drills as very complicated (Xen. Lac. Pol. 11. 8Google Scholar), must have had parades at which to exercise their art. Men like Phalinus, who claimed to be , had hardly mastered their knowledge in a merely theoretical fashion. Anderson, , op. cit., ch. viGoogle Scholar usefully discusses tactical training, but it would be helpful to have a full account of the practice of Greek states in time of peace.

^{page 263 note 1} Paus. 9. 13. 3. For discussions of where exactly Chaereas was stationed, see Beister, , op. cit. 39.Google Scholar

^{page 263 note 2} Cf. Swoboda, , art. cit., col. 2675.Google Scholar

^{page 263 note 3} Paus. 9. 13. 1.

^{page 263 note 4} It cannot be proved that Epaminondas was not Boeotarch before 371. Plut. Mor. 11290 is of little value and Ages. 27 refers perhaps only to experience in battle, but the epitome of the Plutarchian life in Pausanias (9. 13) passes directly to 371 and, if we exempt the notice of Diod. 15. 38, there is no other evidence concerning Epaminondas between the Liberation and the year of Leuctra. He may have been in office in 372, a quiet enough year, but 373 is unlikely, for he has no part in the evidence about the destruction of Plataea, to which he might well have been opposed (cf. Plut. Comp. Pel. et Marc. 1).

^{page 263 note 5} Cf. Appendix I.

^{page 264 note 1} F 312.

^{page 264 note 2} Cf. Nepos, , Epam. 6. 1.Google Scholar

^{page 264 note 3} Cf. Paus. 9. 13. 2. page 265 note 1G.H.I. 131 (decree of 369/8).

^{page 265 note 2} Paus. 9. 13. 2 suggests that the altercation was before the oath-swearing. (Note the future )

^{page 265 note 3} One would never guess from Xenophon that Epaminondas and his fellow ambassadors are likely to have been in Sparta not as the Theban delegation but as the delegation representing the Boeotian So how they came to be listed as ‘Thebans’ is obscure. Attempts to gloss over the difficulty (e.g. Fortina, op. cit. 25Google Scholar) by supposing that the Thebans were listed as members of the Second Athenian Confederacy fail. They swore city by city according to Xenophon (Hell. 6. 3. 19). Why did the Thebans swear? For earlier discussions cf. von Stern, , op. cit. 125 ff.Google Scholar, and Swoboda, , op. cit., col. 2681.Google Scholar

^{page 265 note 4} Diod. 15. 57. 1, Paus. 9. 14. 4.

^{page 265 note 5} Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 29 ff.Google Scholar and 6. 1. 10f.; Isoc. 5. 119.

^{page 265 note 6} Diod. 15. 57. 2, 60. 1 ff.

^{page 265 note 7} Diod. 15. 62. 3; Dem. 16. 12.

^{page 266 note 1} It has been much discussed whether Sparta was represented in the Peace Congress at Athens after Leuctra. Cf. Sordi, M., Riv. Fil. N.s. xxix (1951), 34–64,Google Scholar and Ryder, , op. cit. 131 f.Google Scholar The arguments are of varying worth, but the one drawn from the remarks of Cleiteles of Corinth in winter 370/69 (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 37Google Scholar) seems to show that Sparta was included in 371/70. When Cleiteles spoke in 369, he spoke in support of the Spartans, and said that if Athens did not help Corinth, she would be acting , and it was the oaths of the peace of 371/70, not those of 372/1, which obliged participants to act against transgressors (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 2Google Scholar compared with 6. 3. 18). Cleiteles then went on to make it clear that he meant the oaths of 371/70——and added , which makes clear that the Spartans were included in 371/70 for they were certainly in . ( cannot mean ‘all the Corinthians’, for only the magistrates had sworn in 371/70—Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 3.Google Scholar)

^{page 266 note 2} The disturbances of Diod. 15. 40 probably go with chapters 38 and 39, and belong to 371.

^{page 266 note 3} Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 6 (of 370).Google Scholar

^{page 266 note 4} Ibid. 6. 5. 7, 6. 4. 18.

^{page 266 note 5} Euphron was ready enough, when the time came, to change his loyalties (Xen. Hell. 7. 3. 2Google Scholar). But in 371/70 the attempt at revolution in Sicyon failed (Diod. 15. 40. 4) and Euphron and his ilk were still loyal to Sparta (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 44Google Scholar).

^{page 266 note 6} Plut. Pel. 25 shows that it was Meneclidas who attacked Epaminondas after his victorious first Peloponnesian campaign. Nepos, , Epam. 5Google Scholar is the only other evidence for him.

^{page 267 note 1} See Appendix II.

^{page 267 note 2} Paus. 9. 14, 7, etc.

^{page 268 note 1} Cf. Thuc. 5. 29. 1 and 81. 1.

^{page 268 note 2} Diod. 15. 57. 1, under 364/3. Pausanias 9. 15. 3 dates the destruction of the city when Epaminondas was ceded command at the time of Pelopidas' arrest (Diod. 15. 71), but Isoc. 6. 27 shows that probably it had not happened by 366. For the absence of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, cf. Paus. loc. cit. and Plut. Comp, Pel. et Marc. 1. If the destruction is rightly dated to 364/3 Pelopidas must have been absent on his final (and fatal) expedition to Thessaly, and Epaminondas presumably on his Aegean diplomacy (see below).

^{page 269 note 1} …

^{page 269 note 2} Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 44.Google Scholar

^{page 269 note 3} Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 6–11Google Scholar and Isocrates' Archidamus. That the participants assented to the Theban demand, so long pressed, for the recognition of the Boeotian state is a presumption. Xenophon and the Isocratean Archidamus studiously prefer the term ’Thebans’. In the Hellenica after recording the King's Peace Xenophon uses ‘Boeotians’ of the federal army only (6. 5. 23, 51; 7. 4. 36.5.4).

^{page 269 note 4} Cf. my article ‘The Common Peace of 366/5’, C.Q. N.S. xi (1961), 80 ff.Google Scholar which was opposed by Ryder, , op. cit. 83 n. 1Google Scholar and Appendix VII, where the only point need ing further comment is the claim that I appear not to have regarded, or appreciated the significance of, ‘Timotheus' re-election to the generalship in 366 and the new approach in the Peloponnese (the alliance with the Arcadians and the attempt to seize Corinth …)’ which ‘seem to show that the Athenians were pursuing a more chauvinistic and “tougher” policy, and were now less likely than before to accept the Theban terms’. As to Timotheus, he may well have been the general favoured by the (cf. Historia xii [1963], 94Google Scholar), and, if he was not sent out to help Ariobarzanes ‘without breaking the treaty with the Great King’ (Dem. 15. 9) after the peace of 366/5, he may have been sent so that Persia might feel it prudent to assent to the modifications demanded by Athens for the Royal Rescript of 367 (cf. C.Q. loc. cit. 85Google Scholar). As to ‘the new approach in the Peloponnese’, Corinth Athens' ally, was a major obstacle to peace. Pasimelus, the celebrated Laconophile of the Corinthian War (Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 4, 7Google Scholar) was still in power (ibid. 7. 3. a), and the city, headquarters of the war against Thebes (Xen. Hell. 7. 1. 28Google Scholar for the meeting of allies there, as suggests), was a congenial home for the equally Laconophile Xenophon (Diog. Laert. 2. 53, 56). Why then should the Athenians have feared that the city might not be The terms in which the Corinthians sought Sparta's permission to join the Peace (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 8Google Scholar) show that there was little inclination to traffic with Thebes, and Xenophon (ibid. 7. 4. 6) seems to suggest that the whole peace movement at Corinth followed on the recognition that without Athenian aid the city was defenceless. So Athens cannot have feared that the city would go over to Thebes. But did the Athenians really mean to seize Corinth? Hardly, for the Athenian hoplites were assembled within Corinth itself (ibid. 7. 4. 5), and the Corinthians cannot have feared seizure. It seems possible enough that the curious clause in the decree of Demotion was inspired by the changing Athenian attitude towards Thebes, by a fear that the Corinth of Pasimelus would prove, as earlier (ibid. 7. 1. 40), the stumbling-block for peace. As for the Arcadian alliance (ibid. 7. 4. 2), it certainly showed a very large change of attitude towards Sparta, and the opposition of ‘certain of the Athenians' was overcome only when they realized that there was advantage to Sparta and Athens if the Arcadians did not need the Thebans as well as the Athenians. Xenophon does not dwell on the motives of those Athenians who positively wanted the alliance—motives that may have been, to use Ryder's word, ‘chauvinistic’, or alternatively of a diplomatic sort; Arcadia would be assured of Athenian help against Sparta, and so would be the more able to join in a Common Peace, especially one that was not a (ibid. 7. 4. 10), i.e. had no sanctions clause. (I therefore must retract my statement on p. 85 of C.Q. N.s. xi [1961]Google Scholar that ‘Thebes occupied in the Peace precisely the position that Sparta had occupied in the King's Peace of 387/6.’ Thebes lacked Sparta's one-time hegemonic position.)

This peace will always divide opinion, until new evidence appears. For the present, judgement depends largely on estimation of Xenophon (whose details may be a good deal more deceptive than Ryder supposes), but, as I continue to hold, not entirely.

^{page 270 note 1} Cf. my article discussed in the preceding note, p. 80 f., and also p. 85 for the suggestion that Ariobarzanes handed over Crithote and Sestos (Nepos, , Tim. 1. 3Google Scholar) under the terms of the Common Peace. (For it is odd that a Persian satrap, whose hyparch could be said by Demosthenes (23. 142) to have held ‘the whole Hellespont’, should have handed over territory to an Athenian general. But Dem. 23. 202 perhaps implies some special services contributed by Timotheus, and Ariobarzanes may have been wavering in loyalty; hence the special instruction to Timotheus of Dem. 15. 9.)

^{page 270 note 2} Cf. Thomes, F. Carrata, Egemonia beotica e potenza marittima nella politico di Epaminonda (Torino 1952)Google Scholar, Fortina, M., op. cit. 77 ff.Google Scholar, and, most recently, Wiseman, J., Klio li (1969), 195f.Google Scholar

^{page 270 note 3} Justin's words (auxitia a Timotheo, Atheniensium duce, mox ab Epaminonda Thebanorum petivere) suggest that the Heracleans appealed to the two duces actually at the Helles pont.

^{page 270 note 4} Accame, , La lega ateniese, 179 n. 3Google Scholar, argues that Byzantium was in revolt from the Second Athenian Confederacy from the mid 360s and cites I.G. VII 2408Google Scholar (a Boeotian proxeny decree for a Byzantian) which he dates 363. He then goes on to attach the special significance to the expression of Diodorus 16. 7. 3 () of meaning that the Byzantians were in a different condition, i.e. they had been in revolt for some time previously. But the date of I.G. VII 2408Google Scholar is quite unsure and could well belong in the 350s (see below) and Diodorus is rather given to such expressions (e.g. 15. 85. 2, 16. 19. 3, 16. 21.1). The beaching of corn-ships (Dem. 50. 6, etc.) does not necessarily argue more than bad relations. Nepos, , Tim. 1Google Scholar (Olynthios et ByzMtios bello subegit) is more substantial, if not literally correct (cf. Isoc. 15. 108–113, who has nothing to say on the subject—perhaps Nepos points to little more than that Timotheus was, according to Dem. 23. 149, ).

^{page 271 note 1} Cf. Thomes, Carrata, op. cit. 13 f.Google Scholar

^{page 271 note 2} It is to be noted that the ship-building decree of Diod. 15. 79. 1 at the same moment ordered the appeals to Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, presumably intending that both should be set in hand forthwith; i.e. there was apparently no question of Epaminondas waiting for ships to be built.

^{page 271 note 3} Cf. Dem. 51. 8, 50. 4, Polyaenus 6. 2. 1–2, Diod. 15. 95. 1 ff.

^{page 271 note 4} It is hard to know what lies behind Plut. Philopoemen 14. 1 f. Epaminondas was certainly not defeated in a sea-battle, or we should have heard of it. Perhaps there is not much more than that he was a bad sailor (cf. Paus. 8. 11. 10), but Plutarch concludes with the remark . The Epaminondas is sadly missed on this topic.

^{page 271 note 5} Seep. 270 n. 4 for Byzantium, and Diod. 11. 7. 3 for the revolt of 357.

^{page 271 note 6} Cf. Fortina, , op. cit. 85Google Scholar on the purpose of the expedition.

^{page 271 note 7} Xen. Hell. 6. 1. 12,Google Scholar Isoc. 5. 119.

^{page 271 note 8} Plut. Mor. 193c preserves a dictum of Epaminondas which might imply antipathy to Persia, but presumably the Great King would not be supposed to be offering large sums of money to Panhellenist politicians.

^{page 272 note 1} Diodorus (15. 78 f.) places the expedition under 364/3, but that proves nothing. An argument of some value is that shortly after appealing unsuccessfully to Epaminondas for help the Heracleans turned to Clearchus (Justin 16. 4. 4), whose tyranny was assigned by Diodorus in a chronographic notice to 364/3 (15. 81. 4). This would be decisive enough if it were not that Diodorus has put one of the notices concerning the rulers of Heraclea in the wrong year. Clearchus after a twelve-year rule was succeeded by Timotheus (16. 36. 3, under 353/2) who in turn after a fifteen-year rule was succeeded by Dionysius (16. 88. 5, under 338/7) who died after a thirty-two year rule (20. 77. 1, under 306/5). If the consistent notices of the successors of Clearchus are correct, Diodorus should have put the notice about Clearchus under 365/4. (Beloch, , G.G. ² iii. 2 p. 94 f.Google Scholar curiously prefers to date Clearchus' accession from the voyage of Epaminondas. He also assigns Diod. 16. 88. 5 to 337/6.) So the argument is not entirely satisfactory, but prompts us to confine the voyage to 365/4 and 364/3.

Pelopidas marched out on his fatal expedition just after 13 July 364 (Plut. Pel. 31), and, if the voyage of Epaminondas began not long before, both could have been absent for the destruction of Orchomenus (cf. p. 268 n. 2). I therefore opt for 364.

The argument of Glotz, G. (‘Un Carthaginois à Thèbes en 365 avant J.-C.’, Mélanges Jorga, Paris 1933)Google Scholar, which sought to connect S.I.G. ³ 179 with the ship-building programme, is not cogent. There is no reason to connect these honours for Nobas the Carthaginian with the ship-building (which probably did not get very far anyhow). To judge by New Comedy and Aristotle's Politics, Carthaginians were frequent enough in fourth-century Greece and Carthage a matter of interest (cf. Gsell, , Histoire de l'Afrique du Nord iv. 152 n. 3Google Scholar). Nobas may well have had commercial dealings with Thebes. Nor must the inscription be dated before 362. It certainly enough belongs to the middle fourth century (Plut. Pel. 35 names two of the Boeotarchs the decree lists—cf. Koehler, U., Hermes xxiv [1889], 637 f.)Google Scholar, but a date in the early 350s is possible. (Indeed Epaminondas' attempt as he lay dying to have Daïphantos and then Iolaïdas take command—Ael. V.H. 12. 3, Plut. Mor. 194c—suggests that they were both notable Boeotarchs in 362 and perhaps earlier. Neither name is in the list of S.I.G. ³ 179. The only year shortly after 362 certainly excluded is 361, when Pammenes held office—Diod. 15. 94.)

^{page 272 note 2} The only evidence for the date is Diod. 18. 18. 9.

^{page 272 note 3} Sealey, B. R. I., Phoenix xi (1957), 95 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar redated I.G. II ²1609Google Scholar to 370/69 (rightly, as I hope to argue elsewhere, despite Davies, J. K., Historia xviii [1969], 308 ff.Google Scholar), but the of line 89 are not necessarily a sign that Athens had embarked on a radical change of policy as early as 369. The ancient cleruchy on Lemnos I.G. II ²30Google Scholar survived the King's Peace (Xen. Hell. 5. 1. 31Google Scholar), and magistrates were sent out to the i sland annually throughout the century (Ath. Pol. 62. 2 and 61. 6).

^{page 272 note 4} Demosthenes' phrase (15. 15) is is the word commonly used for recovering possessions (e.g. Dem. 23. 153, Isoc. 8. 6, 22). are the assets of the fifth-century empire, the of Andoc. 3. 15 and Isoc. 14. 44.

^{page 273 note 1} See above, p. 269 n. 4.

^{page 273 note 2} Admittedly the epitome of the speech in Diodorus 15. 78. 4 seems a frank profession of imperial ambition, but this may have been the Ephoran interpretation of Epaminondas' intentions. (Cf. Isoc. 5. 53 .) But it is very unlikely that Epaminondas was in fact so imprudently blunt.

^{page 272 note 3} Cf. Beloch, , G.G. ² iii. 1 p. 237 f.Google Scholar Despite the very large number of ships in the Athenian navy, their fleets were never in the fourth century as huge as they were in the fifth. The largest number of ships at sea of which we hear was 170 in the Lamian War (Diod. 18. 15.8).

^{page 274 note 1} Cf. Pomtow, H., Klio vi (1906), 94 f.Google Scholar

^{page 274 note 2} Cf. Phocian independence in 362, in contrast with their compliance in 370/69 (Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 4Google Scholar and 6. 5. 23).

^{page 274 note 3} F119, Diod. 15. 79. 2, and 88. 4.

^{page 274 note 4} Polyaenus recorded five of his (5. 16. 1–5). Plut. Mor. 805E–F classed him with Aristides, Phocion, Lucullus, Cato, and Agesilaus, and declared that he rose to eminence under the patronage of Epaminondas, who used him (Paus. 8. 27. 2) to help the Arcadians establish Megalopolis. The young Philip was lodged as hostage with him (Plut. Pel. 26). For his military career after 362, cf. Diod. 15. 94. 2, 16. 34. 1 f., and Dem. 23. 183.

^{page 274 note 5} F119