^{page 200 note 1} Cf. §64.

^{page 200 note 2} Cf. Dem. 23. 169 for Cardian hostility to Athens at an earlier date.

^{page 201 note 1} Save in the Third Philippic. Aeschines (3. 82) mocked Demosthenes for his obsession with these forts, so important to Athens that no one had ever heard their names before.

^{page 201 note 2} Note (Dem. 19. 156).

^{page 201 note 3} Schaefer, , op. cit. ii. 246Google Scholar, presumed there were Athenian forces in these forts. There is no evidence that this was so. If the forces were mercenary and paid by Cersobleptes, it would have needed a Demosthenes to pronounce them Athenian.

^{page 201 note 4} According to Philip ([Dem.] 12. 8) this claim was actually stated in decrees of the In 341 Cersobleptes was still no more than ‘your ally’ (Dem. 10. 8). The more secure Demosthenes' power became, the less did he need to regard the truth.

^{page 202 note 1} In Athenaeus 508 e.

^{page 202 note 2} Aesch. 3. 91–104. See Appendix III.

^{page 202 note 3} Aesch. 3. 103.

^{page 202 note 4} Dem. 19. 75, 204, 219, 326.

^{page 202 note 5} So Wüst, , op. cit., p. 110Google Scholar, in answer to Kahrstedt, , op. cit., p. 72.Google Scholar The only real difficulty arises out of Demosthenes' account of Philip's acts of in 10. 8 and g. He seems there to be following chronological order and he puts the destruction of Porthmus before the Megarian affair of summer 343 (vide supra). Yet in a similar review in 18. 71 he puts the destruction of Porthmus not only after the Megarian affair, but also after the Macedonian occupation of Oreus. Comparison of the two passages suggests that in 10. 8 and 9 he compressed a whole series of events concerning Eretria and misdated it. If this were not so and the destruction of Porthmus by Macedonian troops belonged to 343, both the silence of Hege-iippus and Athens' negotiations with Clitarchus would be hard to explain.

^{page 202 note 6} Aeschines' statement (3. 90) that Callias: urned to Athens need not be taken seriously. If there were anything much in it, one would lave expected more about it from Demoshenes.

^{page 203 note 1} The sons of Philiades were the only Messenians named by Demosthenes in his black list of guilty men (18. 295).

^{page 204 note 1} Oreus. Cf. Dem. 9. 59 and, for example, 8. 36.

^{page 204 note 2} Cf. 18. 46.

^{page 204 note 3} 9. 37; 18. 61, 247; 19. 259, 300.

^{page 204 note 4} There are literally dozens of references bearing on these accusations.

^{page 204 note 5} Cf. Horace, Odes 3. 16. 13 f.; Plut. Aem. Paul. 12; Cic. ad Att. 1. 16. 7.

^{page 204 note 6} Cf. Dem. 19. 294, where it is said that there was bound to be corrupt practice in Megara. Aeschines accused Demosthenes of taking bribes (3. 103)—a foretaste of accusations to come.

^{page 204 note 7} Dem. 19. 139; Theopompus F 162

^{page 204 note 8} Cf. Cloché, , op. cit., p. 26.Google Scholar

^{page 204 note 9} See my article, ‘Aeschines and die ruin of Phocis in 346’, in R.É.G. lxxv (1962), 453.Google Scholar

^{page 204 note 10} 19. 145.

^{page 204 note 11} 18. 41.

^{page 204 note 12} The fact that Demosthenes called Olynthians to bear witness to his statements about Philocrates (19. 146) is not very impressive; Demosthenes was suspected of fabricating evidence (Aeschin. 2. 154 f.).

^{page 205 note 1} The archon date is furnished by Philochorus F 158 and it seems fair to infer from Hegesippus' remarks in [Dem.] 7. 41 f. that the Cardians were not yet directly menaced by Diopeithes. Presumably cleruchs were normally established early enough in the summer to enable them to prepare the ground for sowing. For a conspectus of views see Wiist, , op. cit., p. 114 n. 5.Google Scholar

^{page 205 note 2} Dem. 8. 6 and Hypothesis § 1; Dem. 9, 15.

^{page 205 note 3} Aeschin. 2. 72.

^{page 205 note 4} Dem. 8. 2, 35.

^{page 205 note 5} Dem. 5. 25.

^{page 205 note 6} Dem. 8. 8 and Hypothesis § 3; [Dem.] 12. 3.

^{page 205 note 7} Dem. 8. 16, 62 () and Hypothesis § 3. Demosthenes asserted (8. 58 and 9. 35) that Philip had actually sent forces into Cardia but this presumably was exag geration, for Philip's letter merely threatened intervention.

^{page 205 note 8} This seems a reasonable inference from the fact that Artaxerxes sent a gift to Diopeithes which did not reach him until after his death (Arist. Rhet. 1386^a14). Pohlenz, , Hermes lxiv (1929), 46,Google Scholar inferred from I.G. ii.² 228 (a decree of early 340) that he was replaced by Chares, but there is no indication of when Chares was sent out to the Chersonese.

^{page 205 note 9} In this section I have confined myself to the matters which Demosthenes regarded as showing Philip's aggressive intentions towards Athens. Perhaps something should be added about north-west Greece. Certainly Philip's activities in southern Epirus ([Dem.] 7. 32) must have disquieted Corinth, but they came to nothing: Philip did not attack Ambracia (Dem. 9. 72). Demosthenes claimed the credit for this (cf. 18. 244) but it is unlikely that Philip was deterred either by Demosthenes' diplomatic activity or by the Athenian expedition to Acarnania (Dem. 48. 24 and 26). Demosthenes probably exaggerated his own importance. It is to be noted that Corinth, which would have been especially concerned with the safety of Ambracia, did not enter into alliance with Athens in 342 (see W st, op. cit., p. 94 n. 1). Doubtless Demosthenes and Callias had much to say about the dangers of the situation in their embassies of early 342 (cf. Aeschin. 3. 94 f. and see Appendix III for the date), and they returned to Athens in high hopes of creating a union of Peloponnesian states. But it is clear from Aeschines (cf. § 99 § 100 ) that nothing came of it all. (The syntaxis of 15,000 hoplites and 2,000 cavalry of Plut. Dem. 17 is not the force proposed in 342, for which Aeschines gives different totals, but the force of Dem. 18. 237, which fought at Chaeronea.) The sum total of alliances for 343/2 is listed by the Scholiast on Aeschin. 3. 83, and of these the Achaeans alone appear to have fought at Chaeronea (Paus. 7. 6. 5). Their fear was that Philip would favour the claim of the Aetolians to Naupactus (Dem. 9. 34), as indeed he subsequently did (cf. R.-E. xvi. 2, col. 1990Google Scholar), and no doubt they were ready to respond to the appeal of Demosthenes and Callias. Corinth and Megara, however, did not stir. The meeting of the Synedrion, promised for 16th Anthesterion (Aeschin. 3. 98), did not happen. In the last prytany of the year Messene entered into alliance (I.G. ii.² 225), probably out of fear of Sparta, not of Philip, and the adhesion of other allies listed by the Scholiast was probably for the same reason. There are no good grounds for asserting that Greece in general felt itself menaced by Philip in early 542 and that Demosthenes' analysis of the lituation was widely shared.

^{page 206 note 1} The date of Dem. 8 and 9 is derived rom Dionysius of Halicarnassus Ad Amm. 10 and the allusions in 8. 14 and 18. Only Pohlenz, , loc. cit., p. 46 n. 2Google Scholar, has wanted to reject this and put the speeches in early 542 on the strength of the Scholiast to Aeschin. 3. 83. But Philip's protest was occasioned by Diopeithes' invasion of Thrace, and there is no reason to think that this happened in the same year as the fighting over Cardian land began.

^{page 206 note 2} Pace Beloch, Att. Pol., pp. 216 f. However, Pohlenz's, reasons (loc. cit., p. 45Google Scholar) for ejecting Beloch are unsound. The connexion between Hegesippus and Diopeithes is clear enough (Aeschin. 1. 63).

^{page 206 note 3} There is no evidence that Demosthenes was in any way or on any ocasion after 346 opposed to Hegesippus.

^{page 206 note 4} Cf. Isoc. First Epistle to Philip § 15.

^{page 206 note 5} The occasion of Hegesippus' frank declaration that he was bent on war (Plut. Mor. 187 e) is not known. shows that it was after 346. 1 Philoch. F 56 B. It was after Philip declared war in 340 ([Dem.] 11. 4).

^{page 207 note 1} The date of Dem. 8 and 9 is derived from Dionysius of Halicarnassus Ad Amm. 10 and the allusions in 8. 14 and 18. Only Pohlenz, loc. cit., p. 46 n. 2, has wanted to reject this and put the speeches in early 342 on the strength of the Scholiast to Aeschin. 3. 83. But Philip's protest was occasioned by Diopeithes' invasion of Thrace, and there is no reason to think that this happened in the same year as the fighting over Cardian land began.

^{page 207 note 2} e.g. by Beloch, G.G. iii.² 1, p. 507, and Jaeger, , Demosthenes, pp. 161 and 178.Google Scholar

^{page 207 note 3} Aeschin. 2. 141 and 143.

^{page 207 note 4} For the position of see BusoltSwoboda, G.St., pp. 1246f. Pericles had been of the Spartan King, Archidamus, in the years before 431 (Thuc. 2. 13. 1), but his policy was hardly Alcibiades was able to resume his family's Spartan during the Archidamian War (Thuc. 6. 89. 2). If had implied anything about a statesman's policy, Aeschines would have had a great deal more to say in 343 and 330 about Demosthenes' relation to Thebes.

^{page 207 note 5} This is to be inferred from the words which Aeschines (2. 106 f.) imputed to Demosthenes, but which Demosthenes can not actually have uttered.

^{page 207 note 6} It is not clear to what Demosthenes referred in his statement that Eubulus ‘constantly wanted to make this treaty of friendship’ (18. 162).

^{page 207 note 7} Jaeger, , op. cit, pp. 161 and 251 n. 20,Google Scholar claimed that Dem. 5. 15, 18, and 24 showed that Demosthenes wanted a concert with Thebes. Of these passages Jaeger appears to mistranslate § 24 (Demosmenes was not proposing that Thebes should be allowed to keep Oropus); § 15 merely contains the suggestion that Thebes would not want to join Philip in a war against Athens, where only he could profit (for they would certainly suffer). § 18 does appear to protest against Athenian bitterness against Thebes, as might be expected from a proxenus, but this is very far from proposing that Athens should ally with Thebes.

^{page 208 note 1} Seep. 167 n. 1.

^{page 208 note 2} C.Q. N.S. xii (1962), 134f.Google Scholar

^{page 209 note 1} It is not clear that Demosthenes' view of the situation in 344 was not clouded by the hope of somehow recovering Amphipolis. In 5. 14 he spoke of war being renewed with Philip He must have realized that Philip would never yield by negotiation to Hege-sippus' demand for Amphipolis, but he may still have dreamed of recovering it in the war he was so anxious to bring about.

^{page 210 note 1} See Wüst, , op. cit., pp. 110f.Google Scholar, and Cloché, , op. cit., p. 238.Google Scholar

^{page 210 note 2} Cf. Charax, (F. Gr. Hist. 103) F 19.Google Scholar

^{page 210 note 3} Cf. Beloch, , op. cit. iii. 2, p. 292.Google Scholar Jacoby's answer in his commentary on Philoch. F. 160 is not entirely clear.

^{page 211 note 1} Dem. 18. 82 alleged that Aeschines had the representatives of both Philistides and Clitarchus staying in his house when the rejected their claims (presumably vis-à-vis Callias and his League). Even if true, this would not prove Aeschines was necessarily closely linked with Clitarchus.

^{page 211 note 2} 8. 18, 36, 5959. 12, 33, 57f.

^{page 211 note 3} Dem. 9. 58 and Carystius ap. Ath. 508 e.

^{page 211 note 4} Dem. 9. 62.

^{page 211 note 5} Dem. 9. 58.

^{page 211 note 6} Cf. Jacoby's commentary on Philoch. F 158. The fact that the Scholiast does not mention the Euboean cities in his list of alliances does not prove that Callias' negotiations do not fall in 343/2. The Scholiast confined himself to elucidating Aeschin. 3. 83. By the time he came to § 95, where he could have helped us about the Euboean League, his comments had become very sketchy.

^{page 211 note 7} The history of this movement is obscure but the coinage of Eretria shows that the resistance to Athenian imperialism in the fifth century in Euboea as elsewhere, e.g. in Ghalcidice, Rhodes, and Boeotia, took the form of a movement for federal unity. Cf. Head, H.N.², p. 362, for coins with inscription EYB or EYBOI. Thucydides affords supporting evidence. He was careful in his use of names (cf. Clement, and Robinson, , Excavations at Olynthus, ix. 122 n. 55,Google Scholar for his careful use of rather than , and, except at 1. 98. 3, he reserves the term for the peoples of Euboea when they were in opposition to the Athenians. The history of this movement in the fourdi century is less clear, because neither Xenophon nor Demosthenes can be relied on for exact usage, but inscriptions (e.g. I.G. ii.² 16, 43, and 44) suggest that Athens continued to support the anti-federalists. This may lie behind Xenophon's use of at Hellenica 6. 5. 23, or Demosthenes' at 8. 74 (of Athenian help in 357/6 to Euboea before the cities returned to the Second Athenian Confederacy, which they rejoined in fact separately—as I.G. ii.² 124 shows) and at 4. 37 (of Philip's letter in the late 350's). The only evidence which might be opposed to this has, I believe, been wrongly dated. I.G. ii.² 149, which is concerned with an alliance between Athens and was assigned by Koehler to the 350's by reason of the style of lettering and confidently related by Woodward, in J.H.S. xxviii (1908), 307,Google Scholar to the settlement of Euboea in 357, despite the fact that I.G. ii.² 124 showed that the Euboean cities made separate alliances. I suggest that the inscription in fact records the alliance between Athens and the Euboean League in 342 (vide infra). (In passing it may be noted that there is no necessity to read in line 8, or in line 24. Woodward's suggestions in J.H.S. xxx (1910), 266,Google Scholar of and have the merit of reducing line 24 to its proper length and eliminate a name alien to 342, for by then Histiaea was known as Oreus; cf. Aristotle, Politics 1303^a for an allusion to the grandfather (probably) of the in line 7.) Conversely, I.G. ii.² 230 should be connected with the settlement of 357, when Eretria rejoined the Athenian alliance (cf. lines 12 to 16 with lines 4 to 7 of I.G. ii.² 124).

^{page 212 note 1} Aeschin. 3. 89 f. 2 In a separate expedition. Cf. in Philoch. F 160. The use of this phrase in contrast to the plain of F 159 suggests a different explanation of the fact that two separate generals were involved in the operations in Euboea from that of Beloch, , op. cit. iii.²293,Google Scholar who took it as evidence that the two expeditions were separated by a long interval of time. At some time Cephisophon of Aphidna was general on Sciathus. Pace Kroll in R.-E. xi. 1, col. 240,Google Scholar and Kirchner, Pros. Att. 8410, there is no reason to assign his period as general on Sciathus to 340; neitiier I.G. ii.² 1623. 35 (of 333/2) nor I.G. ii.² 1629. 484 (of 325/4) furnish any date (and it may be re marked in passing that I.G. ii.² 1622. 213 is not evidence that he was trierarch in the year he led the attack on Oreus). I suggest that he was on Sciathus in 342/1 and conducted the operation from there. After all, if Philip was sending forces into Euboea (Dem. 9. 57 f.), the island of Sciathus was an important position, and one would expect it to be occupied in 342/1, and if it was occupied it was the right base for assaulting Oreus. For Eretria it was better to send another force across under Phocion, who knew the terrain by bitter experience. Cf. Dem. 8. 36, where he says that Philip established two tyrants in Euboea,

^{page 212 note 2} In a separate expedition. Cf. δι⋯βησαν εἰς Ὲπετπἰαν in Philoch. F 160. The use of this phrase in contrast to the plain of F 159 suggests a different explanation of the fact that two separate generals were involved in the operations in Euboea from that of Beloch, op. cit. iii.2 293, who took it as evidence that the two expeditions were separated by a long interval of time. At some time Cephisophon of Aphidna was general on Sciathus. Pace Kroll in R.-E. xi. 1, col. 240, and Kirchner, Pros. Ait. 8410, there is no reason to assign his period as general on Sciathus to 340; neither I.G. ii.² 1623. 35 (of 333/2) nor I.G. ii.2 1629. 484 (of 325/4) furnish any date (and it may be remarked in passing that I.G. ii.2 1622. 213 is not evidence that he was trierarch in the year he led the attack on Oreus). I suggest that he was on Sciathus in 342/1 and conducted the operation from there. After all, if Philip was sending forces into Euboea (Dem. 9. 57 f.), the island of Sciathus was an important position, and one would expect it to be occupied in 342/1, and if it was occupied it was the right base for assaulting Oreus. For Eretria it was better to send another force across under Phocion, who knew the terrain by bitter experience. Cf. Dem. 8. 36, where he says that Philip established two tyrants in Euboea,

^{page 212 note 3} Dem. 9. 12, and 33.

^{page 213 note 1} Since Philistides had popular support (Dem. 9. 61), there were many who could be treated as Philippizers.

^{page 213 note 2} 3. 91 f.

^{page 213 note 3} See p. 211 n. 7 for the suggestion that I.G. ii.² 149, an alliance between Athens and ‘the Euboeans’, is the fruit of these negotiations.

^{page 213 note 4} Pace the comment on I.G. xii (9), 207, a document of the early third century.