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Demosthenes' Policy After The Peace Of Philocrates. I1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

G. L. Cawkwell
Affiliation:
University College, Oxford

Extract

In 346 the Athenians were sadly deceived by Philip. The long war for Amphipolis had taken its toll and the people wanted relief, but the real motive of those who wanted peace in 346, both Philocrates with his principal abettor Demosthenes, and Eubulus and Aeschines, was to try to keep Philip out of Greece itself.2 In Elaphebolion the only debate was about means, whether, as Aeschines wanted, to try to get Phocis included in a Common Peace, or, as Demosthenes with a clearer view of what Philip would accept urged, to make a separate peace and alliance and leave the salvation of Phocis to the future: he probably thought that, if Philip should afterwards attack Phocis, Athens could choose between her allies and, as in 352, rush to the aid of Phocis.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1963

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References

2 Gf. Aesch. 2. 36Google Scholar and 37 (defence of the Gates).

3 Cf. Cawkwell, , R.É.G. lxxiii (1960), 416 f.Google Scholar

4 Cf. ibid. Ixxv (1962), 453 f.

5 F.G.H. 115 T 19 and F 27, 162, 224.Google Scholar

6 Cf. Hdt. 5. 22Google Scholar and see Geyer, , Make-donien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps, ii. 32 f., 47 f., 97 f.Google Scholar, and Cloché, , Histoire de la Macédoine, pp. 97102.Google Scholar

7 e.g. Wilcken, , Philipp II von Makedonien und die panhllenische Idee, pp. 7 f.Google Scholar

1 F.G.H. 328 F 157.Google Scholar

2 The annual rise and fall of the Nile at Cairo averages about 14 feet between the minimum in late May and the maximum in mid-September.

3 Babelon, , Traié des monnaies, ii. 2, p. 583.Google Scholar

4 Cf. Kent, Roland G., Old Persian Grammar, p. 161.Google Scholar

5 For the Dream of Nektanebo vide infra.

6 Vide infra.

7 Commentary, p. 532.Google Scholar

8 Cf. Foucart, , Étude sur Didyme, p. 162.Google Scholar

9 pp. 94 f.

10 G.G. iii 2. 2, pp. 284–7.Google Scholar

11 Loc. cit. in note 7.

1 Text in Wilcken, , Urkunden der Ptole-mäerzeit i, no. 81Google Scholar, English translation in Olmstead, , History of the Persian Empire, pp. 438 f.Google Scholar

2 ‘La cronologia delle vittorie persiane e la caduta di Ermia di Atarnco, in Diodoro Siculo’, v (1959), 109. For a dis cussion of this attempt to rearrange the whole chronology see Appendix II.

3 Cf. Kahrstedt, , Forschungen, pp. 7 f.Google Scholar, Beloch, , loc. cit.Google Scholar, and Sordi, , art. cit, pp. 107 f.Google Scholar

4 The full text is most conveniently found in Bickermann-Sykutris, , Speusipps Brief an König Philipp (Sitzungsberichte der Sächsi-schen Akademie, Phil.-hist. Klasse, 1928).Google Scholar Most of the text is to be found in F.G.H. ii A 69, pp. 3537.Google Scholar

5 Note 18 to the Commentary on F. 157.

6 See Appendix I.

7

8 For the dating of Hermias, see Kahrstedt, , op. cit., pp. 10 f.Google Scholar For discussion of the views of Sordi, , art. cit., see Appendix II.Google Scholar

1 The Persians knew by experience the danger of not starting the attack in good time. Cf. Diod. 16. 43. 4 for the expedition of 373, which was flooded out.Google Scholar

2 In addition, the commissariat needed careful long-term planning. The sort of pre parations described in Theopompus F 263 could not be hurried. Cf. Diod. 16. 41. 5 for the detail of fodder.Google Scholar

3 Cf. Isoc. 5. 125 f., 4. 135Google Scholar; Xen. Anab. 2. I. 14, 5. 13.Google Scholar

4 Diod. 15. 38. I.Google Scholar For the correct date of the Peace of 375 see my article ‘Notes on the Peace of 375/4’ in Historia xii (1963), 88 f.Google Scholar

5 It is to be noted that Diodorus breaks his narrative after the capture of Sidon and resumes under a new archon. The general impression his account makes, however, is of one campaign. The truth is that his habits in chronology are such that any precise inferences are dangerous. After all, the only indication of interval between the expedition of 351/0 and that of 343/2 is (16. 43. 1 under 351).

6 Quoted by Jacoby with Philochorus F. 157. Notice .

7 Ad Amm. 10, p. 737.Google Scholar

1 e.g. Kahrstedt, , op. cit., p. 15Google Scholar; Pickard-Cambridge, , Demosthenes and the Last Days of Greek Freedom, p. 315Google Scholar; Wüst, , op. cit., p. 65.Google Scholar

3 e.g. Beloch, , G.G. iii2. 2, p. 290.Google Scholar

3 Calhoun, G. M., T.A.P.A. lxiv (1933), 1 f.Google Scholar, rejected the evidence of the Hypothesis to the speech, but has found few supporters. Cf. Wüst, , op. cit., p. 57, n. 1.Google Scholar

4 Commentary (on Philochorus F 157), p. 532.Google Scholar

5 Cf. Beloch, , loc. cit.Google Scholar

1 Op. cit, pp. 69 f.Google Scholar

2 Dion. Hal. Ad Amm. 10, p. 737, said the speech was delivered .Google Scholar

1 Wüst, , op. cit., p. 65Google Scholar, argued that the Second Philippic cannot be Demosthenes' answer to Python because it did not discuss Python's proposals about peace. This is wrong. The whole speech seeks to show the hollowness of the proposals.

2 Philip preferred charm to abuse. Cf. Cloché, , Un Fondateur d'empire, pp. 24 f.Google Scholar

3 One may note the distinctions made by Demosthenes in the Second Philippic (§§ 29 and 30). For the attack on Proxenus see Dem. 19. 280 with scholiast, and Din. 1. 63.Google Scholar

4 One consequence of identifying the em bassy of Python with that recorded by Philochorus early in 344/3 is that the period during which Philip's proposal for the amendment of the Peace of Philocrates was under consideration is extended from about twelve to eighteen months: for it was still open when Hegesippus dealt with further offers from Philip in early 343 ([Dem.] 7). Some may find this interval long, but in truth whether it was a matter of my eighteen or the usual twelve months the interval needs explanation. Although the only evidence, that of the speeches, is not very satisfactory, the position seems to be that, although there was a lapse after the return of Hegesippus' embassy in the course of 344/3 (cf. Dem. 19. 331Google Scholar), the proposal which had been accepted by Athens, ([Dem.] 7. 30Google Scholar) might still have been carried out (cf. Dem. 19. 204Google Scholar and vide infra) and was definitely put forward again by Philip in early 342 in the letter [Dem.] 7. 34Google Scholar) brought by the Macedonian embassy (ibid., § 1), whose formal business was perhaps the negotiation of (ibid., § 9). After Hegesippus' speech no more is heard of the matter. The negotiations were long and came to nothing because politicians like Demosthenes and Hegesippus kept using them for their own ends, but in itself the long interval of eighteen months is not impossible.

5 Since Meyer, , ‘Isokrates' zweiter Brief an Philipp und Demosthenes' zweite Philippika’, S.B. Preuss. Akad. (phil.-hist. Classe), 1909, pp. 760f.Google Scholar

1 Dem. u. s. Z. ii 2. 345.Google Scholar

2 It is common to assign to 345 the founda tion of colonies (cf. Wüst, , op. cit., p. 54Google Scholar, and Schaefer, , op. cit., p. 344Google Scholar, and note Justin 8. 5. 7–6. I), but these would not have re quired Philip's presence or the use of his whole military power. On the other hand, on the common hypothesis that he cam paigned against the Illyrians in the first half of 344 and intervened in Thessaly in the second, there is barely room for his cam paign. Isoc. 5. 21Google Scholar says that by 346 Philip had mastered the mass of the Illyrians and, as Meyer, , op. cit., p. 761Google Scholar, remarked, the Pleuratus who wounded Philip on this campaign (Didymus, , col. 12, I. 65Google Scholar) probably dwelt right over near Scodra (cf. Polyb. 2. 2. 4).Google Scholar So a full campaigning season would have been necessary, and this, as well as the argument adduced in the text, argues for 345 as the date of his campaign and the letter of Isocrates.

3 The date is provided by Dion. Hal. Ad Amm. 10, p. 737.Google Scholar Cf. § 11 of the second hypothesis to Dem. 19.

4 Both in substance and in language. The ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ tides recur ad nauseam in even the best books, e.g. Wüst; they are useful only when not taken literally. Yet it is easy to slip into the habit of taking them literally, and in general Greek history is bedevilled by the practice, not just with re gard to Philip, but almost universally—? tyrants, Persia, Sparta, Thebes. A supreme instance is Kahrstedt's view of Demosthenes as the servant of Persian interests. Such crudities are only too frequent. It is best to avoid the ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ language which expresses them.

5 If the story in Plutarch, (Mor. 342 b, c)Google Scholar about Alexander's dealing with a Persian embassy in Philip's absence is true, it prob ably belongs to 341 or after. Cf. Wüst, , op. cit., p. 89 n. 2. But it is perhaps fictitious.Google Scholar

6 e.g. Schaefer, , op. cit. ii. 33Google Scholar; Pickard-Cambridge, , op. cit., p. 191 n. I.Google Scholar

7 Cf. Kahrstedt, , op. cit., p. 139Google Scholar; Momi-gliano, , Filippo il Macedone, p. 139 n. 1Google Scholar; Wüst, , op. cit., pp. 89 f.Google ScholarBeloch, , op. cit. iii 2. I, p. 538 n. 1, puts the alliance after the conquest of Egypt.Google Scholar

1 Cf. Arrian, , Anab. I. II. 58, 1. 16. 6 f., 2. 14. 4Google Scholar; Plut. Alex. 34.Google Scholar

2 Cf. Dem. 15. 24.Google Scholar

3 i.e. at the end of the Social War.

4 There is no precise evidence about the development of Philip's plans. There was no point in warning the Persians. Some have thought that it was not until he had triumphed over Greece and founded the League of Corinth that he turned his thoughts to Persia: that is why he was not appointed leader of the war until 336 (Justin 9. 5. 2 ff.). But the story of the torturing of Hermias (Didymus, col. 5, I. 64 f.Google Scholar, F.G.H. 124 F 2 and 3Google Scholar) shows both that the Persians were suspicious and that Hermias probably knew something of the preparations to which Demosthenes in 341 alluded (10. 32). Indeed the Persians aided Perindius in 341/0 as a means of checking these preparations (Diod. 16. 75. 1Google Scholar). Some may doubt whether Philip, despite Isocrates' letters, had any serious idea earlier than 341 of attacking Persia, but his very refusal to follow up the victory of 346 was, as the source of Diod. 16. 60. 5 saw, a sign that he was aiming at the domination of more than Greece. Perhaps the vague promises which he was said to have made in proposing the extension of the Peace of Philocrates reflect his plans. Both in the letter he sent with Python and in the letter of early 342 he indicated that he intended to do great things for Athens if she would only work with him ([Dem.] 7. 3335).Google Scholar I suspect that he was alluding darkly to plans for colonization. Note especially § 35 Isocrates understood.

1 Or earlier. See p. 135 n. 1.

2 Dem. 6. 14.Google Scholar

3 The cities of Phocis, with the exception of Abae, had been destroyed in 346 (Paus. 10. 3. 1Google Scholar; Dem. 19. 325)Google Scholar, but their condition must have changed by 343 when came to support Aeschines, (Aesch. 2. 142).Google Scholar Of course, this may be a misleading description, but the cities were rebuilt and, to judge by Demosthenes' allusion to Elatea (6. 14), not long after the peace. By 342/1 there was an archon for Phocis, (S.I.G. 3 231Google Scholar) and there was no Macedonian garrison in the state in 339/8. (Cf. R.-E. xx. 1, col. 490.)Google Scholar

4 Cf. Dem. 9. 34Google Scholar for the seizure of Echinus. Also it is to be noted that despite the vague phrase of 8. 63 , repeated in the Fourth Philippic (§ 64), at 9. 27 Demosthenes speaks as if Thebes as well as Athens was menaced by the ‘tyrannies’ in Euboea.

5 He was certainly alive after Chaeronea, (Plut. Mor. 760 A and B).Google Scholar

1 Dem. 18. 64 for Argive neutrality.Google Scholar

2 By the date of the trial of Aeschines, with Nicostratus and 3,000 hoplites in Egypt (Diod. 16. 44. I)Google Scholar, the position had changed somewhat (Dem. 19. 261Google Scholar), but early in 342 it changed again and the Athenian alliance, then formed, endured (Schol. Aesch. 3. 83).Google Scholar

3 This embassy of 340 (note the tense of in the Letter of Philip) was not successful, for there are no signs in 339/8 that Persia was obliged by to help Athens. No doubt, after the rebuff of 344/3 the Great King was in the mood which he subsequently displayed in the letter to the alluded to in Aesch. 3. 238.Google Scholar

4 Wüst, , op. cit., p. 67Google Scholar, professed to discern a change in Demosthenes' attitude towards the Great King between the Second Philippic (§ 11) and the speech On the Embassy (§ 253), and, since he put the Persian appeal in 343, took this change as a sign that Demosthenes wished to accept the proposed alliance. Since, however, the Persian appeal came in early 344/3, the manner in which he referred to the Great King in the Second Philippic (§11) supports the view taken in the text. In any case it is doubtful whether Wiist is right to contrast the two passages in the way he does.

1 The practically universal opinion is that it was Androtion who moved the response to Persia. Cf. Wüst, , op. cit., pp. 66 f.Google Scholar, and Jacoby's commentary on Philoch, . F. 157.Google Scholar The opinion is based on Diels's supplement of Didymus, , col. 8, 1. 15Google Scholar (… his Commentary on Androtion (p. 90, 11. 22 f.) has a great deal to say about the Panhellenism of Androtion, all resting on this supplement. Is it the right one ? is hardly the word one would expect to find in a literary source: for it is inept; for mere proposal would be the historian's word. The supplement has in fact found favour for want of a better. I suggest as no worse at any rate …] or …], the former being two letters longer, the latter one, than the supplement of Diels which is itself one letter short of the possible (to judge by the copy of the papyrus on p. 34 of Diels-Schubart, Didymus). In any case, there is no need to seek for an explanation of why Didymus quoted Philochorus rather than Androtion or Anaximenes: Philochorus was here suitably brief, and Didymus constantly preferred him.

2 Dem. 14. 12.Google Scholar

3 Dem. 19. 10, etc.Google Scholar

4 Dem. 6. 15.Google Scholar

1 [Dem.] 7. 19 ff.Google Scholar

2 Zosimus, , Vita Isocratis, p. 256, 91 W.Google Scholar, quoted by Jacoby, in F.G.H. 324 T 2 B.Google Scholar

3 Paus. 4. 28. 2.Google Scholar

4 Aesch. 3. 70.Google Scholar

5 [Dem.] 7. 30Google Scholar Hegesippus spoke here as if it was Athens who had proposed it, but see §§ 18 and 26.

1 Kennedy, Pace, who understood Demosthenes to refer to 'the dilatoriness of the ambassadors' in 346 (The Orations of Demosthenes, ii. 180).Google Scholar

2 This is clear in any case from [Dem.] 7. 30.Google Scholar

3 §§ 87, 204, 295, 326.

4 Ad Amm. 10, p. 738.Google Scholar

1 Both Memnon and Mentor were probably ‘enrolled as benefactors’ of the king (cf. R.-E. xv, cols. 652 and 964Google Scholar) and Demosthenes' words in 10. 31 are perhaps best applied to individuals. Further, as Mr. Griffith has pointed out, the Persian help to Thrace, mentioned in Alexander's letter, probably preceded the attack on Perinthus, by which time Philip had completed the conquest of Thrace (Diod. 16. 71 and 74)Google Scholar; so 341 is a suitable date for the Persian help.

The only other serious possibility seems to me to be the Thebans, who had rendered the king such signal service in the recovery of Egypt, and whom he had favoured amongst the Greeks since 367. But other references to Thebes in the speech (§§ 64 and 67) do not support this, and, although Theban relations with Philip were no doubt deteriorating, would be far too strong a word. So I much prefer Mr. Griffith's suggestion, which goes beyond the similar explanation of the passage by Croiset (in the Budé, edition, Harangues ii. 128).Google Scholar

2 In a forthcoming article on Eubulus, in J.H.S. Ixxxiii (1963).Google Scholar

3 It is prior to 335/4 (Bus.-Swob. G.S., p. 1043 n. 1).Google Scholar

4 In a paper not yet published.

1 How far into columns 2 and 3 of the papyrus the discussion of dating extended we cannot know. The reference to Byzantium in line 23 of column 2 and to the Great King in line 28 may belong to it: certainly there is nothing in the early part of the speech which elucidates the remains of the summary of the contents of the column given at the top, and so the contents of the column may well be part of the introductory remarks.

2 As he would appear to have done in the dating of Dem. 13 (cf. col. 13 of the papyrus).

3 There is another translation in Olm-stead, , op. cit., p. 437.Google Scholar

4 Sordi contends that this decree was not passed in answer to a Persian appeal, but in the Panhellenist high spirits of the in late 347/6. If this were right, Artaxerxes need not have subsequently asked whether Athens kept her .

1 So either Strabo is wrong in saying that Aristotle left when Hermias was arrested or Dionysius has the wrong date.

2 Mr. E. Sollberger points out that the king is referred to as ‘Ochus, who is called Artaxerxes’ whereas one would have ex pected the Babylonian scribe to give the Greek name as the alternative one. Again, as Mr. P. A. Hulin has pointed out to me, in mat Si-da-nu first the determinative mat indicating ‘country’ or ‘district’ as opposed to ‘town’ is rare, and secondly the usual spelling is Si-dun-nu.

1 For the chronology of Tachos see Kienitz, , Die politische Geschickte Ägyptens, pp. 175f.Google Scholar

2 Babelon, , Traité des mommies, ii. 2, p. 582Google Scholar, assigned the coins of Mazaeus bearing the number 1 to 4 to the first years of Arta-xerxes Ochus. Leuze, , Die Satrapieneinteilung, pp. 236 f.Google Scholar, argued strongly that these coins relate to the reigns of Arses and Darius. If perchance Babelon were right, the series would end in the year of our tablet, and it might be that the intervention of the Great King in Phoenicia in 355 led to the confinement of Mazaeus to Cilicia and the appointment of Belesys to Syria (for whom see Leuze, , op. cit., pp. 350 f.Google Scholar). However, Leuze is probably correct about the dating of these coins.