¹ Demetr. Lac. P.Herc. 1012, cols. LXVI–LXVIII Puglia; Cic. Att. 7.2.4 = 125 SB; Arr. Epict. Diss. 1.23; Plut. De amore prolis 495A–C, Adv. Col. 1123A; Lactant. Div. Inst. 3.17.5. With the exception of Demetrius of Laconia, the evidence is presented in 525–9 Usener. It is not uncommon to see Epicurus making such provocative claims about sex, children and marriage, in keeping with his wider practice of challenging established social norms (e.g. Diog. Laert. 10.119; Arr. Epict. Diss. 3.7.19; Clem. Al. Strom. 2.23.181.25; Lactant. Div. Inst. 3.17.5). See further, in particular, Brennan, T., ‘Epicurus on sex, marriage, and children’, CPh 91 (1996), 346–52Google ScholarPubMed; Brown, R.D., Lucretius on Love and Sex: A Commentary on De Rerum Natura IV, 1030–1287 with Prolegomena, Text, and Translation (Leiden, 1987), 118–22Google Scholar; and Chilton, C.W., ‘Did Epicurus approve of marriage? A study of Diogenes Laertius X, 119’, Phronesis 5 (1960), 71–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² Epicurus, RS 31–40; Lucr. 5.925–1027; Hermarchus ap. Porph. Abst. 1.7.1–12.7. For detailed discussion, see further, for example, McConnell, S., ‘Lucretius and civil strife’, Phoenix 66 (2012), 97–121, at 102–3CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Campbell, G., Lucretius on Creation and Evolution: A Commentary on De Rerum Natura 5.772–1104 (Oxford, 2003), 252–83Google Scholar; Algra, K., ‘Lucretius and the Epicurean other’, in Algra, K., Koenen, M. and Schrijvers, P. (edd.), Lucretius and his Intellectual Background (Amsterdam, 1997), 141–50Google Scholar; Armstrong, J.M., ‘Epicurean justice’, Phronesis 42 (1997), 324–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Alberti, A., ‘The Epicurean theory of law and justice’, in Laks, A. and Schofield, M. (edd.), Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, 1995), 164–75Google Scholar; Waerdt, P.A. Vander, ‘Hermarchus and the Epicurean genealogy of morals’, TAPhA 118 (1988), 87–106 Google Scholar; Waerdt, P.A. Vander, ‘The justice of the Epicurean wise man’, CQ 37 (1987), 402–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Long, A.A., ‘Pleasure and social utility: the virtues of being Epicurean’, in Flashar, H. and Gigon, O. (edd.), Aspects de la philosophie hellénistique (Geneva, 1986), 283–324, at 285–94Google Scholar and 313–16.

³ Diogenes Laertius reports: φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὰ τέκνα φιλοστοργίαν φυσικὴν εἶναι αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐν φαύλοις μὴ εἶναι (‘And they [the Stoics] also say that affection for one's children is natural for them [good men] and that it is not in bad people’, 7.120). See also Cic. Fin. 3.62. For the Stoics φιλοστοργία is a virtue, defined as φιλοτεχνία τις οὖσα περὶ στέρξιν φίλων ἢ οἰκείων (‘a certain skill with regard to loving friends and relatives’, Clem. Al. Strom. 2.9.41.6; cf. SVF 3.62 Ant.; Arr. Epict. Diss. 1.11, 3.24.58–118; M. Aur. Med. 1.17.7, 2.5, 6.30.1, 11.18.9). For detailed critical discussion of the Stoic conception of φιλοστοργία, see further Roskam, G., ‘Plutarch against Epicurus on affection for offspring. A reading of De amore prolis ’, in Roskam, G. and van der Stockt, L. (edd.), Virtues for the People: Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics (Leuven, 2011), 175–201, at 178–88CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ Cicero's Stoic spokesman Cato remarks: pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur; a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur (‘Again they [the Stoics] hold that it is important to understand that it happens by nature that children are loved by their parents; from which first principle we trace the origin of the communal fellowship of the human race’, Fin. 3.62).

⁵ Blundell, M.W., ‘Parental nature and Stoic οἰκείωσις’, AncPhil 10 (1990), 221–42, at 221Google Scholar: ‘Stoic οἰκείωσις is the process by which we recognize our natural affinity first to ourselves and subsequently to various features of our environment, which we pursue as being οἰκεῖος or “belonging to us”. This natural tendency comes in two forms: towards ourselves and towards others. These have been called “personal” and “social” οἰκείωσις respectively ( Inwood, B., ‘The two forms of oikeiōsis in Arius and the Stoa’, in Fortenbaugh, W.W. [ed.], On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics [New Brunswick, 1983], 190–201, at 193Google Scholar). The theory was supported by careful observation of human and animal nature, especially the urge to self-preservation, which underpins the concept of personal οἰκείωσις, and the love of parents for their offspring, which provides the strongest evidence for social οἰκείωσις.’ The key sources for the Stoic notion of social οἰκείωσις, and in particular the role played by natural parental love, are Cic. Fin. 3.62–8; Diog. Laert. 7.85–6; Sen. Ep. 121.6–15; Hierocles 1.34–9, 1.51–7, 2.1–9, 9.3–10, 11.14–18; Stob. Ecl. 4.671.7–673.11; Plut. De Stoic. rep. 1038B. The evidence can be found along with helpful commentary in Long, A.A. and Sedley, D.N., The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1987), 1.346–54Google Scholar. For social οἰκείωσις as a foundation of justice, see also Plut. De soll. an. 962A; Porph. Abst. 3.19; Stob. Ecl. 2.120.8–14; Anon. In Plat. Theat. 5.19–20. For critical discussion of the Stoic arguments concerning οἰκείωσις, see further, for example, Pembroke, S.G., ‘ Oikeiōsis ’, in Long, A.A. (ed.), Problems in Stoicism (London, 1971), 114–49Google Scholar; Striker, G., ‘The role of oikeiosis in Stoic ethics’, OSAPh 1 (1983), 145–68Google Scholar; Brunschwig, J., ‘The cradle argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism’, in Schofield, M. and Striker, G. (edd.), The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics (Cambridge, 1986), 113–44Google Scholar; Engberg-Pederson, T., ‘Discovering the good: oikeiōsis and kathēkonta in Stoic ethics’, in Schofield, M. and Striker, G. (edd.), The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics (Cambridge, 1986), 145–83Google Scholar; Engberg-Pederson, T., The Stoic Theory of Oikeiosis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoicism (Aarhus, 1990)Google Scholar; Blundell (this note); Inwood (this note [1983]); Inwood, B., Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford, 1985), 182–201 Google Scholar; and Inwood, B., ‘L’oikeiosis sociale chez Epictete’, in Algra, K.A., van der Horst, P.W. and Runia, D.T. (edd.), Polyhistor: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy Presented to Jaap Mansfeld on his Sixtieth Birthday (Leiden, 1996), 243–64Google Scholar.

⁶ The two key Stoic critics are Cicero and Epictetus. In a letter to Atticus (7.2.4 = 125 SB) Cicero attacks the Epicureans with two arguments: (1) first-hand experience refutes the Epicurean position, as Atticus himself—a professed Epicurean—has shown: even though his new-born daughter gives him pleasure, Atticus admits that it is not because of calculations of pleasure that he loves his daughter but rather because of nature, so implying that parental love is natural and that he would love his daughter regardless of the pleasure that results; and (2) the reality of human political community proves that parental love is natural because it is a necessary condition of human political community, a point Cicero reiterates in a number of his philosophical works (e.g. Leg. 1.42–3; Fin. 1.23, 3.57, 3.62–8, 4.17, 5.65, 5.68–9, 5.81–2, 5.84; Tusc. 5.5; Off. 1.12, 1.54). Furthermore, in certain speeches Cicero presents the naturalness of parental love as essentially an obvious fact that all reasonable people will assent to without question—indeed, questioning the naturalness of parental love or, worse, acting against nature by neglecting one's children is a sure sign that one is a base and degenerate, perhaps even sub-human, individual (e.g. Dom. 97–8; Cael. 79–80; Rosc. 40–1, 52–5, 62–3). On Cicero's views on parental love, see in particular Treggiari, S., ‘Putting the family across: Cicero on natural affection’, in George, M. (ed.), The Roman Family in the Empire: Rome, Italy, and Beyond (Oxford, 2005), 9–36 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Epictetus (a.d. 55–135) directs further arguments against Epicurus’ views on parental love in Discourse 1.23, a short polemical piece that has the title πρὸς Ἐπίκουρον (In Answer to Epicurus). This tract can be seen as a supplement to Discourse 1.11, in which Epictetus presents in detail his own positive Stoic views on φιλοστοργία (cf. also Disc. 3.22.67–72 and 3.24.58–118). Further, Plutarch's short tract περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ ἔγγονα φιλοστοργίας (De amore prolis or On the Love of One's Offspring) contains a number of arguments that can be seen as a critique of Epicurus’ position, although they do not appear to have a Stoic provenance; see in particular Roskam (n. 3) and Barigazzi, A., ‘Ancora una declamazione contro Epicuro: De amore prolis ’, in id., Studi su Plutarco (Florence, 1994), 99–114 Google Scholar.

⁷ The works attributed to Demetrius are Unsolved Questions of Polyaenus (P.Herc. 1083, 1258, 1429, 1642, 1647, 1822), Quaestiones convivales (P.Herc. 1006), On Geometry (P.Herc. 1061), On Poems (P.Herc. 188, 1014), On the Size of the Sun (P.Herc. 1013), On Fickleness (P.Herc. 831), an untitled theological work usually called On the Form of God (P.Herc. 1055), an unidentified rhetorical work (P.Herc. 128), two untitled works (P.Herc. 1786, 124), in addition to the untitled P.Herc. 1012 that contains philological critique of Epicurus’ writings and is given the title ‘Problems in the text of Epicurus’ by Puglia, E., Demetrio Lacone: Aporie testuali ed esegetiche in Epicuro (Naples, 1988)Google Scholar.

⁸ For detailed discussion of biographical details, see Clay, D., ‘The philosophical writings of Demetrius of Laconia’, in Sorabji, R. and Sharples, R.W. (edd.), Greek and Roman Philosophy 100BC-200AD (London, 2007), 1.207–11; and Puglia (n. 7), 11–23 Google Scholar.

⁹ See further Long, A.A., ‘Reply to Jonathan Barnes, “Epicurean signs”’, in Annas, J. and Grimm, R.H. (edd.), OSAPh Supplementary Volume 1988 (Oxford, 1988), 135–44Google Scholar; Barnes, J., ‘Epicurean signs’, in Annas, J. and Grimm, R.H. (edd.), OSAPh Supplementary Volume 1988 (Oxford, 1988), 91–134 Google Scholar; Sedley, D.N., ‘On signs’, in Barnes, J., Brunschwig, J., Burnyeat, M. and Schofield, M. (edd.), Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice (Cambridge, 1982), 239–72Google Scholar; and De Lacy, P.H. and De Lacy, E.A., Philodemus: On Methods of Inference (Naples, 1978), 156–230 Google Scholar.

¹⁰ See further especially Puglia (n. 7), 49–104; Clay (n. 8), 208–11; Gigante, M., Philodemus in Italy: The Books from Herculaneum (trans. D. Obbink) (Ann Arbor, 1995), 18–20 Google Scholar; and Sedley, D.N., ‘Philosophical allegiance in the Greco-Roman world’, in Griffin, M.T. and Barnes, J. (edd.), Philosophia Togata (Oxford, 1989), 97–119, at 107Google Scholar; also Puglia, E., ‘L'Enchiridion di Demetrio Lacone’, CronErc 16 (1986), 45–51 Google Scholar; Ferrario, M., ‘La nascita della filologia epicurea: Demetrio Lacone e Filodemo’, CronErc 30 (2000), 53–61 Google Scholar; and Auricchio, F. Longo and Guerra, A. Tepedino, ‘Aspetti e problemi della dissidenza epicurea’, CronErc 11 (1981), 25–40 Google Scholar.

¹¹ Vander Waerdt (n. 2 [1988]), 93 n. 26 translates: ‘How was it absurd for Epicurus to say [that affection for one's children is not natural]’.

¹² Here Demetrius denotes parental love with the Greek phrase στοργὴ πρὸς τὰ τέκνα (it appears without editorial reconstruction in line 9 of column LXVIII), which is a phrase replicated by Cicero in a letter to Atticus (7.2.4 = 125 SB). In other sources the term φιλοστοργία is used in place of στοργή. Both terms appear to be interchangeable. Demetrius uses φιλοστοργία in column LXVI.12–13 and Cicero also uses φιλοστοργία twice, although with regard to affection between friends rather than love between parents and children; Att. 13.9.1 = 317 SB, 15.17.2 = 394 SB. It must be said, however, that later sources tend to favour φιλοστοργία. There is no extant first-hand example of Epicurus himself using either term.

¹³ Brown (n. 1), 119 n. 56.

¹⁴ Puglia (n. 7), 297–302 and Alesse, F., ‘ΤΕΚΝΟΠΟΙΙΑ e amore parentale in Epicuro e nell'epicureismo’, CronErc 41 (2011), 207–15Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Epicurus, Ep. Men. 128–30, Sent. Vat. 25; Diog. Laert. 10.34. On the so-called hedonic calculus, see further Warren, J., ‘Epicurus and the pleasures of the future’, OSAPh 21 (2001), 135–80, at 138–48Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Note that both Clement of Alexandria (Strom. 2.23.181.25) and Lactantius (Div. Inst. 3.17.5) refer to the pains that children might bring as Epicurean reasons for remaining childless in the first place.

¹⁷ Philodemus, an Epicurean writing in Italy in the first century b.c., suggests that certain emotions are natural and unavoidable in certain situations, simply owing to physiological facts about human nature (hence the ‘bite’ or ‘sting’ image). In so far as one ought to control one's emotions, it is a matter of forming the correct mental dispositions (forming Epicurean beliefs, for example). This allows one to have emotions such as anger only in appropriate contexts—to have only natural emotions. This entails a division of emotions into valid and invalid forms, with the natural emotion alone being justified. Anger is the best example to illustrate this: θυμός is depicted as anger that is uncontrolled or out of proportion whereas ὀργή refers to appropriate and controlled anger; in other words, θυμός is ‘empty anger’ whereas ὀργή is ‘natural anger’. Philodemus maintains that the sage only experiences ὀργή (On Anger col. XLV.5–23 Indelli); see further Tsouna, V., The Ethics of Philodemus (Oxford, 2007), 196–238 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Asmis, E., ‘The necessity of anger in Philodemus’ On Anger ’, in Fish, J. and Sanders, K. (edd.), Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition (Cambridge, 2011), 152–82CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Parental love might seem another candidate for an Epicurean treatment of this kind. However, we have no extant evidence for Philodemus addressing the topic of natural parental love towards children at all, in this or in any other context (the only extant use of φιλοστοργία refers to affection towards a sage; On Frank Speech col. VIIIb.1-5 Konstan et al.). For further discussion of Epicurean views on the emotions, and the extent to which Philodemus is influenced by the Stoics and diverges from Epicurus’ own doctrine, see, for example, Gill, C., ‘Stoicism and Epicureanism’, in Goldie, P. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion (Oxford, 2009), 143–66Google Scholar; Tsouna (this note), 32–51; Armstrong, D., ‘“Be angry and sin not”: Philodemus versus the Stoics on natural bites and emotions’, in Fitzgerald, J.T. (ed.), Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought (London, 2008), 79–121 Google Scholar; Asmis (this note); and Konstan, D., ‘Lucretius and the Epicurean attitude towards grief’, in Lehoux, D., Morrison, A.D. and Sharrock, A. (edd.), Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science (Oxford, 2013), 193–209 Google Scholar.

¹⁸ See further Konstan, D., A Life Worthy of the Gods: The Materialist Psychology of Epicurus (Las Vegas, 2008), 1–25 Google Scholar.

¹⁹ As Campbell (n. 2), 222 rightly observes, ‘clearly there is no sign here of any innate affection of φιλαλληλία between the first humans that we find in Stoic and Aristotelian theories’. This lack of interpersonal affection extends to the case of parents and children: there is no real sign of any parental love, let alone natural parental love.

²⁰ On Epicurus’ egoistic moral psychology, see in particular Woolf, R., ‘What kind of hedonist was Epicurus?’ Phronesis 49 (2004), 303–22CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²¹ For detailed commentary on Lucretius’ account of early human beings and the shift to a softer human nature, see Campbell (n. 2), 217–27.

²² Campbell (n. 2), 272.

²³ There are then two distinct Epicurean arguments for the non-naturalness of parental love: (1) it is a matter of cultural conditioning, arising only after certain influences of communal life but then essentially ubiquitous among domesticated human beings; (2) it is a matter of individual choice, a straightforward weighing of advantages and disadvantages in the hedonic calculus. In order to reconcile these two arguments, Epicurus might hazard the following: presently a parent does have immediate affectionate feelings for the new-born child, brought about by cultural conditioning, but it is the subsequent formal acceptance of the child into the family unit that involves a choice or a decision to love the child.

²⁴ Puglia (n. 7), 297–302 and Alesse (n. 14), 210–15.

²⁵ For further discussion, see the works cited in note 9 above.

²⁶ Puglia (n. 7), 49–104 discusses this in depth.

²⁷ Alesse (n. 14), 210–12.

²⁸ In addition, Alesse (n. 14), 212 seeks to confirm the internal school debate by citing two extracts from the Life of Philonides (P.Herc. 1044) that mention parental love (frr. 8.4, 49.6–9 Gallo). Philonides (200–130 b.c.) was an Epicurean philosopher and mathematician resident in the Seleucid court. Only fragment 49 bears any weight: it states that Philonides accepted Epicurus’ views on celestial phenomena and then mentions parental love before breaking off. Alesse claims that this indicates a deviation on the part of Philonides, thus showing disparate views on parental love in the Epicurean school. The evidence, however, is too fragmentary to be conclusive.

²⁹ It is even tempting to see Demetrius engaging with the Epicurean model of natural and necessary desires with respect to parental love in column LXVI: in order to be a natural desire it would have to be unavoidable like desires for food, sex, shelter and so forth, in which case one could then judge whether it is natural and necessary (if its fulfilment is necessary for happiness) or natural and unnecessary (if a lack of fulfilment leads to no real harm). That parental love is a natural and unnecessary desire might be an appealing position for Epicureans to hold, for it avoids the unsettling denial of natural parental love. However, Demetrius shows that parental love falls at the very first hurdle—it does not arise ‘by nature’.

³⁰ To be sure, in Discourse 3.24 in particular, Epictetus presents parental love as coming in a variety of forms, some of which are in fact vicious and disadvantageous. He stresses that in order for parental love to be a virtue, it must accord with our reason; and in so far as there is such a virtue of parental love, it is always advantageous to have it. See further Roskam (n. 3), 181–3.

³¹ See further Puglia (n. 7), 300–2 and Alesse (n. 14), 210–11.

³² This suggests that he has elsewhere dismissed the claims that parental love is always advantageous (that it is a virtue) and that it is a natural instinct or capacity like procuring nourishment, which would in all likelihood involve the two Epicurean arguments that we see in other sources.

³³ Demetrius’ argument posits a very strong connection between naturalness, necessity, the involuntary and ἀντίπραξις. But he is not committed to the view that one always chooses or desires otherwise in such cases where things are ‘by necessity’, making involuntary all things that are ‘by necessity’. Instead, he implies that choosing or desiring otherwise to see if one can do otherwise is simply a way of ascertaining whether or not something is ‘by necessity’: if one cannot do otherwise even despite choosing to, then one's action is ‘by necessity’ and involuntary, but at times one will choose voluntarily to follow necessity. This is indicated by the statement that the involuntary is ἴδιον (‘distinctive’) in the case of things that are ‘by necessity’; ἀντίπραξις (‘resistance’) in turn is a παρακολούθημα (‘consequence’) of the involuntary.

³⁴ There is a sole usage of the verb ἀντιπράσσω (‘oppose’) by Demetrius of Laconia in On the Appearance of God (col. XXIV.4 Santoro).

³⁵ A TLG search on all cognate forms generates twenty-four examples, most of which are to be found in works of ecclesiastical or Byzantine origin.

³⁶ The surviving fragments of the text appear with an English translation in Ramelli, I., Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of Ethics, Fragments and Excerpts (Atlanta, 2009)Google Scholar.

³⁷ ἀντίπραξις appears towards the end of the final extant column, which is very poorly preserved (only the first third or so of each line survives), before the papyrus breaks off.

³⁸ On πράξις in particular, see further Inwood (n. 5 [1985]), 52–3 and Bobzien, S., Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy (Oxford, 1998), 240–2Google Scholar.

³⁹ For detailed accounts of the Stoic theory of action see, for example, Inwood (n. 5 [1985]), Bobzien (n. 38) and Brennan, T., The Stoic Life: Emotions, Duties, and Fate (Oxford, 2005), 49–113 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, with further references.

⁴⁰ A TLG search indicates that τὸ παρακολούθημα is the more common term. However, with the exception of Demetrius himself, all the extant examples appear in the work of much later figures.

⁴¹ Note that the meaning of ἡ παρακολούθησις is sometimes ‘understanding’ or ‘interrelation’ rather than ‘consequence’: Aristotle uses ἡ παρακολούθησις only once, in his Posterior Analytics, with regard to the interrelation between explanans and explanandum (ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν σχημάτων ὧδε ἀποδώσει ζητοῦσι τὴν παρακολούθησιν τοῦ αἰτίου καὶ οὗ αἴτιον, 99a30); and some centuries later the Stoic Epictetus uses ἡ παρακολούθησις to denote ‘understanding’ (Arr. Epict. Diss. 1.6.13, 1.6.21, 2.8.6–8).

⁴² For ease of reference, here is the full text of NA 7.1.7–13: idem Chrysippus in eodem libro tractat consideratque dignumque esse id quaeri putat, εἰ αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων νόσοι κατὰ φύσιν γίγνονται, id est, si natura ipsa rerum uel prouidentia, quae compagem hanc mundi et genus hominum fecit, morbos quoque et debilitates et aegritudines corporum, quas patiuntur homines, fecerit. existimat autem non fuisse hoc principale naturae consilium, ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios; numquam enim hoc conuenisse naturae auctori parentique omnium rerum bonarum. ‘sed cum multa’ inquit ‘atque magna gigneret pareretque aptissima et utilissima, alia quoque simul adgnata sunt incommoda his ipsis, quae faciebat, cohaerentia’; eaque non per naturam, sed per sequellas quasdam necessarias facta dicit, quod ipse appellat κατὰ παρακολούθησιν. ‘sicut’, inquit ‘cum corpora hominum natura fingeret, ratio subtilior et utilitas ipsa operis postulauit, ut tenuissimis minutisque ossiculis caput compingeret. sed hanc utilitatem rei maioris alia quaedam incommoditas extrinsecus consecuta est, ut fieret caput tenuiter munitum et ictibus offensionibusque paruis fragile. proinde morbi quoque et aegritudines partae sunt, dum salus paritur. sicut hercle,’ inquit ‘dum uirtus hominibus per consilium naturae gignitur, uitia ibidem per adfinitatem contrariam nata sunt’.

⁴³ See further Marrone, L., ‘Le Questioni logiche di Crisippo (P.Herc. 307)’, CronErc 27 (1997), 83–100 Google Scholar, and Mastro, G. Del, ‘Il P.Herc. 1380: Crisippo, Opera logica ’, CronErc 35 (2005), 61–70 Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ See Sedley (n. 9), 243–5 and 257 n. 46. He suggests that Demetrius is engaging with Stoic critics who are two generations after Chrysippus.

⁴⁵ This premise rests on the Stoic notion, unexpressed in the extant passages from Demetrius, that ἀντίπραξις is an inevitable negative consequence (παρακολούθημα) of nature providing us with a faculty of assent to its prompting that is ‘up to us’ (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν): such a faculty is a good thing but has an unavoidable in-built capacity for error (one might fail to assent to nature's prompting and vainly resist instead).

⁴⁶ Kechagia, E., ‘Rethinking a professional rivalry: early Epicureans against the Stoa’, CQ 60 (2010), 132–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar attributes this to the Stoics’ growing profile, the increasing sophistication of their doctrine, and their shift away from their Cynic origins (early Epicurean criticisms of the Cynics are common).