² On the phrase πρòς ςoνήν λÉγειν and related ideas, see De Romilly, J., ‘La condamnation du plaisir dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide’, WS 79 (1966), 142–8Google Scholar; Ober, J., Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton, 1989), 43–4Google Scholar (discussed below, n. 8); Flory, S., ‘The meaning of τà μ μϒθŵδες (1.22.4) and the usefulness of Thucydides’ History’, CJ 85 (1990), 198–200Google Scholar; Heath, M., ‘Thucydides’ political judgement’, LCM 15 (1990), 158–60.Google Scholar The following works, cited more than once, will be indicated by author’s name only: Andrewes, A., ‘The Mytilene debate: Thucydides 3.36–49’, Phoenix 16 (1962), 64–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Andrews, J. A., ‘Cleon's ethopoetics’, CQ 44 (1994), 26–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cairns, D. L., ‘Hybris, dishonour, and thinking big’, JHS 116 (1996), 1–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Crane, G., Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1998)Google Scholar; Fisher, N. R. E., Hybris: A Study in the Values of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greece (Warminster, 1992)Google Scholar; Heath, M., ‘Justice in Thucydides’ Athenian speeches’, Historia 39 (1990), 385–400Google Scholar; Hornblower, S., A Commentary on Thucydides, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1991)Google Scholar; Kagan, D., ‘The speeches in Thucydides and the Mytilene debate’ YCS 2 (1975), 71–94Google Scholar; Kakridis, J. Th., Der thukydideische Epitaphios. Ein stilistischer Kommentar (Munich, 1961)Google Scholar; Lévy, E., Athènes devant la défaite de 404. Histoire d’ une crise idéologique (Paris, 1976)Google Scholar; Macleod, C. W., Collected Essays (Oxford, 1983)Google Scholar; Loraux, N., The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City (Cambridge, MA, 1986)Google Scholar; Nippel, W., Mischverfassungstheorie und Verfassungsrealität in Antike und früher Neuzeit (Stuttgart, 1980)Google Scholar; Ober, J., Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton, 1989)Google Scholar; Raaflaub, K. A., Die Entdeckung der Freiheit (Munich, 1985)Google Scholar; De Romilly, J., Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism (Oxford, 1963)Google Scholar; ead., ‘Le Thème du prestige dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide’, Ancient Society 4 (1973), 39–58; ead., Problèmes de la dèmocratie grecque (Paris, 1975); Rusten, J. S. (ed), Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War, Book II (Cambridge, 1989)Google Scholar; Saar, H. G., Die Reden des Kleon und Diodotus und ihre Stellung im Gesamtwerk des Thukydides (diss. Hamburg, 1953)Google Scholar; Tuplin, C., ‘Imperial tyranny: some reflections on a Classical Greek political metaphor’, in Cartledge, P. A. and Harvey, F. D. (edd.), CRUX: Essays presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix… (Exeter, 1985), 348–75Google Scholar; Vlastos, G., ΙƩΟΝΟMΙA πΟΛΙTΙKΗ, in Mau, J. and Schmidt, E. G. (edd.), Isonomia. Studien zur Gleichheits- vorstellung im griechischen Denken (Berlin, 1964), 1–35Google Scholar; reprinted in Vlastos, G., Platonic Studies (Princeton, 1973), 164–203Google Scholar; Gomme, A. W., Dover, K. J., and Andrewes, A., A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, 5 vols (Oxford, 1945–1981)Google Scholar, hereafter HCT.

³ 3.36.6 τŵ σήμω παρà πoλù ༐ν τŵ τóτε πιθανώτατoς. Cf. 4.21.3. So too the Sicilian demagogue Athenagoras is ༐ν τŵ παρóντι πιθανώτατoς τoî πoλλoîς (6.35.2). On Athenagoras, see below.

⁴ It is not just Cleon but the Athenians as a whole who decry the heinous character of the revolt (3.36.2). This, Salaithos’ summary execution (3.36.1), and the explicit surrender of the proceedings to ὀργή (3.36.2) all make the prevailing mood of the assembly perfectly apparent. For a reconstruction of the arguments at the first assembly, see Legon, R. P., ‘Megara and Mytilene’, Phoenix 22 (1968), 208–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar (followed by Kagan [n. 2], 80–1).

⁵ Andrewes (n. 2), 76–7 (‘he violently discredits his opponent in advance… he appeals to unregulated emotion…. Tactics like these should be comprehended in Thucydides’ ༐τράπoντo καθ’ ήδoνàς τŵ δήμω καì τà πράγματα ༐νδιδóναι’); Edmunds, L., Cleon, Knights, and Aristophanes’ Politics (Lanham, MD, 1987), 32Google Scholar (‘Thucydides’ Cleon is presented as a source of stasis’, in confirmation of the report at 2.65).

⁶ Gomme in HCT, vol. II, 299.

⁷ ‘Cleon sets himself against the clear tide of public opinion’, contrary to what 2.65.10 has led us to expect, remarks Lewis, D. M., Cambridge Ancient History, vol. V² (Cambridge, 1992), 405–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Cf. S. Hornblower (n. 2), 420. Of course, the apparent inconsistency between these two passages, 2.65 and 3.37–40, may merely be a reflection of changes in Thucydides’ own thinking over the several decades during which he was at work on his history. So de Romilly (n. 2, 1963), 171: ‘While in his judgment in 2.65 Thucydides seems particularly concerned to underline the difference between Pericles and his successors, [in the Mytilene Debate] he makes no effort at all to mark the contrast between Pericles and Cleon…. The explanation is that between the composition of the debate on Mytilene and the judgment in 2.65, there was an interval: the contrast which had previously seemed unimportant turned out to be essential, and the attacks of the opposition, now triumphant, called for precise justification.’ But before we conclude that Cleon's speech is not intended to exemplify the politician who, in contrast to Pericles, makes his advice conform to the likings of his audience, we must investigate what these likings might be. That is the task of this paper. I hasten to add that viewing Cleon's speech as a confirmation of the authorial comments of 2.65 does not require us to view the speech as a late composition, nor to doubt its authenticity. I leave these questions for a later occasion.

⁸ According to Ober (n. 2), 316–24, the rhetor was expected to ‘prominently stand forth’ and speak his mind, defending, advising, leading, and even criticizing the people. But his outspokenness stopped short of attacking democratic ideology. Here, he was expected to demonstrate ‘his ideological solidarity’ with his audience (93). What élite critics like Thucydides revile as ‘pleasing speech', argues Ober, is in fact nothing more than the speaker's effort to ‘accommodate himself to the ethos—the ideology—of his audience’ (43). One virtue of Ober's approach is that it shows that the speech was pleasing to the audience not only when it appealed to their emotions but also when it confirmed their opinions (or ‘ideological presuppositions’). There is indeed some of the latter in Cleon's speech: see below on δóξα and the wisdom of mass decisions. But on the interpretation of the speech advanced here, the pleasure afforded by Cleon's speech involves gratification of desires largely emotional.

⁹ Moraux, P., ‘Thucydide et la rhétorique’, ÉC 22 (1954), 9Google Scholar, labels the former of these an ảπoτρεπtau;ικàς λóγoς, the latter, a κατηγoρικàς λóγoς.

¹⁰ Heath (n. 2), 388–9 notes that, relative to other Athenian speakers in Thucydides, Cleon's insistence on considerations of justice is exceptional.

¹¹ In those places where, as here, I have consulted another's translation, I have turned to R. Crawley, as revised in Strassler, R. B., The Landmark Thucydides (New York, 1996).Google Scholar

¹² Regarding the walls and ships, see. n. 19 and cf. 3.4.2, 3.3.4, 11.6.

¹³ See Kagan (n. 2), 79–80.

¹⁴ Cleon characterizes the revolt as ༐πανάσταστσις not so much because he wishes to liken it to domestic revolution (Andrewes in HCT, vol. V, 45; cf. Saar [n. 2], 43–4) as to suggest that linguistic usage itself sanctions and supports his notion of two distinct forms of revolt.

¹⁵ Cf. Diodotus’ discussion of the subject at 3.45, and Tompkins, D. T., ‘Thucydides constructs his speakers: the case of Diodotus’, Electronic Antiquity 1.1 (June 1993).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Cleon places great emphasis on the Mytileneans’ happiness and prosperity (39.3–5 εủδαιμoνíα…, εủπραγíα…, εủτυΧoûντα…, εủδαιμoíαν), and its issue in ὕβρις. Gomme in HCT, vol. II, 307 and Saar (n. 2), 46 note the contrast with Chios (8.24.4 ηủδαιμóν τε ἃμα καì έσωøρóνησαν).

¹⁷ de Romilly (n. 2, 1963), part III, ch. iii, esp. 322–9. For recent reappraisal of ὕβρις, see below, n. 23.

¹⁸ As elements of αủτoνoμíα, neither walls, ships, nor freedom from tribute is necessary or sufficient. As Ostwald, M., Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History (Chico, CA, 1982), 27–8Google Scholar observes, the Chians ‘demolished their walls at the bidding of Athens in 425 b.c., and yet Chios continued to be considered autonomous down to the time of her revolt in 412 b.c.…. Participation with her ships (in joint naval campaigns with Athens) makes Methymna αủτóνoμoς in one passage but ὑπήκoς in another…. (The Peace of Nicias) guarantees the αủτoνoμíα of six Thracian cities, “provided that they continue to pay the tribute assessed at the time of Aristeides“.’

¹⁹ At this date only Mytilene and Chios retained their navies; each was required, on an ongoing basis, to place a contingent at the disposal of the Athenian navy (3.10.5). These two allies were likewise the only Ionian states to have retained their walls (3.39.2, 4.51; 3.33.2). Doubtless the presence of walls at Mytilene and Chios could be represented to the Greek world as a token of Athenian respect for the autonomy of these two states. This seems to be Cleon's tactic here. Regarding the absence of walls in Ionia, see Meiggs, R.The Athenian Empire (Oxford, 1979), 149–51Google Scholar, who attributes their removal to Athenian imperial policy (Meiggs is anticipated by Brunt, P. A., ‘Athenian settlements abroad in the fifth century’, in Badian, E. [ed.], Ancient Society and Institutions. Studies… Victor Ehrenberg [New York, 1967], 84, 92Google Scholar, n. 54). The alternative view, first advanced by Wade-Gery, H. T., Essays in Greek History (Oxford, 1958), 219–20Google Scholar, is that the walls had been removed by the Athenians at the time of the Peace of Callias. If this is true, subsequent Athenian imperial policy may have consisted in nothing more than insisting on strict observance of the terms of the Peace. And if allies in the time of the Athenian ρΧή in Thrace were allowed to retain their walls, that is because no ‘Peace of Callias’ will have existed to protect the allies from hostile neighbors (Andrewes in HCT, vol. V, 36). For further discussion and bibliography, see Hornblower (n. 2), 414–15.

²⁰ The Athenians who address the Spartan assembly at 1.75.3 cite τιμή together with fear and profit as the fundamental motives of their ἀρΧή. Scholars have difficulty taking the first of these as seriously as the others: see n. 22, and cf. Lévy (n. 2), 111–19; de Romilly (n. 2, 1963), 79.

²¹ In Thucydides the prosperity or good fortune which leads to hubris is often said to have arisen unexpectedly (de Romilly [n. 2, 1963], 324). One of Cleon's ‘sharp practices’ is his elision between ἀπρoσδóκητoς as ‘unexpected’ and as ‘sudden’.

²² Crane (n. 2), 97–105 argues that we must take seriously Thucydides’ suggestion that what chiefly motivated the Corinthians’ ‘irrational’ decision to ‘push the Greek world into… war’ (96) was the Corcyreans’ refusal to perform those symbolic gestures by which they might publicly acknowledge Corinth's cultural superiority. The fundamental issue is, as Thucydides 1.38 supposes, the Corinthians’ slighted honour. Cf. de Romilly (n. 2, 1973), 42: ‘On dirait… que l'honneur commande… le conflit des intèrêts.’ Similarly p. 41: the role played by τιμή in this episode ‘déroute les historiens modernes et… leur semble mince au regard de l'événement; mais c'est l'explication que donne Thucydide’.

²³ For Fisher (n. 2), 148, ‘the core of the concept is beyond any doubt the committing of actions of intentional insult, of acts which deliberately inflict shame and dishonour on others’. Cairns (n. 2) accepts the emphasis on honour, but argues that Fisher has incorrectly limited the ‘dispositional’ aspect of hubris to the intention to insult and dishonour. His emphasis ‘is on that element of hybris which relates to one's own honour’. He argues that ‘the state of mind which over-values one's own honour is decisive for hybris…. Terms such as mega phronein are… ways of referring to the subjective, dispositional aspect of hybris, and thus, since hybris-woids can be used in purely dispositional senses, hybris and “thinking big” can amount to the same thing’ (10–11).

²⁴ In order to imagine, with the speaker, how a charge of ὕβρις would rekindle the Athenians’ spent anger, we may turn to Aristotle's discussion of audience psychology in Rhetoric 2. Chapter 2 treats anger (ὀργή), which Aristotle defines as ‘desire… for conspicuous retaliation (τιμωρíα) because of a conspicuous slight ὀλιγωρíα (1378a30fF, trans. G. Kennedy). Of the three forms which a slight may take, the most grievous is ὕβρις, ‘doing and speaking in which there is shame to the sufferer, not that some advantage may accrue to the doer or because something has happened but for the pleasure of it’ (my italics). (Note Aristotle's further remark that victims of ὕβρις are especially provoked when the belittlement is at the hands of friends or those whom they have shown special favour—as the Athenians have the Mytileneans.) In short, nothing so provokes ργή, i.e. the passion for τιμωρíα, as aggression, which is perceived as arising from and constituting ὕβρις The passage is central to the ‘behaviourist’ account of ὕβρις offered by Fisher (n. 2) and to the attempt of Cairns (n. 2), esp. 2–8, to redress what he regards as Fisher's under-estimation of the ‘dispositional’ aspect of ὕβρις.

²⁵ Attempting to show the speaker's adoption of an endoxic ethos, Andrews (n. 2), 35, n. 53, downplays the outspokenness of Cleon's opening remarks. In fact, these opening remarks are a bracing assault on democratic principles and practices, the object of which is to establish the need for endoxy in matters of justice and self-interest. Cleon's own endoxic ethos in these matters first becomes evident at 3.38.1, then repeatedly in 3.39–40.

²⁶ The prime examples are the rescue of the Heraclidae and the return of the remains of the Seven to the Argive mothers. Says Loraux (n. 2), 67: ‘for the authors of the epitaphioi, these two episodes are an opportunity of recalling this generosity, this compassion for the weak and oppressed, which both tragedy and rhetoric agree are one of the principal features of the Athenian character’.

²⁷ In Thucydides, see Pericles at 2.40.4–5, where the statesman speaks of the Athenians outdoing their friends in kindness (oὐ γàρ πáσΧoντες εὗ, λλà δρŵντες κτώμεθα τoὺς øíλoυς). Some do read this passage as a comment on Athenian foreign relations (J. T. Hooker, ‘Χáρις and ρετή in Thucydides’, Hermes 102 [1974], 164–9; Loraux (n. 2), 81). But Rusten (n. 2), 156 objects that this would be a ‘grotesque distortion of the nature of empire, which he later compares to a tyranny’. Pericles’ words, says Rusten, ‘are meant to apply to the character of individual Athenians’.

²⁸ Heath (n. 2), 394. Cf. (in addition to Loraux in n. 26 above) Kakridis (n. 2), 33.

²⁹ In translating λευθρως ‘with tolerance,’ I follow Rusten (n. 2), 146. Cf. Classen, J., Thukydides, Band 2 (rev. J. Steup, Berlin, 1914 ^s), 175Google Scholar: ‘in freier Weise, ohne die in Verfassung und Sitte begründete Freiheit zu beschränken’. I disagree, however, with Rusten's view (147) that λευθρως… πoλιτεoμεν bears only on what follows, τá… πρòδ τò κoινàν arising merely from Thucydides’ habit of antithetical thought. I prefer the view that λευθρως… πoλιτεoμεν is in part a recapitulation of 2.37.1, and that the words τá…. πρòς τò κoινóν are intended to make that evident. So Gomme in HCT, vol. II, 114–15; Kakridis (n. 2), 29–31; De Romilly, J., Thucydide: La guerre du Péloponnèse, Livre II (Paris, 1962), 96Google Scholar; Raaflaub (n. 2), 288.

³⁰ On the suspiciousness of the tyrant, see Tuplin (n. 2), 354, 356, with nn. 25 and 33.

³¹ I read 2.37 as Pericles’ attempt to distance Athenian democracy from the negative implications of the ‘name δημoκρατíα’. In this I differ with Gomme in HCT, vol. II, 110 and follow instead Kakridis (n. 2), 24–8 (esp. 25); Grant, J. R., ‘Thucydides 2.37.1’, Phoenix 25 (1971), 104–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sealey, R., ‘The origins of Demokratia’, CSCA 6 (1973), 281Google Scholar (who cites R. Hirzel, Themis, Dike und Verwandtes [Leipzig, 1907], 263 with n. 8); Nippel (n. 2), 50–1; Raaflaub (n. 2), 287. For further discussion of this reading of 2.37, see ‘Freedom and equality in Periclean Athens’ (forthcoming).

³² For further discussion of this passage, see below.

³³ Cleon does not bother to explain in what sense the Mytilene decree may be viewed as a law, and its repeal seen as the subversion of νóμoι, apparently on the assumption that his audience is at this point more attuned to his criticism of their democracy than to the Mytilene question. Regarding Cleon's apparent equation of decrees and laws, see further below.

³⁴ Saar(n.2),28–31.

³⁵ For μαθíα signifying a refusal to listen, cf. Soph. O. T. 545.

³⁶ On the question of applying the term πoλυπραγμoσúνη’, to this quality of behaviour, see J. W. Allison, ‘Thucydides and πoλυπραγμoσúνη’, AJAH 4 (1979), 10–22 and the response of Raaflaub, K. A., ‘Democracy, power, and imperialism in fifth-century Athens’, in Euben, J. P., Wallach, J., and Ober, J. (edd.), Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstruction of American Democracy (Ithaca, NY, 1994), 108Google Scholar, n. 9. For additional discussion of the Athenians’ alleged relentless activity abroad, see Levy (n. 2), 121–8.

³⁷ At 1.84.3 Archidamus substitutes τà εὔκoσμoν as a synonym for σωøρoσúνη Cf. Marchant, E. G., Thucydides, Book I (London, 1905; repr. Bristol, 1982), 223.Google Scholar

³⁸ On the central role of παρασκευή in Archidamus’ argument, see Allison, J. W., Power and Preparedness in Thucydides (Baltimore, 1989), 45–60.Google Scholar

³⁹ S. Hornblower (n. 2), 425 glosses κριταì πà τoû ἴσυ ‘being impartial judges’ [lit. ‘judges from a position of equality’]. But these two ideas should be distinguished: the issue is not that ordinary people impartially judge the various proposals, but that they respect the equal status which they share among themselves. Ordinary people are content to remain equals and peers, in contrast to the desire of intellectual advisers to win personal distinction for themselves—to achieve unequal, or elite, status.

⁴⁰ Ober (n. 2), 163–4, stressing the testimony of Aristotle, Pol. 1281a39–b9. Cf. Larsen, J. A. O., ‘The judgment of antiquity on democracy’, CP 49 (1954), 4–5Google Scholar; de Romilly (n. 2, 1975), 66–71; Nippel (n. 2), 50, n. 30 (who cites Braun, E., ‘Die Summierungstheorie des Aristoteles’, JÖAI 44 [1959], 157–84).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Ober (n. 2), 164. 6.39.1 γώ δ øημι… øúλακας μν ρíστoυς εἶναι Χρημτων τoùςπλoυσíoυυς, βoυλûσαι δ’ ἂν βλτιστα τoùς ξυνετoú, κρîναι δ’ κoúσαντας ἂριστα τoùς πoλλoúς… On the relation of the democratic principles espoused in th e Sicilian speeches to Athenian democracy, see (with Ober [n. 2], 164, n. 22) Jones, A. H. M., Athenian Democracy (Oxford, 1957), 43.Google Scholar

⁴² Ober (n. 2), 164, n. 22.

⁴³ Andrews (n. 2), 36, n. 58.

⁴⁴ Note the generalizing expressions: πì τà πλoν ἂμεινoν oἰκoσι, τŵν αἰεì λεγoμένων, τᾰ πoλλᾰ σøλλoυσι, ρθoûνται τà πλεíω.

⁴⁵ As Gomme in HCT vol. II, 302 observes, the normal sense of παρà δóξαν in Thucydides is ‘contrary to expectation’.

⁴⁶ Andrews (n. 2), 36–7.

⁴⁷ Cleon indicates what he regards to be his audience's endoxic truths regarding justice and self-interest in the next sentence (3.38.1). For discussion, see Andrews (n. 2), esp. 32–3.

⁴⁸ Cleon in 3.38 will take his audience to task for their permissiveness, explaining it in terms of their fondness of intellectual display. For discussion, see Andrews (n. 2), 38.

⁴⁹ On ἴσoς in the sense ‘fair,’ see Vlastos (n. 2), 184–5, n. 78. On the relation of Athenagoras’ hypothetical debate to the question of arithmetic and geometric equality, see Harvey, F. D., ‘Two kinds of equality’, CM 26 (1965), 102Google Scholar; de Romilly (n. 2, 1975), 151 with 49–52; Raaflaub (n. 2), 298 with n. 174. The discussion of Nippel (n. 2), 49–50 is apposite. On ἰσoνoμíα in connection with the Athenian democracy, see most recently Ober, J. and Hedrick, C. (edd.), Dêmokratia. A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern (Princeton, 1996)Google Scholar, which contains several discussions of Athenian democratic equality. For previous bibliography, see K. A. Raaflaub's entry, ‘Equalities and inequalities in Athenian democracy’, 164, nn. 44,47.

⁵⁰ Marchant, E. C., Thucydides Book VI (London, 1897), 184Google Scholar explains καì κατᾰ μρη καì ξμπαντα ‘as separate μρη of the δῆμoς and as together making it up. The words are introduced for the sake of the reference to ξμπαν and μρoς above—a point missed by edd.’ Pace Dover in HCT vol. IV, 305–6 (followed by Nippel [n. 2], 50, n. 31), I doubt that Athenagoras is here making claims about individual rights and privileges.

⁵¹ On the right of public speech, see Raaflaub, K. A., ‘Des freien Bürgers Recht der freien Rede. Ein Beitrag zur Begriffs- und Sozialgeschichte der athenischen Demokratie’, in Studien zur antiken Sozialgeschichte. Festschrift F. Vittinghoff (Cologne and Vienna, 1980), 7–57Google Scholar (cf. Raaflaub [n. 2], 277–83). According to Raaflaub, anxiety in the 430s over the possibility that social class would re-emerge as a criterion for political involvement led to currency of a new term, παρρησíα: the freedom of each citizen, regardless of social class, to speak as he wished (ἰσηγoρíα, which lacked the social implications of παρρηαíα, nonetheless continued in existence alongside the new democratic term). On this interpretation, παρρησíα, ‘freedom of speech’, expresses no less a positive democratic concept than ἰσηγoρα, ‘equality of speech’. It is tempting to see these two concepts lurking behind Cleon's discussion: equality of speech, ἰσηγoρα, involves the responsibility not to say anything which is at odds with δóξα, the wisdom of the masses, while παρρησíα is to presume the right to say absolutely anything at all (παν-ρrsquo;ησìα: see Raaflaub, Studien, 18, 49, n. 60), even that which contradicts conventional views on justice and self-interest. Perhaps Cleon is turning an ‘élitist’ denigration of παρρησíα against the enemies of democracy: παρρησíα is indeed an evil thing, if it means the freedom of élite intellectuals to make light of ordinary views and the decrees of the people's assembly.

⁵² On the dual sense of ἴσoς (equal, fair), see above, n. 49.

⁵³ δυναστεîαι (6.38.3). The Thebans (3.62.3) draw a distinction between λιγρΧα ἰςóνoμoς, oligarchy which respects the principle of a fair distribution of political rights, and δυναστεα λγων νδρŵν, which they say most closely approximates to tyranny. We may infer that δυναστεα (and tyranny as well: see n. 58) is characterized by disregard for τò ἴσoν and by πλεoνεξα, the desire to garner to oneself all power, in violation of the principle of ἰσoνoμα, a fair distribution of rights. On the Theban λιγαρΧἰα ἰσóνoμoς, see Vlastos (n. 2), 178–83.

⁵⁴ On τò ἴσoν and πλεoνξα, see Vlastos (n. 2), 185, n. 78. R. Balot's presentation at a recent meeting of the American Philological Association, ‘Text and context: pleonexia in revolutionary Athens’, discussed the role of these closely interrelated concepts in the civil discord of 411 and 404: see APA Abstracts 1998.

⁵⁵ And as do the people in Pericles’ Athens: 2.40.2.

⁵⁶ Andrewes (n. 2), 72.

⁵⁷ On this speech as evidence for a democratic ‘establishment mentality’, see Ostwald, M., From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1986), 253–4.Google Scholar Regarding Cleon's pose as the champion of δóξα and endoxic reasoning, see Andrews (n. 2). It should now be apparent that this endoxic ethos is intended to exploit the audience's assumptions about δóξα and mass wisdom. Part of its hidden attractiveness is its tacit appeal to these ideological presuppositions.

⁵⁸ Tuplin (n. 2) is critical of what he judges to be extravagant scholarly claims about the origins and significance of the imperial tyranny metaphor. ‘The truth is that direct characterizations of tyranny, when dealing with general features at all, mostly dwell on the illegitimacy, lawlessness, unrestrained power, dependence on force and arrogance of the tyrant, that other metaphorical uses of tyranny evidently derive from such characteristics, and that there is no good reason to require more of its application to empire’ (366). One of those characterizations is ‘the obvious point that the autocrat, once installed, necessarily denies equality to those around him’ (365; my italics). And indeed Tuplin supplies a whole series of fifth- and fourth-century texts in which ‘the opposition between tyranny and equality is… explicit’ (364–5; my italics). That Cleon encourages his audience to aspire to what is unfair and unequal and to exercise the resulting power without regard for τò ἴσoν is, I believe, evident. Representing the expert advisers’ exercise of free and equal speech as a display of contempt for the ordinary views of the masses, he tempts the πλῆθoς to arrogate to themselves the right to decide who is fit to speak. This is ἄνισoν, as are too the attempt to keep the Mytileneans’ case from being heard and the use of law to intimidate the allies (see below). Finally, Cleon urges the Athenians to punish the Mytileneans, if necessary, ‘contrary to what is fair’ (3.40.4 παρà τò εἰκóς). Cleon is appealing to the pleonexia of the masses, their appetite for a share greater than equal. Thus, to the extent that τò ἄνισoν is understood as a characteristic of tyranny, Cleon's own use of the imperial tyranny metaphor must be seen as prescriptive as well as descriptive. There is some force in Tuplin's objection that we see no ‘denial of erstwhile equality’ in the passages cited by K. A. Raaflaub, ‘Polis Tyrannos: zur Entstehung einer politischen Metapher’, in G. W Bowersock et al. (edd.), Arktouros: Hellenic Studies Presented to Bernard M. W. Knox… (Berlin and New York, 1979), 237–52—‘and this despite the fact that it does appear in other imperial contexts’ (365). This objection could perhaps be met by showing that the injustice with which the imperial state is charged involves violation of distributive justice, where the issue is precisely each state's fair share (ἴσoν).

⁵⁹ Scholars who scrutinize Cleon's reasoning find much to fault. See, in addition to R. P. Winnington-Ingram (next note): Gomme in HCT, vol. II, 299–300, 304, 307, 310; Hornblower (n. 2), 430, 431, 432; Saar (n. 2), 44, 46. For the view that the fallacies and inconsistencies of Cleon's speech should be viewed as part of a larger Thucydidean programme, see Macleod (n. 2), 88–102; Arnold, P. E., ‘The persuasive style of debates in direct speech in Thucydides’, Hermes 120 (1992), 44–57.Google Scholar Macleod, closely studying how Cleon (and the Mytileneans and Diodotus) employ reason in their effort to persuade, is keenly interested in rhetorical technique. Nonetheless, whether the audience is persuaded or not is secondary for him. What matters is the manner in which the historian ‘discover(s) to his readers the limits, or the failures, as well as the powers, of reasoning’ (88). Arnold takes the view that Thucydides’ intention in the speeches is to re-create for a reading audience the experience of listeners exposed to sophistic reasoning; and since readers, having the text before them, are less susceptible to fallacy, Thucydides employs in the speeches a style designed to make the logical difficulties less readily apprehended.

⁶⁰ Winnington-Ingram, R. P., ‘TA ΔΕΟΝTA ΕΙπΕΙΝ: Cleon and Diodotus’, B1CS 12 (1965), 76.Google Scholar Hornblower (n. 2) 422–3 minimalizes the difficulty.

⁶¹ Gomme in HCT, vol. II, 310: ‘a cynical and ruthless logic, which is, strictly, inconsistent with the bold assertion of the tyranny in 37.2’. Cf. Mackenzie, M. M., Plato on Punishment (Berkeley, 1981), 118Google Scholar: ‘The hopeless tangle of (Cleon's) disjunctive argument may be encapsulated thus: on the one hand, it is just to punish (the Mytileneans), therefore they should be punished, and this will also be expedient; on the other hand, it is expedient to punish them, whether it be just or not, therefore they should be punished.’ See too Cohen, D., ‘Justice, interest, and political deliberation in Thucydides’, QUCC 16 (1984), 48Google Scholar

⁶² Tuplin (n. 2), 354 with n. 25.

⁶³ Commenting on the enlightened tyranny of the Peisistratids, Thucydides remarks that αὐτ 120πóλις τoîς πρν κειμνoις νóμoις Χρτo (6.54.6).

⁶⁴ Gomme in HCT, vol. II, 300. Cf. Macleod (n. 2), 69. However, Hansen, M. H., The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes (Oxford, 1991), 161–2Google Scholar claims that the difference in the fifth century between νóμoς and Ψøισμα is merely a matter of emphasis, whereby νóμoς stresses the contents of a rule, Ψøισμα its enactment. Says Hornblower (n. 2), 423–4 (who had before him an earlier discussion of νóμoς and Ψøισμα by Hansen): ‘on the technical point Hansen seems right; but there is no denying that Kleon is trading on the reassuring associations of nomos’.

⁶⁵ In construing ὧν ἂν δóξη πéρι as περ, πéρι ὧν ἂν δóξη, I follow J. Classen, Thukydides, Band 3 (rev. J. Steup, Berlin, 1892³), 65. Saar (n. 2) 26 interprets the relative clause as πéρι τoτων, ἃ ἂν δóξη, even though (as Saar himself recognizes), the attraction of the nominative relative pronoun to the genitive of its antecedent is very irregular. That νòμoς can be used t o refer to a precedent is seen from 1.40.4–6, where the Corinthians urge the Athenians no t to intervene on behalf of the Corcyraeans lest they establish the precedent (νóμoν καθιστναι) whereby either they or the Peloponnesians may bring aid to states who defect from the rival camp. Further, Diodotu s evidently has the παρδειγμα of 3.40.7 in mind when he says (3.45.3): oὐκ ἔστι νóμoς ⋯στις περξει τoτυ (sc. τo μαρτνειν). Given the limited role accorded to precedent in Athenian law itself (Todd, S. C., The Shape of Athenian Law [Oxford, 1993], 49–63Google Scholar, esp. 60–1), this use of νóμoς t o express the idea of a precedent is perhaps surprising.

⁶⁶ Compare Zeus in Aesch. P. V., who preserves his rule through laws of his own making (403 ἰδoις νóμoις ρατνει), and for whom justice is no more than his freedom to satisfy his own interests (186—7 παρ’ αυτŵ τò δἰκαιoν ἔΧει).

⁶⁷ Cf. Soph. Ant. 506–7 λλ’ τυραννς πoλλ τ’ ἄλλ’ εὐδαιμoνεῖ κἄξεστιν αὐτῆ δρâν λγειν θ’ ἃ βoλεται.

⁶⁸ If both Cleon and Pericles, when addressing the Assembly, were able rhetorically to exploit the Peloponnesian charge of imperial tyranny, then perhaps it was possible actually to give the charge a positive spin: ‘GewiB, wir herrschen wie ein Tyrann, aber bedenkt doch, wie herrlich und beneidenswert die Herrschaft eines Tyrannen ist!’ So Raaflaub, K. A., ‘Athens “Ideologie der Macht” und die Freiheit des Tyrannen’, in Schuller, W.et al. (edd.), Studien zum Attischen Seebund (Konstanz, 1984), 76.Google Scholar Raaflaub would explain this frank acceptance of the charge of imperial tyranny as the final development of the Athenians’ distinctive notion of absolute freedom. Objects Tuplin (n. 2), 362: ‘Of course, granted the “Konzeption der absoluten Freiheit” (which is anyway the really important part of Raaflaub's article…), Athenians might logically exult in their tyranny. But there is no evidence that they did.’ Open exultation is indeed missing. But I do believe that Cleon's speech at least demonstrates a Thucydidean speaker's conviction that the Athenians were prepared to view their need to rule harshly as an opportunity to transgress τò ἴσoν, in the manner of the tyrant (above, n. 58), both at home and abroad. On the question of the Athenians’ imperial tyranny, see (in addition to the articles by Raaflaub and Tuplin): Hunter, V.; ‘Athens tyrannis’, CJ 69 (1973/1974), 120–6Google Scholar; Connor, W. R., ‘Tyrannis polis’, in D'arms, J. H. and Eadie, J. W. (edd.), Ancient and Modern: Essays in Honor of G. F. Else (Ann Arbor, MI, 1977), 95–109Google Scholar; Schuller, W., Die Stadt als Tyrann—Athens Herrschaft über seine Bundesgenossen (Konstanz, 1978)Google Scholar; Raaflaub (n. 58), 237–52; Scanlon, T. F., ‘Thucydides and tyranny’, CA 6 (1987), 286–301Google Scholar; Barceló, P., ‘Thukydides und die Tyrannis’, Historia 39 (1990), 401–25.Google Scholar For bibliography on ‘popular tyranny’, as well as a variety of discussions of the subject, see the forthcoming collection of essays under that title, edited by K. A. Morgan.