¹ It is difficult to maintain, as only very few nineteenth-century scholars nevertheless have, that the Hippias Minor is actually spurious, particularly since Aristotle mentions and discusses it (Met. Δ. 29. 1025a6–13), but it is likely, as Paul Friedländer remarks, that ‘without the explicit testimony of Aristotle, probably few critics would consider the Hippias Minor a genuine Platonic work’. See Friedländer, 's Plato, trans. Meyerhoff, H. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), ii, 146Google Scholar.

² Besides these there are also (a) the shocking conclusions reached in the dialogue, (b) the aporia with which the dialogue ends, and (c) Socrates' alleged ‘hint’ at 376b5–6 (εἴπερ τ⋯ς ἔστιν οὗτος) that the dialogue's conclusion is not to be taken seriously (since no one actually does do wrong intentionally), all of which cry out for interpretation. But none of these, nor the irony and caricature, affects the validity of the arguments or the morality of their conclusions.

³ See, e.g., Hoerber, R. G., ‘Plato's Lesser Hippias’, Phronesis 7 (1962), 121–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar, who thinks that this view is supported by Eudicus' appearing twice in the dialogue, once in the beginning and once in the middle, thereby dividing the dialogue into two parts. In general, Hoerber is fascinated by the dialogue's twos: two propositions, two Homeric heroes, two famous Socratic doctrines (i.e. ‘No one does wrong willingly’ and ‘Virtue is knowledge’), two characters carrying on the discussion, and two appearances by Eudicus. In my opinion, however, Eudicus' reappearance confirms the dialogue's continuity, its integrity, rather than its duality.

⁴ The term ‘involuntary liars’ may seem peculiar, if not outright self-contradictory, for a ‘liar’ is normally one who intentionally speaks falsely in order to deceive. However, it does seem a suitable translation of οἱ ἄκοντες ψευδ⋯μενοι, which may be just as peculiar an expression in Greek as ‘involuntary liars’ is in English. The intended sense is, of course, ‘involuntary speakers of falsehoods’.

⁵ Interestingly, Sprague, R. K. who, in her Plato's Use of Fallacy (London: Routledge, 1962)Google Scholar, also emphasizes the unity of the dialogue when she claims that the Hippias Minor ‘consists of a single argument (with variations)’, p. 65, offers an analysis of the earlier part of the dialogue which is very similar to the one proposed here (see Sprague, pp. 66–70). Hence her interpretation is not embraced by our reference to the ‘usual’ or ‘standard’ interpretation. The major (and irreconcilable) difference between her interpretation and mine, however, is that she believes that the dialogue contains equivocation and I do not.

⁶ Mulhern, J. J., ‘Tropos and polytropia in Plato's Hippias Minor’, Phoenix 22 (1968), 283–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar. There are, of course, other ways of characterizing the equivocation in the first argument. Hoerber emphasizes the dialogue's pervasive confusion, which he regards as Plato's way of challenging his readers. The pairs of terms he thinks are intentionally confused in the first argument are: δυνατοί/σοφο⋯ and πανουργ⋯α/φρόνησις. Sprague says that Socrates uses two ambiguous terms in the first argument: (a) ‘power’, which can be either for good or for evil, and (b) ‘wiliness’, which can be either the shiftiness of the false man or the intellectual ability which enables such a man to carry out his designs. Like Hoerber, she also sees the equivocations as intentional (pp. 67–8).

⁷ The term τρ⋯πος is found at 365b3–4, where Hippias says that the τρ⋯πος of Achilles and Odysseus as set forth by Homer is such that Achilles is ⋯ληθ⋯ς and ⋯πλο⋯ς, and Odysseus πολ⋯τροπος and ψευδ⋯ς. This passage, however, does not seem to support Mulhern's view that Plato makes an intentional pun on πολ⋯τροπος, for the way in which he uses τρόπος does not suggest that he restricts it to words describing man's typical behaviour; on the contrary, it seems that, for Plato, a man's τρ⋯πος is any way in which he can be characterized.

⁸ Mulhern excuses Socrates' equivocation as an expression of his justified objection to Hippias' mixing of dunamis- and tropos-concepts in distinguishing Achilles and Odysseus (p. 287).

⁹ With respect to arithmetic and calculation, Hippias, who is able to tell falsehoods δυνατώτατα (366d 6), is thus the ψενδ⋯ς περ⋯ λογισμόν (367c 5); in geometry, the man who μ⋯ δυν⋯μενος ψεύδεσθαι is not ψευδ⋯ς (367e5–6); in astronomy, ⋯ ⋯γαθ⋯ς ⋯στρονόμος ψευδ⋯ς ἔσται, ⋯ δυνατòς ψεύδσθαι (368a4–5).

¹⁰ This precisely parallels what is said in the astronomy example: κα⋯ ⋯ν ⋯στρονομίᾳ ἄρα εἳπρ τις κα⋯ ἄλλος ψευδ⋯ς, ⋯ ⋯γαθòς ⋯στρον⋯μος ψενδ⋯ς ἔσται, ⋯ δυνατòς ψεὑδεσθαι… 'Ο αὐτòς ἄρα κα⋯ ⋯ν ⋯στρονομ⋯ᾳ ⋯ληθ⋯ς τε κα⋯ ψευδ⋯ς ἔσται (368a3–7).

¹¹ Gomperz, T., in Greek Thinkers, trans. Magnus, L. (London, 1920), ii, 296Google Scholar, takes this argument to be a reductio ad absurdum of the idea that all that is involved in action is knowledge; choice of ends is important, too.

¹² Hoerber, p. 126.

¹³ On the proposed interpretation, as we shall see, the comparison Hippias draws between Achilles and Odysseus has far more bearing on the argument than it had on the standard interpretation in which the comparison was merely a literary device to introduce the argument but did not actually affect it. On the present interpretation, however, Hippias' description (in Homer's name) of Achilles as ⋯πλο⋯ς – usually rendered ‘simple’ – and ⋯ληθ⋯ς, and of Odysseus as πολὑτροπος and ψευδ⋯ς will play a crucial role.

¹⁴ There is a difference between the claim of Gomperz and Hoerber that the argument rests on the hypothesis that the essential factor or attribute of a truthful or false man is his δ⋯ναμις and the claim made here that the substantives ‘truthful’ (⋯ληθς⋯ς) and ‘false’ (ψευδ⋯ς) are throughout the argument shorthand for ‘the man skilled at speaking truthfully’ and ‘the man skilled at lying’, respectively. Whereas, in the former case, one may sensibly ask ‘Is it true that the essential attribute of a truthful man is his δὑναμις to speak truthfully?’, in the latter, it is nonsense to ask ‘Is it true that the essential attribute of a man skilled at truth-telling is his skill at truth-telling?’. In the former case, Socrates can perhaps be blamed for missing the essential nature of ⋯ ⋯ληθ⋯ς and ⋯ ψευδ⋯ς; in the latter, since he is only ascertaining what Hippias means by ψευδ⋯ς, blame would be entirely out of place.

¹⁵ ‘Wily’ is a suitable translation of πολ⋯τροπος because (a) it suggests the cleverness which is essential, and (b) it is a word which, while having an appropriately pejorative taint, does not go so far as to become a tropos-adjective like, say, ‘wicked’ or ‘treacherous’.

¹⁶ Hoerber points out that when this word characterized Odysseus in the first line of the Odyssey, it probably meant ‘much-travelled’, ‘much wandering’, though Hippias takes it in its other sense meaning ‘crafty’, ‘shifty’, ‘clever’, or ‘versatile’ when equating it with ψευδ⋯ς (pp. 124–5). But Mulhern makes a distinction even within this second sense between dunamis- and tropos-terms; he would probably consider ‘crafty’ and ‘shifty’ tropos-terms, and ‘clever’ and ‘versatile’ dunamis-terms, like his own ‘resourceful’.

¹⁷ At this point, Socrates has not yet finished probing Hippias' intention in identifying πολ⋯τροπος and ψενδ⋯ς. While it is true that the question: ‘Does ⋯ ψενδ⋯ς deceive ὑπò πανουργìας καì φρον⋯σεώς τινος?’ may suggest that the skill of the ψευδ⋯ς is not part of the very meaning of ψευδ⋯ς but is merely that with which the ψευδ⋯ς does his deceiving, since the cross-examination is not yet complete, it is too soon to decide. By 366b4–5, however, Socrates is asking not merely if οἱ ψευδεῖς are σοφοί but if they are οἱ σοφοί τε καί δυνατο⋯ ψε⋯δεσθαι and receiving an unequivocal ναί for an answer.

¹⁸ It is incorrect to say here, as Gomperz does, that Socrates ‘wrings’ this admission from Hippias (p. 291). Considering that Hippias equates πολ⋯τροπος with ψευδ⋯ς, it is very reasonable for Socrates to ask if ψευδεῖς are δυνατο⋯ and Hippias answers readily – with no hesitation – that they are.

¹⁹ This is the crucial move (367 c6). It flatly contradicts Hippias' association of ⋯ληθ⋯ς with ⋯πλο⋯ς, for here the good man and ⋯ δυνατ⋯ς are one and the same. (See n. 31.) Cf. Sprague, who presents a similar analysis of the argument in general (pp. 66–70), and also perceives this as the crucial move (p. 68).

²⁰ Thus Socrates in effect denies what Hippias (and Homer on Hippias' interpretation) had affirmed, i.e. that ⋯ ⋯ληθ⋯ς is ⋯πλο⋯ς. On the contrary, ⋯ ⋯ληθ⋯ς is πολ⋯τροπος.

²¹ This is in fact a return to Socrates' initial position that both are πολ⋯τροποι, only now πολ⋯τροπος means ‘having ability in lying’. But, for Socrates, things have not really changed at all.

²² This he does in line 1 of the Odyssey.

²³ Although Hippias could no doubt have found passages in which Odysseus does lie (particularly in the Odyssey), had Plato allowed him to cite those, Socrates' question here would not make sense.

²⁴ There is thus no reason to believe that in seeking the man who actually lies, Socrates returns to a tropos-sense of πολ⋯τροπος He merely regards actual lying as an indication of possible skill at lying.

²⁵ Indeed, Socrates is aware that it is not enough to show that Achilles actually lies in order to show that he is πολ⋯τροπος, presumably because even people who are not πολ⋯τροποι do lie – out of ignorance; he must show that Achilles' lying is voluntary. This accounts for the γε when Socrates says: ⋯ δ⋯ 'Αχιλλεὺς πολ⋯τροπος τις φα⋯νεται κατ⋯ τòν σòν λóγον ψε⋯δεται γο⋯ν (370a1–2); the fact of lying is not more than an indication that πολυτροπ⋯α may be present in the liar.

It is important to point out here that the first argument, as it was presented on the ‘usual’ interpretation, contained as its second premiss the statement: ‘Only the man who has the power, ability, and wisdom in the matters in which he is false can be false’. This seems to contradict what is being said here, i.e. that many people lie without being powerful or wise. On the revised analysis of the first argument, however, the word ψευδ⋯ς no longer means ‘one who lies’, but rather ‘one who is skilled at lying’. Thus, at 366b6–7, when Socrates says: 'Αδ⋯νατος ἄρα ψε⋯δεσθαι ⋯ν⋯ρ καἱ ⋯μαθ⋯ς οὐκ ἂν εἴη ψευδ⋯ς, he is to be understood as saying not that one who has no skill and is ignorant cannot lie, but rather that one who has no skill and is ignorant cannot be a ψευδ⋯ς, a man skilled at lying.

²⁶ The emphasis on Achilles' superiority to Odysseus in cunning shows that it is Achilles who is δυνατóς even in lying, and hence Hippias must surely be mistaken in his claim that πολ⋯τροπος means skilled in lying; if it does, why does Homer call Odysseus – rather than Achilles- πολ⋯τροπος?

²⁷ Hippias means by this that Achilles had no intention of deceiving, ‘but the force of external circumstances had brought his actions into disaccord with his words; it was the desperate position of the army that had prevented him from withdrawing, as he had threatened’, Gomperz, p. 292. As Socrates will show, if this is the case, then Achilles is indeed the inferior. Although Gomperz thinks this is a just defence of Achilles on Hippias' part, that is beside the point, for Achilles manifests the inability to tell the truth whenever he wishes. (This case, in which Achilles is prevented from telling the truth by ‘external circumstances’, is not the same as the case of extenuating circumstances described by Socrates earlier (366b), i.e. being prevented by disease or some such thing; in which case, it could, presumably, still be true that one is skilled. In Achilles' case, however, there is a definite lack of ability.)

²⁸ This certainly shows that Hippias is concerned not with Odysseus' τρ⋯πος but with his δ⋯ναμις, with how Odysseus speaks – both when he is and when he is not lying.

²⁹ ψευδ⋯μενοι is the word used for liars; ψευδεῖς is reserved for those skilled at lying, οἱ ψευδεῖς = οἱ ⋯κóντες ψευδóμενοι.

³⁰ cf. 366 b 2–3: π⋯τερον λ⋯γεις δυνατοὺς εἶναι ψε⋯δεσθαι ⋯⋯ν βο⋯λωνται.

³¹ cf. 366d3–5: Socrates asks Hippias if he is only wisest and ablest in arithmetic and calculation, or if he is also the best, and Hippias says he is also the best. Socrates makes sure there that Hippias sees a connection between wisest and ablest, on the one hand, and best, on the other, so that the connection between ⋯γαθóς and δυνατ⋯ς is not new.

³² Even though ⋯κών is not used but rather βονλ⋯μενος ψε⋯δεσθαι, ἄκων is used (367a3) as the opposite of βουλ⋯μενος to mean, with respect to lying, ‘not (only) when one wishes to’. ἄκων implies τò μ⋯ εἰδ⋯ναι – not knowing (367a3).

³³ There is, of course, no excuse for this because if he does not see all cases of lying as bad, there was no point in his substituting ψενδ⋯ς for πολ⋯τροπος.

³⁴ Socrates seems aware of the change because, when he states his present belief, he talks of καί ⋯δικο⋯ντες καί ψευδóμενοι καί ⋯ξαπατ⋯ντες καί ⋯μαρτ⋯νοντες ⋯κ⋯ντες (372d5–6). As we shall see, οἱ ⋯δικο⋯ντες require a stipulation beyond what οἱ ⋯μαρτ⋯νοντες do, although both of these are new to the discussion. Interestingly, this is the last time we see Achilles and Odysseus in the dialogue; by dropping their names, Socrates also signals that a new topic is beginning.

³⁵ Socrates speaks of these as doing the actions themselves, except in the case of eyes, with which the blinking is done voluntarily.

³⁶ Though not specified, the skill of slaves is presumably to carry out their master's wishes well.

³⁷ τέχνη substitutes for ⋯πιστ⋯μη here, with δ⋯ναμις, in both cases, being the alternative. There is no change in meaning implied. Hoerber attempts to show that Socrates distinguishes between Hippias' τ⋯χναι and the previously discussed ⋯πιστ⋯μαι such as arithmetic, geometry and astronomy (368b 1–2), but drops the distinction when it flies past Hippias (375b8–el), p. 126. The fact is, however, that Socrates never distinguishes between the two terms in this dialogue. He does not distinguish Hippias' crafts from ⋯πιστ⋯μαι, but rather calls those crafts ⋯πιστ⋯μαι, asking Hippias to consider with respect to πασ⋯ν τ⋯ν ⋯πιστ⋯μων if the same principle holds. The ⋯πιστ⋯μαι he goes on to enumerate are all Hippias' τ⋯χναι.

³⁸ Perhaps this is what Guthrie, W. K. C. (A History of Greek Philosophy iv, Cambridge, 1975, p. 195)Google Scholar means when he accuses Socrates of ‘treating as absolute contraries what are matters of degree only’.

³⁹ This is foreshadowed in Stage I where the good man is the able man just as the ablest and wisest man is the best. See n. 31.

⁴⁰ There are two definitions of the good runner, (1) he who runs well (373d2), and (2) he who runs slowly – βραδ⋯ως (= poorly – κακ⋯ς – 373d 3), intentionally (373 e4).

⁴¹ Guthrie sees equivocation on ⋯γαθ⋯ς which can mean either good, as a technical accomplishment, or morally good; the equivocation on ⋯κ⋯ν confuses ‘able and willing’ with ‘able’ alone (p. 195). Hoerber sees confusion between ⋯με⋯νων and βελτ⋯ων, only the latter of which has moral connotations, p. 127. (If this is true, it is very difficult to see why Socrates uses βελτ⋯ων about instruments!) Mulhern characterizes the equivocation on (a) ⋯γαθ⋯ς, such that it can be either neutral (good at something – a dunamis-concept), or evaluative (a tropos-concept), (b) ⋯κών, such that it can either refer to what is in our power (a dunamis-concept) or to what we normally wish (a tropos-concept), and (c) ⋯με⋯νων, such that it can be either the comparative of the dunamis-sense of ⋯γαθ⋯s or that of its tropos-sense. Applied to the voluntary wrongdoer, the one who has it in his power to do wrong is indeed the better in the dunamis-sense, but one who normally wishes to do bad is probably not better in the tropos-sense, p. 288. For Sprague, the major fallacy is the move from powerful (to do evil), to powerful, to better (morally); so it turns out that he who does evil voluntarily (i.e. because he has the power) is better (morally) than he who makes mistakes involuntarily, p. 77.

⁴² Grote, G., in Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates i, (London, 1865), p. 394Google Scholar, following Steinhart, thinks that the historical Socrates did use the Sophistic style of speaking. Cf. p. 258.

⁴³ Mulhern, for example, excuses the equivocation because he thinks Hippias confuses tropos- and dunamis-terms (p. 286).

⁴⁴ Apelt, , Platonische Aufsätze (Leipzig, 1912), p. 205Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Hoerber, p. 128.

⁴⁶ Sprague believes that there is equivocation in the argument because ‘no other activity than the activity of being a man has been specified for him [i.e. the good man] to be skillful at’, p. 75. Once we see, however, that Socrates has indeed specified justice as that at which the good man is skilled, we are no longer forced to say that ⋯γαθ⋯ς is used in the conclusion to mean ‘morally good’.

⁴⁷ Even in the case of running where τò θεῖν is used, Socrates makes a point of ascertaining that this too is a kind of ποιεῖν or ⋯ργ⋯ζεσθαι (373d7–9).

⁴⁸ According to Robinson, R., in Plato's Earlier Dialectic (2nd ed.Oxford, 1953), p. 39Google Scholar, the only two cases in Plato where an epagoge is the main step (i.e. the step before the conclusion) in an argument are the two long arguments in the Hippias Minor. This, however, is not strictly true because, certainly in Stage III, there is a universal statement made before the case of οἱ ⋯κóντες ⋯δικο⋯ντες comes up, though the argument does go back to a particular case, i.e. that of slaves' souls, before deducing the conclusion. Nevertheless, the conclusion that the better soul is the one that does wrong intentionally does not derive strictly from particular co-ordinate cases, but rather relies upon what is the case in τἆλλα π⋯ντα τ⋯ κατ⋯ τ⋯ς τ⋯χνας τε καί τ⋯ς ⋯πιστ⋯μας (375b8–cl). Similarly, in Stage I, before concluding that ⋯ ⋯ληθ⋯ς and ⋯ ψευδ⋯ς are the same in terms of Achilles and Odysseus, Socrates asks about ⋯ ⋯ληθ⋯ς and ⋯ ψευδ⋯ς in all the arts and sciences (368a8–369a2).

⁴⁹ The verb κακουργ⋯ω appears in only three places in the dialogue, (1) at 365e8–9, where Hippias says that οἱ ψενδεῖς have knowledge and therefore κακουργο⋯σιν, (2) at 373b4–5, where Hippias, accusing Socrates of being troublesome in argument, says that Socrates ἔοικεν ὥσπερ κακουργο⋯ντι, and (3) here, at 375c5, d1, where the soul that intentionally κακουργῇ is seen to compare favourably with the soul that does so unintentionally. In an interesting way this word unites the dialogue, appearing once in the discussion of ⋯ ψευδ⋯ς, once in the discussion of the voluntary versus involuntary deceiver, and once in the discussion of voluntarily versus involuntarily wrongdoing souls (here). As we can see, each of these corresponds to the particular topic of one of the three distinct stages in the Hippias Minor.

⁵⁰ Another attempt at viewing δικαιοσ⋯νη as a craft is found in Republic 1. 334a, and there the concern is to specify its use, since it is assumed that all crafts are useful for some purpose. The end result is a paradox similar to the one in the Hippias Minor, namely, that the just man turns out to be some kind of thief, i.e. a man who is good at stealing as well as guarding money.

⁵¹ To amplify this point, let us turn to a remark by Guthrie: ‘One might ask anyway why Hippias should agree at once that justice must be “either a power or knowledge or both”. Can it really be supposed to follow from his previous admission that no action can be performed unless one has the power and skill to perform it, justice being seen as a form of action?’, p. 195, n. 3. The ‘previous admission’ of which Guthrie speaks is not at all what he says it is, i.e. that no action can be performed unless one has the power and skill to perform it. On the contrary, actions can be performed without one's having the skill and ability to perform them, i.e. one can perform them when one does not wish to, or involuntarily. Thus, unless one is capable – skilled at lying – one may tell the truth inadvertently when one wishes to lie. Only in order to be a ψευδ⋯ς, in the dunamis-sense, does one need to be δυνατ⋯ς; one does not need to be δυνατ⋯ς just to lie. It is not that anyone who lies must be able to lie, it is that anyone who lies whenever he wishes to lie must be able to lie. Thus Socrates says (367b2–3), εἔπερ μ⋯λλει ψευδ⋯ς ἔσεσθαι, ὡς σὺ ἄρτι ὡμολ⋯γεις, δυνατ⋯ν εἶναι ψε⋯δεσθαι, but does not say, εἴπερ μ⋯λλει ψε⋯δεσθαι…δυνατ⋯ν εἶναι ψε⋯δεσθαι. Also, of course, justice is not seen as a ‘form of action’; it is a power or knowledge in the soul. Doing noble or ignoble deeds is the action to which this power corresponds.

⁵² In Republic 8. 535e, Socrates maintains that the unintentional lie is to be despised by the rulers who love truth just as much as the intentional. We may assume, then, that if the lie spoken from ignorance is no better than the lie spoken willingly, the lie spoken willingly is certainly to be condemned.

Confusing the voluntary lie with the voluntary liar is perhaps what caused Hamilton, E. and Cairns, H., eds., The Collected Dialogues of Plato (Princeton, 1963)Google Scholar to say, in their introduction to the Hippias Minor, that this dialogue ‘is inferior to all the others… It turns upon voluntary and involuntary wrongdoing, Hippias maintaining that it is better to do wrong unintentionally than intentionally and Socrates taking the opposite side’, p. 200. Shorey, too, in What Plato Said (Chicago, 1933)Google Scholar, says: ‘The Hippias Minor issues in the paradox that if virtue is knowledge, and the virtues may be compared in Socratic fashion with the arts and sciences, then it is better to do wrong knowingly than without knowing it, for induction shows that in every science and craft the good artist is the one who can most skillfully and most certainly do wrong if he chooses’, pp. 86–7. It does not really follow, however, that if the good artist is the most skilful at doing wrong it is better to do wrong willingly, and in the Hippias Minor there is no suggestion that it does.

⁵³ This is reminiscent of Donald Ogden Stewart's burlesque of Post, Emily, Perfect Behavior (1922; rpt. Philadelphia, 1977)Google Scholar which begins with the definition: ‘The perfect gentleman is he who never unintentionally causes pain’, p. 1.

If one accepts the idea that the scandalousness of the conclusion is seriously reduced with the appreciation of the difference between the goodness of a voluntary wrongdoer and the goodness of voluntary wrongdoing, Aristotle's criticism of this passage loses some of its force. Aristotle attempts to drive a wedge between τ⋯ν δυναμεν⋯ν ψε⋯σασθαι (Met. Δ. 29. 1025a8) and τ⋯ν ⋯κ⋯ντα φα⋯λον (a 9), but when one realizes that the two are equivalent, especially since there is no mention of the deed but only of the doer, the importance of the distinction disappears. Of course, when the comparison is put in terms of the voluntary and involuntary wrongdoer rather than the man able or unable to do wrong, the conclusion has the more paradoxical sound which Plato no doubt intended. But one must always bear in mind that these terms are introduced in the dialogue by Hippias – not by Socrates; Socrates never himself goes beyond οἱ ⋯κ⋯ντες ψευδ⋯μενοι. Cf. Grote, p. 398, who agrees with Aristotle. (It must be said that Aristotle hopelessly jumbles the arguments of the Hippias Minor, claiming that the identity of the false man and the true is based on the two assumptions that (a) the man more skilled at lying is the false, and (b) the good man does wrong willingly. Of course, the second assumption appears in the dialogue only after the identity of the true man and the false has been established.)

⁵⁴ In Stage III it is not even usually the agent himself who is discussed. Indeed, only in the case of the runner and wrestler (and other masters of bodily exercise) is the man himself considered. After these there are voices, feet, rudders, musical instruments, horses, dogs, and all sorts of souls, and it is not until Socrates says that ⋯ ⋯γαθ⋯ς ⋯γαθ⋯ν ψυχ⋯ν ἔχει (376b3–4) that a man re-enters the picture. This may be significant, for had Socrates asked Hippias if he prefers a physician who prescribes the wrong drug intentionally to one who does so unintentionally, Hippias may well not have known which to choose. But with the alternatives put in terms of souls, the choice is easy: the better soul is the soul that can do whatever it wishes, be it good or bad; that physician's soul is better which prescribes the wrong drug intentionally. This applies even to the just man as the craftsman of justice. Indeed, first his soul is discussed and only later, after the admission that the good man has the good soul, is the good man (⋯ ⋯γαθ⋯ς) said to be he who sins voluntarily. This connection between the soul and its possessor is made only for justice.

⁵⁵ cf. Xenophon, , Mem. 4.2. 19–20Google Scholar, where Socrates asks the identical question and again speaks not of intentional and unintentional deception, but rather of intentional and unintentional deceivers, and here too the act is specified as bad: ⋯ξαπατώντων ⋯πί βλ⋯βῃ, ruling out the possibility that the goodness of the intentional doer depends on the goodness of the deed done intentionally.

⁵⁶ As Gomperz notes, ‘Socrates does not disguise his dissatisfaction with the conclusion, in spite of the necessity with which it appears to flow from the discussion leading up to it’, p. 294. Not everyone, however, believes that the conclusion is disapproved of by Socrates despite his having said that it is. Aristotle quotes the Hippias Minor's paradoxes without giving any indication that Plato or Socrates did not believe them (Met. Δ. 29. 1025a6–13). Xenophon, too, has Socrates bring up the identical point in Mem. 4. 2. 19–20 in terms of liars and deceivers. Many modern scholars as well have taken as Socratic the view that intentional wrongdoers are better than unintentional. Grote, for instance, considers this view to be one of Plato's and Socrates' ‘startling novelties in ethical doctrine’, p. 393.