^{page 44 note 1} The problem has been, and still is being, discussed by biologists and philosophers all over the world, and no agreement has been reached between those who defend and those who oppose mechanism in biology. J. S. Haldane's insistence that the organism is a wholeness a living being, and a system informed by an organic plan, and that it cannot be separated from its environment, should be particulary mentioned in this connexion, though I must here refrain form further describing his views.

^{page 44 note 2} Phys. B 8. 198^b10, and passim.

^{page 44 ntoe 3} Ib. I99^b26.

^{page 44 note 4} Cf. Phaedo 97–8.

^{page 45 note 1} Balme, D. M., ‘Greek Science and Medianism. I. Aristotle on Nature and Chance’, C.Q. xxxiii 1939 PP. 129–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; ‘II. The Atomists’, C.Q. xxxv, 1941, pp. 23–8Google Scholar.

^{page 45 note 2} C.Q. xxxiii. 138.

^{page 45 note 3} Cf. C.Q. xxxiii. 129: ‘The chief weapon which Aristotle finds to use against the φυσικο⋯ is that natural physical interactions could not, unguided, produce the orderly world. Yet it is precisely the orderliness of nature which the modern mechanist invokes in his own defence.’ Ib., p. 132: ‘Lastly there is Aristotle's unceasing criticism of the φυσικο⋯. He attacks them the very weapon with which they would now defend themselves: if everything is due to automatic interactions in nature, how is it that phenomena are so orderly?—The φυσικο⋯ refer everything to Ananke: but this is manifestly untenable, for Ananke and chance could never produce an orderly world.’ Ib., p. 137: ‘he (sc. Aristotle) could not credit natural processes with orderly behaviour unless they were guided by a creative impulse towards ends. An orderly nexus of automatic causes and effects is not contemplated by him. The nexus which he contemplates in his attack on Empedocles is criticized as disorderly.’ C.Q. xxxv. 23: ‘The principle that a moving body must continue to move unless something stops it was not known to Aristotle. … This ignorance … compelled him to believe that nature could not be orderly unless guided by a purposive force. Therefore he attacked those scientists who had thought that the world could be explained in terms of the compulsions and interactions of natural stuffs—a principle which they vaguely called Necessity, Ananke. In attacking their doctrine Aristotle cannot have thought he was attacking the mechanistic determinism which modern critics have detected in their words: for he could not even conceive of such an idea.’ Ib., p. 27: ‘Epicurus saved the human mind from random behaviour, but he could not save his world from it. It seems likely that in the interval between him and Lucretius his opponents fastened upon that point, asking (with Aristotle) how atomism could account for the orderliness of nature (a question which has no cogency against Laplace).’ Ib., p. 28: ‘But he (sc. Lucretius) has not explained why nature should be so overwhelmingly regular in achieving motus convenientes, and why the abortive combinations are so conspicuously i n the minority. On this point the Epicureans did not advance a step on Empedocles, and the answer which he had got from Aristotle was repeated to Epicurus by the Stoics.’

To the present author it would seem that the Stoics, like Aristotle, were in the right with their criticism, and, what is more, that Aristotle's question does possess cogency even against Laplace. Mr. Balme thinks of mechanical order only, but the orderliness of nature which fascinates Aristotle is not explained by modem mechanism either, and defies all mechanistic explanation.

^{page 46 note 1} Cf. above, p. 44 and ib., n. 3. In marked contrast to φὺσις there is in τ⋯χνη a planning agent, who is different from, and exists outside, the thing which undergoes the change. This agent is a human being, and he is led by νο⋯ς. τ⋯χνη is one special kind of setting-into-motion within Praxis. Therefore, here as in all πρ⋯ξις, νο⋯ς in the form of λ⋯γος is found to be playing its part: τ⋯χνη is ⋯ μετ⋯ λ⋯γου ποιητικ⋯ ἒξις (Eth. Nic. Z 4. 1140²4).

^{page 47 note 1} C.Q. xxxv. 28.

^{page 47 note 2} A. clearly holds that the various realms of nature, such as ἄψυχα, plants, animals, are not separated from each other by definite boundaries but show gradual transitions. He had observed in the sea living beings intermediate between plants and animals (Hist, anim. Θ 1) and seems to have thought that there exist similarly transitionary phenomena between ἄψυχα and living beings. He definitely states that ⋯κ τ⋯ν ⋯ψὺχων εἰς τ⋯ ζῷα μεταβα⋯νει κατ⋯ μικρ⋯ν ⋯ φὺσις (Hist, anim. Θ 1. 588^b4); similarly ⋯ γ⋯ρ φὺσις μεταβ⋯νει συνεχ⋯ς κ.τ.λ. (De part.an. Δ 5. 681^a12 ff.). In anticipation of the discussion below it may here be mentioned that Uexküll likewise inclines to believe in the unity of organic and inorganic nature.

^{page 48 note 1} I here take ψυχ⋯ in the Aristotelian sense as = principle of life, including the life of plants and animals.

^{page 48 note 2} Here we have to remind ourselves of the distinction, so fundamental in Aristotle, between τ⋯ ⋯ε⋯ ⋯ντα and τ⋯ ⋯νδεχ⋯μενα ἄλλως ἒχειν. Accordingly, the respective modes of cognition differ from each other. It is only concerning the invariable that strict knowledge is possible. The ⋯νδεχ⋯μενα admit of δ⋯ξα only, i.e. of a not firmly established way of thinking about them, since they themselves are not firmly established but variable. Plato likewise had held the view that the ontological character of what is being cognized determines the mode of cognition. We may compare his discussion of ⋯πιστ⋯μη and δ⋯ξα towards the end of Republic E (477 ff.). With regard to nature, accordingly, Aristotle endeavours to show in Physics B 2 how the method of discussion must follow from the subject. See below, p. 51.

^{page 48 note 3} von Uexküll, J., Theoretische Biologic, 2nd edition, Berlin, 1928CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Cf. also Uexküll, Baron and Kriszat, G., Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen, Berlin, 1934CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

^{page 48 note 4} Theor. Biol., p. 144: ‘Higher rules are called plans, regardless of whether or not they rest on human intentions.’

^{page 49 note 1} Op. cit., p. 148.

^{page 49 note 2} We can compare, to a certain extent, Arist.'s ontology of the living being, as presented in De anima. For he also takes into account, while analysing the powers of ψυχ⋯, the various ways in which an animal possesses a world and is equipped for it, by its two faculties of motion and perception. Plants grow into all directions of space, but they lack perception. Animals possess αἴσθησις. Colour, sound, smell, and taste are discussed as the ⋯ντικε⋯μενα of the animal's senses, thus forming part of that phenomenon which is called a living being. Correspondingly, man's highest faculty, νσ⋯ς, cannot be interpreted without an understanding of the νοητ⋯. They do not exist in the animal's world, but they form part of the human world. Uexküll's analysis, naturally, is confined to the animal's world. Here, however, he goes far beyond Arist. by tracing out, with the help of experiments, exactly what the world of every one species is like, as distinct from the worlds of the other species.

^{page 50 note 1} Cf. Driesch, , Der Vitalismus als Geschichte und als Lehre, Leipzig, 1905, esp. pp. 193 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar. It should be noted that while Driesch's experiments are illuminating, his theory as a whole is misleading.

^{page 50 note 2} Among the three plans, the plan for the functioning of adult life naturally has priority.

^{page 50 note 3} Uexküll mentions that the rule for functioning dictates the rule for genesis. That the rule for repair is, in its turn, dictated by the rule for the finished animal's life functioning is self-evident. Hence also the animal–world relation is of comprehensive importance.

^{page 51 note 1} The analogy of the three plans is applicable to the tool as well as to the machine. But when we come to the feature of self-motion in the animal, this is no longer comparable to a tool, yet the analogy to a machine still seems to hold true. The machine-theory, accordingly, has played a great role in biology. Uexküll, however, searching deeper, shows its inadequacy.

^{page 51 note 2} Phys. B 1. 192^b13ff.

^{page 51 note 3} The word agent, of course, must be understood to be a mere metaphor, arising from the comparison with human craft. From a failure fully to realize this springs the misconception of some small being or life-force existing in the animal. Neither Uexküll nor Aristotle means anything of that sort. To them the cause that operates in the living being is not separable like an existing thing. It is of the very essence of nature, as distinct from craft, that there exists no agent, no force, but what is found is a peculiar mode of being. In other words, the living being as a whole has this specific mode of causation.

^{page 51 note 4} The school of Gestalt-Psychologen thinks of Gestalt or Ganzheit as a primary phenomenon, not in organic life only. Uexküll considers Gestalt as an even more fruitful concept than Ganzheit. In agreement with Driesch he wishes to restrict the use of both concepts to organic nature. In inorganic nature we find merely sums but no wholes. In his view, it is the idea of Planmässigkeit that underlies both phenomena, Gestalt and Ganzheit (op. cit., p. 199). The Greeks, I think, who spoke of εἶδος, μορφ⋯, and τ⋯λος must have possessed this insight which modern science is reacquiring.

^{page 52 note 1} Theor. Biol., p. 195; ibid., p. 148.

^{page 52 note 2} It will soon be found, however, that Uexküll does justice, after all, to what is considered as undeniable evidence in this matter, by his admission of a splitting into sub-species, so that it is merely on his interpretation of the evidence that he differs. See below.

^{page 52 note 3} ‘Variation [schil, of species] is, according to the Darwinists, a chemical process, which produces living beings completely planlos. Among them the struggle for life eliminates, in a mechanical way, those which are unsuited, i.e. which are not fit for life, thus attaining a selection of the fittest’ (op. cit., p. 195).

^{page 53 note 1} Uexküll wishes to apply the term evolution only to a mere unfolding (in accordance with the root-meaning of the word), i.e. to an evolving of what has already existed. He insists that the word is incorrectly used with regard to processes that tend towards increasing perfection, or make something new arise.

^{page 53 note 2} Op. cit., p. 196.

^{page 53 note 3} Op. cit., p. 198.

^{page 53 note 4} Loc. cit., pp. 98–9: ‘In alien Fällen wird etwas Neues geleistet …, nirgends Evolution, immer Epigenese.’

^{page 54 note 1} Theor. Biol., p. 138. Cf. this paper, p. 51.

^{page 55 note 1} Just as in Aristotle. Nature lacks νο⋯ς. τ⋯λος in nature, consequently, does not imply consciousness.

^{page 55 note 2} The idea of some conscious planning, which almost inevitably creeps in when we speak of purpose, leads, with regard to nature, to two faulty views. (1) Either the animal itself is thought of as being conscious of the purpose even though only possessed of a vague consciousness (or instinct). Thus biology is falsely built up on the analogy of psychology. But the plan in nature is no psychological phenomenon. (2) Or, the planning intelligence is imagined to exist outside the animal. On this interpretation, the animal will be regarded as far too similar to inorganic matter on which an outside agent works. The agent, here, must be God. Thus we commit the two errors of making statements about something which lies beyond the biologist's experience, by bringing God as an agent into the analysis of nature, and, at the same time, of understating what our subject-matter, living nature, actually shows us; for the evidence shows that it is more than, and different from, lifeless matter. The basic phenomenon of living nature is a plan, inherent in the animal, but not known to it nor perceived by it.

^{page 55 note 3} It is open to question whether in some higher animal species a certain aiming is to be found. Uexküll, in his Theoretische Biologie, does not seem to admit of the possibility, but in Streifzüge dutch die Umwelten, etc., he says (p. 47): ‘Vielleicht erweisen sich später gewisse Handlungen der höchsten Säugetiere als Ziel-handlungen, die selbst wieder dem gesamten Naturplan eingeordnet sind.’

^{page 56 note 1} Streifzüge durch die Umwelten, etc., p. 49.

^{page 56 note 2} Phys. B 8. 199^b26–8.

^{page 56 note 3} Ib. 28–30.

^{page 56 note 4} Ib. 199^a12.

^{page 57 note 1} Theor. Biol., p. 214. Aktiver Bauplan is a term meant to characterize nature. Machines depend on a foreign and passive plan, whereas animals possess a plan of their own, and one that is active. A chair, e.g., possesses a foreign and passive plan which makes the chair entirely depend on the carpenter. The chair, therefore, is a Heteronom, whereas the living being is an Autonom. The difference is explained, Theor. Biol., p. 200, and passim.

^{page 57 note 2} Ib., p. 215.

^{page 58 note 1} Ross, W. D., Aristotle, p. 186Google Scholar: ‘The notion of unconscious teleology is, it is true, unsatisfactory. If we are to view action not merely as producing a result but as being aimed at producing it, we must view the agent either as imagining the result and aiming at reaching it, or as the tool of some other intelligence which through it is realizing its conscious purposes. Unconscious teleology implies a purpose which is not the purpose of any mind, and hence not a purpose at all. But Aristotle’s language suggests that he (like many modern thinkers) did not feel this difficulty, and that, for the most part, he was content to work with the notion of an unconscious purpose in nature itself.’

^{page 58 note 2} With special emphasis in De Partibus Animalium, A. I.