¹ It is not my purpose to present a detailed discussion of the peculiar nature of Thucydides' fifth book. (For a valuable recent account of the problems with bibliography, cf. H. D. Westlake, CQ 65 (1971), 315 ff.) It is clear from the absence of speeches, the inclusion of undigested documents, and the frequent harshnesses of style and thought that the book is unfinished. Many difficulties of detail are caused by this fact. But the real problem is perhaps more fundamental. Despite revolt in the Athenian empire, which he dealt with, and discontent in the Peloponnesian League, which he tended to ignore or gloss over, Thucydides was for the most part able to write about the war as a contest between two monolithic blocks, whose policies and strategies were decided by Athens and Sparta. From the Peace of Nicias to the Sicilian expedition the picture was much more complex. Events were determined, in more or less equal measure, by the actions and ambitions of no less than five major powers. This created problems, not perhaps so much of gathering information as of organizing material into a comprehensible form, which in his text as it survives Thucydides had not yet solved.

² 5.14.1 f. (References without indication of author are to Thucydides.)

³ 5.14.3f. On the text, cf. Gomme ad loc. On Argos and her exploitation of her neutrality during the Archidamian war, cf. 5.28.2, Arist.Pax 475–7, Diod.12.75.6.

⁴ 5.17.2. For Boeotia, cf. Arist.Pax 464–6; for Megara, ibid. 481–3, 500–7. Cf.

V. Martin, La Vie internationale dans la Grece des cités, 449 f.

⁵ Cf. 5.31.1 ff., 49.5–50.1.

⁶ Another state which would surely have been happy to see the war continue was Mantinea, whose parochial dominion in Arcadia was bound to be threatened as soon as Sparta was liberated from the burden of war with Athens: cf. 5.29.1. It is surprising that Mantinea voted to accept the peace, but her readiness to disown it leaves little doubt as to her real desires.

⁷ 5.30.2. For the relevant clause in the peace, cf. 5.18.8.

⁸ Cf. Martin, op. cit., 449.

⁹ Cf. 5.31.6.

⁹ Cf. 5.31.6, 38.1.

¹¹ 5.18.7.

¹² Cf. 5.36.2, 39.2.

¹³ Cf. 5.38.3. The war became particularly profitable for the Boeotians after the occupation of Decelea, but it had been so to some degree even earlier: cf. Hell.Oxy.17.3 f.

¹⁴ 5.21.2.

¹⁵ The implied possibility that it might nc is perhaps the first sign that Sparta was playing a double game.

¹⁶ 5.21.3.

¹⁷ For their renewed refusal, cf. 5.22.1.

¹⁸ 5.22.2. This may be the implication of the imperfect ; however, the presence of Athenian envoys at Sparta may suggest that Athens' thoughts were running in the same direction.

¹⁹ The text of 5.22.2 presents grave difficulties, cf. Gomme ad loc. The most economical solution is to bracket and in line 19 of the Oxford text.

²⁰ For the relevant clauses, cf. 5.23.1 f. Gomme on 5.22.3 suggests that Athens may have hoped to recover Panactum and Plataea while keeping Nisaea. But though the alliance might make Sparta even less concerned than before about the interests of Megara, it is hard to see why Boeotia should be moved to make any concessions.

²¹ Cf. 5.22.2. For the part of Nicias in persuading the Athenians to accept the alliance, cf. Plut.Nic.10.2.

²² 5.25.1.

²³ 5.27.2, Diod.12.75.2 ff.

²⁴ 5.28.1, cf. 27.2.

²⁵ 5.29.1.

²⁶ 5.29.2.

²⁷ 5.29.2 f., cf. 5.18.11, Diod.12.75.4.

²⁸ 5.29.4.

²⁹ 5.30.1.

³⁰ 5.30.2 ff. On the meaning in 5.30.2, cf. Andrewes ad loc., G. E. M. de Ste Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War 82 ff.

³¹ 5.30.5.

³² 5.31.1, 5.

³³ 5.31.6.

³⁴ For the text of 5.31.6 and the meaning of , cf. Gomme ad loc.

³⁵ 5.32.3.

³⁶ 5.32.4.

³⁷ 5.32.5.

³⁸ 5.32.6 f. For the two possible meanings of , cf. Gomme ad loc.; Grote's view seems to me the more plausible.

³⁹ 5.33.1 ff. For the topographical problems, cf. Andrewes ad loc. It is noteworthy, as Andrewes points out to me, that Pleistoanax had spent his exile in Parrhasian territory, on Mt. Lycaeum (5.16.3); no doubt he retained connections in the area.

⁴⁰ 5.34.1, cf. 31.4.

⁴¹ However, the element of secrecy discerned by D. Kagan (AJP 81, 1960, 293 ff.) in her dealings with Argos seems largely imaginary. It was the Argive assembly which accepted the Corinthian plan and appointed the negotiators (5.28.1): 5.27.2 refer of course not to the Argive people but to the masses in those states to be approached by the negotiators. Nor is there any reason to suppose that the Corinthian envoys were acting without the knowledge and approval of their government.

⁴² Cf. Westlake, AJP 61 (1940), 416, Kagan, op.cit., 291, 297. Westlake believes that Sparta would take the Athenian side, Kagan that she would accept a subordinate place in the coalition under Argive leadership.

⁴³ Westlake (op.cit., 416) recognizes that the mass of Argives was friendly to Athens and believes that this was why Corinth could not divulge her aims. But Corinth would have had to make her intentions clear some day, and however long she waited she would inevitably have been rebuffed, provided that Argos remained a democracy.

⁴⁴ In favour of Corinth's sincerity, cf. G. T. Griffith, Historia 1 (1950), 236; against: Westlake, op.cit., 414.

⁴⁵ Cf. Griffith, op.cit., 237.

⁴⁴ Thus Kagan (op.cit., 299). Such dissensions might or might not stem from sociopolitical divisions like those posited by Kagan (op.cit., 295).

⁴⁷ This would give full value to in 5.32.5: the Corinthians did not think that Boeotia and Megara would join, but neverthe less they approached Boeotia.

⁴⁸ For a more positive view of Corinth's intentions, cf. Westlake, op.cit., 418, based on the assumption, rejected above, that Corinth was trying to direct the Argive alliance towards war with Athens.

⁴⁹ 5.28.2.

⁵⁰ 5.29.2 ff.

⁵¹ Elis is an exception.

⁵² Cf. 5.29.1.

⁵³ Cf. Westlake, CQ 65 (1971), 320 f.

⁵⁴ In 5.35.2 ff. Thucydides speaks of mutual suspicion, whereas in 5.25.2 he refers only to the suspicions of Athens. This is understandable: since the lot had made it Sparta's responsibility to act first, her failur to do so made Athens suspicious so that she in her turn refused to hand back her gains and incurred Spartan suspicions. This is not to deny that the passages were probably written at different times; it explains why Thucydides chose to make a slightly different point on each occasion.

⁵⁵ For the return of the prisoners, cf. 5.24.2.

⁵⁶ 5.35.4 ff.

⁵⁷ 5.36.1.

⁵⁸ Reading in 5.36.1; cf. Gomme and Andrewes ad loc.

⁵⁹ On the text of 5.36.1 at this point, cf. Gomme and Andrewes ad loc., but the sense seems to be clear.

⁶⁰ 5.36.2.

⁶¹ This answers the argument of Kelly, T., Historia 21 (1972), 161, that to hand back Panactum would promote peace, not war.Google Scholar

⁶² Andrewes on 5.36.2 is less optimistic about Sparta's chances of winning acceptance from Argos.

⁶³ Thus Westlake, op.cit., 418; against: Kagan, op.cit., 304, followed by Kelly, op.cit., 162 f.

⁶⁴ 5.37.1 f. On these events, cf. Westlake, , Rylands Bull. 53 (1970), 235 ff. He believes (236, n. 1) that the envoys did not realize that the aims of the Argives were entirely different; it seems to me more likely that the Boeotians intended from the first to deceive Argos.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ This tells against Kelly's conjecture (op.cit., 162) of previous communication between the Argives and Cleobulus and Xenares.

⁶⁶ 5.37,3 ff.

⁶⁷ 5.38.1.

⁶⁸ 5.38.2 ff. It was of course also im30ssible for Corinth to clarify the change n her position, for fear of putting Argos m her guard.

⁶⁹ Or, if war with Athens was to come,:he proposal seemed to bring closer a:lash of Boeotia and Argos against Sparta md Athens. The councils can hardly be )lamed for preferring the prospect of Boeotia and Sparta against Athens and Argos, a more likely eventuality if Boe)tia cleaved to Sparta.

⁷⁰ 5.39.2.

⁷¹ Cf. Kelly, op.cit., 164, 168.

⁷² 5.39.3.

⁷³ It has of course been repeatedly noted that no such clause appears in the alliance between Athens and Sparta. It may have been a later addition, but an informal understanding, as suggested by Andrewes on 5.39.3, is perhaps the most likely explanation.

⁷⁴ It should not be assumed that they would be happy to offend Athens, since, as the elaborate moves before the Archidamian war show, even those who were resolved to go to war might still be eager not to be branded as aggressors.

⁷⁵ 5.39.3.

⁷⁶ Cf. Andrewes on 5.39.3.

⁷⁷ 5.39.3.

⁷⁸ 5.42.1. Kelly's suggestion (op. cit., 165 ff.) that the destruction of Panactum was carried out with the approval, if not actually at the suggestion of Cleobulus and Xenares is attractive: it would certainly serve their purpose, and they might be content to see Sparta's hand forced. Thus what is said here of the Boeotians might equally apply to them.

⁷⁹ Kelly (op. cit., 159, 165 ff.) believes that Argos did, as Thucydides says, learn what was happening at Panactum before the world at large, and that the news, suitably slanted, was passed to them by Cleobulus and Xenares. Though not susceptible of proof, this may well be right.

⁸⁰ 5.40.1.

⁸¹ 5.40.2 f. In 5.40.2 should not be changed to even if Kelly's views are rejected, cf. Andrewes ad loc. The Argives' panic is all the more comprehensible if they thought that Sparta was ready to approve such an extreme step by the Boeotians.

⁸² 5.41.1 ff.

⁸³ 5.41.3.

⁸⁴ 5.42.1, cf. Plut.A/c.14.4 f., Nic. 10.3.

⁸⁵ 5.43.1 ff., Plut.Alc.14.2 ff., Nic. 10.4.

⁸⁶ 5.43.3. The sense required for is that given by Hobbes's translation, ‘to get the Argives … away from them’, cited by Gomme ad loc.

⁸⁷ Cf. J. Hatzfeld, Alcibiade, 102 f.

⁸⁸ 5.44.1 f., cf. 43.3.

⁸⁹ 5.44.3.

⁹⁰ 5.45.1 ff., Plut.Alc.14.6 ff., Nic. 10.4 ff. For attempts at elucidation, cf. Hatzfeld, op. cit., 89 ff.; better: P. A. Brunt, REG 65 (1952), 65 ff. It is not the purpose of this paper to add to the debate on the degree to which Alcibiades personally determined the course of world history; for recent statements of extreme positions, cf. McGregor, M. F., Phoenix 19 (1965), 27 ff., E. F. Bloedow, Alcibiades Reexamined.Google Scholar

⁹³ 5.45.4.

⁹² 5.46.1, Plut.Nic.10.7.

⁹³ 5.46.2 f., Plut.Alc.15.1.

⁹⁴ Cf. Gomme on 5.46.5.

⁹⁵ Cf. Plut.Nic.10.8 on the influence of the .

⁹⁶ 5.46.4.

⁹⁷ 5.46.5, 48.1, Diod.12.77.2, Plut.Alc. 15.1, Nic.10.8 f.

⁹⁸ Cf. 5.47, Tod, GHI 72.

Cf. Plut.Alc.15.2 on the advantage of fighting a long way from Athens.

¹⁰⁰ 5.48.2.

¹⁰¹ The precise date of this offensive and defensive alliance is not made clear in 5.48.2. It was probably recent: it is hardly likely to have been made before the first Corinthian change of heart in 5.32.3, otherwise Corinth would probably have joined. It should also perhaps be later than the Boeotian councils' refusal to ally themselves with Corinth because of Corinth's breach with Sparta (5.38.3). Argos is unlikely to have devised such a scheme during the period of her loss of confidence in spring 420 (5.40.1). Perhaps the most plausible moment is therefore in the renewed flush of enthusiasm that came when Argos realized the truth about Athens' attitude to the alliance between Sparta and Boeotia, but before the alliance between Argos, her allies, and Athens was actually concluded—perhaps before the envoys of Argos, Elis, and Mantinea set out for Athens (5.44.2).

¹⁰² 5.48.3; Diod.12.77.3 suggests that the initiative for the rapprochement came from Sparta.

¹⁰³ If Corinth thought that the alliance between Athens and Argos was likely to bring war closer, rather than to put Sparta off, she may have welcomed it, as Kagan claims (op. cit., 306).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. 5.69.1 on what Argos was fighting for at Mantinea.

¹⁰⁵ 5.49.1, 50.3.

¹⁰⁶ 5.50.5.

¹⁰⁷ 5.53.1.

¹⁰⁸ For Corinth and Epidaurus, cf. Andrewes on 5.53.1. Such pressure could be only psychological or diplomatic; diffi culty of communications by land made Epidaurus useless as a base for operations against Corinth.

¹⁰⁹ 5.55.1 ff.; cf. Hatzfeld, op. cit., 101.

¹¹⁰ Kagan (on. cit., 307) believes that Corinth hoped the Epidaurian war would force Sparta to fight and so sabotaged the talks at Mantinea. This is not impossible, but a more straightforward interpretation, that is, that Corinth wanted to protect Epidaurus, but not at the price of excessive concessions, is equally satisfactory.

¹¹¹ 5.56.2.

¹¹² 5.58.1.

¹¹³ 5.59.4.

¹¹⁴ 5.59.5–60.1. Kagan's assumption of treachery during the campaign by oligarchic Argive generals and an attempt by Thrasylus and Alciphron to discredit the alliance with Athens (CP 57 (1962), 212 ff.) is hardly necessary.

¹¹⁵ 5.60.5 f., Diod.12.78.5; cf. Kagan, op. cit., 215.

¹¹⁶ 5.61.1.

¹¹⁷ There is certainly nothing here to support Kagan's suggestion (op. cit., 215) that by this time oligarchic views were prevalent.

¹¹⁸ 5.61.2 f.

¹¹⁹ 5.48.1.

¹²⁰ 5.52.2, Plut.Alc.15.6.

¹²¹ Gomme ad loc. thinks that they did; so too Anderson, J. K., BSA 49 (1954), 84.Google Scholar

¹²² 5.55.1 ff.

¹²³ 5.55.1. ff.

¹²⁴ Uncertainty over the text of 5.55.4 makes this assertion problematical. Andrewes ad loc. favours deleting and taking the participle with . This would probably require for , and even so, would be strange: one would expect an adversative. If this reading were correct, it would suggest that Alcibiades was prepared to fight the Spartans if the need arose. But if be taken with ‘and even so’, the view taken above may stand. With any text and any interpretation malls awkward; ‘but’ would be more natural.

¹²⁵ 5.56.2.

¹²⁶ 5.56.2.

¹²⁷ 5.56.3, Plut.Nic.10.9.

¹²⁸ Cf. 5.59.3, 61.1.

¹²⁹ Cf. Andrewes on 5.59.4; against: Hatzfeld, op. cit., 104.

¹³⁰ Cf. Gomme on 5.57.1.

¹³¹ 5.61.1 ff., 62.1 f., Diod.12.79.1 ff.

¹³² Cf. 5.61.2.

¹³³ 5.69.1. '34 5.48.1.

¹³⁵ f., Diod.12.77.3.

¹³⁶ 5.52.1.

¹³⁷ 5.54.1 f., 55.3. On the Spartan objectives, cf. Andrewes ad locc.

¹³⁸ It is uncertain whether they took part in any fighting; the language of 5.55.1 need not entail any actual clash.

¹³⁴ 5.56.1.

¹⁴⁰ 5.57.1.

¹⁴¹ Cf. 5.57.1 f., 58.4, 59.1 ff., 60.3.

¹⁴² 5.60.1 f., cf. 63.1 ff., Diod.12.78. 4 ff. Thucydides clearly believed that Agis could have inflicted a crushing defeat on the Argives. The king's decision to make terms is nevertheless politically intelligible, but much of the criticism directed against him was probably not based on political calculation, but sprang more simply from the anger and frustration that was felt at the waste of what was perhaps rightly seen as in purely military terms a golden opportunity. It is plain that criticism of Agis was immediate, though it was no doubt exacerbated when Argos chose to fight and Orchomenus fell. Cf. Kagan, op.cit., 215.

¹⁴³ 5.64.2 ff., 67.1.

¹⁴⁴ 5.75.2 f.

¹⁴⁵ 5.52.2, 53.1, Plut.Alc.15.6.

¹⁴⁶ 5.57.2, cf. 58.4, 59.1, 3.

¹⁴⁷ 5.64.4, 75.2.

¹⁴⁸ 5.52.1; according to Diod.12.77.4 Heraclea asked the Boeotians to intervene.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Andrewes on 5.52.1.

¹⁵⁰ 5.57.2, 64.4, 75.2.

¹⁵¹ 5.75.4 ff.

¹⁵² 5.76.2 f.

¹⁵³ 5.77.

¹⁵⁴ 5.78, Diod.12.80.1.

¹⁵⁵ 5.79.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Andrewes on 5.79.3.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Andrewes on 5.79.3.

¹⁵⁸ 5.80.1, 3.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Andrewes on 5.80.3.

¹⁶⁰ 5.81.1, X. He11.5.2.2, Diod.12.80.2. '61 5.81.2, 82.1, Diod.12.80.2, Plut. Alc.15.4.

¹⁶² 5.82.2 ff., Diod.12.80.3, Plut.Alc. 15.4 f.

¹⁶³ 5.83.1 f., Diod.12.81.1.

¹⁶⁴ 5.84.1, Diod.12.81.2 ff., Bengtson, Staatsverträke ii. 196 (on the date, cf. W. Kolbe, CP 25, 1930, 105 ff.).