¹ Translations and commentaries on the Crito, Apology,and so forth which are referred to in this article are as follows: F. J. Church, Plato: Euthyphro Apology, Crito(London, 1923); R. E. Allen, Socrates and Legal Obligation(Minneapolis, 1980), J. Adam, Plato: Crito(2nd edn, Cambridge, 1961 [1888]); J. Burnet, Plato′s Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and Crito(Oxford, 1924); C. Cron, Platons Schriften(3rd edn, Leipzig, 1865); L. Dyer (rev. T. D. Seymour), Plato: Apology and Crito(New Rochelle, 1984 [1885]); M. Schanz, Plato: Ausgewdhlte Dialoge(Leipzig, 1887); E. De Strycker and S. Slings, Plato′s Apology of Socrates(Leiden, 1994); L. L. Forman, Plato Selections(Edinburgh, 1900). Other translations: B. Jowett, Dialogues of Plato(3rd edn, Oxford, 1892), Vol. II; M. Croiset, Platon: Oeuvres Completes(2nd edn, Paris, 1959), Vol. I; H. Tredennick, The Last Days of Socrates(Harmondsworth, 1954); G. M. A. Grabe, Five Dialogues(Indianapolis, 1981); A. M. Adam, The Apology of Socrates(Cambridge, 1964 [1914]); J. Adam, Plato: Protagoras(2nd edn, Cambridge, 1905 [1893]); W. A. Heidel, Plato: Euthyphro(New York, 1902).

² If we interpret Cron′s remark ‘die Macht der Menge ist eben so beschrankt, wie ihre Einsicht’ with our eyes on the understanding of power in the Gorgias,it is exactly on target. It is less so if we follow Cron and add remarks about not only chance but ‘a higher will’and the biblical ‘furchtet euch nicht vor denen, etc’ Unfortunately, the Dyer-Seymour commentary based on Cron′s commentary omits not just the latter, more doubtful material, but also the former, important material. (The examples of the hurricane and the volcano are from my ‘Desire and Power’, cited in n. 4 below, being examples of things that ‘have power’ of a sort that is irrelevant to the question whether orators and tyrants ‘have power’. To have power of the sort orators and tyrants claim to have, one has to be able to accomplish what one singles out as what one wants.It is not enough to have a devastating effect on people′s lives.)

³ Adam suggests here, surely wrongly, that the imperfect in indicates an intention to say it was better ‘in the minds of the gods, when they made their decision about [his] fate’. I cannot see any reason to doubt that we have here Socrates′ judgement at the time when he was accused and convicted that it was better for him that this should happen: , at 41D3–5. [So also A. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility (Oxford, 1960), p. 261.] here goes with earlier at Dl. And the there is surely a case of being harmed, as at D8. Such a reading seems amply confirmed in the earlier reference to the sign at 40A2ff., esp. 40B7-C5: It looks as if this consequence has come about as a good; and that those of us who think that death is a bad thing] are completely mistaken... But consider also in this way how there is great hope that it is a good [thing]: death is one or other of the following things... These goods and bads can surely only be good and bad for Socrates, i.e. benefits or harms to Socrates, things contributing to his happiness or unhappiness. So too for the profit of a dreamless sleep at 40D2, E2, and also for ‘better and more pleasant’ at D6, ‘What greater good?’ at E6–7, and ‘happiness’ at 41C4, 5.

⁴ See my ‘Desire and power in Socrates: the argument of Gorgias466A-468E that orators and tyrants have no power in the city’, Apeiron24 (1991), 147–202. It is entirely possible that the interpretation offered here of is the one Andrew Barker had in mind in ‘Why did Socrates refuse to escape?’, Phronesis22 (1977), 13–28, at 20, where he quotes our passage in Greek and then says that this ‘oblique and allusive answer’ speaks to the question of harm involving making one worse, and citing passages like the ones I have cited. But he offers no discussion, or even translation of the crucial phrase, the clarifying of which has been my aim here.

⁵ See esp. 59 (which is the first place where Kraut puts the obedience or disobedience first, and then talks about explaining afterwards: ‘You owe an explanation to those with whom you made a voluntary agreement if you break your word’), 60–5 (a convincing argument against suggestions in Gerasimos Santas, Marshall Cohen, Joel Feinberg, and others, in which Kraut argues that there is nothing wrong with an account of political obligation allowing the possibility of disobedience, provided there is subsequent requirement of explanation; with the beautiful example already mentioned of the daughter being permitted to disobey provided there is subsequent explanation), and 82 (‘Thus far, I have been assuming that when a citizen violates a law or an order, the appropriate time for persuasion comes after he has acted illegally’).

⁶ ‘Going away from here having failed to persuade the city that...I assume that the aorist participle here represents the persuading as past relative to the main verb , while the present participle represents the going away as contemporaneous with it. Cf. the examples at W. Goodwin, Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb(Philadelphia, 1899), §§139, 143, and H. Smyth, Greek Grammar(Cambridge, MA, 1920), §1872, as well as the example at G. Curtius, A Grammar of the Greek Language(New York, 1872), §493. The fact that the participle is aorist may also suggest (what will become important later: §11.2 below) that ‘persuade is a success verb here, and should not be taken as either continuous or conative.

⁷ as Adam and Forman say ad loc, this is ‘whether...or..., and if...‘ For this use of ‘solitarium’, Forman also cites 52D1.

⁸ Kraut is of course quite right, at 57 n. 10, to object to Tredennick′s translation of 51B3–4 as ‘... if you cannot persuade your country, you must do whatever it orders, and suffer... [period⁵(Jowett adds the same objectionable protasis). Kraut is plainly right that the Greek should not be so translated as to exclude the possibilitythat tryingto persuade is an alternative to obedience even if one fails to persuade. (Though I would not agree that this passage—or indeed any other passage in the Crito—really envisages this possibility.) But the real fault of Tredennick′s translation is the impression it leaves that the single sentence of the Greek is such that it really consists of several things said categorically about obedience. (For example, And if it leads you out to war, to be wounded or killed, you must comply, and it is right that you should do so.’) Similar remarks apply to Grube′s translation. Burnet′s punctuation of the Greek text is surely well justified in its capturing the idea that there is a single thought throughout: persuade or obey (and in that order).

⁹ Actually, in the passage it is not‘obey unless you persuade’. It is not even ‘obey unless you persuade us thatwe have acted badly’ (as in Jowett and in Allen, and cf. Stallbaum ad loc). It is ‘obey unless, in the case that[lit.: if,as in Tredennick, Grube] we have acted badly, you persuade us’. That is, the ‘unless ’ clause does not give us an option unless the state has in factacted badly. Plato′s use of the ‘if here is deliberate. While he does not emphasize the point, Kraut sees well enough that persuasion is not in order if the state has notin fact acted badly: see 67 (first case). All of the above suggests that persuading is more the exception than the rule. This is particularly clear if we also bring out something else Kraut sees well—that Socrates is generallysatisfied with the laws of Athens (though I do not follow Kraut so far as to suppose this general satisfaction amounts to assigning positive moral influence to precepts derived from Athens’ democratic laws—rather in the manner indicated in Protagoras’ Great Speech in the Protagoras:see Kraut, ch. 6, esp. 207ff., 219ff.). For to say this is presumably to say that Socrates is not going to be complaining so very often that the state has acted badly.

¹⁰ Effective presentation of this antithesis is probably also a reason why Plato saw fit not fully to present the available option (to persuade) in the clause that together with the fact that the alternative choice ‘persuade in the case that we are acting badly’ is going to be the exception rather than the rule [n. 9 above].

¹¹ See my ‘Verbs and the identity of actions—a philosophical exercize in the interpretation of Aristotle′, in George Pitcher and O. P. Wood (edd.), Ryle(New York, 1970), pp. 393–460. Notice that I have embodied in the present description of the distinction my view in 1970 that the distinction cannot be made at the linguistic level [verbs or verb-phrases, as in J. L. Ackrill, ‘Aristotle ′s distinction between Energeiaand Kinesis’,in R. Bambrough (ed.), New Essays on Plato and Aristotle(London, 1965), pp. 121–41, Z. Vendler, ‘Verbs and times’, Philosophical Review66 (1957), 143–60, and others criticized there, as well as B. Comrie, Aspect(Cambridge, 1976), pp. 44–48], but must be made at the ontological level. That is, the distinction is one between the actionsthat verbs and verb phrases designate. Thus, ‘is walking’ will almost always stand for the same action as some other verb phrase, ‘is walking from Ato ffeven if used without verbal complement. Similarly for ‘is singing’ and ‘is singing such and such a song’ (or ‘is singing such and such a tune’: the example of singing from Comrie). No wonder there is trouble trying to handle Aristotle′s distinction as Ackrill does, by following Vendler′s treatment of ‘is walking’ as involving a different case from ‘is walking from Ato B'\On the other hand, I also argue that, besides such there are such as exercizing one′s physical (ambulatory, vocal) capacities—the idea of introduced by Socrates and Plato, and culminating in Aristotle′s beautiful development of the notion of into the notion of as opposed to (The chief is of course happiness.) Condition (d) in the main text, suggesting that we should not in general treat walkingdifferently from walking from A to B,is an ontological condition. But we should be clear that the distinction between continuous and simple occurrence uses of a verb for is merely a distinction between different ways of looking at the same .

¹² The Concept of Mind(London, 1948), p. 130.

¹³ Not to complicate things too much all at once, notice that ‘tried ’ is a simple occurrence use of the verb ‘try ’, ‘was trying’ a continuous use. This distinction is easier to make in past tenses, since an action which is a is easier to represent as a whole (from a ‘simple occurrence’ standpoint) in the past. This is why books on Greek syntax say that the ‘conative ’ shows up more often in the imperfect than in the present, as, for example, in Goodwin, §25. This is a point which Burnet makes very well in the passage quoted below, n. 15.

¹⁴ Cf. also at 49A1 (Crito should try to answer Socrates’ questions in connection with Socrates’ persuasion that there be no escape), Apology20D2 (try to show how I got slandered), 21C7–8 (try to show someone only thoughtthey knew), 24B6 (try to make his defence), 24C8 (try to show the jury what Meletus is up to). Cf. also De Strycker and Slings on Apology30D5.

¹⁵ As I have already said in n. 8 above, one may agree with Kraut, 85 n. 42, as against iTredennick (and indeed Jowett), that the Greek at 51B3–5 does not say:persuade, and if that fails, obey. But if it is a simple occurrence use of as I maintain it is, then Jowett and Tredennick are still right about what Socrates actually intends here. On ‘persuade successfully’, it is worth noticing Bumet′s comment at 37A6: As is to succeed in producing conviction, is to fail to do so. This comes out chiefly in the imperfect tense Herod. 2.121), but that is only because of the double use of the present as a tense of continuance and a tense of attainment.[Notice that every other use of in a present or imperfect active form in the Apologyis a ‘got if use: 18B5, D3–4,19E6,27E5, 35C2,36C5,37D8,38A7 (cf. also 37E6); and for aorist uses, cf. 37E5.] As I have already mentioned, one will look in vain in LSJ for a sense of other than a success use (‘to prevail upon someone...’ ). None of which is to suggest that Burnet or LSJ would deny that there are uses of the sort ‘be in process of persuading...’ or ‘offer persuasion...’ [The examples in Goodwin, §36, from Herodotus and Xenophon are convincing, though it is harder to find examples in the Socratic dialogues. Adam thinks Protagoras3 16C7 is ‘conative ’ though it plainly need not be, and the parallel passage suggested by Adam, Apology19E-20A, plainly does not involve a ‘conative ’ use.] What I am suggesting rather is that we not opt for such uses unless there are contextual indications (a) that the verb is to be taken continuously and not as a ‘simple occurrence’ use, and in addition, (b) that the persuading engaged in was or might have been unsuccessful.

¹⁶ In illustration of the point that uses of ‘persuade ’ are, in the absence of reference to possible failure in the offing, to be taken as success uses, notice Kraut′s remarks, 57: And surely there is no strain in taking the phrase ‘persuade or obey’ to mean that if one does not obey then one must persuade. I find it almost impossible to hear the word ‘persuade ’ in this [simple occurrence] use as not implying success. That is, I find it impossible to hear it in any other way than as: ‘If one does not obey, then one must succeed inpersuading’. It is only if one knows Kraut is going to argue later that ‘persuade ’ can be ‘conative ’ [in its continuous present use] that one can really set oneself up to hear the ‘persuade ’ here as allowing ‘try to persuade’.

¹⁷ For example, consider the young men who have consorted with Socrates, who do not think Socrates has corrupted them—whose parents also would deny that Socrates has corrupted their sons (33C8–34B5). The suggestion may be that they have been persuaded to act (and think) in certain ways—ways which are beneficial to them and their relatives.

¹⁸ I am very grateful to both Richard Kraut and Christopher Rowe for looking at some parts of an early draft of these ‘Notes ’ and suggesting both useful objections and many improvements to the putting of my case. They should of course not be supposed thereby to have endorsed what I have to say here.