¹ For an overview of stasis-theory see Russell, D., Greek Declamation (Cambridge, 1983), 40–73CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Kennedy, G., Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors (Princeton, 1983), 73–86Google Scholar; Montefusco, L. Calboli, La dottrina degli status nella retorica greca e romana (Hildesheim, 1986)Google Scholar; and my commentary on Hermogenes περ στσεων ardaewv (Oxford, forthcoming).

² See Hermogenes 60.19–61.3 Rabe. This case is found also in Sen. Contr. 1.2.23. A simpler variant in which the eunuch is prosecuted for adultery (RG 5.158.12–15, 7.217.21–4; Syrianus II 114.1 Rabe) is evidently definition.

³ See RG 5.158.8–159.6 Walz.

⁴ See RG 8.407.14–16; the same case with a philosopher is found in Fortunatianus, RLM 92.26–9 Halm.

⁵ See Matthes, D., ‘Hermagoras von Temnos’, Lustrum 3 (1958), 58–214, esp. 166–78Google Scholar (with references to earlier literature). More recently: Barwick, K., ‘Augustinus Schrift De Rhetorica und Hermagoras von Temnos’, Philologus 105 (1961), 97–110CrossRefGoogle Scholar; id., ‘Zur Erklärung und Geschichte der Staseislehre des Hermagoras von Temnos’, Philologus 108 (1964), 80–101Google Scholar; id. ‘Probleme in den Rhet. LL Ciceros und der Rhetorik des sogenannten Auctor ad Herennium’, Philologus 109 (1965), 57–74Google Scholar; Adamietz, J., M. F. Quinliliani Institutionis Oratoriae Liber III (Studia et Testimonia Antiqua 2, Munich, 1966), 206–21Google Scholar; Montefusco, L. Calboli, ‘La dottrina del KPINOMENON’, Athenaeum 50 (1972), 276–93.Google Scholar

⁶ The parties to the dispute are called ‘prosecutor’ and ‘defendant’ for simplicity's sake; in some cases the first party might be a petitioner (e.g. a hero or tyrannicide) claiming an award which the second opposes.

⁷ Since my main concern is with the Greek tradition, I will generally translate the terminology of Latin sources into Greek without comment (here it is inferred from ad Her. 1.27: intentio = κατϕασις, infitatio = πϕασις, iudicatio = κρινμενον). Most equivalences are clear (e.g. status or constitutio = στσις, quaestio = ζτημα), but care is needed over the translations for two of our key terms, αἴτιον and συνχον. I accept Quintilian's statement (3.11.5, 9) that ratio = αἴτιον, continens or firmamentum = συνχον. Sometimes ratio is glossed as quae continet causam (Cic. Inv. 1.18) or quae…continet defensionem (ad Her. 1.26); might the use of continere suggest that ratio = συνχον (the equation stated e.g. in Caplan's note on ad Her. 1.27)? The inference is groundless: firmamentum ( = continens, continentia: Cic. Top. 95, Part. 103–4) is itself glossed quod continet accusationem (ad Her. 1.26), and Cicero observes that ratio and firmamentum equally continent causas (Part. 103).

⁸ Thus Prologemenon Sylloge (22) 329.10–12 Rabe (hereafter PS); with minor variants, (18) 318.10–12; RG 7.173.10–12 omits ϕσις and truncates after πργματος, and this shorter version also underlies Quint. 3.6.21. I note in passing that this definition explains why Hermagoras excluded νομικ ζητματα from the system of στσεις: νομικ ζητματα are περ ῥητο (cf. e.g. Hermogenes 37.17–20), and so do not grasp the ὑποκεμενον πργμα.

⁹ The antilogical implications of Hermagoras' ντιλαμβανμεθα are noted by a later commentator on Hermogenes (RG 7.171.20–173.13), who infers (173.9–13) that Hermagoras agreed with his own adherence to Position B, as against adherents to Position C such as Minucianus (whose definition of stasis is attacked at 172.27–173.2). For this commentator stasis is not the zêtêma, but produces it: στσεις γρ εἰσιν αἱ νωττω προτσεις…αὕται δ συνιοσαι ποιοσι ζτημα, 172.2–4). He quotes Hermagoras' definition in the abbreviated form (see n. 8); ϕσις (if authentic) contradicts the plural προτσεις, and rules out Position B.

¹⁰ See LSJ⁹ s.v. συνχω 3. The usage is attested (e.g.) in Polybius' references to the sunekhon of a treaty (2.12.3), document (3.27.1), agreement (3.29.9) or deliberative assembly (24.4.2).

¹¹ De Oratore is securely dated to 55 by ad Att.4.13.2; on the date of Part.see Gilleland, B. B., CP 56 (1961), 29–32, who argues for 54–52.Google Scholar

¹² The Topica is dated to 44 by ad Fam. 7.19.

¹³ Compare the gloss on continentia = αυνχον = D² here (quibus sublatis defensio nulla sit) with that on ratio = αἴτιον = D² at Inv. 1.18 (quae si sublata sit nihil in causa controversiae relinquatur).

¹⁴ Ps.-Augustine does not say that conjecture and the other staseis require different treatment, although none of his illustrations of this scheme is conjectural.

¹⁵ If ps.-Augustine's evidence is discounted, the statement that Hermagoras used aition aitiou as equivalent to sunekhon must be rejected, or else the usage must be reinterpreted in terms of Model 1 (e.g. aition gives the ground of the initial defence = D² and sunekhon = aition aitiou gives the ground of the ground = D³).

¹⁶ E.g. Matthes (n. 5), 174–6; contrast Adamietz (n. 5), 206–7.

¹⁷ Motivation is no problem, of course, if we are free to assume ‘misunderstanding’ (e.g. Matthes (n. 5), 176); but since Inv. and ad Her. attest lively debate over, and deliberate modification of, Hermagoras' views, we should look for intelligibly motivated changes before resorting to the hypothesis of misunderstanding.

¹⁸ Thus Cic. Part. 102 adopts Position B (characterising stasis as quasi conflictio cum adversario) but recognises that it is the defence's response which determines the nature of the conflict, aliquo certo statu aut infitiando aut definiendo out aequitate opponenda. In the second century, Minucianus (discussed below) followed Position C but likewise saw the defence as determinative (RG 5.8.22–3; 7.139.24–5). At a still later date (citing the fourth-century Tyrannus) compare PS (22) 329.22–4: … το ϕεγοντος ϕων ποιοσα τν μϕισβτησιν, κα ὡς ἂν ϕεγων πολογσtαι ναϕανεται στσις. Even Quintilian, who argues stasis is sometimes determined by the prosecution (3.6.13–19), accepts that determination by the defence is the norm.

¹⁹ Compare too the glosses on D² quoted in n. 13 above with the definition in Stoic theory of causation of the class of cause termed sunektikon: αἴτιον οὗ παρντος μνει τ ποτλεσμα κα αἰρμενον αἴρεται…αὐτρκως δι' αὑτο ποιητικν στι το ποτελσματος (SVF II 121.25–8); cf. Long, A. and Sedley, D., Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1987), I 336, with 341–2.Google Scholar

²⁰ See Quint. 3.6.9, 11.8; this is not to deny that any subsidiary questions which may arise in a speech will each have stasis (3.6.6–12, 11.6–7, Cic. Inv. 1.19).

²¹ In 5–8 Quintilian digresses to review some variant usages and discuss the possibility of multiple aitia and/or krinomena.

²² The supplement 〈idem〉 esse (printed in Butler's Loeb) leads to incurable contradictions; Adamietz and Winterbottom rightly reject it.

²³ PS (22) 330.14–331.3 (at 330.27 Rabe's supplement 〈οὐδαμς〉 destroys the sequence of the argument); see Schissel, O., ‘Lollianus aus Ephesos’, Philologus 82 (1926/1927), 181–201, esp. 191–5Google Scholar; Richter, P., ‘Byzantinischer Kommentar zu Hermogenes’, Byzantion 3 (1927/1928), 153–204, esp. 190–1Google Scholar. On Lollianus: Gloeckner, S., Quaestiones Rhetoricae (Breslauer Philologische Abhandlungen 8.2, 1901), 50–4Google Scholar; O. Schissel, art. cit. and RE XIII/ii (1927) 1373–5 s.v. Lollianos (15).

²⁴ Homicide: Syrianus II 129.19–22; RG 4.595.27–9. Dêmosia adikêmata: RG 4.587.23–4, 615.8–20; 7.487.29–488.31, 490.27–491.27 (and probably in 7.234.25–j235.1).

²⁵ See Richter (n. 23), 190.

²⁶ This is presumably the explanation of Aquila's interchange of the terms sunekhon and krinomenon (Syrianus II 50.23–51.2): the defence's claim (e.g. ‘I killed justly since he was an adulterer’) is the point to be submitted to the jury's adjudication, and the question arising (‘was the killing, given such-and-such circumstances, a legal killing of an adulterer?’) is the crux of the case. Matthes (n. 5), 171 and 170 n. 3, infers textual corruption in the Aquila testimonium; but Syrianus' description of Aquila's proposal as a ‘change’ (ναλλξας) would hardly be warranted by the minor alteration to the definition of aition (= τ π' ρχς ἄχρι τλους, i.e. the events on which the charge is based, e.g. a man's standing beside the newly-slain corpse as the basis for a homicide charge) alone. For Aquila see Brzoska, J., RE II (1896) 314 s.v. Aquila (6).Google Scholar

²⁷ Minucianus: Gloeckner (n. 23), 22–50. Stegemann, W., RE XV/ii (1932) 1975–86Google Scholar s.v. Minukianos (1) is not consistently reliable on points of rhetorical theory.

²⁸ See PS (13) 206.2–5, (21) 318.13–15, (22) 328.13–14; RG 7.170 n. 58, 7.172.27–8.

²⁹ PS (13) 209.19–20; RG 7.139.22–5; compare Sopater's equation of aition and sunekhon with kataphasis and apophasis (RG 5.77.27–78.3, with 4.202.7–19).

³⁰ This pasage incidentally shows that the distinction between conjecture and other staseis has been forgotten; the illustration given is a standard example of conjecture (the man found beside a newly slain corpse and charged with homicide).

³¹ See Gloeckner (n. 23), 49, quoting the unedited scholia of Nilus: πε δ πολλο τ παρ τῷ τεχνικῷ παρδειγμα κβαλεῖν πιχειροσι το ὅρον, ντιππτοντες οὐ μνον τῷ τεχνικῷ, λλ' ἔτι κα Μινουκιανῷ…

³² RG 7.139.19–40.4; cf. Syrianus II 50.13–15; PS (13) 209.17–18, (22) 330.10–11; Rufus 405.3–7 Spengel-Hammer. There appears to be no evidence that any rhetor before Minucianus tried to integrate the theory of asustata with his Model for the analysis of themes possessing stasis; I suspect that in Hermagoras asustata were discussed and classified before the Model was introduced.

³³ Admittedly inconsistency is possible. Fortunatianus' presentation of a version of Model 3 similar to that of ps.-Augustine does attempt to identify asustata by means of kataphasis (P₁) and apophasis (D₁). It is perhaps significant that this attempt to integrate the theory of asustata with the Model (RLM 82.12–14) comes adrift from the immediately following survey of the four Hermagorean categories of asustata (82.15–83.9); for example, the category of impudens intentio mentioned at 82.13 corresponds to nothing in Hermagoras. Ps.-Augustine introduces the Hermagorean asustata immediately after his exposition of Model 3, but makes no use of the Model in defining them (RLM 145.34–147.17).

³⁴ Zeno: Gloeckner (n. 23), 103–8; Gärtner, H., RE XA (1972) 140–2Google Scholar s.v. Zenon (9). There are (I believe) possible indications that Zeno's work may antedate that of Minucianus; if so, the ancient testimony that the system of thirteen staseis (which Zeno uses) was introduced by Minucianus (PS (6a) 60.14–15; RG 5.8.21–2; Syr. II 55.1–3) must be treated with caution. I hope to discuss the point elsewhere. On Sulpicius Victor see Schissel, O., RE IVA (1931) 873–8 s.v. Sulpicius (106).Google Scholar

³⁵ Compare the distinction in Sopater's treatise on division between ἔγκλημα and ζτημα in certain kinds of complex conjecture (RG 8.42.23–43.8, 51.5–16).

³⁶ Jaeneke, W., De statuum doctrina ab Hermogene tradita (Diss. Leipzig, 1904), 145–6Google Scholar, and Calboli Montefusco (n. 1), 88–9, equate Hermogene' category of ‘incident definition’ (μππτων ὅρος, 64.15–23) with enkrinomenon. This is a mistake. In Hermogenes' example (a man dreams about the mysteries, and asks an initiate whether his dream was accurate; the initiate assents, and is charged with disclosing the mysteries to an uninitiate) there are two zêtêmata: whether assenting to the other's statement was revealing the mysteries; and whether the questioner was still, after his dream, uninitiate. Both must be resolved in order to reach a verdict. In enkrinomena there is only one zêtêma. Once it is established whether a cenotaph is grave, judgement on whether the man is a grave-robber follows immediately; no further investigation is needed.

³⁷ PS (22) 330.13–14 equates krinomenon with ὐποκεμενον πργμα in a summary of Minucianus' theory; but this is unique (Minucianus' krinomenon is treated as a question by Syr.II 50.22–4; cf. PS (13) 209.21–2; RG 4.143.11–12, 7.140.1–3), and I suspect contamination With Hermogenes.

³⁸ Tyrannus: Gloeckner (n. 23), 89–90; Stegemann, W., RE VIIA (1948) 1843–7 s.v. Tyrannos (2).Google Scholar

³⁹ Syrianus does not name Tyrannus as his source; the identification is suggested by PS (22) 329.17–20 and PS (21) 318.16–319.3, where the same definition is attributed to Tyrannus by name. (The modified form of the definition which is adopted there is found at (23) 339.6–9 = (24) 350.4–11, and in abbreviated form at (13) 206.7–9.)

⁴⁰ The allusion in the opening sentence of the treatise (28.3–7) to the definition of τχνη as σστhμα καταλψεων συγγεγυμνασμνων πρς τι τλος εἔχρηστον τῷ βῳ (SVF 1.21, 2.30–1, cf. Long and Sedley (n. 19) I 259; Quintilian 2.17.41 shows that it had lost any distinctively Stoic flavour) has been recognised since antiquity. But Hermogenes seems to elide its epistemological content in favour of an interest in the historical development of rhetoric (note ξ ρχς…τῷ χρνῳ).