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Slavery in Plato's Republic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

Brian Calvert
Brian Calvert
Affiliation:
University of Guelph, Ontario
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Extract

For a number of years, in the not too distant past, there was a lively debate between Plato's defenders and critics over the question of whether his Republic contained slaves. However, since the appearance of an article by Gregory Vlastos1 some twenty years ago, it seems to have been generally felt that the issue has been resolved, and the controversy has died down. Vlastos argued that the evidence admits of no doubt - Plato included slaves in his ideal state. In this paper, I wish to have the case reopened, and to revive interest in what I believe should continue to be a matter of debate. In opposition to what has become the standard view, I am inclined to think, on balance, that his Republic could not contain slaves. Vlastos begins by reminding us that, on those occasions when Plato wants to propose a radical change from existing institutions, he argues for such a change. If he had intended to abolish slavery from his ideal society, this would have been a radical change, and we should have expected him to indicate clearly such an intention, and to justify it. Since no justification is forthcoming, we may presume that no change is envisaged. This line of argument I shall call the presumptive argument. One version of it is mentioned by R. B. Levinson,2 namely that the rough and dirty work, carried on behind the scene by slaves, will take place as usual, and the continuance of slavery is assumed without question.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 37 , Issue 2 , December 1987 , pp. 367 - 372
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1987

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References

1 Gregory Vlastos, ‘Does Slavery Exist in Plato's Republic?’, CP (1968), reprinted in Platonic Studies (Princeton U.P., 1973; henceforth P.S.).

2 R.B., Levinson, In Defense of Plato (Harvard U.P., 1953), 163.Google Scholar

3 Levinson, p. 171.

4 Vlastos, P.S. 145–6.

5 One might in fact say that so strong has Vlastos' argument appeared to subsequent commentators and scholars that it is simply accepted without question. In her recent book, An Introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford, 1981), 171, Julia Annas, without mentioning Vlastos, refers to 433d as the one passage from which ‘we know that there are slaves’.

6 For instance, at Politics I, 1255b21ff. Aristotle tells us that the natural slave does not possess reason, that he is useful, like a domestic animal, for the provision of the necessities of life by bodily service, and that nature intends (though it does not always succeed) to make the body of the natural slave different from that of the free man. The body of the slave ought to be suited for heavy labour.

7 At the conclusion of his paper (p. 146), Vlastos is quite adamant on this point. He asserts that ‘there is no contrary evidence’, and it is this complete absence of evidence to the contrary which he sees as making his initial presumption acceptable

8 Levinson, p. 171.

9 Levinson, p. 169.

10 Vlastos, P.S. 141 n. 6. He gives a similar account in ‘The Theory of Social Justice in the Republic’, in Interpretations of Plato (ed. H. North, Leiden, 1977), 25 n. 92.

11 Vlastos, ‘Slavery in Plato's Thought’, reprinted in P.S. 149.

12 Vlastos, P.S. 151

13 Vlastos, P.S. 142.

14 I hesitate to accuse such a careful scholar as Vlastos of this inconsistency, and doubly so when he acknowledges its existence. My only explanation for this lapse is that in the context he is primarily concerned that a passage from Morrow should not be misinterpreted, but that in so doing he overlooks the damage he does to his own case. While he says (P.S. 142 n. 13) that he failed to reckon with the problem in ‘Slavery in Plato's Thought’, n. 12 seems to make it clear that he sticks by the main conclusions of that article, in particular the view that the kind of authority involved in ruling or owning people is restricted to those who have the necessary logos

15 This is, perhaps, contradicted by 443d, when Plato compares the parts of the soul to a musical harmony, and refers to the possibility of other parts lying in between (). But even if we grant the possibility of there being more parts, they would not lie outside the range of the other three. They would be mixtures of or intermediates between existing parts. A slavish element could not exist in between the existing parts.

16 In his exposition of 433d, Vlastos maintains that slaves contribute to the excellence of the polis (P.S. 141, 125), and certainly this seems to be Plato's message at this point. However Plato tells us nothing about what the slaves would do, and is silent on the matter of how exactly they would contribute to the well-being of society. According to Vlastos, as possessions of the third class, they would presumably function as manual labourers, in which role he suggests they would be ‘most urgently wanted’ (P.S. 142). But in ‘The Theory of Social Justice in the Republic’ (n. 10 above), 28ff, and especially on p. 30, Vlastos recognises the position of the unskilled worker who is a citizen, and, as I have argued, it is this citizen who performs the traditional slave labour. Manual labourers are certainly needed in the Republic; otherwise, as Vlastos aptly puts it, ‘the philosopher… would then have to divert precious time and energy to meaningless drudgery’ (p. 30). But, to repeat, these manual labourers are citizens not slaves.

17 This conclusion is reinforced by what Plato says at 454b ff. There he makes the important point that if we treat people differently, we must be able to appeal to some relevant difference in order to justify such differential treatment. So if slavery is to be defended as an institution, it would be necessary to pick out some relevant difference between slave and non-slave. But no relevant differences, either in terms of personality or suitability to a particular kind of job, can be found. In that case, there is no justification for claiming that anyone ought to be a slave.

18 The nature of the city-soul correspondence should not be misunderstood. I do not intend the analogy to be so strict that, corresponding to the cobblers and carpenters in society, there must exist an identifiable cobbling or carpenting part of the soul. Rather, if a person is suited to do one or more of the range of jobs assigned to the money-making class, this will mean that the appetitive part of the soul predominates. Plato's formulation of the principles of justice has left open a certain flexibility within the third class for people to exchange jobs, or to do more than one job (434a–b). But this flexibility does not affect the correspondence between the appetitive part of the soul and the third class of citizens. The point remains that if there is to be a justifiable doctrine of slavery, this would require a fourth part of the soul corresponding to the slave class.