¹ P. van Braam, ‘Aristotle's use of CQ 6 (1912), 266–73;CrossRefGoogle ScholarHey, O., ‘AMAPTIA’, Philologus 83 (1928), 1–17, 137–63;CrossRefGoogle ScholarGlanville, I. M., ‘Tragic Error’, CQ 43 (1949), 47–57;CrossRefGoogle ScholarOstwald, M., ‘Aristotle on Hamartia and Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus, Festschrift Kapp (1958), pp. 93–108;Google ScholarBremer, J. M., Hamartia (1968), pp. 4–64.Google Scholar Hey and Bremer trace and its cognates from Homer onwards, while van Braam and Glanville concentrate on specific passages from the Nicotnachean and Eudemian Ethics. Bremer and Hey, judging by the high frequency of (or cognate) meaning ‘mistake’ in the other treatises of Aristotle, conclude that has this meaning in Po. 13. Glanville and Stinton find in the review of and its cognates in Aristotle too diverse a range of meanings to conclude with certainty that in Po. 13 it means only ‘mistake’. For a discussion of Ostwald's views see pp. 64 f. below

² The other terms in the definition were treated briefly by Adkins, A. W. H. (CQ N.S. 16 (1966), 78–102).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ Although in general the Poetics appears to be written in a haphazard manner, important definitions like that of the tragic agent show deliberate construction. Similarly the definition of tragedy (1449^b 24–8) is carefully laid out by Aristotle in a quadripartite structure, with every element except the last having received an earlier treatment in the Poetics. See Else, Gerald F., Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument (1957), pp. 221–32.Google Scholar It is clear from the Topica (139^b 12–140^b 26) that Aristotle regards clarity of language and succinctness as two necessary elements of a well-constructed definition.

⁴ Lucas, D. W., Aristotle: Poetics (1968), pp. 143–4.Google Scholar

⁵ Ostwald, M., op. cit. (n. 1).Google Scholar

⁶ Other than Bremer, discussed below, only Dawe, R. D. (HSCP 72 (1967), 120–1)Google Scholar states objections to Ostwald's interpretation Stinton (p. 236) in disputing Ostwald merely refers to Bremer's inadequate discussion, though he does defend Ostwald against at least one of Dawe's criticisms.

⁷ Bremer, , op. cit., p. 55.Google Scholar

⁸ Ostwald, , op. cit., p. 104.Google Scholar

⁹ Bremer (p. 55) seems to abet more than hurt Ostwald's case when he unaccountably inserts after in this passage.

¹⁰ This is not to deny that the emphasis on clause (3) would not be as great if is really the equivalent of in this context.

¹¹ The possibility that a disparity could exist between a man's and his personal worth, unthinkable in the morality of Homer, was generally recognized by the fourth century. So it was not difficult for Glaucon to imagine the perfectly just man with the of perfect injustice, and his opposite, the perfectly unjust man with the of perfect justice (Republic 361 a–d). It is interesting that in this passage we find the phrases which resemble the opening of (4)

¹² Sol. 13, 15 (West).

¹³ It would appear that Aristotle's manner of glossing the proverb of Solon is influenced by Plato's definition of tragedy it Phil. 47 d ff. Plato says that tragedy in life and on the stage is caused when ignorance and power are joined 49c 1–3. Perhaps the manuscripts are right in reading rather than The latter is Cornarius' emendation, which must be made no less than five times (38 c 8, 48 c 2, 49 c 2, 49 d 9,49 e 6), mainly to bring the sentence quoted into line with the neighboring discussion of (48 c–d). Plato himself says at Tim. 86 b that comprises both so there is perhaps some reason why the MSS. reading should be followed; in addition, cf. the uses of at Phil. 12 d and 49 b 1. In that case, there may even be a verbal echo of the Philebus in Aristotle's fragment. But whether we read or What Plato is defining seems to us very close to what Aristotle means by

¹⁴ Stob. iii. 200 Hense; The Oxyrhynchus Papyri iv. 666.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Düring, Ingemar, Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction (Studiagr. et lat. Goth, xii, 1961). For the purposes of this discussion we use Düring's numbering of the fragments.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Cf. E.E. 1248^b 27 ff., where Aristotle makes a similar statement about the harmful effects wealth and good fortune may produce in men of insufficient wisdom.

¹⁷ The metaphorical use of and in particular of and the like is common enough in Aristotle (e.g. E.N. 1101^a 15, 1117^a30, 1179^a 11); cf. the similar use of E.N. 1099^a 33). In the more elevated style of the Protrepticus and emphasized by it seems more a ‘live’ metaphor than elsewhere.

¹⁸ Düring, (op. cit., pp. 176–7)Google Scholar paraphrases what must have been included in the missing section of the Protrepticus partially as follows: ‘Both from your knowledge of myth and history and from personal experience you will remember instances of pride coming before a fall: you have seen men who have put too much faith in wealth, good fortune, and power and met with a sudden change, a The greater their success was, the deeper they felt their failure and bad fortune …’

¹⁹ Cf. Rhet. 1391^a 33–1391^b 1:

²⁰ Cf. Pol. 1295^b 6–20.

²¹ By now it should be obvious how our interpretation of Po. 13 differs from that of Adkins, (op. cit. (n.2), pp. 98–9),Google Scholar who believes Aristotle's tragic agent must be

²² Dawe, , op. cit. (n. 7), pp. 89–107).Google Scholar

²³ We are very grateful to Professors A. A. Long, Michael Wigodsky, and Michael Gagarin, as well as the two referees, for their criticisms and their assistance in improving our presentation of this paper. For its central thesis, and for any faults that remain, we are of course responsible. We regret that it was not possible for us to see Moles, John, ‘Notes on Aristotle's Poetics’ 13 and 14,Google ScholarCQ N.S. 29 (1979), 77–94, in time to take account of it in our discussion.CrossRefGoogle Scholar