^{page 129 note 1} At least seven editions of the pseudo-Platonic Περỉ Аρετής, Axiochus and Eryxias appeared between 1711 and 1788.

^{page 129 note 2} Hermann, , Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie, pp. 416–417 (Heidelberg, 1839), is an exceptionGoogle Scholar.

^{page 129 note 3} Observationum oeconomico-politicarum in Aeschinis dialogum, qui Eryxias inscribitur, partes, II (Königsberg, 1822)Google Scholar. This work was not accessible to me.

^{page 129 note 4} Quoted by .DrSchrohl, in his thesis on the Eryxias (p. 7)Google Scholar. See below.

^{page 129 note 5} De Eryxia, qui fertur Platonis (Göttingen, 1901)Google Scholar.

^{page 129 note 6} Vol. XIII, part 3 (Dialogues Apocryphes).

^{page 129 note 7} Op. cit., p. 86. ProfessorShorey, Paul in his account of the Eryxias (What Plato said, pp. 433–436)Google Scholar appears to me to suggest a similar point of view when he says of the final argument 'Its conclusion may seem to point to the Stoic interpretation of the Gorgias'. He does not work out this idea.

^{page 129 note 8} Op. cit., p. 83.

^{page 130 note 1} Op. cit., pp. 15–16 and 18–19.

^{page 130 note 2} I have felt it necessary to work out this exposition in some detail, since previous attempts to summarize the argument appear to me to be misleading.

^{page 130 note 3} I do not, however, wish to maintain that the dialogue is free from logical weaknesses. There is a particularly serious one (which will be discussed later) at 402AI–4.

^{page 130 note 4} ProfessorTaylor, A. E. (Plato, the Man and his Work, third edition, pp. 548–550)Google Scholar points out that the dialogue is to some extent a polemic against Stoicism. His conclusion, however, appears to be based purely on the first argument of the dialogue, in which, as we shall see, there is little ground for taking only a minor part in the discussion, while recognizing any such polemic. Moreover, he appears to follow other writers in assuming that the whole of the last part of the dialogue represents the author's own point of view.

^{page 130 note 5} The portico of Zeus Eleutherios is the scene of the pseudo-Platonic Theages and also of Socrates' conversation with Ischomachus in Xenophon's Oeconomicus. It is possible that the author was influenced in his choice of a setting by the Oeconomicus. Certain other details in the dialogue appear to show the influence of this work. See Souilhé, op. cit., p. 85.

^{page 130 note 6} The earlier date is fixed by the reference to certain minor acts of aggression, the earliest of which, the cruise of Laches and Charoeades, took place in 427. The latter is indicated by the covert reference to a ‘great expedition’. Presumably the Sicilian expedition of 415–414 is hinted at.

^{page 130 note 7} The author, as Dr. Schrohl has observed, appears of his Charmides in the grouping of his characters. In both Socrates takes the chief part and Critias the second. Erasistratus corresponds to Chaerephon, each taking only a minor part in the discussion, while the characters who give their names to the dialogues fill an intermediate position.

^{page 131 note 1} Diogenes Laertius VII, 102.

^{page 131 note 2} Op. cit., p. 550.

^{page 133 note 1} I have occasionally inserted in this sum- mary statements in brackets which are extraneous the original text. They occur at points where the author has failed either to make clear certain implications or to emphasize the connection between one section and another.

^{page 133 note 2} He quotes Diog, . Laert. VII, 103Google Scholar: ἔτι τέϕασιν ᾡ ἓστιν єὖ καì κακς χρσθαι, τοτο οὐκ ἔστιν γαθνֹ πλούτψ δ κα ύγιєίą ἒστιν єὖ κα κακς χρσθαι οὐκ ούκ ăγαθν πλοτος κα ὑγίєια.

^{page 133 note 3} I have added an appendix on this passage.

^{page 133 note 4} This suggestion was made by Hermann, (Platonische Philosophic, footnote to p. 578)Google Scholar. He does not, however, explain where and how the refutation takes place.

^{page 133 note 5} Actually the proposition established by Critias is not this, but a slightly different one, namely that to be rich cannot be good since for some people it is harmful. The present propoto sition is mentioned for the first time after the conclusion of Critias' argument and is described as having been upheld by Prodicus (397E4–5). If it is to be attributed to Critias, it should be either identical with or obviously implicit in Critias' proposition, whereas it is verbally, at least, inconsistent with it. The author, how ever, appears to regard the two propositions as identical. Prodicus' proposition when it is first mentioned at 397E is alleged to have been put forward by Critias also. (Or else it is alleged that he would have put it forward in similarcircumstances. ὣσπєρ κα σύ νύνδη would support either interpretation.) The author is clearly guilty of a logical error here.

^{page 134 note 1} This passage is difficult to interpret, and also appears to be logically unsound. Consequently some comment seems called for. The passage runs as follows:

SOcrates: Пότєρον ἂν ϕήσαιμєν οῖόν τє єῖναι ταὐτν πργμα πρς τν αὐτν έργασίαν τότє μν χρήσιμον єῖναι τότє δέ χρєῖον; (402AI–2.)

Eryxias: Οὐκ ἒγωγ᾽ ἂν ϕαίην λλ᾽ єἲ тι δєοίμєθα τούτον πρς τήν αὑτν έργασαν. καί χρήσιμόν μοι δοκєῖ єῖναιֹ єί δ μή٫ οὒ.. (402A3–4.)

The discussion is concerned with wealth in general and the satisfaction of bodily needs in general. With this reservation, we may interpret Socrates' question as follows:

‘Should we admit it to be possible that <a specimen of> a given class of things should be useful for <the achievement of one instance of> a given class of purposes on one occasion <when it is our wish to attain such a purpose> and yet that <a specimen of> the same class of things should not be useful for <the achievement of another instance of> the same class of purposes on another similar occasion?’

In other words, to use the example employed at 402A6, can fire be useful on one occasion for casting a bronze statue, and yet not be useful, on some other occasion, for so casting another?

Eryxias answers: ‘No. A thing <of the class A> is useful for a purpose <of the class B> if, and only if, that purpose <B > can never be attained except by means of that thing <A>’.

That is, fire cannot be called useful for casting a bronze statue unless it is true that no bronze statue can ever be cast without the aid of fire.

It will be noticed that Eryxias' reply is not a mere restatement of Socrates' question. The question might imply no more than that a thing A is useful for a purpose B, because the purpose B can always be attained better (e.g. more agreeably, more economically, more effectively) with the help of A than without it. So far, the meaning attached to χρήσιμος may be merely the meaning attached to it in ordinary usage. But Eryxias' answer gives the term a far narrower connotation. It implies that a thing A is useful for a purpose B because the purpose B must always be attained with the help of A, and can never be attained without it. The term is applied to a thing which must be used for a given purpose, and not, as usually, to a thing which can be conveniently used for that purpose. No attempt is made to justify this identification of the ‘useful’ with the ‘indispensable’ It remains an unproved hypothesis, presumably because the author has no proof to offer, and is a fatal flaw in the whole of the final argument of the dialogue.

It may be noticed that this conception of the term ‘useful’ is already implicit in the previous stage of the discussion (401D–E). The method adopted here by Socrates for defining the purpose for which a given thing is useful is none other than the method which the ordinary man would use for defining the purpose for which it is indispensable. Eryxias is asked to consider what thing it is the removal of which will enable all that is usually regarded as wealth to be dispensed with; since the procuring of this thing will be the purpose for which anything which is to rank as wealth will be useful. This thing, whatever it is, must be something which without the help of wealth cannot be procured at all, not merely something which can be procured better with its help than without it.

^{page 135 note 1} Prodicus' proposition (397E4–7), which, as we have seen, is attributed rightly or wrongly to Critias, runs in full as follows: ‘[To be rich] is good for good men who know how wealth should be employed, and bad for the vicious who do not know’.

^{page 135 note 2} The implications of this paragraph (403B9–C6) are more than usually obscure, and my interpre sage translated runs as follows: ‘But to proceed the following extension of the argument will (άτáρ) it appears that even a man who, owing to his ignorance of horsemanship, is the possessor of horses which are useless to him will, if anyone teaches him horsemanship, have been madericher at the same time, if property which was useless to him before has thereby been made useful to him. For his instructor, by imparting to him a form of knowledge, will have made him rich at the same time’. This is followed directly by the suggestion that Critias will disagree with the preceding conclusions, whereupon Critias does in fact protest. A possible clue to an interpretation is suggested by the opening phrase (και τόν άνєпιστήμονα ίппικής ίппικής, ‘Even the man who …’), which implies that what is true of the man who becomes ίппικός will be even more obviously true of some other person. Since the example of the ίппικός is used above (403B) to illustrate something which is true of the καλός κάγαθός this person will presumably be the καλός κάγαθός. If, there fore, we substitute καλοκάγαθιας for ίппικής. άργύριον for ίппους and καλόν κάγαθόν for ίппικόν, the following extension of the argument will result: (1) If horses become useful to a man who becomes ίппικός it is clear that in becoming ίппικός he has acquired a fresh form of knowledge and therefore a fresh form of wealth (403B9–C6). (2) But if the knowledge which a man acquires in becoming ίппικός is a form of wealth, still more so is the knowledge which a man acquires in becoming καλός κάγαθός a form of wealth, since this form of knowledge, by making money useful for him, actually makes it wealth for him also.

^{page 136 note 1} Op. cit., p. 83. Dr. Schrohl finds a similar difficulty (p. 18).

^{page 136 note 2} See footnote to par. 395A5–C5.

^{page 136 note 3} This distinction as applied to food, etc., on the one hand and money and its equivalents on the other is already hinted at in par. 401D6–E2, and again in par. 402B3–C1.

^{page 138 note 1} See Seneca, , Ep. 87, 22: ‘Bonum ex malo non fit’, and Alexander Apbrodisiensis, In Aristot. Top. Comment. Ed. Wallies, M., p. 201Google Scholar, lines 19–32: Ƭò διà κακού γινόμєνον ούκ έστιν àγαθόν κτλ. Here he attacks the docgtrine from a Peripatetic standpoint.

^{page 138 note 2} This is the definition adopted as far back as par. 399E. It has not been superseded but merely elucidated by the subsequent discussion about the nature of χρήματα.

^{page 139 note 1} In a note on par. 403B.

^{page 139 note 2} See footnote on par. 402A.

^{page 141 note 1} See for example Hermann, (Disp. de Aeschinis Socrattd Reliquiis, Göttingen, 1850Google Scholar, passim), Krauss (Teubner edition, p. 30)and Souilhé (op. at., p. 87).

^{page 141 note 2} Dittmar, (Aeschines von Sphettus, Philologische Untersuchungen, 1912. pp. 198–199Google Scholar) conjectures that the Callias was well known to the author of the Eryxias on the ground that certain statements of a similar kind occur both in the sixth Socratic letter, which he believes to have been based on the Callias, and in the Eryxias in par. 396E–397A. It is generally recognized, however, that this paragraph was inspired by a passage in the Euthydemus (see note in the summary). There is more to be said for his suggestion that the author's conception of Prodicus was partly the result of the severe treatment accorded to him in the Callias, to which Herodicus (cited by Athenaeus, Bk. V, 220B) testifies.

^{page 141 note 3} Cf. Alline, , Histoire du Texte de Platon, p. 41Google Scholar, footnote 3: ‘II est probable que les bibliothècaires, une fois detrompès sur les apocryphes platoniciens, les attribuérent, pour pallier leur erreur, aux petits Socratiques.’ He mentions the ʽEρδόμη as an example of this tendency.

^{page 141 note 4} Alline, pp. 121–123.

^{page 141 note 5} Dio Cassius, 58, 27.

^{page 141 note 6} DrSchrohl, quotes Boeckh, , Staatsaushaltung der Athencr, Vol. I, p. 548Google Scholarfoil, ., and Dittenberger, , De Ephebis Atticis, p. 40Google Scholar. Oehler, J. (Pauly-Wissowa, , Vol. VII, p. 1969 foil.)Google Scholar, Glotz, G. (Daremberg and Saglio, Vol. II, part 2, p. 1676Google Scholar foil.) andFerguson, W. S., Hellenistic Athens, p. 203Google Scholar, have also thrown much light on the subject.

^{page 142 note 1} This is the date assigned by Koehler to C.I.A. Vol. II, No. 1181. which is the latest extant inscription commemorating a liturgical gymnasiarchy.

^{page 142 note 2} Op. cit., pp. 42–43.

^{page 142 note 3} Aristotle (Politics 1323A1) classes it with other offices which had been established for the maintenance of good order in certain peaceful and prosperous cities.

^{page 142 note 4} C.I.G. Vol. II, part 5, No. 614b. This is the date assigned to the inscription by W. Kolbe (Festschrift zu Otto Hirschfeld, p. 513, etc.). Most auhorities, including Ferguson in his brochure on the Athenian archons of the third and second centuries, have maintained that thedate is 290–287. Ferguson, in his later work, Hellenistic Athens, appears to accept Kolbe's dating.

^{page 142 note 5} Bk. VI, 89.

^{page 142 note 6} Act III, Sc. 2, line 21: Gymnasi praefecto poenas pendere.

^{page 142 note 7} In Panly-Wissowa, Vol. VII, p. 1989.

^{page 142 note 8} Par. 395E6–396A2 and 404C4.

^{page 142 note 9} Op. cit., p. 86.

^{page 143 note 1} See, for instance, Seneca, , Ep. 87, 22Google Scholar.

^{page 144 note 1} In a note on par. 404C4.

^{page 144 note 2} Op. cit., pp. 37–38.

^{page 144 note 3} Cf. Diogenes, Laertius VII, 102Google Scholar: οὐ μȃλλον δ ὠϕєλєȋ ή βλάπτєι ὑ πλοτος καì ὑγίєια֗ οὐκ ᾰρα àγαθὺν οτє πλοτος οτє ύγίєια (von Arnim III, 117).

^{page 144 note 4} ‘L'Euthydème en proclamant l'insignifiance des biens extérieurs considérés en eux-mêmes, laisse pressentir la grande maxime vulgarisrée par le Portique’ (p. 85).

^{page 144 note 5} In his final argument Socrates assumes as a matter of course that other people besides the good man do know how to use wealth.

^{page 144 note 6} See summary, with the note on this passage.

^{page 145 note 1} See, for instance, Meno 88E.

^{page 145 note 2} Stobaeus, , Eclogue Ethicae 95, 9Google Scholar: οίκνομικòν δ’ єȋνον μόνον λέγουσι τơν σПπνδαîον καì àγαθòν οìκονόμον κτλ (von Arnim III, 623).

^{page 145 note 3} These arguments are stated and discussed in Seneca, Ep. 87. One of them is referred to earlier in this chapter: Bonum ex malo non fit: divitiae fiunt, fiunt autem ex avaritia: divitiae ergo non sunt bonum.

^{page 145 note 4} Cf. Seneca, , Ep. 117, 9Google Scholar: Quod nisi bonus non habet, bonum est. If the obscure statement interposed at 403B9–C6 is to be taken, as I have suggested in my note, as implying that the Wisdom of the good man is as much a form of wealth as the material forms of it, Critias' reluctance to accept it may be similarly explained. The admission of σοфΙα to the genus wealth would completely undermine the Stoic scheme of values, since wealth would no longer be regarded simply as ‘indifferent.’

^{page 145 note 5} 138C–140E.

^{page 145 note 6} 369B–370A. ήκουσα δέ пοτє καÌ τοȗ Пροδίκου λέγοντοςǒτι ό θάνατος οǒτє πєρì τούς ζŵντάς έστιν οǒτє ΠєρÌ τοùς μєτηλλαχότσς κτλ.

^{page 146 note 1} The contradiction between the first and last propositions is only a verbal one, since the term ‘rich’ is employed in the first in an unusual sense. The wise man is the richest not because he possesses the greatest quantity of material goods, but because he possesses something of pre-eminent intrinsic value.

^{page 146 note 2} The relation of the first of the three conclusions to Stoicism was discussed at the beginning of this article in the note on par. 394–395. The possibility that the author was an Epicurean does not seem to me to be worth discussing. If this were the case, we should surely expect some reference to pleasure in his definition of wealth.

^{page 146 note 3} Professor Souilhé, while implying that Stoicism has influenced the author's point of view, insists that Cynic influence is predominant (p. 86). His view rests on a misinterpretation of the final argument, where according to him riches are condemned because they give rise to numerous and pressing desires. What the author proves is not this, but that riches can only be said to exist as such when they are in the hands of a person whose desires are of this character.

^{page 147 note 1} Diogenes is said to have proposed a currency of knuckle-bones (Athenaeus IV, I59E).

^{page 147 note 2} See, for instance, Stobaeus, Flor. 93, 35 (Meineke): ό Διογένης ěλєγє μήτє έν πόλєι πλουσίą μήτє éν οΙκίą àρєτήν οΙκЄȋν δύναθαι.

^{page 147 note 3} Diogenes Laertius VI, 70: διττήν δ’ ëλєγєν (i.e., Diogenes the Cynic) єȋναι τήν ȁσκησιν τήν μèν Ψυχικήν, τήν δè σωματικήν… єȋναι δ’ áτєλή τήν έϒéραν χωρΙς τής έτéρας.

^{page 147 note 4} Apart from this difficulty, the Eryxias is not the sort of work which we should expect Cynic to produce. Except in one passage (394D–E) the homiletic note is lacking, and the major part of the discussion is more concerned with the correct use of terms than with the inculcation of an attitude.

^{page 147 note 5} Op. cit., pp. 26–27.

^{page 147 note 6} See, for instance, Rep. 422A and Laws 742D.

^{page 147 note 7} Laws 743.

^{page 147 note 8} See the note on par. 393–394 in the summary.

^{page 147 note 9} Politics 1257B (Book I, Chap. 9. § II).

^{page 149 note 1} This point of view would be easy for a, Greek to adopt owing to the association of νόμισμα with νόμος. Compare the use of νομίζω in Eryxias, 400A.

^{page 149 note 2} This may well be the case with the пєρì Δικαίου and пєρì ’Aρєтής if they date from the Hellenistic period.

^{page 149 note 3} See ProfessorSouilhés, remarks in the Budé edition of Plato. Vol. XIII, part 2, p. viiiGoogle Scholar.

^{page 149 note 4} ProfessorSouilhé, (l.c., p. ix)Google Scholar implies that none of the dialogues excluded from the tetralogies are by Academic authors.Alline, (Histoire du texts de Platon, footnote to p. 117)Google Scholar maintains that the exclusion of such dialogues does not indicate non-Academic authorship, but merely the fact that their spuriousness was universally admitted (όμολογουμένως νοθєύονται). Dialogues such as the Second Alcibiades were admitted because their spuriousness, although suspected, was not proved. EvenProfessorSouilhi, admits the possibility of Academic authorship in the case ot the Axiochus (Vol. XIII, pt. 3, p. 136)Google Scholar. J. Chevalier, to whose essay(la dialogue I'Axiochus) he refers, attributes it to an Academic of the 1st century B.C.

^{page 149 note 5} Op. cit., p. 43, where he attributes its survival to its polemical character.

^{page 149 note 6} Professor Souilhe sees an allusion to Pyrrhonian scepticism in par. 395B. Socrates, however, explicitly dissents from the view expressed here.

^{page 149 note 7} Cf. διομολογήθη (396E2) συνομολογήσαι (399D6).

^{page 149 note 8} It does not follow that if Stoicism is criticized in the dialogue, the dialogue must have been written after the accession of Arcesilaus. ‘In the time of Arcesilaus … anti-Stoic polemic became the main business of the school. It does not necessarily follow that the polemic may not have begun rather earlier’ (ProfessorTaylor, A. E., l.c., p. 528Google Scholar. He is discussing the Second Alcibiades).

^{page 149 note 1} We may compare the Axiochus (3698, etc.), where Epicurean doctrine is attributed to Prodicus. Possibly this device was derived from the Eryxias.