Plato nowhere deals systematically with the problem of the origin of evil. And yet no system of philosophy which proposes to explain the mysteries of existence can leave untouched the undeniable and perplexing fact of warps and imperfections in the fabric of our life, seemingly inherent in the very tissue of which it is woven. It is difficult to believe that Plato could shape his scheme without taking this into account—somewhere, one feels, he must offer an explanation. He does, indeed, in various dialogues drop scattered hints which apply to the matter in hand, without throwing light on the problem as a whole. The following are typical instances. In the Republic he says that evil may be a punishment for sin in a former life, or, if not that, may be good which we cannot recognize: Оȕτως äρα ύποληπτέον περι τοΰ δικαον νδρός ὲάν τ' ν πενϭ γγνηϒαι ν τ' ν νόσοιας ἥ τινι δδλѱ τών δοκούντων κακŵν, ώς τούτψ ταûτα ες γαθόν τι τελεντήσει ξѾντι ἥ καί ποθανόντι. ‘Then this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty or sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work together for good to him in life and death’ (Jowett's translation).