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Plato and Allegorical Interpretation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

J. Tate
Affiliation:
United College, St. Andrews.

Extract

It is clear, then, that Plato's strictures on Homer ought not to have given any encouragement to allegorical interpretation. The eulogists of Homer ought to have sought other grounds for the defence which he invited them to make; while the allegorizing philosophers, if they persisted in treating interpretation of the poets as an instrument of knowledge, ought to have answered Plato not by multiplying allegories but by producing a defence of the allegorical method. The question with which we are concerned is, of course, not what ought to have been done, but what actually happened. But the foregoing considerations ought to warn us against assuming without evidence that all those who allegorized after Plato did so in order to answer his attack on the poets, and were directly incited by that attack to engage in allegorical interpretation. The fact that the early Stoics were prolific in such interpretations is in itself no proof that they intended in this way to answer Plato's criticism of the myths. Other evidence is required to prove that it was the desire to answer Plato which impelled them to wallow in allegory.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1930

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References

page 1 note 1 Rep. 607d.

page 1 note 2 Dion LIII. 3. For names of those who wrote on behalf of Homer against Plato see Reinhardt, , De Graecorum Theologia, p. 23Google Scholar; Weinstock, , op. cit., pp. 145 sqqGoogle Scholar.

page 1 note 3 E.g. , ps.-Plutarch in the Vit. Horn. Cf. NO. I., VOL. XXIVGoogle Scholar. Reinhardt, , op. cit., p. 22Google Scholar.

page 1 note 4 Quaest. Horn. 24, 29 (cf. 5). These allegories are ‘inepte et tumide scriptae’ (Diels, H., Doxographi Graeci, p. 98Google Scholar), ‘a brilliant little work’ (Murray, G., Four Stages of Greek Religion, p. 147)Google Scholar.

page 2 note 1 35 (p. 76, 7, Lang), 31 (64, 16) Persius is said to have bequeathed to him about 700 books of Chrysippus.

page 2 note 2 Strabo I. 2, 3.

page 3 note 1 Arnim II., fr. 925, p. 267.

page 3 note 2 Cf. C.Q., January, 1929, p. 42.

page 3 note 3 In etymology they took up no such position as that of Cratylus. Chrysippus by admitting that there was more than one word for the same thing, and more than one meaning for the same word (zeller, , Stoics, pp. 73–4, n. 4Google Scholar), virtually recognized that his etymologies were merely conjectural. Cf. D.L. VII. 172, where Cleanthes is rallied on his word-play.

page 4 note 1 E.g. Julian, , oral. IV. 137cGoogle Scholar; cf. Lucian, , Zeus Cross-examined, 2Google Scholar.

page 4 note 2 Proclus, , In Plat. Remp. 371–2Google Scholar; Julian, , orat. VII. 206–7Google Scholar. Probably the Stoics also agreed with Plato that certain myths are unsuitable for the young; most of the allegorical interpretations are far too difficult for children to understand.

page 4 note 3 In Plat. Remp. 386, 405.

page 4 note 4 The Platonic account of imitation was, apparently, not faced at all by the Stoics, unless (as seems most improbable) Strabo (I. 2, 5) takes from them his rather feeble attempt at an answer: if Homer had not known life well, hecould not have imitated it so well.

page 4 note 5 On Rep. 378d, 24. Cf. Gomperz, , G.T. II., pp. 139Google Scholar sqq., who sets forth the ordinary view of Antisthenes' allegorism with brilliant imaginative power. For A.'s frr. see Mullach, , F.P.G. II., pp. 261 sqqGoogle Scholar.; the Homeric frr. are 25 33, p. 277.

page 5 note 1 As by Weinstock, , op. cit., pp. 123 and 138Google Scholar.

page 5 note 2 De Dionc Chrysostomo Cynicorum sectaton. (Leipziger Studien X., 1887, pp. 77 sqqGoogle Scholar.), p. 225.

page 5 note 3 La Critique des Traditions Religieuses chez les Grecs, p. 289.

page 5 note 4 Soph., fr. 885: Eur. Tro. 988–90; Gorgias, , Praise of Helen, 19Google Scholar. A.'s remark is in Mullach, ibid., p. 272, n. 138.

page 5 note 5 Following Krische, ; see Porph. Quaest. Hom., pp. 386 sqqGoogle Scholar.

page 5 note 6 p. 123, n. 7.

page 6 note 1 Pp. 226 sqq. (This is how Dion treats Homeric characters.)

page 6 note 2 Though Antisthenes (the name is a more or less probable emendation) merely said that Iliad XI. 637 meant that Nestor (as became his years and steady head) could drink the contents of the cup without becoming drunk.

page 6 note 3 A. decided that πολύτροπος referred to the adaptability of Odysseus' wisdom, and was neither a compliment nor the reverse.

page 6 note 4 I am only granting it for the sake of argament, except in the case of Heracles. (A. wrote a work entitled Heracles or concerning wisdom and strength.)

page 6 note 5 Excursus III. ad II. XXIII., p. 578.

page 6 note 6 Cornutus 31 (p. 63, 4).

page 6 note 7 It is fairly certain that this is not A.'s remark at all but the scholiast's (έκ τούτον ΦησΙ—from this passage A. derives his statement that the wise man, etc.). Cf. schol. on Il. XXIV. 526: ‘From this passage Epicurus derives his statement that the gods neither have trouble nor give trouble to others.’ In spite of this and others like it (e.g. on Od. IX. 28) no one nowadays holds that Epicurus either derived, or pretended to derive, his doctrines from Homer. So far as this ‘fragment’ is concerned, Antisthenes is similarly guiltless of reading into Homer the Socratic doctrine of the unity of wisdom (pace Zeller, , Socrates, p. 330)Google Scholar.

page 7 note 1 Fr. 287 (Mullach).

page 7 note 2 Plutarch rejects the allegorical interpretation of poetry, but is anxious that the right morals should be derived from the myths. That is to say, he concentrated on the τύποι and rejected the ύπόνοιαι. Since Heyne, writers on the history of allegory are too little aware that interpretation by τύποι and interpretation by ύπόνοιαι are not the same thing. See Plutarch, , De Aud. Poet, 19e sqqGoogle Scholar., and the analysis of Rep. 377 sqq. supra. A good example of interpretation by τύποι is in Plato, , Apol. 28bcdGoogle Scholar (example of Achilles proves that it is no disgrace to live in danger of death).

page 7 note 3 Outside the philosophers one finds it in, e.g. Gorgias, , Palamedes 24Google Scholar, Isocrates, , ad Dem. 17Google Scholar.

page 8 note 1 Orat. LV. 22.

page 8 note 2 I. 2, 17.

page 8 note 3 De Aud. Poet. 17d.

page 8 note 4 De Aud. Poet. 20e. Cf. Proclus, (In Plat. Remp. 372Google Scholar), who finds in the contradiction a proof that the theomachies are allegorical.

page 8 note 5 Op. cit., p. 138, n. 40, p. 142.

page 9 note 1 De Aud. Poet. 17b.

page 9 note 2 Cf. Zeller, , Stoics, c. xiiiGoogle Scholar.

page 9 note 3 See Pearson on Zeno's definition of δόξα (fr. 15).

page 9 note 4 Cornutus, c. 35 (76. 4).

page 9 note 5 Strabo, I. 2, 7.

page 9 note 6 N.D. II. 63, 70; cf. I. 41, III. 62.

page 10 note 1 Suppose, per impossibile, that the principle had the meaning ordinarily alleged: that Homer expressed some truths literally and others allegorically; it would indeed be a very curious way, for Zeno to state the fact that there is scarcely any of what might be regarded as literal Stoicism in Homer (cf. ps. Plut, . Vit. Hom. 119Google Scholar, 134).

page 10 note 2 Virgil's allegorizers were prompted by a similar motive, not by any desire to defend the poet (see Comparetti, , Vergil in the Middle Ages Part I., c. viiiGoogle Scholar.).