^{page 101 note 2} Cf. 144 C–D with 131 A–B; 150 A–C with 131 C–E; 150 C–D with 133 C–134 A; 159 B–C with 130 B; 159 c–D with 131 A–E.

^{page 101 note 3} Cf. the author's Das Ckorismosproblem bei Aristoteles (Berlin), Einleit. Sect. 3 C.

^{page 101 note 4} 248 A ff. and 259 E.

^{page 102 note 1} Parm. 127 E.

^{page 102 note 2} 129 B–E.

^{page 103 note 1} 129 A.

^{page 103 note 2} 130 B.

^{page 103 note 3} 130 B–E.

^{page 103 note 4} Cf. 150 B–C.

^{page 103 note 5} 131 A–E.

^{page 104 note 1} 132 A–B.

^{page 104 note 2} Hence the problem of ψєυδὴς δόξα.

^{page 104 note 3} 132 B–C.

^{page 104 note 4} 132 C–133 A.

^{page 104 note 5} 133 A–134 E.

^{page 105 note 1} 135 B–c.

^{page 105 note 2} 129 D–130 A, etc.

^{page 105 note 3} 137 B.

^{page 105 note 4} In 129 B and D, where the reference is to the Methexis of things in the Idea, ἓν stands for єἰδός τι ένός. With this may be compared the shortened expression ὁμοιότης for єἰδός τι ὁμοιότητος, 129 A. That the process of inference in the second part of the dialogue is performed with the One as a special case cannot be doubted. On this point cf. 137 B.

^{page 105 note 5} єἰ ἔν ἐστιν 137 c.

^{page 105 note 6} Cf. 137 D.

^{page 105 note 7} Cf. 142 c.

^{page 105 note 8} 137 C–139 B.

^{page 105 note 9} 139 B–E.

^{page 105 note 10} 139 E–141 A.

^{page 105 note 11} 141 A–E.

^{page 105 note 12} 141 E.

^{page 105 note 13} 142 A.

^{page 106 note 1} ἓν єἰ ἔστιν 142 B.

^{page 106 note 2} 142 B–C.

^{page 106 note 3} 142 C–143 A.

^{page 106 note 4} 143 A–144 E.

^{page 106 note 5} 145 A.

^{page 106 note 6} 145 A–151 E.

^{page 106 note 7} i.e. it has being in time, cf. 151 E–152 A.

^{page 106 note 8} 151 E–155 C.

^{page 106 note 9} 155 C–D.

^{page 106 note 10} 155 D.

^{page 107 note 1} 152 A.

^{page 107 note 2} 152 A presupposes 141 A–C.

^{page 107 note 3} Hence, though the argument may be treated as an examination of logical possibilities, it should not be viewed only in that light; the attempt is further made to decide which logical possibility is real and which is not. In any case the arguments are not exercises in thinking, as has been indicated above, and will become clear from the sequel. Also there is no intrinsic necessity for statements expressed in hypothetical form to be mere exercises. The inquiry into the essential relation between ground and consequence is also conducted in hypothetical form.

^{page 107 note 4} 135 B–C.

^{page 107 note 5} 155 E.

^{page 107 note 6} 141 A.

^{page 107 note 7} 156 E.

^{page 107 note 8} 138 B–139 B.

^{page 107 note 9} 142 A.

^{page 107 note 10} 155 E.

^{page 107 note 11} 157 B.

^{page 108 note 1} It is just because the being of the One is not identical therewith that Oneness and Being can be combined. 142 B–c.

^{page 108 note 2} 155 E.

^{page 108 note 3} Philosophically, this interpretation involves a great difficulty, as it derives generation and destruction from the One's simultaneous connexion with being and not-being, and it is only on successive connexion that such a derivation can properly be founded. The interpretation rests therefore on a confusion between simultaneous and successive connexion. For this very reason, however, it is appropriate to Plato. The confusion is Platonic, and the same fallacy meets us again below, 162 B–c.

^{page 108 note 4} 155 E–156 B.

^{page 108 note 5} Cf. 152 B–D.

^{page 108 note 6} 156 B ff.

^{page 108 note 7} 156 C–157 B.

^{page 108 note 8} 157 B–158 B.

^{page 108 note 9} 158 B–C.

^{page 108 note 10} 158 c–D.

^{page 108 note 11} 158 E–159 A.

^{page 108 note 12} 159 A–B.

^{page 108 note 13} That ή ἑτέρα фύσις τού єἴδους is the other can be seen from the context (158 B–C).

^{page 108 note 14} See above 129 A, 130 E, 131 E, 132 A, 132 C, 132 D (twice), 133 A. The references given by Wundt, Max, Platons Parmenides, p. 2Google Scholar, are not accurate.

^{page 109 note 1} Cf. Stallbaum, ad loc.: ‘namἓι єἰ ἒστιν nunc idem est quod ἓι єἰ ἓι ἒστιν’.

^{page 109 note 2} 159 B–C.

^{page 109 note 3} 159 C–160 A.

^{page 109 note 4} As evidence that κοινωνία occurs as a technical term in the Parmenides, see 152 A and cf. 158 D.

^{page 109 note 5} 159 A–B.

^{page 110 note 1} 160 A.

^{page 110 note 2} From the fact that the Other is neither like nor unlike (159 E), neither equal nor unequal (i. e. neither larger nor smaller, 160 A), it follows as a counterpart to the inferences in the first argument (140 E–141 A), that it is neither of the same age as, nor older nor younger than, something else. From this result it follows further, as counterpart to 141 A–D, that the Other is not in time. From this in turn follows a new consequence, corresponding to 141 D–E, that the Other neither is, nor was, nor will be, or that it is in no respect at all. The demonstration which shows that the Other was, is, and will be, or that it has perfect being, needs completion in the same way.

^{page 110 note 3} At 160 B, read καὶ οὐδέν with cod. B. πάντα τє … πρòς ἑαυτό is a summary of arguments 1 and 2, καὶ πρὸς … ᾡσαύτως of 3 and 4.

^{page 110 note 4} This explains why the second part of the dialogue is about three times as long as the Introduction and the first part combined.

^{page 111 note 1} e.g. Phaedo, 79 A; still further developed at Rep. vi. 509 D.

^{page 111 note 2} It is the general tendency in Plato's later dialogues to bring Ideas and things as far as possible together. For this cf. the celebrated words γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν Phileb. 26 D.

^{page 111 note 3} 135 E–136 A.

^{page 111 note 4} 160 B–D.

^{page 111 note 5} Translator's note. The German text is: ‘Das Andersseva ist Nichtsein, das Andersrczn ist doch wiederum sein.’

^{page 111 note 6} 161 E–162 B.

^{page 112 note 1} 160 E–161 A.

^{page 112 note 2} 161 A–163 B.

^{page 112 note 3} So also at MetlO, 98 A.

^{page 112 note 4} 162 A. It should be observed that perfect not-being is to be distinguished from absolut nonentity.

^{page 112 note 5} 163 C.

^{page 112 note 6} 163 C–164 B.

^{page 112 note 7} 164 B–165 E.

^{page 112 note 8} 165 E–166 C.

^{page 112 note 9} In the seventh argument it is inferred from the hypothesis ἔν εἰ μὴ ἔστιν that οὐκούν τό γε τοιοῦτον … ἓν ίνεσθαι ἀνάγκη, … πλήθει ἄπειρον ἕν ἕκαστον фανήναι,165 B–C. But in the eighth we read the following: ἓν ἄρα εἰ μἠ ἔστιν, οὐδἑ δοξάζεταί τι τŵν ἄλλων ἓν εἰναι οὐδἑ πολλά, 166 A. Since the inferences are mutually contradictory, their hypotheses must be distinct in meaning.

^{page 113 note 1} 165 B–C.

^{page 113 note 2} For to that which is not, nothing can be related: cf. 142 A above.

^{page 113 note 3} This is in harmony with three previous instances. In the first and second, third and fourth, and fifth and sixth arguments, similarly worded hypotheses have a different meaning.

^{page 113 note 4} τὀ ὄν in the wider sense, as e.g. Phaedo 99 B, E, and elsewhere.

^{page 114 note 1} The five μέγιστα γένη are ὄν, ταὐτόν, ἕτερον, κίνησις, and στάσις. If we count also the μἠ ὄν included in the ἕτερον, there are in fact three pairs of contraries: ὂν—μἡ ὄν, ταὐτὀν—ἕτερον,κίνησις—στάσις. Cf. Soph. 251 A ff.