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Memory in Plotinus
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
Extract
Scholars have known for some time that Plotinus' treatment of memory forms an important part of his philosophy; and while there are various points of view from which his doctrine can be approached, one seems singularly important. His analysis of memory boldly contrasts conscious and unconscious behaviour in human beings and so materially advances our knowledge of his concept of conscious experience.
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- Copyright © The Classical Association 1965
References
1 4. 4. 4. lines 5–6. Citations for Enneads 1–5 are according to the Henry-Schwyzer Greek text; for Ennead 6 according to Bréhier. The translations are mine.
2 Plotinus is not consistent in his use of , for it frequently refers to ; however, when he is careful, he distinguishes the two types of memory by using the different terms, and . See the interesting passage at Phiiebus 33 c–34 c. Here has a function different from that of Meno 85 d ff. and Phaedo 72 e.
1 Theologia Aristotelis also considers this account to be relevant for the souls ‘on their way back’. ‘If this is so, we revert and say that memory begins from heaven, because when the soul becomes like the heavenly things she remembers them and knows that they are the ones she knew before entering the lowly world’, H.-S., ii. 75.
2 4. 3. 32. line 23.
3 4. 3. 31, lines 16–18.
1 4. 4. i, Lines 1–2 and 4.
2 It would appear as if ‘we’ are split up into higher and lower, though ‘we’, in another sense, are really the higher soul. See my article ‘Consciousness in Plotinus’, Phronesis ix (1964), 83–97.Google Scholar
3 5. 7. i.
1 There is one exception: whatever occurs in this world that is contrary to nature has no place in Nous.
2 ‘C’est le commencement de l'habitude, l'habitude naissante’, Chaignet, , Histoire de la Psychologic des Grecs, iv. 188.Google Scholar
3 4. 4. 4, lines 7–14.
1 4. 4. 5.
2 1. 2. 4.
3 4. 3. 25.
4 4. 4. 24.
1 3. 5. i. lines 59–63.
2 A passage cited by virtually every commentator on Plotinus.
3 4. 3. 25; 4. 4. 3.
4 4. 4. 5.
5 To become fully noetic the soul must purify itself.
1 Following Harder's ‘hat sie es nur in sich ohne es zu verwirklichen, und ganz besonders wenn sie erst eintritt in die irdische Welt’ (Plotins Schriften, ii. 120).Google Scholar
2 Harder, ibid., has ‘Sofern die Seelen dann aber auch zu seiner Verwirklichung kommen, so scheinen die alten denjenigen die verwirklichen was sie in sich tragen, Erinnern, “Wiedererinnern” zuzuschreiben …’, Bréhier, , Ennéades, ‘quand elle en prend une connaissance actuelle, les anciens semblent appliquer à cet état les noms de mémoire et de réminiscence’, iv. 93.Google Scholar
3 4. 3. 25, lines 27–34.
4 Sensation is a power of the soul alone but it requires the body to become active.
5 4. 3. 26, lines 20–24.
1 4. 3. 26, lines 50–54.
2 ‘Il est singulier de voir Plotin appeler un phénomène psychique dont nul, plus que lui, n'a relevé le caractère d'activité. La mémoire est une fonction de l'àme, et l'àme est éminemment force, activité, pouvoir, …’, Chaignet, , op. cit. iv. 181.Google Scholar
3 A reference to Plato, , Rep. 621 a.Google Scholar
4 Following Volkmann.
5 Ficino, Bréhier, MacKenna, and Pistorius all translate ‘memory’.
6 Note a similar expression at 3. 5. 1: . This passage must be interpreted in precisely the same manner. When the desire for the good degenerates into purely sexual passion for generation, then the soul suffers, not by being acted upon but by turning its attention to the wicked and forgetting the holy. It is a sickness of the soul. Vacherot correctly interpreted this passage: ‘Voilà comment il est vrai de dire que l'àme engendre le souvenir, tandis que le corps le détruit. Le corps est ici le Léthé, fleuve de l'oubli', op. cit., p. 556.
For the Stoic origins of this use of and see Pohlenz, Max, Die Stoa, i. 141 ff.,Google Scholar and ii. 77 ff. The Stoic logos may react to stimuli from without either in a healthy or in an unhealthy manner. If the reaction is unhealthy, ‘… der Trieb (wird) zum Pathos, zum Erleiden, in dem der Logos seine Freiheit aufgibt, sich dem äuβern Eindruck beugt und diesem einen beherrschenden Einfluβ auf das Innere des Menschen, auf sein Fühlen und Handeln einräumt’, ibid., i. 142.
7 See Chaignet, , op. cit. iv. 190.Google Scholar is interpreted as ‘un objet senti’.
8 ‘As soon as the nervous system had acquired the power to create representations of the external world the potentiality of memory made its appearance’, Brain, W. Russell, Mind, Perception and Science, p. 46.Google Scholar
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