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The Legal Background of Two Passages in the Nichomachean Ethics1
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
Extract
The two passages in question are I. the discussion of Justice in Bk. V. chs. I-II, and in particular the definition and subdivisions of Corrective Justice (ch. II 1130b 30–1131a 9); and II. the discussion of the voluntaryand προα⋯ρεσɩς in Bk. III chs. II-II. My object is to show that each is better understood if it is seen in the light of contemporary legal ideas and practice.
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References
page 129 note 2 Vinogradoff, Collected Papers vol. II p. 3Google Scholar.
page 130 note 1 This seems to be the normal meaning of the word, and certainly the one it bears in this context. Cf. Pol. IV 1300b 23 ff., Dem. xxiv. 213 (where we have ἴδɩα σ.). Rhet. A 1376b 11 (where the Oxf. trans. renders ‘business realations’).
page 130 note 2 Cf. Vinogradoff, Papers vol. II p. 4Google Scholar: Ross, Aristotle p. 211 note 2Google Scholar.
page 130 note 3 Cf. Lipsius, Attische Recht p. 683Google Scholar, Ross, Aristotle p. 211Google Scholar: and more especially Vinogradoff op. cit., paper I ‘Aristotle on Legal Redress’.
page 130 note 4 I draw this parallel without assuming any connexion between Roman and Attic law.
page 130 note 5 It may also be noticed that Aristotle's λαθραα finds some parallel in the Roman dolus, and that one of the praetorian delicts was ‘servi corruptio’.
page 131 note 1 Companion to Greek Studies p. 482.
page 131 note 2 Vinogradoff, Hist. J. p. 191Google Scholar.
page 131 note 3 Ibid. 192. Cf. Lipsius 246–8, 683.
page 131 note 4 Cf. Lipsius 674, ‘Eigentumrecht oder Obligationrecht’.
page 131 note 5 V. Lipsius pp. 738, 738, 716, 705, 716, 735, 752 for these contracts in the oreder quoted.
page 131 note 6 Lipsius 636 ff.
page 131 note 7 Lipsius 601 ff.
page 131 note 8 A. 's use of συν⋯λλαγμα = obligatio is the first instance of his usage: v. Lipsius 683.
page 132 note 1 Grant, Ethics note on Bk. III ch. I §§ 1–2Google Scholar.
page 132 note 2 Cf. Stewart, Notes on the Nic. Eth. vol. I pp. 226 ffGoogle Scholar.
page 132 note 3 Cf. Ross, Aristotle pp. 199–201Google Scholar. Rackham Aristotle Nic. Eth. (Loeb) note to ch. II of Bk. III, ‘the writer here examines the operation of the will.’
page 132 note 4 1109b 31 ff.: Mr. Rackham's trasnlation. The connexion between the voluntary and involuntary and reward and punishment is also stressed in ch. V 1113b 22 ff.
page 133 note l E.g. Dem. XXIII 77.
page 133 note 2 E.g. Antipbon's κατηγορ⋯α ϕαρμακείας.
page 133 note 3 Pol. IV 13 1300b 24, Mr. Rackham's translation. The court in Phreatto, mentioned both the subject. here and in the Ath. Pol. in addition to the other three, dealt not with cases of homicide of a further kind, but with cases of ϕόνος ⋯κούσɩος under special circumstances. ‘It was required if a man, already banished for unintentional homicide, sought to clear himself of a further charge of murder or malicious wounding’ (Companion to Greek Studies p. 480). Cf. Dem. XXIII 77.
page 133 note 4 Lipsius, p. 603. Cf. Dinarchus 1. 6 ⋯ τ⋯ν ⋯κ προνο⋯ας ϕονων αξɩόπɩστος οὖσα βουλή.
page 133 note 5 It is used by Aristotle loc. cit. and by Demosthenes XXIII 24 when quoting the law on the subject.
page 133 note 6 So Demosthenes uses it in the same speech XXIII 77, 78: cf. 73. And in Antiphon's second tetralogy, whose subject is a ϕόνος ⋯κούσɩος, the antitheses ⋯κούσɩος—⋯κούσɩος, εκων—ἄκων occur constantly.
page 133 note 7 I 5.
page 133 note 8 so we find in [Arist, .] Magn, Mor. I 16Google Scholar 1188b 28, 37 μετα δɩανο⋯ας as a synonym for ⋯κ προνο⋯ας.
page 134 note 1 Ant. V 57–63: summarized by Jebb, (Attic Orators pp. 59–60)Google Scholar in the words ‘He shows that he could have had no motive for the murder.’
page 134 note 2 v. especially α 5–8, answered in β 9, reinforced in γ 6–8, and answered again in δ 9.
page 134 note 3 So Lipsius p. 132. He quotes [Arist, .] Magn. Mor. I 16 1188b 31Google Scholar, a case of ϕαρμακε⋯α, where, though the accused admitted having caused death, she denied προνοɩα, and was acquitted.
page 134 note 4 Magn. Mor. loc. cit. Cf. Lipsius 608.
page 134 note 5 Ant. I 9.
page 134 note 6 Ibid. 5 της δ⋯ εκ προνο⋯ας ⋯ποκτεɩνασης.
page 134 note 7 Lysias III 41, 42 ⋯σοɩ ⋯πɩβουλύσαντες ⋯ποκτεɩνα⋯ τɩνας ἔτρωσαν 42. Cf. also Lysias IV 6, 7.
page 134 note 8 Cf. Lipsius 607: Sandys Ath. Pol. note ad loc. cit.
page 134 note 9 Lysias III and IV.
page 134 note 10 Lysias III 34, 41–42.
page 134 note 11 Lysias IV 7, 1–4.
page 135 note 1 Antiphon IV β 5. Cf. Andocides 4. 94 τὺν βουλεύσαντα ⋯ν τῷ αὐτῷ ⋯νεχεσθαɩ κα⋯ τ⋯ν τῇ χεɩρɩ ⋯ρϒασαμενον.
page 135 note 2 Aristotle A th. Pol. loc. cit. says that cases of βούλευσɩς came before the Palladion. But it appears that there was no separate action βουλεύσεως earlier in the fourth century. The effect of law quoted by Andocides was rather to lay the βουλεύσας open to the same charge, and in the same court, as the χειρ⋯ ⋯ργασ⋯μενον. So Antiphon's Περ⋯ το⋯ χορευτο⋯ was delivered before the Palladion, the case being one of β03BF;⋯λευσις ϕ⋯νου ⋯κουσ⋯ου: his speech Against a stepmother was delivered before the Areopagus, the case being one of βο⋯λευσις ϕ⋯νου ⋯κουσ⋯ου or more precisely, ϕαρμακε⋯ας. For this and βούλευσɩς generally v. Lipsius pp. 125 ff., 612–14.
page 135 note 3 Cf. especially Antiphon's first Tetralogy. E.g. II α 5 ⋯ξ ⋯πιβουλης ⋯ποθανόντα: επιβουλεύεɩν II α 6, II β 3, 8. On the other hand II γ 5 ⋯πɩβουλεύεɩν is used in the narrower sense of instigating as opposed to doing: the prosecutor is arguing that the defender almost certainly did the killing himself, for even if he had had it done by someone else he would have been denounced as ⋯ ⋯πɩβουλεύσας (and, the implication is, he might as well be hung for a sheep as a lamb). Cf. also Lysias I 40, 44.
page 135 note 4 Jebb, Attic Orators I 52Google Scholar.
page 135 note 5 Cf. E.N. V 8 1135b 12. It is interesting also to compare the remarks on ⋯μαρτία in the Poetics 13 1453a 13 etc.
page 136 note 1 Ant. III β 6–8.
page 136 note 2 Ant. III γ 11–12.
page 136 note 3 Ant. III δ 8–9.
page 136 note 4 Ant. IV γ 7. De Caed. Her. 80–83. Cf. Dem. XXIII 71–73. The idea is of course familiar in the tragedians: e.g. the opening of Oed. Tyr.
page 136 note 5 On this cf. Glotz, Solidarité de la famille, pp. 228 ffGoogle Scholar.
page 136 note 6 The pollution attaches to any killer: and the family demands vengeance for any death. Glotz, op. cit. p. 218Google Scholar.
page 136 note 7 Glotz, op. cit. p. 302Google Scholar.
page 136 note 8 Lipsius p. 611.
page 136 note 9 Antiphon I 27, V 92: cf. IV α 6. Aristotle E.N. III ch. I init.
page 136 note 10 Antiphon V 92.
page 136 note 11 Remember also that the idea that punishment is corrective or deterrent, which d widely from the more primitive idea of vengeance, was becoming a commonplace by the end of the fifth century: Glotz, v.op. cit. pp. 414–15Google Scholar.
page 137 note 1 Lysias I 37–46.
page 137 note 2 Dem. XXIII 53. Cf. on the whole subject Lipsius 614–17.
page 137 note 3 Lipsius p. 654: cf. Dem, . Meidias 527Google Scholar. 28.
page 137 note 4 Laws IX 860e. Plato disagrees with the distinction, as he holds, with Socrates, that οὐσε⋯ς⋯κὼν ⋯μαρτ⋯νει—a Socratic paradox that stands out all the more sharply when seen against the background of current legal ideas.
page 137 note 5 1368b 6 ἔστω τ⋯ ⋯δɩκεɩν τ⋯ βλάπτεɩν ⋯κοντα παρα τ⋯ν ν⋯μον: 1369b 20: 1373b 28–36: 1397a 14: cf. Rhet. ad Alex. 1427a 4, Eth. Eud. 1226b 38 καλ⋯ς διορ⋯ζονταɩ οἲ τ⋯ν παθημ⋯των τ⋯ μ⋯ν ⋯κούσɩα τ⋯ δ' ⋯κο⋯σια τ⋯ σ' ⋯κ προνο⋯ας νομ03BF;θετο⋯σι.
page 137 note 6 Rhet. 1373b: cf. 1368b 9.
page 137 note 7 Pol. IV 13 1300b 24, Eth. Eud. 1226b 38: Magn. Mor. A 16 1188b 35, Rhet. ad Alex. 1427a 4, Problems 951b 27, 30, 952a 2.
page 137 note 8 Most clearly in Rhet. 1374a 11 ⋯ν γ⋯ρ τῇ προαɩρ⋯σεɩ ⋯ μοχθηρία κα⋯ τ⋯ ⋯δικεῖν ν;⋯ δ⋯ τοια⋯τα τ⋯ν ⋯νομ⋯των πτοσσημα⋯νει τ⋯ν προα⋯ρεσιν (‘imply deliberate purpose’ O.T.), οἴον ὕβρις κα⋯ κλοπ⋯: cf. 1347b 14, 1367b 21–26, 1366a 15: also Eth. Nic. v 8 1135b 26, Magu. Mor. A 17 1189a 30. Lycurgus (In Leocr. 148) uses the phrase τ⋯ κατ⋯ προα⋯ρεσιν ⋯δικ⋯ματα.
page 138 note 1 1111a 23: 1110a I.
page 138 note 2 ‘Threats’ cf. 1110a 4 ὅ ι ⋯ ϕ ⋯ β ο ν μειζ⋯νων κακ⋯ν πρ⋯ττεται, Rhet. 1368b 9 (quoted above) ⋯κ⋯ντες δ⋯ ποιο⋯σιν ὅσα ειδ⋯τες κα⋯ μεκόντες δε ποιοȖσɩν ðσα ε⋯δοτες κα⋯ μἠ ⋯ναϒκαζόμενοɩ1F74; εκόντες δε ποιοȖσɩν ðσα ε⋯δοτες κα⋯ μἠ ⋯ναϒκαζόμενοɩ1F00;ναγκαζεκόντες δε ποιοȖσɩν ðσα ε⋯δοτες κα⋯ μἠ ⋯ναϒκαζόμενοɩ1F79;μενοι.
page 138 note 3 Aristotle p.168.
page 138 note 4 Cf. 1109b 32 ⋯π⋯ τοɩς ⋯κουσίοɩς συϒϒνώμης, ⋯⋯⋯οτε δ⋯ καἰ ⋯λ⋯ου <ϒιϒνομ⋯νων>: cf. also with what follows the passing remark in 13, we easily pardon a man who is sorry for what he has done.
page 139 note 1 1111a 2 ff.
page 139 note 2 This is not in the Greek, which has only ⋯ τον καταπ⋯λrην: but Mr. Rackham so translates in the Loeb.
page 139 note 3 Ant. I (administered as an aphrodisiac), Ant. VI: cf. the δ⋯κη фαρμακε⋯ας above.
page 139 note 4 Cf. Ross, Aristotle p. 200Google Scholar.
page 140 note 1 L. and S.9 s.v. Cf. the meaning of ‘plan’ or ‘policy’ which the word can bear.
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