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The King's Peace*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

G. L. Cawkwell
G. L. Cawkwell
Affiliation:
University College, Oxford
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Extract

Nothing about Xenophon's Hellenica is more outrageous than his treatment of the relations of Persia and the Greeks. It was orthodoxy in the circle of Agesilaus that Theban medizing, barbarismos, had sabotaged the plans for a glorious anabasis (IV. ii. 3, V. ii. 35, III. v. 1 f.) and recalled him to the defence of his city (by the very route, ironically, taken by King Xerxes in 480 — IV. ii. 8 — the would-be avenger in the footsteps of the would-be enslaver). Not until the Thebans woo and win the fickle favour of the King (VII. i. 33 ff.), does anything like detail emerge. In the regrettable interlude, the less said the better. If the third speech of Andocides had not survived, there would have been some tangled theorizing about a note in Didymus (FGrH 328f 149), especially as regards ‘the ambassadors who in Sparta consented’, but sober historical judgement would never have transgressed so far from the text of Xenophon as to postulate a Peace Congress in Sparta as well as in Sardis in 392. Likewise, the merest chance of epigraphic survival assures us that the oaths, which the ‘Athenians and the Spartans and the other Greeks’ swore in 387/6, ‘the King swore’ (G.H.I. 118 lines 10 f.) — and so on. If we did not have the reflection of Ephorus in Diodorus, albeit a mirror cracked and blemished, we would be sadly astray in 375 and 371. When, however, the despicable Thebans become the King's favoured power, disgraceful scenes unfold. ‘Pelopidas very much had things his own way with the Persian; he could say that the Thebans alone of the Greeks had fought on the King's side at Plataea, that they had never afterwards campaigned against him, that the Spartans were at war with them because they would not join Agesilaus…etc.’ (VII. i. 34). A Persian is found at Thebes reading out the contents of a Royal Rescript, after displaying the Royal seal (ibid. §39); at Sparta twenty years before, such details had been left to the imagination.

The cause of Xenophon's method in this matter is not for the moment under discussion, but rather the consequence, viz. our uncertainty about what precisely the King's Peace said. There was a document, inscribed on stone pillars and displayed in the national shrines (Isoc. IV. 180, XII. 107). If ever a copy turns up, what can we expect to find? The measure of our uncertainty was provided by Wilcken, who produced a curious hypothesis which found little sympathy; that he could do so shows the state of the evidence. Some effort of the imagination is needed, and those who gravely disapprove of conjectures of what might have been the case need read no further. At the end one can be sure of very little. Conjectures, however, have been uttered, en passant, elsewhere. What may prove to be a chorus of disdain has begun. A formal confession may be welcome.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Classical Quarterly , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , May 1981 , pp. 69 - 83
Copyright
Copyright © The Classical Association 1981

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References

1 All unexplained numerical references in this paper are to the Hellenica.

2 Wilcken, U., ‘Über Entstehung und Zweck des Königsfriedens’, Abhandl. der Preuss. Akad. (Phil.-hist. Klasse) (1941), no. 15Google Scholar. Cf. Martin, V., ‘Sur une interprétation nouvelle de la “Paix du Roi”’, MH 6 (1949), 127–39Google Scholar.

3 Lewis, D. M., Sparta and Persia, p. 147 n. 80Google Scholar, and Sinclair, R. K., ‘The King's Peace and the Employment of Military and Naval Forces 387–378’, Chiron 8 (1978), 29–54Google Scholar, both in reference to ‘The Foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy’, CQ N.S. 23 (1973), 47–60CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Ambassadors could be ‘fully empowered’ αὐτοκράτορες, but only within limits, stated or understood. Presumably this is what is behind Thuc. 5. 45; there were things which the Spartan ambassadors could negotiate and things which they could not or dare not, or which they were persuaded by Alcibiades to say that they could not or dare not. So too perhaps in 392 the ambassadors to Sparta dared not ‘sign away’ the cities of Asia on their own authority. In §§ 33 and 34 Andocides may either have been claiming a virtue the ambassadors did not possess — for there were many cities involved and others' ambassadors may have insisted on the reference of the peace terms — or have been pretending that they had powers which they did not (cf. Andrewes ad Thuc. 5. 45. 2).

5 There is a difficulty about Xenophon's account of the swearing of the King's Peace (V. i. 32). The Thebans knew perfectly well what the autonomy clause delineated at Sardis was and could swear cheerfully provided they swore as ‘Boeotians’, but Agesilaus refuses to accept their oaths, ‘unless they swear, ὥσπερ τ⋯ βασιλ⋯ως γράμματα ἔλεγεν, αὐτονόμους εἶναι κα⋯ μικρ⋯ν κα⋯ μεγάλην πόλιν’. The Theban ambassadors declared that ‘these were not their instructions’. What went wrong for the Thebans in 387/6 was not what they were required to swear but in what capacity; they cannot have not been told to swear to a Peace with the autonomy clause; they were not prepared for Agesilaus saying they must swear as ’Thebans’ not as ‘Boeotians’. The resolution of the difficulty is, I suggest, that αὐτονόμονς εἶναι κα⋯ μικρ⋯ν κα⋯ μεγάλην πόλιν is the object not of ⋯μνύωσιν, but of ἔλεγεν, which may seem awkward linguistically but is nothing like as awkward to my mind as the notion that the Thebans were declining to swear to the autonomy clause. So one should understand Xenophon to mean ‘Agesilaus refused to accept the oaths unless they swore ‹large and small cities separately› just as the Royal Rescript required that each city, large and small alike, should be autonomous’.

Similarly at VI. iii. 19 I take ὦν to be the subject of ⋯μοσαν and of ⋯πεγράψαντο — ‘he would change no name of those who first swore and enrolled themselves’. Again the point was not what the Thebans swore, but in what capacity.

6 cf. CQ N.S. 26 (1976), 276 n. 25Google Scholar.

7 Martin, V., ‘Le traitement de l'histoire diplomatique dans la tradition/litéraire du IVe siècle avant J-C’, MH 1 (1944), 23Google Scholar, took it that the Peace was fully drawn up in Susa by the King in collaboration with Antalcidas. His reason was that he supposed that ταύτην τ⋯ν εỉρήνην in the Rescript (V. i. 31) must refer to something outside the Rescript and he supposed it to be ‘the peace which the King sends down’ (§30). I believe this is erroneous. By ‘this peace’ in the Rescript, Artaxerxes meant a peace on the basis of the two principles enunciated in the first two sentences of the Rescript.

8 The celebrated wrangle between Agesilaus and Epaminondas in 372/1 (Plut. Ages. 26) could have been part of the debate on precise terms.

9 D. M. Lewis, op. cit. p. 147, takes ⋯πότεροι to refer to the two sides in the Corinthian War. Martin, art. cit. in n. 7 p. 22 n. 14, less probably refers it to the two groups, island and mainland cities.

10 Lewis, op. cit. p. 146 n. 68 finds the phrase ‘tantalising in the extreme’. ‘It is alien to Greek diplomatic language, but I cannot translate it into Aramaic. Prolonged contemplation of Greek and Persian passages about “the King's house” leave me still in doubt about the full implications.’ So I must fear (yet again) his disfavour. But at Hdt. 5. 31. 4 and 6. 9. 3, ‘the King's house’ seems to be a phrase roughly equivalent to ‘ the Persian Empire’, and at 4. 97. 6 ‘my house’ appears to mean ‘in my empire’, rather than ‘home in Susa’ or the like; other challenging passages are 7. 194. 2, 8. 102. 3, 9. 107. 1. Why is the phrase so frequent in Persian talk in Herodotus? So too in the letter in Thucydides. Themistocles had not damaged the royal house so much as the whole power of Persia, and presumably the phrase was used by Thucydides because he knew it would sound authentic. It is true that the uses of viθ- in the Old Persian inscriptions (cf. Kent, R. G., Old Persian Grammar, p. 208Google Scholar) do not advance the case. Perhaps Biblical uses of ‘house’ could be used for support.

11 Xenophon professes to quote — εἶχε δ⋯ ὦδε (V. i. 30).

12 Martin art. cit. in n. 7, p. 26; Ryder, T. T. B., Koine Eirene, pp. 122 fGoogle Scholar.

13 To follow the view argued in CQ N.S. 11 (1961), 80–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 cf. Thuc. 3. 52. 2.

15 Martin art. cit. p. 26 supported his case with Justin's description of the peace (VI. 6. 1), and he was probably right in suggesting that the phrase τ⋯ν ⋯αυτ⋯ν ἔχοντες (Andoc. III. 19) was in the draft of the Peace in 392.

16 art. cit. in n. 3, p. 36.

17 For the variety of opinions, see Accame, , La lega ateniese, pp. 92 ffGoogle Scholar. Accame, , like Beloch, GG iii. 12, 156 n. 1Google Scholar, held that Xenophon's notice of the despatch of Cleombrotus (VI. i. 1) was misplaced by Xenophon.

18 CQ N.S. 23 (1973), 54Google Scholar.

19 art. cit. pp. 31 ff.

20 cf. Sinclair, art. cit. p. 32 n. 13 for the evidence.

21 See n. 18.

22 cf. Thuc. 1. 78. 4, 1. 88, 4. 23. 1.

23 Sinclair, art. cit. pp. 52 f.; Lewis, op. cit. p. 147 n. 80.

24 cf. the proposal of Harpagus in 546 for Phocaea (Hdt. 1. 164. 1). I suppose that Isocrates' remark (IV. 120) about the King ‘all but establishing governors (⋯πιστάθμους) in the cities’ may have been directed in part at the stipulation concerning the Piraeus.

25 It is clear from Sinclair's discussion of Athenian naval strength (pp. 49 ff.) that there is no evidence that ships were built between 387/6 and 378. The institution of the new system of eisphora in 378 (Polyb. II. 62, Dem. XXII. 44) made possible a resolute building programme.

26 The affair of Demaenetus raised fears of Spartan reprisals, but the transport of the embassy of Hagnias was perhaps normal enough (Hell. Oxy. 6 and 7).

27 Hence perhaps the ships of IG ii2. 30.

28 Sinclair, art. cit. p. 37.

29 cf. Jacoby, F., FGrH iii bl, p. 239Google Scholar.

30 cf. the designation in Diod. XIV. 117. 8.

31 Lewis, op. cit. p. 147 n. 80 professes himself ‘wholly resistant’ to my revival of ‘the old view that the Spartans were actually named in a document as the προστάται of the Peace’. I do not follow his reasoning, but I should make clear that I am not claiming that the word προστάται was necessarily used in the Peace. That may well be Xenophon's version (cf. Martin, , MH 1 (1944), 24 n. 17Google Scholar) of a clause that contained such a phrase as εỉ δ⋯ τις παρ⋯ τα⋯τα ποιοίη, τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους βοηθεῖν ταῖς ⋯δικονμ⋯ναις πόλεσι (cf. VI. iii. 18), or v.i. τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους κα⋯ τοὺς συμμάχους κ.τ.λ.

32 cf. Ryder, op. cit. p. 68.

31 According to Isocrates (XIV. 27), the Thebans ‘entered into the Spartan alliance when you were bringing (or ‘brought’) the war to a conclusion’. Whatever the correct reading, it ought to relate to the period immediately before the King's Peace; after it, the Thebans could hardly be said to have abandoned the Athenians. Isocrates goes on to say that the Chians, Mytilenaeans and Byzantians remained with us (συμπαρ⋯μειναν), which in view of the Chian alliance of 384 supports the idea that he is speaking of the closing phases of the Corninthian War. Why then were there Thebans at Mantinea in 385 (v.s.)? Perhaps those who were sent were ‘volunteers’, including Epaminondas and Pelopidas eager for experience of war.

34 cf. Martin, , MH 1 (1944), 25 fGoogle Scholar. Aristides, AeliusPanath. 172Google Scholar (= i. 282 Dind.) suggests that Seuthes and Dionysius were parties to the Peace.

35 The things the Acanthians complained of were probably enough features of the Chalcidian state of 432, of which Sparta resumed recognition after the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5. 80. 2 and cf. 6. 7. 4). Cf. Zahrnt, M., Olynth und die Chalkidier, pp. 73 ffGoogle Scholar. But the Chalcidians joined the Grand Alliance of the Corinthian War (Diod. XIV. 82. 3) and according to Isaeus 5. 46 ‘Olynthians’ fought — not to be rejected (pace Zahrnt p. 81 and n. 3) on the grounds of Xenophon's failure to mention them. The likely moment for dissolution would seem therefore to be in 387/6.

page 81 note 1 The introduction to ch. 40 may simply be intended to carry the reader back to the end of ch. 38.

page 81 note 2 cf. IG ii2. 33, 37 and Aristides, AeliusPanath. 172 fGoogle Scholar. (= i. 283 Dind.).

page 81 note 3 There is a curious parallel in the case of Thucydides. Cf. Thuc. 5. 26. 5, Paus. 1. 25. 9 and Marcellinus, Vita 32Google Scholar.

page 82 note 4 Beloch, K. J., GrGes iii. 22, pp. 230 ffGoogle Scholar.

page 82 note 5 ibid.

page 82 note 6 Although foreign arbitration between factions had had a long history (cf. Busolt-Swoboda, , GS i. 375Google Scholar), the Phliasian exiles had no right to claim it if it had not been provided for in the decree of recall, as it was for instance at Tegea in 324 b.c. (G.H.I. 202 1. 24).