¹ E.g.: Boardman, J. et al. (edd.), The Oxford History of the Classical World (Oxford, 1986), pp. 29–30Google Scholar; Starr, Chester G., A History of the Ancient World ³ (Oxford, 1983), pp. 210–11Google Scholar; Murray, Oswyn, Early Greece (London, 1980), p. 54Google Scholar; Bury, J. B. and Meiggs, R., A History of Greece ⁴ (London, 1975), pp. 94–5CrossRefGoogle Scholar. A modified version in: Boardman, J. and Hammond, N. G. L. (edd.), The Cambridge Ancient History ², vol. Ill, 3 (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 327, 340–1Google Scholar.

² Albracht, F., KampfundKampfschilderung bei Homer, Part I (Naumburg, 1886), pp. 27–40Google Scholar; Lang, A., The World of Homer (London, 1910), pp. 54–9Google Scholar; , E. and Lammert, F., RE II.A.l, s.v. Schlachlordnung (1921), col. 444Google Scholar; Kromayer, J. and Veith, G., Heerwesen und Kriegfuhrung der Griechen und Romer (Munich, 1928), p. 26Google Scholar. In n. 2, Kromayer expresses his scorn for the ‘vielfach verbreiteten’ orthodox view, as something no Homerkenner would take seriously!

³ Kirk, G. S., ‘War and the Warrior in the Homeric Poems’. In: Vernant, J.-P. (ed.), Problemes de la guerre (Paris, 1968), p. IIIGoogle Scholar; Latacz, J., Kampfparänese, Kampfdarstellung und Kampfwirklichkeit in der Ilias, bei Kallinos und Tyrtaios (Munich, 1977), esp. p. 225Google Scholar [reviews: Willcock, M. M., LCM 2 (1977), 241–2Google Scholar; Bodson, L., AC 47 (1978), 602–3Google Scholar; West, M. L., CR 29 (1979), 135–6Google Scholar; Kierdorf, W., HZ 229 (1979), 396–7Google Scholar; Delgado, J. A. F., Emerita 48 (1980), 152–4Google Scholar; Combellack, F. M., CPh 77 (1982), 62–5Google Scholar; and Leimbach, R., Gnomon 52 (1980), 418–25Google Scholar, the only one to disagree]; Pritchett, W. K., The Greek State at War, Part IV (Berkeley, 1985), pp. 7–33Google Scholar [quotes: 30 and 44; curiously, Pritchett appears to be supporting two different views (see nn. 6 and 7)]. Further support for this interpretation comes from Morris, I. M., Burial and Ancient Society (Cambridge, 1987), pp. 171–210Google Scholar.

⁴ 8.60–5 and 66–7.

⁶ 11.564–5 with 571–4, 576, 589.

⁶ Finley, M. I., The World of Odysseus (London, 1977), p. 74Google Scholar. See also: Leimbach, op. cit. (n. 3), 424; this view seems to be commonly held, but it is not often found in writing. A similar approach is that which interprets the descriptions of fighting as consisting of short, conventional combat scenes built into a larger structure according to literary conventions – thereby excluding the possibility that the poet has a comprehensive ‘vision’ of battle. See e.g. Mueller, Martin, The Iliad (London, 1984), pp. 102ff.Google Scholar; Krischer, Tilman, Formale Konventionen der Homerischen Epik (Munich, 1971), pp. 13–89Google Scholar.

⁷ Willcock, M. M., ‘Battle Scenes in the Aeneid’, PCPS (1983), 87Google Scholar.

⁸ See note 1. Adherents of this view tend just to ignore massed hand-to-hand fighting, but some have explained that it is an ‘interpolated’ element: Murray, G., The Rise of the Greek Epic ⁴ (Oxford, 1934), p. 151Google Scholar; Webster, T. B. L., From Mycenae to Homer (London, 1958), pp. £214–20Google Scholar.

⁹ Kirk, op. cit. (n. 3), pp. 110–14; cf. Pritchett, op. cit. (n. 3), pp. 15–21; Finsler, G., Homer, l.Teil: Der Dichter und Seine Welt ² (Berlin, 1914), pp. 142–3Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Lang, op. cit. (n. 2), pp. 54–9; cf. Pritchett, op. cit. (n. 3), pp. 14–15, 28–30.

¹¹ Albracht, op. cit. (n. 2), pp. 10–12, 21-W; Lammert and Lammert, op. cit. (n. 2), col. 442–4; Kromayer and Veith, op. cit. (n. 2), pp. 23–6; Latacz, op. cit. (n. 3), passim, esp. pp. 118–19, 140, 225. See also: Seymour, T. D., Life in the Homeric Age (New York, 1907), pp. 559–85Google Scholar; Couissin, P., Les Institutions militaires et navales (Paris, 1931), pp. 17–19Google Scholar; Lammert, F., REX1X. 2, s.v. Phalanx (1938), col. 1626–7Google Scholar; Kusters, A., Cuneus, Phalanx und Legio (Würzburg, 1939), pp. 5–9Google Scholar; Ducrey, P., Guerre et guerriers dans la Grece antique (Fribourg, 1985), pp. 42–3, 63Google Scholar.

¹² I shall return to (a) in section 2.3 and to (b) in section 2.4; (c) is illustrated by the comparison of 4.446–51, 8.60–7 and 11.84–5, made in the text above. It is further illustrated by the disagreement on which phase is supposed to come first, and by the fact that Albracht, Lammert, Couissin and Ducrey (as cited in previous note) all allow for ‘exceptional’ reversals of the presumed order.

¹³ β δι προμχων 4.495; 5.562, 566, 681; 17.3, 87, 124, 592; 20.111. θνδι προμχων: 5.250; 11.188, 203, 342; 20.412. ἴθνϲεν δ δι προμχων 16.582; 17.281. Joining πρóμαχοι 3.31; 5.134; 8.99; 13.642; 15.457. ‘Jumping’ forward: e.g. 11.256; 13.541; 15.520, 525; 16.319–20, 330 πορειν 11.489; 12.404; 13.643; 17.342 πλλομαι 12.191; 13.546; 17.293 (παῑϲϲειν

¹⁴ It is not possible to distinguish between ‘javelins’ and ‘lances’ in the epic. The difference in use is expressed in verbs for ‘striking’ (with hand-weapons) and ‘hitting’ (with missiles). See Trümpy, H., Kriegerische Fachausdriicke im Griechischen Epos (Basel, 1950), pp. 90ffGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ ἄψ δ' τρων εíσ ἔθοσ χζετο 3.32; 11.585; 13.165,533, 566,596,648; 14.408; 16.817. Cf. 11.595; 15.591; 17.114. Retreat to πλθνσ 11.354–60; cf. 17.30–1; 20.196–7, 376–8. Retrieving one's spear and running back is mentioned as regular practice (13.506–15), and occurs at 4.527–35; 5.610–23; 11.357–8; 13.567–75; 16.806–15. Wounded men almost invariably retreat at once. When one takes spoils, one obviously has to withdraw to dispose of them.

¹⁶ Spears hitting the ground: 13.502–5; 16.608–15; unintended victims: e.g. 13.183–7, 402–12; 14.459–75, 487–91; 15.520–4; 17.304–11. Despoiling: e.g. 4.463–9, 491–3, 531–5; 5.615–26; 11.246–60, 368–77; 15.573–91; 17.288–302.

¹⁷ E.g. Albracht, op. cit. (n. 2), pp. 28–34; Seymour, op. cit. (n. 11), pp. 584–5; Kromayer, op. cit. (n. 2), pp. 24–5; Couissin, op. cit. (n. 11), p. 18; Kusters, op. cit. (n. 11), pp. 6–9; and, most elaborately as well as nearest to my view, Latacz, op. cit. (n. 3), pp. 129–78, esp. 140 and 170.

¹⁸ Formal duels: 3.76–461 and 7.54–312. Informal duels: e.g. 5.628–69; 16.419–507; 20.158–329; 21.139–201, 545–605; 22.226–369. Martin Mueller, op. cit (n. 6), does take them as typical (p. 78), in spite of compiling much evidence to the contrary (pp. 79–81). He reconciles the evidence with his reading of it by claiming that the poet describes only ‘the decisive and disabling blow’ (p. 82), not the full ‘duel’. I can see no reason to think that this is so.

¹⁹ Against 28 cases in which the participants are aware of being under attack and try to counter it, I find 17 cases in which the intended victim withdraws (e.g. 5.21–6; 14.488; 15.727–31; 17.574–81; 22.136–46) or ignores the attack (e.g. 13.183–7, 402–12, 502–5; 17.304–11) and 125 cases in which there is no sign of awareness at all (not counting a further 130 cases in which we hear no more than the name[s] or number of victims). Apart from having his back turned (e.g. 13.545–59), the target may be busy plundering a corpse (e.g. 4.467–9), ‘dazed’ (13.434–44; 16.401–10), wounded (16.818–22), or fighting someone else (16.319–25). Running away after delivering an unsuccessful blow: 13.643–51; 16.806–15; 17.43–50.

²⁰ Men defending their brothers: 11.248ff., 428ff.; 14.476–85; 16.319–21, 321–5; 20.419ff. I Cousins: 15.422–8, 545–59; brother-in-law; 13.463–9. A fellow-refugee: 16.570ff. Leaders ; retaliating for the death of companions: 4.491ff.; 5.533ff.; 15.518ff.; 17.344ff., 575ff.; V countrymen: 14.476ff. (Boiotians); 16.419ff. (Lykians); 17.348ff. (Paionians). See also: Trojans I at large defending a corpse, e.g. 5.618ff.; 13.51 Iff, 551ff.; 15.583ff. Failure to defend a brother: 5.21; a leader: 13.659; 15.650ff.; 16.290ff. There are many more examples of this sort of : interaction, but in these the relation between victim and defender/avenger is not made clear.

²¹ Archers: 4.112–26 and 8.266–72. Charioteers: e.g. 13.384–6; 15.456–7; 17.501–2, 699 and ‘cf. 11.339–42, 354–60.

²² See: Wees, H. van, ‘Leaders of Men? Military Organisation in the Iliad’, CQ 36 (1986), 288–90Google Scholar. My argument here reinforces a point that Albracht (op. cit. [n. 2], p. 28) and especially Latacz (op. cit. [n. 3], pp. 83–5) have been at pains to make: that the poet's narrative technique is ‘selective’, i.e. that he implies the presence of a large number of fighters, while directly mentioning a few only.

²³ On the supposition that a leader lived together with his followers during a campaign, we might take an epic band to consist of some 50 men (8.562–3), which would coincide with the usual size of a ship's crew. It is suggested that Akhilleus has at least a dozen followers sharing ‘his hut: ‘only’ two serve him, the rest sit apart (24.473–5). On the relation between these bands and the ‘contingent’ following the heroes, see Van Wees, op. cit. (n. 22), 296–301.

²⁴ See esp. 13.455–97, where it is made clear that there is a ‘mass of men' (λαῷν ἔθνοσ, 495) with the leaders; and further: 5.166ff.;8.91ff.; 11.31 Iff., 461ff., S05ff., 575ff.; 12.331ff.; 14.42Iff.; 16.490ff.; 17.89ff., 212ff., 483ff.

²⁶ E.g. Latacz, op. cit. (n. 3), p. 188; Albracht, op. cit. (n. 2), p. 39.

²⁶ There are fifteen further passages of this type. In almost all cases a ‘massed advance’-interpretation is precluded by subsequent references to (a) further ‘advances’, (b) individual mobility, or (c) the use of missiles. One group refers to men ‘jumping’ or ‘rushing’ at the enemy: (1) 4.470–2, followed by 4.473–504, in which (b) and (c) occur; (2) 8.251–65 ~ 266–334 (c); (3) 11.67–73 ~ 84–5 (c); (4) 14.400–1 ~ 421–32 and 440–2 (a), 402ff. (b, c); (5) 15.379–89, 405–18 ~ 420ff. (b, c); (6) 16.764–71 ~ 16.772–82 (c); (7) 15.592–3 ~ no ‘inconsistent’ references. A second group refers to the use of hand-weapons: (8) 16.633–7 ~ 16.638–40 (c); (9) 17.730–1 ~ 18.152, 231–2 (c). A third refers to πλαγγεσ, ϲτíχεσ or ‘all’ Trojans advancing towards a single Greek leader: (10) 11.343–8 ~ 349ff. (b, c); (11) 11.411–20 ~ 11.459–60 (a), 421–61 (b); (12) 13.33CM4 ~ 13.361^123 (b, c); (13) 17.107 ~ 17.233–6, 262–8 (a). Finally, there is a further case of'charging in throngs’ – (14) 13.136 ~ 13.145–8 (b), 149–205 (b, c) – and one in which ‘Trojans followed their leaders, some ahead, close together, and other behind them’–(15) 13.800–1 ~ 13.810, 833–7 (a), 806–7 (b).

²⁷ Latacz, op. cit. (n. 3), pp. 63ff.; Albracht, op. cit. (n. 2), pp. 36–8;versus Webster, op. cit. (n. 8), pp. 214–20 [cf. Kirk, G. S., ‘Objective Dating Criteria in Homer’, Museum Heheticum 17 (1960), 194]Google Scholar, and ‘orthodox’ scholars in general. For 13.83–135 and 16.199–217, see Van Wees, op. cit. (n. 22), 294 n. 51 and 292. It is not clear exactly what ‘strengthening the χλαγγεσ implies, but increased density seems suggested.

²⁸ So, too, Lorimer, H. L., ‘The Hoplite Phalanx’, ABSA 42 (1947), 114Google Scholar; and Kiechle, F., Lakonien und Sparta (Munich, 1963), p. 268Google Scholar.

²⁹ Contra Kromayer, op. cit. (n. 2), p. 25.

³⁰ So Lorimer, loc. cit. (n. 28); Albracht argues that this refers to ‘levelling’ spears, ‘zum Stosse, nicht zum Wurfe’ (op. cit. [n. 21], p. 38); cf. Latacz, op. cit. (n. 3), p. 192.

³¹ It must be noted that here, exceptionally, Patroklos' defenders are told not to ‘exceed’ others in προμχεòθαι (17.358). I take this to mean that they must not fight too far out in front. It might conceivably mean that they must not fight ahead of others at all, but this possibility seems to be ruled out by the reference to ‘dashing forward’ αíεí and νωλεμσ (i.e. there is not a single united advance, but a sustained series of attacks – by individual fighters), and by the fact that one of the protagonists is moving in and out of the fight (17.574, 581; cf. 561–4) and uses a missile (17.574–8).

³² The other relevant passages are: (1) 11.593–4: the Greeks are called upon to stand πληòíοι by Aias, who is retreating from the enemy; no subsequent fighting is described. (2) 16.211–17: Myrmidons are massed together; two leaders go ‘ahead of them all’ because they want to ‘do battle infront of the Myrmidons’ (16.218–20); when they rush in, ‘in throngs’, Patroklos is ‘first to throw his spear’ (16.276, 284). (3) 16.600–2: Trojans spontaneously gather ολλεσ round Glaukos; the ensuing fight involves the use of missiles (16.603–13). (4) 12.86–106: Trojans are organised in five groups, they ‘lock shields’ and advance against the Greek wall; Greeks ‘jump’ forward out of the gate (12.145, 191) and throw spears at the enemy (183, 189); those on the wall throw stones (154–61, 287–9, 380) and shoot arrows (388,400–1) as well as stab at the attackers; the Trojans either throw stones too (287–9, 445–66) or individually run up the wall, fight, and retreat if necesssary (387–407), and at one point are said to ‘press forward more’ (414). Even after the Greeks on the wall have ‘strengthened the πλαλλɛσ’ (415) and in fierce combat (416–36) ‘struck [οὐτζοντο]’ (427) one another, there are men ‘turning their backs’, i.e. retreating from the enemy (428). Evidently, the massed advance is not brought up to the foot of the wall and the assault is carried out πρóμαχοι-style. On (2) and (4) see also Kiechle, op. cit.(n. 28).

⁸³ 13.701–12.

³⁴ Lammert and Lammert, op. cit. [n. 2], col. 436–7, 442; Küsters, op. cit. [n. 11], p. 2; Lang, op. cit. [n. 2], p. 55 (= Pritchett, op. cit. [n. 3], p. 14); Albracht, however, insists on the exceptionality of the Lokrians, op. cit. [n. 2], pp. 6, 33.

³⁶ Helmets, shields and spears: 4.281–2; 7.61–2; 13.126–35; 16.211–17. Cuirasses are added at 13.339–42 and 19.359–61. χαλκεοθὡρηκεσ: 4.448 = 8.62 (cf. the common χαλκοχíτωνεσ) χαλκοκνἠμιδεσ 7.41 (cf. the common εὐκνἠμιδεσ). Light-armed: Teukros (8.266–72, cf. 15.442–83) and Paris (3.17–19, cf. 3.332–3; 6.321–2).

³⁶ Arrows: 3.79–80; 8.513–15; 11.191 =206; 15.313–19; 16.361, 772–8. The possession of bows is widespread: 2.719–20 (Phthians); 2.773–5 (cf.Od. 8.219–20); 2.848=10.428 (Paionians). The Phthians and Paionians, though noted for their archery, do not limit themselves to shooting ‘from the back’, witness their appearances in battle: 13.693–700; 16.290–2; 21.205–11. The importance of archery is confirmed by Odyssey 8.215–18. Note that there are armoured archers as well (see: Hijmans, B. J., ‘Archers in the Iliad’. In: Festoen [Festschrift A. N. Zadoks-Josephus Jitta] [Groningen, 1976], pp. 343–52)Google Scholar.

³⁷ This tribal peculiarity may have been invented to explain why Aias son of Oileus is always joining the men of the other Aias, or else the Lokrians may have been regarded as ‘underdeveloped’ as the (West) Lokrians were by Thucydides (1.5.3). The (East) Lokrians, however, are already called ‘close-fighting’ (λχμαχοι) in the Hesiodic Shield of Herakles, 25.

³⁸ Missile-passages: 3.79–80; 17.370–5. All others have already been quoted in the text or [ amon g the ‘inconsistent’ passages of notes 26, 31, 32.

³⁹ Latacz, op. cit. (n. 3), pp. 129–78, esp. 140, 159–60, 170; Albracht, op. cit. (n. 2), pp. 27–30, 35–9.

⁴⁰ See: Pritchett, op. cit. (n. 3), pp. 21–5; Latacz, op. cit. (n. 3), pp. 45–67; Albracht, op. cit. (n. 2), pp. 10–12, 24, 34–8. The evidence for a rigid formation consists of the words χλαγγεσ òíχεσ, interpreted on etymological grounds as ‘lines’ –, and πργοσ – thought to be an oblong formation. Elsewhere I have tried to show that these interpretations are incompatible with epic army organisation, and I have advanced alternative etymologies (Van Wees, op. cit. [n. 22], 292–5). The present argument will show that the existence of such formations would be ‘incompatible with the epic manner of fighting, too. For Pritchett's repeated assertion that the f πρóμαχοι are not the first line of men, but a ‘forward échelon…a company or battalion’ (op. t cit. [n. 3], pp. 25–6; idem, Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, part V [Berkeley, 1985], pp. f 18–19 = 26–7), there is no evidence at all.

⁴¹ Cf. 11.163–4 and the threats uttered against enemy πρóμαχοι ‘go to your πλθνσ, do not stand up to me’ (17.30–2; 20.196–8).

⁴² Nestor: 11.596–804; 14.1–15. Idomeneus an d Meriones: 13.208–329. Earlier, Paris ha d taken time off to sleep with Helene! (3.380–448; 6.313–7.12), Hektor takes care of business in town (6.86–118, 237ff.) and a θεπων of Eurypylos is staying in his hu t during battle: 11.843. Let me repeat that leaders are – explicitly, in the case of Idomeneus (13.210–13) – accompanied in their movements by ταιροι

⁴³ 13.737–9; 15.671–5; ‘μεθιντεσ: e.g. 4.351, 516; 13.97, 229. The contrast is made very clear at 4.231–50, 371–3; 5.252–8, 476–7; 13.260–5; 15.707–15 (quoted above, 2.3), and see several passages quoted below.

⁴⁴ 13.121, with 13.83–98; 13.108–10, 14.49–51; 13.459–60.

⁴⁵ Other examples are : 4.223–421, 516; 6.83; 12.409–12 (quoted below, 3.1); 13.83–125, 206–39; 14.128–32.

⁴⁶ Op. cit. (n. 2), pp. 29–30.

⁴⁷ Op. cit. (n. 3), p. 172. Latacz (ibid., 177, 225) an d Albracht (op. cit. [n. 2], p. 39) are forced to assume that the πρóμαχοι step back into the first line of the formation before the massed advance takes place. The evidence Latacz adduces consists of phrases such as ‘he jumped at the òτíχεσ’ (20.353), ‘he went [forward] among the first’ and even ‘he led’, which are too vague to support his assumption. Note also Couissin's unsupported claim that mass missile combat is brought to an end when the phase of single combat begins (op. cit. [n. 11], p. 18).

⁴⁸ πλἠθνσ basically means ‘multitude’, of course, and simply indicates large numbers (as in 11.404–5; 17.221). It is only when used in contrast to πρóμαχοι that it acquires the connotation of ‘th e men at the back’.

⁴⁹ A reversal of this kind is indicated in 13.737–9, and in references to the ‘scattering’ of battle (e.g. 15.328). No t much attention is given to it in the narrative, presumably because situations of increasingly intense combat make a better story than the reverse.

⁵⁰ I cannot here go into the question of how this consistent ‘heroic’ picture relates to the styles of warfare of Greek history: I will argue later that the present interpretation ha s consequences for Greek history, whether or not the Homeric type of fighting was ever practised. (I should like to mention that a further section, in which I argued that the Homeric use of chariots is consistent in itself and with the picture of battle, has been dropped for lack of space.)

⁵¹ Accounts of flight and recovery: Latacz, op. cit. (n. 3), pp. 213–14; Albracht, op. cit. (n. 2), pp. 41–52; cf. Willcock, M. M., A Companion to the Iliad (Chicago, 1976), p. 280Google Scholar.

⁵² Descriptions of wπρóμαχοι-style fighting during flight and pursuit, e.g. 5.37^197; 11.90–165, 544–74; 16.306–418; 17.597–633, 722–61 (cf. 18.148–53). Note that men may still be called πρóμαχοι too: 8.99–100. Nestor and Hektor telling men not to stop for the collection of spoils: 6.66–71; 15.343–51.

⁵³ I will leave out of consideration the divine contribution to the course of battle, as belonging to a different plane of causation.

⁶⁴ Other occasions: 8.335–6; 16.352–7 and 364–71; 17.274–6; and, once, the Greeks almost manage to score a success ‘beyond the fate set by Zeus, through their own strength and effort' (17.319–22).

⁵⁶ In 5.27–9, the Trojans panic because of the death of a son of a ‘fine rich man’ while the cause of their flight is described in 5.37 as ‘th e Greeks forced back the Trojans’ Compare 14.489–507 – son of the richest ma n in Troy is killed-wit h 14.510–‘Poseido n forced the battle’, through inspiring the Greeks to greater efforts; 16.588 – πρóμαχοι retreat before Patroklos – with 16.592 – “The Trojans retreated, the Greeks drove them back’. Elsewhere, the cause for flight is no t explicitly given, bu t it is preceded by a reference to a general charge, as well as a depiction of the deeds of a single hero : 11.292–5, with 296–309 (Hektor) ; 12.442–4, 467–71 with 445–66 (Hektor) ; 20.353–63 (cf. 394–5 ; 22.205–7) with 20.381–22.363 (Akhilleus). M Compare 16.268–77 – Myrmidon s ‘falling o n the Trojans in throngs’–with 16.284–92 Patroklos makes the Paionians run ‘by killing their leader’ ; 16.633–58–fierce fighting and divine intervention – with 16.659–60–Lykian s run away because Sarpedon is dead ; 21.206–8 – death of Asteropaios makes Paionians run – with the general flight envisaged throughout the book (esp. 21.1–16). A t the time of the fear-inspiring deaths of Demokoo n (4.497–505), Moulios (11.738–46) an d Phorkys (17.312–16) there are numbers of πρóμαχοι around their killers (resp. 4.495; 11.744; 17.281).

⁵⁷ 5.95–105 (Diomedes); 11.284–91 (Agamemnon); 11.459–60 (Odysseus); 14.418–1 (Hektor); 15.484–500 (Teukros); and 11.504–9 (Makhaon); 15.458–62 (Hektor).

⁶⁸ Trench: 8.213–52; wall: 12, passim; ships: 8.335–47; 15.367–78; huts: 15.655–67; Trojan chariots: 15.3, cf. 270, 279; Skaian gate: 11.170–214; 16.697–714; city: 21.606–11/22.1–6. On two occasions, Hektor's encouragements bring the Trojans to a halt in the middle of the plain: 5.461–97; 6.73–106.

⁵⁹ His victim is the son of the richest man of the Myrmidons (16.595–6); cf. 16.421–2; 17.277–303 (leader of the Pelasgians); 17.333–45. An important recovery in the ‘centre’ is brought about by Poseidon, who causes the Aiantes to make a stand, and then tells many others to gather around them (13.43–135).

⁶⁰ The implications are clearest in 11.336–542, o n which see Van Wees, op. cit. (n. 22), 288–90. In the defence of the ships, while it is suggested that Aias is the only ma n no t to flee (15.675), it becomes clear that many other Greeks are still resisting, too (15.670–3, where the ταíροι are Greeks; 687; 696–715). See also: Aiantes’ defence at 17.720–34; 18.150–8; Diomedes and Nestor at 8.99–131. For a discussion, see Seymour, op. cit. (n. 11), pp. 564–6.

⁶¹ Cf. Patroklos: 16.39, 95–6; Aias, ‘fence of the Greeks’ (3.229): 6.6; 12.334; Teukros: 12.334; 16.512; Idomeneus: 13.424–6; Diomedes: 16.75.

⁶² Fo r recent discussions see: Drews, Robert, Basileus (New Haven/London, 1983), pp. 100–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Carlier, Pierre, La Royauté en Gréce avant Alexandre (Strasbourg, 1984), pp. 136–230Google Scholar.

⁶³ A., NotablyAdkins, W. H., whose theory of why Homeric morality suits Homeric society hinges on this notion (see Merit and Responsibility [Oxford, 1960], esp. p. 61)Google Scholar. In a mor e recent work he notes that Sarpedon has, in fact, inherited his privileges, bu t he does no t draw the conclusions I a m drawing (‘Values, Goals an d Emotion s in the Iliad’, CPh 11 [1982], 293)Google Scholar. Latacz's view is similar to that of Adkins (op. cit. [n. 3], pp. 152–3).

⁶⁴ I am not denying that being a good speaker and counsellor is a highly rated quality (see Schofield, Malcolm, ’Euboulia in the Iliad’, CQ 36 [1986], 6–31)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, but it seems that it is a quality which the poet appreciates only in those who are good warriors, too.

⁶⁵ Agamemnon’ s ba d ideas are criticised subtly by Nestor (2.55–154, esp. 79–83); harshly by Diomedes (9.9–59, esp. 32–49) and Odysseus (14.64–108, esp. 83–102). Hektor is advised and berated by Poulydamas. Significantly, Hektor only accepts his advice in so far as it allows him to go on fighting (fully accepted: 12.61ff.; partly accepted: 13.726ff. – as proposed, men are gathered, but instead of a strategic meeting, there is an immediate attack). Proposals to retreat are violently rejected (12.21 Iff.; 18.243ff.).

⁶⁶ E.g. Finley, op. cit. (n. 6), pp. 116–17; Redfield, J. M., Nature and Culture in the Iliad (Chicago, 1975), p. 154Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ Sarpedon and Glaukos bring fame to the Lykians by their ‘fine strength’: 12.318–21. Nestor and Odysseus are called ‘great glory of the Greeks’ (9.673; 14.42). Apart from protection and glory, one other form of ‘repayment’ is occasionally mentioned: by their peace-time role as judges, βαòιλεσ – as long as they are fair – will ensure the prosperity of their community (Odyssey 19.109–14; Iliad 16.385–92).

⁶⁸ A world, too, in which the efforts of non-βαòιλεσ on the battlefield are justly rewarded, as in the case of Aineias' companion Deikoon, ‘whom the Trojans respected as much as the sons of Priamos, because he was quick to fight among the foremost’ (5.533–6).

⁹ Makhaon is ‘being the best’ (ριòτεοντα, 11.506) in battle. Teukros is mentioned as ‘the best’ several times, apparently with reference to his archery (13.313–14). Of the Trojan leaders, the sons of Merops (2.828–31) are the ‘two best men of the Sryjioy’ (11.328). Note, however, firstly, that there is no rigid hierarchy - Patroklos, Euphorbos and Periphas are ‘best’ of the Myrmidons, Trojans and Aitolians, too (18.10–12; 17.80–1; 5.842–3) – and, secondly, that references to the ρíòτοι collectively do include names of men who are not said to be leaders.

⁷⁰ Both Akhilleus an d his ‘close-fighting θεποντεσ’ regard themselves a s ‘fa r th e best of Greeks’ (16.271–2). Nestor seems to think of leaders and men being κακóσ or òθóσ as a group (2.365–6).

⁷¹ One may note the unique case in which the Myrmidons fight without their leader. There is a danger, here, seen by Akhilleus, that Patroklos and his other followers will do equally well in battle without their /JaciAeus (16.242–5). He asks Patroklos not to go too far, in order not to make his leader look superfluous and, therefore, ‘less respected’ (16.87 96). In the event, his men do more than he wanted them to. But they cannot really do without their leader: when Apollo causes a change of fortune, the only one who can save them is Akhilleus, and he does so by himself (although supported by Athena).

⁷⁸ At Plataiai, in 479 B.C., the contingents of Sparta (with Lakedaimon) and Athens (with Salamis) comprised respectively 10,000 to theIliad's 3000 (i.e. 3–3 times as large) and 8000 to 3100 (i.e. 2–6 x). These are the only directly comparable regions. In other cases one must divide the size of the Iliad's contingent (= number of ships x 50 men) by the number of cities it is said to comprise. All the Greek contingents in the Iliad together comprise 1136 x 50 + 50 x 120 = 62,800 men from 150 localities (counting groups of islands and areas not divided into towns as each), i.e. an average of 419 men. At Plataiai the assembled army consisted of 33,700 hoplites (not counting the perioikoi) from 25 towns, i.e. 1348 men on average, which is 3–2 x as many). Arkadia is exactly average: 60 x 50 = 3000 men from 9 towns ~ 333 men; of these towns only Tegea (1500) and Orkhomenos (600) are represented at Plataiai, i.e. an average 1050, or 3–2 x ‘as many, men. The only other possible comparisons are the contingents of Euboia, at Plataiai | 1–2 x as large as in the Iliad; Argos, 1–3 x; and Mykenai, no less than 6.1 x larger at Plataiai! i The differences are in fact even greater, since the numbers for Plataiai must be doubled to allow I for the light-armed men, who are presumably included in the numbers of the Iliad. These calculations do not, of course, prove that Homeric warriors are an elite: that depends on how much larger than the communities envisaged by the epic poet those of fifth-century Greece f were.

⁷³ See the discussion by Austin, M. M., ‘Hellenistic Kings, War, and the Economy, CQ 36 (1986), 450–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁴ My work on this article was supported in part by the Foundation for Historical Research, which is subsidised by the Netherlands Organisation for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.). An earlier draft was read and criticised by T. J. Cornell, S. C. Humphreys, R. Janko, C. J. Ruijgh, Y. Sugino, M. M. Willcock, and an anonymous referee of CQ. Their comments and suggestions have done much to improve it. They are, of course, not necessarily in agreement with my views.