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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 June 2018
One of the simplest methods used by Cicero for depicting a personality or characteristic of an individual within his correspondence was to use a nickname. When describing groups, the natural progression was to use collective nouns that helped to define some essential quality of this collective. The enormity of Caesar's assassination provided an opportunity to use a plethora of terms for the conspirators, most conspicuously seen in Cicero's treatment of Cassius and Brutus following the death of Caesar. The act itself had a polarizing effect. On one side were the invective terms for assassins, murderers and parricides (sicarii, homicidae, interfectores, parricidae). On the other side were the favourable terms, such as liberators (liberatores), heroes (heroes) and tyrannicides (tyrannoctoni). Cicero also included in his correspondence Greek words, as well as their transliterations into Latin. Each word would seem to have its own subtle characteristics, focussing on different aspects and interpretations of the conspirators and their act of tyrannicide or political murder. The collective nouns themselves and the context in which they are used not only will provide the first indication of how Cicero felt about the conspirators but may also give an insight into Cicero's perception of the general feeling about the political situation in Rome at this time.
1 Examples of this type of personal nickname are the use of the term Caluenna or φαλάκρωμα (‘baldy’) for Matius (Att. 14.2.3, 14.5.1, 14.9.3, 16.11.1), Caluentius Marius for L. Piso Caesonius (QFr. 3.1.11), and the more enigmatic Πεντέλοιπος (‘last of five’) for Hirtius (Att. 14.21.4, 15.2.4).
2 For a recent study on the reshaping of political factions and politics itself following Caesar's assassination, see Welch, K., Magnus Pius: Sextus Pompeius and the Transformation of the Roman Republic (Swansea, 2012), 121–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
3 Examples of this include Denniston, J.D. (ed.), M. Tulli Ciceronis in M. Antonium Orationes Philippicae Prima et Secunda (Oxford, 1926), 71Google Scholar; Ramsey, J.T. (ed.), Philippics I–II (Cambridge, 2003), 95Google Scholar.
4 Denniston (n. 3), 71–2 states that ‘the terms liberatores and heroes are frequently applied to them in the letters, as the two leading spirits in the conspiracy’. It may be instructive to realize that the term heroes is used only four times in the letters, and there is only one verifiable use of liberatores.
5 Rawson, E., ‘The aftermath of the Ides’, in Crook, J.A., Lintott, A.W. and Rawson, E. (edd.), Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 9 (Cambridge, 1992), 468–90Google Scholar, at 469 (emphasis added). See also Rawson, E., ‘Cassius and Brutus: the memory of the liberators’, in Moxon, I.S., Smart, J.D. and Woodman, A.J. (edd.), Past Perspectives: Studies in Greek and Roman Historical Writing: Papers Presented at a Conference in Leeds, 6–8 April 1983 (Cambridge, 1986), 101–19Google Scholar.
6 Rawson (n. 5 [1986]), 103 (and throughout).
7 Rawson (n. 5 [1992]), 469. Other authors, such as Smethurst, S.E., ‘Cicero and the Senate’, CJ 54 (1958), 73–8Google Scholar, do likewise.
8 The phrase ‘new party of the Liberators’ was used by Syme, R., The Roman Revolution (Oxford, 1939), 59Google Scholar, in his introductory description of those men who assassinated Caesar.
9 Even taking into account differing opinions of liberation and the varying degrees of achievement, to an ancient Roman the political situation in Rome following (and immediately before) Caesar's assassination would not have been considered ‘free’. The connection between the res publica and libertas will be discussed in the following pages.
10 An indicator of its acceptance as the default description for the assassins of Caesar is the absence of qualification or limitation being applied, such as placing it in quotation marks. Examples include Smith, R.E., Cicero the Statesman (Cambridge, 1966), 235–43Google Scholar; Scullard, H.H., From the Gracchi to Nero: A History of Rome 133 b.c. to a.d. 68 (London, 1982), 155 and 160Google Scholar; Schneider, M., Cicero ‘Haruspex’: Political Prognostication and the Viscera of a Deceased Body Politic (Piscataway, NJ, 2004), 173Google Scholar; Harries, J., Cicero and the Jurists: From Citizens’ Law to the Lawful State (London, 2006), 225–6Google Scholar; White, P., Cicero in Letters: Epistolary Relations of the Late Republic (New York, 2010), 144 and 160–1CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tempest, K., Cicero: Politics and Persuasion in Ancient Rome (London, 2011), 185–6, 189, 201Google Scholar; Zarecki, J., Cicero's Ideal Statesman in Theory and Practice (London, 2014), 14, 141 and 158Google Scholar. Manuwald, G. (ed.), Cicero, Philippics 3–9 (New York, 2007), 353Google Scholar places the term in inverted commas only once, but otherwise employs the term without such qualification at 10, 12, 72, 98, 362. At other times, authors indicate that either Cicero called the conspirators this or that the conspirators themselves preferred the term ‘liberator’ without further evidence; e.g. Allott, P., The Health of Nations: Society and Law beyond the State (Oxford, 2002), 208 n. 50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tempest (this note), 183.
11 Flower, H.I., Roman Republics (Princeton, 2010)Google Scholar states that the Republican system had ended in 60 b.c., having moved through six different Republics, and not one continuous form of government from the Regal period (for an outline of these stages, see Flower [this note], 18–34). If this is correct, Cicero was writing this in a time which had no semblance of the Republican system, with no political system or legislation in place to allow a return to anything resembling one. Despite this, the constant mentioning of the state of politics in Rome and the possibility of restoring the Republic indicates that Cicero still held hope, however slim, for its survival.
12 The comparison of the State to a painting has its origins in Plato (Pl. Leg. 796a–b; Resp. 5.472d–e, 6.500c–501c; Ti. 19b–c); cf. Asmis, E., ‘A new kind of model: Cicero's Roman constitution in “De republica”’, AJPh 126 (2005), 377–416, at 387Google Scholar; Gurd, S.A., Work in Progress: Literary Revision as Social Performance in Ancient Rome (New York, 2012), 56–7Google Scholar; Gildenhard, I., ‘Of Cicero's Plato: fictions, forms, foundations’, in Schofield, M. (ed.), Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century b.c.: New Directions of Philosophy (Cambridge, 2013), 225–75, at 244–5Google Scholar. A similar Platonic comparison is made between a painting, which needs constant repair and touching up, and the laws (Pl. Leg. 769a–c). Cicero regularly wrote comments on the state of the Republic, and his opinion is often influenced by the surrounding events. A parallel sentiment of pessimism regarding the lost Republic can also be seen following Gabinius’ acquittal in 54 b.c. (QFr. 3.4.1; Att. 4.18.2).
13 This motif was a standard for Cicero in this discussion of politics at this time.
14 Cic. Phil. 2.28. Although denying any knowledge of the assassination, Cicero never questioned the historicity of this event. His defence of Brutus’ impassioned cry of ‘Cicero’ was to suggest a comparison with his own equally bloody act over the Catilinarian conspirators and the primary intention of freeing Rome from the tyranny, whether perceived or real, of an individual.
15 I am primarily interested in how these terms relate to Cicero and not the general principles, institutions, philosophies and theories behind the Republic. Some recent studies on the Roman Republic outline these principles and the chronology of scholarship behind it, including Flower, H.I. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic (Cambridge, 2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Flower (n. 11); Rosenstein, N. and Morstein-Marx, R. (edd.), A Companion to the Roman Republic (Hoboken, 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hölkeskamp, K.J. and Heitmann-Gordon, H. (edd.), Reconstructing the Roman Republic: An Ancient Political Culture and Modern Research (Princeton, 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Similarly, for libertas, a recent study by Arena, V., Libertas and the Practice of Politics in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge, 2013)Google Scholar, looks at appeals to libertas, whilst Wirszubski, Stylow and Brunt still remain seminal works (Wirszubski, C., Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate [Cambridge, 1950]CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stylow, A.U., Libertas und Liberalitas: Untersuchungen zur innenpolitischen Propoganda der Römer [Munich, 1972]Google Scholar; Brunt, P.A., The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays [Oxford, 1988], 281–350)Google Scholar. For libertas in Cicero, see Dermience, A., ‘La notion de libertas dans les œuvres de Cicéron’, LEC 25 (1957), 157–67Google Scholar; Bleicken, J., ‘Der Begriff der Freiheit in der letzten Phase der römischen Republik’, Historische Zeitschrift 195 (1962), 1–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dognini, C., ‘Cicero, Cesare e Sallustio: tre diversi modelli di libertas nella tarda repubblica’, Invigilata lucernis 20 (1998), 85–101Google Scholar; Cowan, E., ‘Libertas in the Philippics’, in Stevenson, T. and Wilson, M. (edd.), Cicero's Philippics: History, Rhetoric and Ideology (Auckland, 2007), 140–52Google Scholar.
16 A sample of writers through this period will suffice to illustrate the connection between res publica and libertas in Roman minds (e.g. Rhet. Her. 4.66; Cic. Flac. 25; Sall. Cat. 7.2–3; Livy 1.60.3, 2.1.1–2; Tac. Ann. 1.1.1).
17 Wirszubski (n. 15), 82.
18 Zetzel, J.E.G. (ed.), De Re Publica: Selections (Cambridge, 1995), 127Google Scholar.
19 Rep. 1.41.3, 1.43.2, 1.48, 3.43, 3.44, 3.45, 3.46.
20 Wirszubski (n. 15), 14.
21 Eder, W., ‘Der Bürger und sein Staat – der Staat und seine Bürger’, in Eder, W. and Ampolo, C. (edd.), Staat und Staatlichkeit in der frühen römischen Republik: Akten eines Symposiums, 12.–15. Juli 1988, Freie Universität Berlin (Stuttgart, 1990), 12–32, at 19Google Scholar. Of course, Eder does not take into account fully the emphasis on both plurality and communality in Plt. 3.1276b.
22 Drexler, H., ‘Res publica’, Maia 9 (1957), 247–81 and 10 (1958), 3–37Google Scholar still provides one of the most comprehensive examinations of the definition of res publica.
23 Heinze, R. and Burck, E., Vom Geist des Römertums: ausgewählte Aufsätze (Darmstadt, 1960), 13Google Scholar. For further discussions, see Stark, R., ‘Ciceros Staatsdefinition’, in Klein, R. (ed.), Das Staatsdenken der Römer (Darmstaft, 1966), 332–47Google Scholar; Schofield, M., ‘Cicero's definition of res publica’, in Powell, J.G.F. (ed.), Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers (Oxford, 1995), 63–83Google Scholar; Rudd, N. and Powell, J.G.F. (edd.), The Republic and the Laws (Oxford, 1998), xxxvGoogle Scholar.
24 An overtly dramatized and emphatic statement that not every gathering equates to the ‘State’ is presented in the Paradoxes of the Stoics 27.
25 OLD s.v. congrego; TLL 4.290.22–3, 290.59: § 1 animantia: a) bestias; b) homines.
26 See e.g. Cancelli, F., ‘Iuris consensu nella definizione ciceroniana di res publica’, RCCM 14 (1972), 247–67Google Scholar; Schmidt, P.L., ‘Cicero “De re publica”: Die Forschung der letzten fünf Dezennien’, ANRW 1 (1973), 262–333, at 318–19Google Scholar; Werner, R., ‘Über Herkunft und Bedeutung von Ciceros Staatsdefinition’, Chiron 3 (1973), 163–78Google Scholar; Kohns, H., ‘Consensus iuris – communio utilitatis’, Gymnasium 81 (1974), 485–98Google Scholar; Suerbaum, W., Vom antiken zum frühmittelalterlichen Staatsbegriff: über Verwendung u. Bedeutung von res publica, regnum, imperium u. status von Cicero bis Jordanis (Münster, 1977), 1–37Google Scholar; Suerbaum, W., ‘Studienbibliographie zu Ciceros De republica’, Gymnasium 85 (1978), 59–88, at 74–5Google Scholar; Wood, N., Cicero's Social and Political Thought (Berkeley, 1988), 125–8Google Scholar; Zetzel (n. 18), 127–9.
27 Cancelli (n. 26), 254 sees this more as a harmony of rights and interests (armonia o consonanza di diritti), whereas Büchner, K., ‘Die beste Verfassung. Eine philologische Untersuchung zu den ersten drei Büchern von Ciceros Staat’, SIFC 26 (1952), 37–140, at 98Google Scholar; Büchner, K., Cicero: Bestand und Wandel seiner geistigen Welt (Heidelberg, 1964), 217–18Google Scholar; Suerbaum (n. 26 [1977]); and Schofield (n. 23), 70–1 link this to the identification of idealized justice. Kohns (n. 26) takes a middle ground, seeing a correlation between law and justice, but rejecting a clear identification to iustitia; cf. Long, A.A., ‘Cicero's politics in De Officiis’, in Laks, A. and Schofield, M. (edd.), Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy: Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum (Cambridge, 1995), 213–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
28 Poyser, G.H., Selections from Cicero De Re Publica (Cambridge, 1948)Google Scholar; Zetzel (n. 18), 128.
29 nihil est enim … acceptius quam concilia coetusque hominum iure sociati, quae ‘ciuitates’ appellantur, ‘for nothing is more agreeable than gatherings and unions of men united under law which they call “States”’.
30 Büchner, K., Cicero (Wiesbaden, 1962), 78–9Google Scholar; Büchner, K., M. Tullius Cicero: Kommentar (Heidelberg, 1984), 124Google Scholar refers to them as ‘polar’ aspects and regards utilitas as less important. Suerbaum (n. 26 [1977]), 25 also saw a clear separation. Dodaro, R., Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine (Cambridge, 2004), 13CrossRefGoogle Scholar stated that the two definitions were ‘held in tension’. Schofield (n. 23), 70–1 relates consensus iuris to justice, whilst indicating that utilitas has no connection to this crucial element of iustitia.
31 Stark (n. 23), 338–9; Mayer-Maly, T., ‘Gemeinwohl und Naturrecht bei Cicero’, in Büchner, K. (ed.), Das neue Cicerobild (Darmstadt, 1971), 371–87, at 382Google Scholar; Kohns (n. 26), 494.
32 Zetzel (n. 18), 128.
33 The Digest of Justinian, writing succinctly, records that all are either free or slaves: omnes homines aut liberi sunt aut serui (1.5.3).
34 Reichardt, R., Aufklärung und historische Semantik: interdisziplinäre Beiträge zur westeuropäischen Kulturgeschichte (Berlin, 1998), 24Google Scholar; Hölkeskamp (n. 15), 47. Hölkeskamp also refers to libertas as a linguistic code or cipher for habitualized ideas.
35 A similar sentiment can be found in Livy (35.32.11) and Sallust (Hist. 1.55.4 M).
36 Brunt (n. 15), 283 states that the term is full of self-contradictions since the idea of freedom is different for everyone.
37 Skinner, Q., ‘The idea of negative liberty: philosophical and historical perspectives’, in Rorty, R., Schneewind, J.B. and Skinner, Q. (edd.), Philosophy in History: Essays in the Historiography of Philosophy (Cambridge, 1984), 193–221CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Skinner, Q., ‘A third concept of liberty’, Proceedings of the British Academy 117 (2002), 237–68Google Scholar; Skinner, Q., Hobbes and Republican Liberty (Cambridge, 2008)Google Scholar.
38 Rosenstein, N., ‘Aristocratic values’, in Rosenstein, N. and Morstein-Marx, R. (edd.), A Companion to the Roman Republic (Hoboken, 2006), 365–82, at 378–80CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
39 Both Rosenstein (n. 38), 378 and Arena (n. 15) limit their scope to the citizens themselves. Cicero's notion of populus, however, related to its role within the various vehicles of government.
40 Arena (n. 15), 47 described libertas as the ‘non-subjection to the arbitrary will of another person or group’, while Pettit, P., Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford, 1997), 57Google Scholar suggests that the degree in which interference is considered arbitrary relates to the level of public good. In other words, interference could be perceived as beneficial or undesirable depending on intent; see e.g. Kapust, D.J., Republicanism, Rhetoric, and Roman Political Thought: Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus (New York, 2011), 10CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Sage, M.M., ‘Tacitus’ historical works: a survey and appraisal’, ANRW 2 (1990), 851–1030, at 939Google Scholar saw it as the ‘freedom to think and speak as one wishes’, to pursue one's ends; cf. Skinner, Q., ‘The Republican ideal of political liberty’, in Bock, G., Skinner, Q. and Viroli, M. (edd.), Machiavelli and Republicanism (Cambridge, 1990), 293–309, at 302Google Scholar. These descriptions miss the distinction between modern and ancient Roman conceptions of freedom. Brunt (n. 15), 305, 309–10, in his attempt to refute Schulz and others, seems at times to be more fixated on the notion of something or someone being free (liber) than on the intangible quality of freedom (libertas) and its political nature. Cicero's idea of libertas, which is what is important to this study, is directed towards the latter. As Wirszubski (n. 15), 8 correctly notes, the Romans conceived libertas in terms of duty and social relations.
41 A direct parallel can be seen in Cic. Off. 1.85.
42 Zetzel (n. 18), 127.
43 Zetzel (n. 18), 129.
44 How, W.W., ‘Cicero's ideal in his De republica’, JRS 20 (1930), 24–42Google Scholar; Wood (n. 26), 90–142; Mitchell, T.N., Cicero, the Senior Statesman (New Haven, 1991), 9–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Brunt (n. 15), 283 describes the deference to a superior authority within the notion of libertas as perverse.
45 Arena (n. 15) looks at appeals to libertas in speeches and she identifies three principal cases in which it is used: i) opposing extraordinary commands; ii) supporting the senatus consultum ultimum; iii) opposing land reforms. As can be seen, all of these relate to the individuals or groups seeking control or power either outside the bounds of law or precedence, or over other sectors of politics, or infringing on others’ libertas; cf. Bleicken (n. 15), 38; Wirszubski (n. 15), 80.
46 Connolly, J., The State of Speech: Rhetoric and Political Thought in Ancient Rome (Princeton, 2007), 63–5Google Scholar sees the libertas of the people in direct conflict with the auctoritas of the Senate, but, as mentioned above, it would seem that the key was not placing one's own individual liberty over that of the community (Kapust [n. 40], 12).
47 Monteleone, C. (ed.), La “Terza Filippica” di Cicerone: retorica e regolamento del Senato, legalità e rapporti di forza (Fasano, 2003), 67Google Scholar; Manuwald (n. 10), 97, 306.
48 Wirszubski (n. 15), 5 provides the example from Tacitus of the Armenian removal of their king resulting in the absence of a ruler for a while but without the enjoyment of freedom (Ann. 2.4.3). Removal of autocratic rule in itself could initially create anarchy, and eventually, as was the case in Armenia and following Caesar's death, result in the replacement of the autocrat with another.
49 Zetzel (n. 18), 29.
50 While Cicero objected chiefly to the additional measures that Antonius attempted to push through as part of Caesar's acta, the Senate's ratification of the acta was never to Cicero's liking. In the First Philippic he states that he did not approve of the acta themselves, but supported them in order to bring about ‘peace and tranquillity’ (Phil. 1.16). Other references to this goal of peace being the primary reason for his support include Att. 16.16b.2, 16.16c.3; Phil. 1.23, 2.100.
51 For references to an unrestored Republic in the correspondence following Caesar's death, see Att. 14.4, 14.9.2, 14.3.6, 14.20.3; Fam. 12.1.
52 Zetzel (n. 18), 91–7; van der Blom, H., ‘Officium and res publica: Cicero's political role after the Ides of March’, C&M 54 (2003), 287–319, at 289Google Scholar.
53 An early example of his moral degeneration was his infamous affair with the actress Cytheris: Att. 10.10.5, 10.16.5 (both from May 49), 15.22. The most aggressive of Cicero's invectives against Antonius on moral grounds appears in the Philippics, and the Second Philippic, despite never being delivered publicly, contains many of his thoughts on Antonius as an immoral character (e.g. 2.1–2, 2.6–10, 2.58).
54 Examples of acts seen by Cicero as unlawful or contravening existing law include the use of Caesar's notebooks as part of his acta, the proconsular and provincial rearrangement, and the appointment of Antonius’ brother to the land commission.
55 Direct references to Antonius as a tyrant include Att. 14.14.4, 14.21.3, 15.21.1; Fam. 11.5.3, 12.3.2; Ad Brut. 1.4a.3.
56 One overt example of this polite expression of amicitia is to Tiro in May 44: ego tamen Antoni inueteratam sine ulla offensione amicitiam retinere sane uolo scribamque ad eum, sed non ante quam te uidero, ‘however, I truly want to keep up my friendship with Antonius, which has lasted a long time without a quarrel, and I shall write to him, but not before I shall see you’ (Fam. 16.23.2); cf. Hall, J., Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters (Oxford, 2009), 87–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
57 On the relationship between Antonius and Cicero, see Huzar, E.G., Mark Antony. A Biography (Minneapolis, 1978), 20, 26, 37, 55–6Google Scholar; van der Blom (n. 52), 295–9; Hall (n. 56), 87–99.
58 Long (n. 27); Griffin, M.T., ‘When is thought political?’, Aperion 29 (1996), 269–82, at 278–80Google Scholar; van der Blom (n. 52), 303; Schofield, M., ‘Republican virtues’, in Balot, R.K. (ed.), A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought (Chichester, 2009), 199–213, at 207–10Google Scholar.
59 Notwithstanding that Cicero essentially agreed with Greek political theory in assigning monarchy as the best of the simple forms of government, as long as it was ruled by the wisest and most just, see Brunt (n. 15), 506–7. I cannot agree that this necessarily means that he accepted the notion of ‘single rule’; cf. J.P. Zarecki, ‘Cicero's ideal statesman in theory and practice’ (Diss., University of Gainesville, Florida, 2005), especially 30–5.
60 Zarecki (n. 59), 35 n. 47 sums up the De officiis referring to these principles.
61 Recent works that provide succinct summaries of Cicero's ideal statesman are van der Blom (n. 52), 310–14; Zarecki (n. 59), 35–47; Zarecki (n. 10). Other works include Krarup, P., Rector rei publicae: bidrag til fortolkningen af Ciceros De re publica (Copenhagen, 1956), 121–55Google Scholar; Brunt (n. 15), 507–8; Powell, J.G.F., ‘The rector rei publicae of Cicero's De re publica’, SCI 13 (1994), 19–23Google Scholar; Ferrary, J.-L., ‘The statesman and the law in the political philosophy of Cicero’, in Laks, A. and Schofield, M. (edd.), Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy: Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Hellenisticum (Cambridge, 1995), 48–73, at 51–3Google Scholar.
62 Skinner (n. 40), 304.
63 Akin to φρόνησις: Aristotle's highest intellectual virtue (Eth. Nic. 1140a24–b12).
64 Zetzel (n. 18), 237–8; Atkins, J.W., Cicero on Politics and the Limits of Reason: The Republic and Laws (Cambridge, 2013), 66–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
65 OLD s.v. liber; TLL 7.2.1280.13–1289.17. For etymologies of Latin liber and Greek ἐλευθερία, see Pokorny, J., Indogermanisches etymologisches Wörterbuch (Bern, 1959), 684–5Google Scholar; Frisk, H., Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch (Heidelberg, 1960), 490–1Google Scholar; Chantraine, P., Dictionnaire etymologique de la langue grecque: histoire des mots (Paris, 1968), 336–7Google Scholar; Beekes, R.S.P. and Beek, L.V. (edd.), Etymological Dictionary of Greek (Leiden, 2010)Google Scholar. Liber seems to derive from the Venetic *(e)leudheros, with its Indo-European root *leudh- relating to ‘a breed’ or ‘a growth group’, though, as Brunt (n. 15), 284 notes, this is a frequent but not universally accepted view. Pitkin, H.F., ‘Are freedom and liberty twins?’, Political Theory 16 (1988), 523–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 529–31 provides a summary of the various etymological theories.
66 See e.g. Pohlenz, M., Freedom in Greek Life and Thought: The History of an Ideal (Dordrecht, 1966), 181 n. 4Google Scholar; Ernout, A. and Meillet, A. (edd.), Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine: histoire des mots (Paris, 2001), 355Google Scholar.
67 Wirszubski (n. 15), 7–8; Raaflaub, K., ‘Zum Freiheitsbegriffe der Griechen: Materialen und Untersuchungen zur Bedeutungsentwicklung von ἐλεύθερος/ἐλευθερία in der archaischen und klassischen Zeit’, in Welskopf, E.C. (ed.), Soziale Typenbegriffe im alten Griechenland und ihr Fortleben in den Sprachen der Welt (Berlin, 1981), 180–405, at 186–8, 191–2Google Scholar; Raaflaub, K.A., ‘Democracy, oligarchy, and the concept of the “free citizen” in late fifth-century Athens’, Political Theory 11 (1983), 517–44, at 521CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Raaflaub, K.A. and Mignucci, M., Die Entdeckung der Freiheit: zur historischen Semantik und Gesellschaftsgeschichte eines politischen Grundbegriffes der Griechen (München, 1985), 29–70, 160–88Google Scholar.
68 hic est enim dominus populi, quem Graeci tyrannum uocant (Rep. 2.47).
69 An interesting example comes from Cicero's letter to Decimus Brutus in December 44, when he shifts the position of dominus from Caesar onto ‘the slave’ Antonius: dominum ferre non potuimus, conseruo seruimus (Fam. 12.3.2).
70 OLD s.v. liberator; TLL 7.2.1300.43–1301.22.
71 Weinstock, S., Divus Julius (Oxford, 1971), 142–4Google Scholar notes the rarity of this term in Latin literature, though he downplays Livy's uses.
72 The EDCS list forty-six examples of liberator being used in inscriptions; none dates from before Cicero, with the majority from the period after the reign of Diocletian.
73 One reference to liberatores is also used following the Battle of Forum Gallorum, when Cicero uses it to describe Hirtius, Pansa and Octavian (Phil. 14.12).
74 However, one use before Cicero in Plautus does not constitute proof of regular use in comedy.
75 Dio used the Greek term ἐλευθερωτής, but it can be assumed that the Roman Senate actually used the Latin term Liberator. It is true that others were said to have freed Rome, for example Cato's statements about Pompey the Great to his son Cn. Pompeius (BAfr. 22.2), but this study relates to the use of the word liberator specifically.
76 Weinstock (n. 71), 142–3.
77 Raaflaub, K., ‘Caesar the liberator? Faction politics, civil war and ideology’, in Cairns, F. and Fantham, E. (edd.), Caesar Against Liberty? Perspectives on His Autocracy (Cambridge, 2003), 35–67, at 36–7Google Scholar has argued that Caesar had used libertas in his sloganizing in 49, but the honours he received here were different. He states that Caesar did not emphasize libertas in his propaganda except for a short time before and after the Civil War. The title liberator is unusual and, if it had never been given before, one can hypothesize overzealous advocates pushing for this title. The propaganda for Caesar to be seen as a ‘deliverer’ from the horror of civil war is just as important as Cicero's need to use it to justify the assassination.
78 Dio also uses this as the principal reason for M. Brutus devising the plot against Caesar (Dio Cass. 43.45.4). Ironically this statue to Caesar was mentioned in Cicero's defence of King Deiotarus, where he argues that the statue cannot be used to prove that Caesar was a tyrant (Deiot. 33–4).
79 In addition to this, P. Horatius receives this title (1.26), as does P. Valerius Publicola (3.61). See also Livy 7.32 and 24.25.
80 For instance, there is only one reference to the conspirators as conseruatores in the Philippics (2.31). Interesting though is Cicero's use of a shipwreck analogy to describe the condition of Cassius’ and Brutus’ plans following the Ides, which could definitely be linked to terms for the ideal statesman, such as gubernator (Att. 15.11.3).
81 This self-appointed title/slogan is preserved in the letter from Matius to Cicero dated to September or October 44, in which he indicated that the assassins were calling themselves the ‘authors of liberty’, ut quidem isti dicitant ‘libertatis auctores’ (Fam. 11.28.3). This also appears in two later sources: i) Suetonius refers to C. Albucius Silus, who narrowly escaped punishment for calling M. Brutus, while gesturing to his statue, legum ac libertatis auctorem et uindicem (Suet. Gram. et rhet. 30.6.6); and ii) pseudo-Quintilian's Declamationes Minores indicates that the conspirators were promoting themselves as tyrannicides and linking this to the defence of the Republic and the creation of liberty: perdidimus tyrannicidam et uindicem rei publicae et libertatis auctorem (329.16.2). The similarities in these passages seem to support a deliberate choice by Cicero to use liberator over libertatis auctor. Other references to the phrase libertatis auctor can be found in Livy (24.14.8, 30.45.6, 39.25.11) and Tacitus (Hist. 4.17.3).
82 Thus Dante places them in the personal company of Satan along with Judas Iscariot (Inf. 34).
83 Weinstock (n. 71), 143 correctly notes that Cicero worked hard to transfer this term to Brutus and Cassius.
84 The Romans frequently used this as a metaphor for submission in a military context (e.g. Cic. Off. 3.30.109; Caes. BGall. 1.7, 1.12; Quint. Inst. 3.8.3; Livy 1.26.13, 2.34.9, 3.23.5, 3.28.10, 3.67.5) and even in a marital or intimate context (Plaut. Curc. 50; Hor. Carm. 2.5.1, 3.9.18); cf. coniunx. Its use as a metaphor for being subject to slavery goes back to Greek models (e.g. Hdt. 7.8γ; Aesch. Ag. 953; Sept. 75; Soph. Aj. 944; Ant. 291; Xen. Cyr. 3.1.27).
85 For the importance of using family exempla to exert political force, particularly in regard to Lucius Brutus and Marcus Brutus, including references to sources and previous scholarship, see van der Blom, H., Cicero's Role Models: The Political Strategy of a Newcomer (Oxford, 2010), 97–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
86 However, even in ancient times there were doubts over whether M. Iunius Brutus was related to the legendary figure and founder of the Republic (Plut. Brut. 1.6).
87 For a comprehensive study of the political wrangling surrounding the Apollinarian Games of Brutus in 44 b.c., see Sumi, G.S., Ceremony and Power: Performing Politics in Rome between Republic and Empire (Ann Arbor, 2005), 142–8Google Scholar.
88 Clear examples of Cicero engaging with these terms to counter the slander include Phil. 1.35, 2.31, 13.22.
89 These included: i) the respect he addresses them with; ii) Brutus’ exemption from the law which permitted the absence of the urban praetor for no more than ten days; iii) praise and rejoicing at the Apollinarian Games; iv) provincial appointments; v) increase in number of quaestors and legates appointed to them.
90 This is the first–attested use of homicida (TLL 6.3.2866.14–16).
91 Suetonius describes them as defenders of liberty (legum ac libertatis auctorem et uindicem, Gram. et rhet. 30.6.6), and pseudo-Quintilian has them as defenders of the Republic: perdidimus tyrannicidam et uindicem rei publicae et libertatis auctorem (Decl. Min. 329.16.2).
92 Of course, this does not discount the idea of an abbreviation of the slogan to a more manageable and single-word catchphrase liberatores. Another possibility is that auctor was actually being used more as ‘a supporter’ than ‘a creator’ (OLD s.v. 5; TLL 2.1196.44, 2.1198.38). If this is so, the omission of auctor becomes considerably less critical.
93 A possibly spurious letter from Brutus to Cicero also contains the term liberatores within a criticism of Cicero's support of Octavian (Ad Brut. 1.16.2). In it the liberator of the country (liberator patriae) or of the city (liberator urbis) has been expanded into the hyperbolic liberator orbis terrarum. If genuine, this may be quoting and deriding Cicero's rhetoric, a reminder to Cicero that he needed to be consistent in both words and deeds. If this is correct, it would suggest that liberator was part of Cicero's rhetoric and not Brutus’. Alternatively, the hyperbole could indicate Brutus’ hubris and an unflattering belief in his own self-importance. However, the doubtful nature of this letter makes it wise not to draw conclusions about Cicero's or Brutus’ rhetoric from it. For the doubtful authenticity of Ad Brut. 1.16 and 1.17, see Bailey, D.R. Shackleton (ed.), Cicero: Epistulae ad Quintum fratrem et M. Brutum (Cambridge, 1980), 10–15Google Scholar; cf. Rawson, E., ‘D.R. Shackleton Bailey: Cicero: Select Letters’, CR 31 (1981), 119–20Google Scholar.
94 Cicero famously makes the reference here that on account of his interfering associates he cannot be a good citizen (quem nego posse <esse> bonum ciuem).
95 Note also that Velleius Paterculus uses the same expression when referring to Cassius’ and Brutus’ pretext for not wanting to start a civil war, namely that there was ample honour in the consciousness of their act, plurimum sibi honoris esse in conscientia facti sui (2.62.3).
96 I am following Bailey, D.R. Shackleton (ed.), Cicero's Letters to Atticus (Cambridge, 1967), 25 and 224Google Scholar, How, W.W. (ed.), Cicero: Select Letters (Oxford, 1926), 484Google Scholar, and Tyrrell, R.Y. and Purser, L.C. (edd.), The Correspondence of M. Tullius Cicero (Dublin, 1915), 269Google Scholar here in translating poena as satisfaction for an injury (OLD s.v. 2; TLL 10.1.2497.61).
97 Gildersleeve, B.L. and Lodge, G., Gildersleeve's Latin Grammar (Boston, 1895), 141 §201Google Scholar; Bennett, C.E., A Latin Grammar (Boston, 1895), 108 §145Google Scholar; Allen, J.H., Greenough, J.B., Kittredge, G.L., Howard, A.A. and D'Ooge, B.L. (edd.), Allen and Greenough's New Latin Grammar for Schools and Colleges (Boston, 1903), 139 §225Google Scholar; Hoffman, J.B. and Szantyr, A., Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik (Munich, 1965), 26 §37eGoogle Scholar.
98 Often this is attributed to some lost play: see e.g. How (n. 96), 484; Shackleton Bailey (n. 96), 224. Tyrrell and Purser (n. 96), 269, on the other hand, doubt this attribution to some lost tragedy, thinking it more likely to be Cicero's view of the situation put into Greek. It is in fact unlikely to be from a play owing to its difficult scansion. In short, however, if these are Cicero's words, then this may be a case of ‘graceful distancing’, which is used when wanting to soften a criticism; see Adams, J.N., Bilingualism and the Latin Language (Cambridge, 2003), 329–35CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
99 This does not necessarily have to do with the rumoured plan to kill Antonius on the Ides.