¹ Gercke, A., ‘Eine platonische Quelle des Neuplatonismus’, Rb.Mus. 41 (1886), 266–91.Google Scholar

² Cited according to the edition of Thomas, P., Apuleius: tres de pbilosophia libri (Stuttgart, Teubner, 1970, reprint of edition of 1908–21).Google Scholar

³ Plutarch, , Moralia 568 b-574 f;Google Scholar henceforth simply ‘pseudo-Plutarch’. Cf. the commentaries of de Lacy, P. H. and Einarson, B. (Plutarch, Moralia, Loeb vol. 7, 1959)Google Scholar and of Valgiglio, E. (Pseudo-Plutarco De Fato, Rome, 1964).Google Scholar

⁴ Chs. cxlii-cxc; cited according to the edition of Waszink, J. H., Timaeus: Calcidius. Plato Latinus IV, (London-Leiden, 1962).Google ScholarCf. especially den Boeft, J., Calcidius on fate: his doctrine and sources. Pbilosophia antiqua 18, (Leiden, 1970).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ xxxiv. 740 b-741 a, xxxviii 743 b-756 b, and xliv 796 a. References to Nemesius are by column number of Patrologia Graeca vol. 40, ed. Migne, J.-P., (Paris, 1863).Google Scholar

⁶ (Above, n. 1), p. 279; cf. Theiler, W., ‘Tacitus und die antike Schicksalslehre’, Pbyllobolia für P. von der Mühll (Basel, 1946), p. 71,Google Scholar and den Boeft (above, n. 4), p. 10. (Theiler's essay was reprinted in his Forscbungen zur Neuplatonismus, Berlin, 1966, pp. 46–103;Google Scholar references are to the 1946 edition). In his edition of Calcidius Waszink argued that the common source was Numenius (pp. lviii f., cf. lxi f.), but in his Studien zum Timaioskommentar des Calcidius i. Pbilosophia antiqua 12 (Leiden, 1964), p. 22,Google Scholar n. 2, he changed his position to agree with Theiler as far as the source of chs. cxlii-clix was concerned. Cf. also den Boeft, p. 129.

⁷ Dillon, J. M., The Middle Platonists (London, 1977), pp. 294 ff., 320, 337 f.Google Scholar

⁸ Albinus, , Didasc. xxvi. 179. 7 ff.Google Scholar (cited from the edition by Hermann, C. F. in Platonis Dialogi vol. vi, Leipzig, Teubner, 1902).Google Scholar Cf. pseudo-Plutarch 570 a ff., Calcidius cl. 186. 13 ff., Nemesius xxxviii 765 ab; Gercke (above, n. 1), pp. 273 f., 278 f., Theiler (above, n. 6), pp. 67–82, Dillon (above, n. 7), pp. 294–7, 321–3, 413. Cf. also Nemesius xxxvii 749 b, taken as a reference to the Stoics by Telfer, W., Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa. Library of Christian Classics, 4 (London and Philadelphia, 1955), p. 404,Google Scholar but as a reference to Platonist doctrine by Theiler, , op. cit., p. 79Google Scholar (but cf. n.l) and by Amand, D. (Amand de Mendieta, E.), Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque (Amsterdam, 1973;Google Scholar reprint of Univ. de Louvain, Rec. de travaux d'bist. et de pbilol., 3rd ser., fasc. 19, 1945), p. 565. Cf. below, n. 31.

⁹ Pseudo-Plutarch 568 e, Calcidius cxliv. 182. 16 ff., Nemesius xxxviii 753 b. Gercke (above n. 1), p. 270, Dillon (above, n. 7), pp. 296, 321 f.

¹⁰ Apuleius, de Plat. 1.12 96.2 ff., pseudo-Plutarch 572 ff., Nemesius xliv 793 b; not in Calcidius (but cf. Waszink's notes in his edition on 184.13 and 206.14–18, and id. in Porphyre (Entretiens Hardt 12, 1965) 66Google Scholar). Gercke (above, n. 1), pp. 285 ff.; den Boeft (above, n.4), pp. 15 f.; Dillon (above, n. 7), pp. 323–6.

¹¹ Cod. Par. gr. 1962 fo. 146^V; Theiler (above, n. 6), p. 70 and n. 2, Dillon, p. 267, cf. p. 308.

¹² Dillon, , locc. citt. in n. 7. At pp. 404–7Google Scholar Dillon tentatively suggests that the source (his ‘S’) for those features in Calcidius that do not derive from Adrastus may be Numenius' associate Cronius.

¹³ Plato, , Republic 617 e,Google ScholarPhaedrus 248 c (cf. pseudo-Plutarch 568 cd, Calcidius clii. 187.20, cliv. 189.4, Nemesius xxxviii 753 b, 756 b); also Plato, Laws 903 d ff. (However, the Middle-Platonists transfer to the conse quences of choices made in this earthly life Plato's remarks concerning choices made by the soul outside this life.) Cf. Theiler (above, n. 6), pp. 67–82, and den Boeft (above, n. 4), pp. 30–4.

¹⁴ Cf., in general, Dillon (above, n. 7), pp. 337 f.

¹⁵ i.e. Nemesius and Calcidius (though the latter might indeed be regarded as a Middle Platonist in spite of his later date); cf. Dillon, pp. 401 ff., and below nn. 197–202 on Calcidius' sources.

¹⁶ Cited according to the edition of Bruns, I., Supplementum Aristotelicum II. ii (Berlin, 1892). I am currently preparing a translation of and commentary on this work.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Witt, R. E., Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism (Cambridge, 1937), p. 86 (Alexander and Albinus);Google ScholarTodd, R. B., Alexander of Apbrodisias on Stoic Physics. Philosophiaantiqua 28 (Leiden, 1976), 16 f.,Google Scholar n. 78 (the same); Switalski, B. W., ‘Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Plato's Timaeus’, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittelalters, ed. Baeumker, C. and von Herding, G. F., 3.6 Mü;nster, 1902), 94–6 (Alexander and Calcidius); Theiler (above, n. 6) pp.65 f. and 66, n. 4 (Alexander, Calcidius, and Nemesius).Google Scholar

¹⁸ Long, A. A., ‘Stoic Determinism and Alexander of Aphrodisias de fato (I-XIV)’, Arch. Gescb. Philos 52 (1970), 267.Google Scholar For the Stoics as Alexander's opponents cf. ibid. 247 and my comment, ‘Aristotelian and Stoic Necessity in the de fato of Alexander of Aphrodisias’, Pbronesis 20 (1975), 258, n. 24.Google Scholar Alexander, like Greek writers in general, does not use an expression for ‘free will’; he employs the expression . which I have rendered ‘responsibility’, used both by libertarians and by the Stoics, whose position is a ‘soft-determinist’ one (cf. n. 41). But for the libertarian character of Alexander's position cf. Sharpies, , loc. cit. and p. 256, n. 22.Google Scholar

¹⁹ As for example with the Stoic arguments for determinism from divination (Alexander, , de fato xxxi. 201.32, Calcidius clxi. 194.20–2Google Scholar) and from universal divine foreknowledge (Alexander, , de fato xxx. 200.12; Calcidius clxi. 193.17Google Scholar); Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 95 n. and Waszink, ad loc. Cf. also below, nn. 61, 71, 134, 225.

²⁰ As with the definition of the contingent as what can happen or not (Alexander, , de fato ix. 175.2,Google Scholar Caicidius clxii. 195.16 f.; Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 96) and the discussion of chance, based, both in Alexander and in the Middle-Platonic tradition, on Aristotle (cf. the commentators in nn. 3–4): Aristotle, Phys. 2.5–6, Metaph. Δ 30 1025^a14 ff., 24 ff., Alexander, , de fato viii. 172.17 ff.,Google Scholar xxiv. 194.15 ff., pseudo-Plutarch 571 e ff., Caicidius clviii 191.18 ff., Nemesius xxxix. 761 b ff. Cf. Switalski, p. 96; Waszink, 193.5n.; Domanski, B., ‘Die Psychologie des Nemesius’, Beiträge zur Gescb. derPbilos. des Mittelalters (cf. n. 17), 3.1 (1900), 159,Google Scholar n. 1; Sharpies, ‘Responsibility, Chance and Not-Being (Alexander of Aphrodisias Mantissa 169–172)’, BICS 22 (1975), 46 and nn. 86–9. Cf. also below, § II.

²¹ The question of Caicidius' and Nemesius' sources is too complex to discuss here in full; but cf. Waszink, pp. xxxv-cvi of his edition of Caicidius, den Boeft (above, n. 4) pp. 128–37, and Koch, H. A., Quellenuntersucbungen zu Nemesius von Emesa (Berlin, 1921), especially pp. 22–49. Cf. also below, nn. 197–202, 227–9.Google Scholar

²² On Alexander's later influence cf. especially Théry, G., ‘Autour du décret de 1210: II, Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Apercu sur l'influence de sa noétique’, Bibliotbèque Thomiste (Kain) 7 (1926), 13 ff.Google Scholar

²³ Supplementum Aristotelicum II. i, ed. Brans, I. (Berlin, 1887), 179. 24–186. 31.Google Scholar

²⁴ I am grateful to Professor Long for discussion on this point. Reference will also be made to other sections of the mantissa and of the other collections of short discussions attributed to Alexander; here too questions of authorship are raised, and my use of ‘Alexander’ for the author in such cases is purely for convenience and does not indicate that the passages in question are authentic works of Alexander, though they draw on his work and are probably in any case by authors closely associated with him. Cf. in general the discussions referred to in Sharpies, BICS 22 (1975), 53, n. 28, and addenda, ibid. 23 (1976), 72.

²⁵ Albinus, , Didasc. xxvi. 179.13 ff.,Google Scholar Caicidius cliii. 188. 9 f. Cf. also Maximus Tyrius 13.5, p. 164 Hobein (Leipzig, Teubner, 1910) and Origen in SVF 2.957; but cf. n. 32).

²⁶ XXXI. 202.10 f. Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 95; Witt (above, n. 17), p. 86; M. Dragona-Monachou, ‘Providence and fate in Stoicism and Prae-Neoplatonism’, (Athens) 3 (1973), 271, n. 45. Cf. also Donini, P. L., Tre studi sull' aristotelismo nel 11 secolo d.C. (Padua, 1974), p. 86, n. 8.Google Scholar

²⁷ xxxi. 202.5–25.

²⁸ xxxi. 202.25 ff.; 203.1.

²⁹ SVF 2.956–7, 998. Cf. Theiler (above, n. 6), p. 51, n. 2; Rist, J. M., Stoic Philosophy (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 120 f. Below, n. 42.Google Scholar

³⁰ SVF 2.956; cf. Origen in SVF 2.957 (where however the names are not given—perhaps because they have already been used to make another point; cf. n. 25) and (also without the names) Diogenianus in SVF 2.998, p. 292.34.

³¹ Cf. Theiler (above, n. 6), pp. 73 f.; Valgiglio (above, n. 3), p. XXIX, and ‘Il fato nel pensiero classico antico’, RSC 16(1968), 61 f. and n. 50; Long (above, n. 18), p. 267; Dragona-Monachou, , loc. cit. (above, n. 26).Google Scholar

³² Theiler, , Valgiglio, , locc. citt. Everything is in fate, but not everything according to fate; Albinus xxvi. 179.2 f., pseudo-Plutarch 570 e, cf. 570 be. Contrast, however, Maximus Tyrius, for whom Apollo knew Laius' character and knew that he would disobey (13.5 p. 164 Hobein; Theiler (above, n. 6), p. 51).Google Scholar

³³ SVF 2.978; Theiler, , loc. cit.Google Scholar Admittedly, at SVF p. 284.31 ff.Google Scholar Oenomaus seems to be referring to a view which takes Laius' initial action to be free, which might suggest that he is attacking Platonists rather than Stoics; but he only mentions Chrysippus, Democritus, and ‘prophets’ as his opponents (Patr. Gr. 21.437 be), and 284.28–30 seems to correspond to 284.25 and 27, which do refer to Chrysippus. Oenomaus has, before the passage at 284.31, been attacking the claim to predict Oedipus' action as absurd (Patr. Gr. 21.437d), and in this context it is a useful objection to bring against Chrysippus that he is inconsistent in allowing Laius to be responsible tor his action and yet regarding the oracle as valid so that Oedipus' action is predictable. However, for Chrysippus responsbility for an action is not removed by the fact that it is determined and can be predicted (see below) – a point that Oenomaus ignores.

For conditional oracles cf. Servius in SVF 2.958; and on the possibility, in a deterministic context, of taking precautionary action as the result of a prophecy cf. Cicero, , de div. 2.20 f.,Google Scholar 24, Seneca, , nat. quaest. 2.37, and Diogenianus in SVF 2.939, p. 270.29;Google ScholarGould, J. B., The Philosophy of Chrysippus (Leiden, 1970), p. 145.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁴ SVF 2.939, p. 270.39 ff.

³⁵ This qualification is not in Diogenianus, but seems necessary; the outcome is equally fated before and after Laius' disobedience, but nevertheless it is for Chrysippus on Laius' disobedience that the outcome depends (though not, presumably, in a sense that removes Oedipus' responsibility for his action). Diogenianus does not point out, either, that Laius' attempt to escape his fate was not only ineffective but self-defeating (cf. n. 27 above).

³⁶ Cicero, , de fato 33.Google Scholar

³⁷ Alexander, , de fato xxxi. 202.13.Google Scholar

³⁸ At least with Bruns's conjecture in 202.12 as opposed to Usener's (cf. Bruns's apparatus). I am grateful to Dr. G. E. R. Lloyd for directing my attention to the details of expression of this whole passage.

³⁹ xxx. 200. 12 ff.

⁴⁰ Cf. SVF 2.939,1191 f. Sambursky, S., Physics of the Stoics (London, 1959), pp. 65–71, Gould (above, n. 33), pp. 144 f.Google Scholar

⁴¹ This is shown above all by his ‘cylinderargument’ (SVF 2.974,1000); we are responsible for our actions as being their principal cause, even though they are determined by the combination of principal and auxiliary causes. Cf. Sambursky, , op. cit., pp. 61 ff.;Google ScholarPohlenz, M., La Stoa (ed. Alfieri, V., Florence, 1967) 1.209–11;Google ScholarLong, A. A., Hellenistic Philosophy (London, 1974), pp. 166 f.;Google ScholarDonini, P. L., ‘Fato e volunta umana in Crisippo’, Atti dell' Ace. delle Scienze di Torino 109 (1974-1975), 1–44.Google Scholar For Chrysippus as a ‘soft determinist’ cf. J. B. Gould (above, n. 33), p. 149, n. 1, and p. 152, n. 3.

⁴² On this cf. especially Donini, , op. cit., pp. 28–31.Google Scholar

⁴³ For similar tendentiousness on Alexander's part cf. Long, , Arch. Gesch. Philos. 52 (1970), 249–54, 262.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Cf. Seneca, , de prov. 4.5 ff.,Google ScholarSandbach, F. H., The Stoics (London, 1975), pp. 107 f.Google Scholar; SVF 3.177.

⁴⁵ Cf. Lloyd-Jones, H., The Justice of Zeus (Berkeley, 1971), pp. 119–25.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ xxxi. 202.8 f.

⁴⁷ On the contrast between the positions of these two groups cf. above, n. 32.

⁴⁸ Cf. further below, § III.

⁴⁹ Alexander, , de fato xxxi. 201.30,Google Scholar Calcidius CLVII 191.8 ff., ‘salva est, opinor, divinatio, ne praesagio derogetur auctoritas; potest quippe praescius tali facta informations fati consilium dare aggrediendi vel non aggrediendi, recteque et rationabiliter mathematicus originem captabit instituendi actus ex prosperitate siderum atque signorum, ut, si hoc facta est, proveniat illud.’ Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 96; Waszink, ad loc.

⁵⁰ Contrast Oenomaus in SVF 2.978, who finds it implausible that Apollo should know the consequences of Laius' disobedience but not whether he would disobey (above, n. 33).

⁵¹ Cf. de fato xxxi. 201.30;Google Scholar also x. 176.27 ff. (on the reading at 177.1 f. cf. Apelt, O., ‘Die kleinen Schriften des Alexander von Aphrodisias’, Rh. Mus. 49 (1894), 61–3,Google Scholar and Langerbeck, H., ‘Zu Alexander von Aphrodisias de fato X’, Hermes 71 (1936), 473 f.), mantissa 179.16 ff., and below, n. 186.Google Scholar

⁵² de fato vi. 170.9 ff.Google Scholar (even if there are difficulties in Alexander's position here; cf. my remarks at Phronesis 20 (1975), 267–71).Google Scholar

⁵³ de fato xxvii. 197.3–199.7, xxix. 199.24–9.Google ScholarCf. Donini, , Tre studi, pp. 171–3, 180f.;Google ScholarSharpies, , BICS 22 (1975), 44 and nn.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ de fato xxix. 199.29 ff.;Google Scholar cf. mantissa 174.27–35. Cf. Donini, , Tre studi 176–184,Google ScholarSharpies, , loc. cit.;Google Scholar also Pack, R. A., ‘A passage in Alexander of Aphrodisias relating to the theory of tragedy’, AJPh 58 (1937), 429 and n. 36.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Granted, Oedipus failed to recognize Laius; even so, however, he presumably both could and should have refrained from killing the unknown person he had met.

⁵⁶ Pack, , op. cit., pp. 428 f. At p. 429 Pack argues that Laius was predisposed to disobedience by his nature, but could have acted otherwise.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ mantissa 185.33; cf. Pack, p. 428 and n. 30. Cf. also de fato vi. 171.7, mantissa 186.8.

⁵⁸ Albinus, , Didasc. xxvi. 179.7;Google Scholar for Alexander cf. n. 61. Witt (above n. 17), p. 86; Todd (above, n. 17), pp. 16 f., n. 78, the latter also citing Clement Strom. 1.17, Patr. Gr. 8.800 a. Cf. my comments at Phoenix 31 (1977), 89.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Cicero, , de fato 40Google Scholar (on which cf. Huby, P. M., ‘An Epicurean Argument in Cicero, de fato XVII-40’, Phronesis 15 (1970), 83–5)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; also Plutarch, , de Stoic. Rep. 1050 c,Google Scholarpseudo-Plutarch, , de fato 574 c.Google Scholar Praise and blame are connected with by Epicurus, , ad Menoeceum 133;Google Scholarcf. Aristode, , Eth. Nic. 3.1 1109^b30. Amand (above, n. 8), pp. 574–8; Koch (above, n. 21) p. 37.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ SVF 2.1000, pp. 293.39, 294.3. Cf., for praise and blame, Diogenianus in SVF 2.998, p. 292.5; though the introduction of praise and blame here could be Diogenianus own.

⁶¹ de fato xxvi. 196.25 f.Google Scholar, 197.1 f., xxxv. 206.1; and cf. in Todd's fourth passage, xxxiv. 206.28–30. He also cites xxxvi. 209.20–210.3; for Alexander's own use of the argument one might also add xvi. 187.26 ff.

⁶² Cf. e.g. at Alexander, , de fato xxiv. 206.30,Google Scholar xxxvi. 209.21, with Diogenianus, SVF p. 292.25; it does not occur in the passages of Albinus or Clement cited by Todd.

⁶³ clvii. 194.14–17, clxiii 196.3 ff.; cf. Waszink ad loc, Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 96 fin. So too Nemesius xxxv. 741 b; Amand (above, n. 8), p. 568.

⁶⁴ Alexander, , de fato xvii. 188.1 ff.,Google Scholar Calcidius clxv. 203.9–13; Waszink, , ad loc. Nemesius, loc. cit.; Amand, loc. cit.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Alexander, , de fato xvii. 188.11–17,Google Scholar Calcidius clxxv. 211.9–13; Waszink, ad loc, (but the parallel hardly seems a close one). Cf. also above, n. 49.

⁶⁶ Alexander, , de fato xxxvi. 209.4, 12, Calcidius clvii. 191.13; Switalski, p. 96. Nemesius, loc. cit. and xxxix. 765 b; Amand, p. 568 and n. 1.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Alexander, , de fato xvi. 186.30 ff.,Google Scholar Calcidius clxv. 203.15 f.; Waszink, ad loc.

⁶⁸ Cicero, , de fato 28–30.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ On the uselessness of law if all is determined cf. Amand, pp. 93 (Philo, deprov. 1.80) and 574 ff.; for the incompatibility of providence and prophecy with determinism, ibid., pp. 584 f.

⁷⁰ Alexander, , de fato xxxv. 207.8,Google Scholar… Calcidius clvii. 191.14, ‘… iussum sciscens honesta, prohibens contraria.’ Waszink, , ad loc.; Switalski (above n. 17), p. 95.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Marcianus, Dig. 1.3.2; Gercke, A., ‘Chrysippe’ Jabrbuch für klass. Phil. Suppl. 14 (1885), 694.Google Scholar Moreover, whereas the definition in Calcidius forms part of his own argument against determinism (above, n. 66) that in Alexander is part of one that he gives as his opponents' (xxxv. 207.5–21).

⁷² As pointed out above, parallels between Alexander and Nemesius or Calcidius admit of explanation, not in terms of a common source, but in those of the influence of Alexander on the later authors; further parallels between Alexander and these authors will be discussed below.

⁷³ Cf. Sharpies, , Phronesis 20 (1975), 247–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar (the contingent); BICS 22 (1975), 47Google Scholar (chance); Phronesis 20 (1975), 267–71,Google Scholar and Donini, , Tre studi, pp. 171 f. (fate and nature).Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Cf. also my comments at Phronesis 20 (1975), 259 ff. and n. 37.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ mantissa 181.22–8; cf. Sharpies, , Phronesis 20 (1975), 271–4.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ de fato xxvii. 197.3–17, xxix. 199.24–29;Google Scholar cf. Aristotle, , Eth. Nic. 3.5 1114^a13–21.Google ScholarDonini, , Tre studi, pp. 171 f., 180 f.;Google ScholarSharpies, , BICS 22 (1975), p f.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Pseudo-Plutarch 570 f – 571 a, Nemesius xxxiv. 740 b; not in Albinus, Apuleius, or Calcidius. Dillon (above, n. 7), p. 323.

⁷⁸ Pseudo-Plutarch 571 b, Calcidius civ. 189.13 ff., Nemesius xxxiv. 740 b; Gercke, , Rh. Mus. 41 (1886), 274 f.Google Scholar Cf. also Boethius, in de interpretatione comm. ed. sec. 234.3 ff. (ed. Meiser, C., Leipzig, Teubner, 1877Google Scholar (ed. pr.)and 1880 (ed. sec.); henceforth ‘Boethius comm. ed. pr./ ed. sec.’ simply); and id. SVF 2.201 fin. with the comments of Mates, B., Stoic Logic ² (Berkeley, 1961), p. 37, n. 52.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Pseudo-Plutarch 571 cd, Calcidius clvi. 190.8 ff., Nemesius xxxiv. 737 ab, 740 c-741 a. This docttine reflects various Aristotelian texts (de int. 9,19^a19, ^a38 ff., an. pr. 1.13, 32^b4 ff., Metapb. E 2, 1026^b20 ff., K 8, 1064^b28 ff.) and appears in Alexander, in an pr. 1.13, 162 f. and in top. 2.6, 177.22 ff., without however the explicit connection of the middle class of the contingent with human choice; it is common later (Ammonius, in de int. 9, 142.1 ff., 151.9–152.11; Philoponus, in an. pr. 1.13, 151.27 ff.) Cf. den Boeft, , op. cit., pp. 39, 45 n. 2, 99,Google Scholar and Frede, D., Aristoteles und die ‘Seeschlacbt’ (Hypomnemata 27, Gottingen, 1970, pp. 60–2.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ def ato ix. 175.7Google Scholar (cf. Domański (above, n. 20), p. 148, n. 1, Waszink, p. 189.19n.); cf. quaest. (Suppl. Arist. II. ii) ii. 5, 52.5–7.

⁸¹ Alexander ap. Simplicius, in de caelo 359.1 ff.; Baltes, M., Die Weltentstehung des Platoniscben Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten iGoogle Scholar (Philosopbia antiqua 30, Leiden, 1976), 77.Google Scholar

⁸² Quaest. i.18, 31.18 ff. For the impossible as that of which the opposite is necessary cf. Aristotle, Metaph. Δ 12, 1019^b23.Google Scholar

⁸³ Cf. de fato v. 169.6 ff., xii. 180.6 ff.; Pack (above, n. 54), pp. 423 f. For a more explicit expression of the point cf. mantissa 184.7–13; also 173.4–6.

⁸⁴ Contrast Domański, p. 155, n. 1. Koch (above, n. 21), p. 41. The notion of the contingent that can equally well occur or not is indeed implied at de fato vii. 172.7 f.Google Scholar, ix. 175.17 (cf. Sharpies, , Phronesis 20 (1975), 251, n. 8)Google Scholar, 176.10; but it is not there especially connected with human choice; and at in an. pr. 1.13 162.32 f. Alexander describes the results of choice as usual though giving human actions as examples of what can equally well occur or not (cf. n. 79). Cf. also n. 205.

⁸⁵ Merlan, P., ‘Zwei Untersuchungen zu Alexander von Aphrodisias’, Philologus 113 (1969), 90 f., on quaest. 11.21 70.34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸⁶ Alexander fr. 36 in Freudenthal, J., ‘Die durch Averroes erhaltenen Fragmente Alexanders zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles’, Abhandl. der Berliner Akadamie 1884, 1Google Scholar (Moraux, P., Alexandre d 'Apbrodise: Exégète de la noétique d 'AristoteGoogle Scholar (Bibl. de la fac. de philos. et lettres de l'Univ. de Liège 99, Liege and Paris, 1942), 200Google Scholar), and Thillet, P., ‘Un traité inconnu d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise sur la providence dans une version arabe inédite’, L'Homme et son destin … Actes du ler congres internat. de pbilos. médiévale (Louvain, 1960), p. 321, lines 3–5.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Ps.-Plutarch 573 a; cf. Nemesius xliv. 793 b. Cf. also Justin Martyr c. Trypb. 1.4, Patr. Gr. 6.473 c-476 a.

⁸⁸ fr.2 in Vitelli, G., ‘Due Frammenti di Alessandro di Afrodisia’, Festchrift Tbeodor Gomperz (Vienna, 1902), pp. 90–3)Google Scholar. (I am grateful to Professor Robert B. Todd for drawing my attention to this passage.)

⁸⁹ 272 e.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Above, n. 10; Dillon (above, n. 7) p. 324.

⁹² X. 164.16 (t; cf. Dillon, p. 282.

⁹³ Dillon, pp. 366–71.

⁹⁴ On inter-school polemic in general cf. Dillon, pp. 249 f.; but cf. below, § 111 fin.

⁹⁵ Pack's presentation of the de fato as ‘a classification of causes’ (above, n. 54), p. 418 is over-systematic (in spite of xxvii. 211.1 ff.). The dialectical, ad homines character of much of Alexander's discussion also plays a part here; above, n. 51.

⁹⁶ Cf. Sharpies, , BICS 22 (1975), 42 and nn. 43, 45; 44–9.Google Scholar

⁹¹ chs. xxvii-xxix; cf. also xv. 185.21–8 and mantissa 174.13–39. Donini, , Tre studt, pp. 170–84,Google ScholarSharpies, , BICS 22 (1975), 43 f. Above, nn. 53–4, 75.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ viii. 172.17 ff., xxiv. 194.15 ff. Sharpies, , BICS 22 (1975), 46–9.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ ix. 175.16 ff. Sharpies, , Phronesis 20 (1975), 247–58 and 265, n. 48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Above, nn. 96–7.

¹⁰¹ He does connect human choice with a particular class of the contingent (n. 79), but he does not analyse the processes leading to human action, in the context of the problem of freedom and determinism, in the same way as does Alexander (n. 97). (571 d hardly goes against this.) Cf. Koch (above, n. 21), p. 41 on Nemesius.

¹⁰¹ Above, nn. 20 (chance), 79 (Aristotelian foundations of the Middle-Platonic discussion of the contingent).

¹⁰³ Above, nn. 98, 99.

¹⁰⁴ Above, nn. 96, 97, 100.

¹⁰⁵ Pseudo-Plutarch, 574 ef.

¹⁰⁶ (Above, n. 7), pp. 211, 325.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. p. 250.

¹⁰⁸ , The latter part of ch.X (177.7 ff.) may be cited as an extreme case.

¹⁰⁹ de fato xiii. 181.15–182.8Google Scholar (SVF 2.979). For fire heating cf. xi. 179.15, xiv. 183.11, 184.13, and with the examples at xiii. 181.19 cf. also xiii. 182.8 ff., xiv. 185.3 f., xv. 185.17 f., 28 ff., xix. 189.21 ff., xxxiv. 205.27 ff. (below, n. Ill), xxxvi. 208.6 f., 23 ff. Cf. also D.L. 7.86, and, for impulse as characteristic of living creatures, SVF 2.714, 844.

¹¹⁰ xiii. 182.8–20. Cf. Rieth, O., Grundbegriffe der Stoischen Etbik (Problemata 9, Berlin, 1933), pp. 144 ff.;Google ScholarBréhier, V., Chrysippe et l'ancien stoïcisme ² (Paris, 1951), p. 193Google Scholar and nn. 2, 3; Sambursky, S., Physics of the Stoics (London, 1959), pp. 63 ff.;Google ScholarLong, A. A., Arch. Gesch. Philos. 52 (1970), 260 ff.Google Scholar and Problems in Stoicism (London, 1971), pp. 180 ff.;Google ScholarDonini, P. L., Atti dell' Acc. delle Scienze di Torino 109 (1974-1975), 32 ff.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ xxxiv. 205.24 ff. (SVF 2.1002); linked with ch. xiii by Guttmann, J., ‘Das Problem der Willensfreiheit bei Crescas …’, Jewish Studies in Memory of G. A. Kohut, ed. Baron, S. W. et al. (1935), p. 341, n. 21.Google Scholar

¹¹² Above, n. 41. Alexander's description of external causes as (xiii. 181.29) recalls adiuvantia in Cicero de fato 41 (SVF 2.974; cf. Donini, , op. cit., p. 34);Google Scholar cf. also xxxiv. 205.29 (n. 111) with SVF 2.1000, p. 294.7 ff. (on which cf. Long, , Problems, p. 197,Google Scholar n. 48, Donini, p. 13). Cf. also Bréhier, , loc. cit., Theiler (above, n. 6),Google Scholar and Long, , Arch. Gesch. Philos. 52 (1970), 261; also below, nn. 126 ff., 142.Google Scholar

¹¹³ Cf. Long, , op. cit., p. 263.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ Cf. Reesor, M. E., ‘Fate and Possibility in Early Stoic Philosophy’, Phoenix 19 (1965), 288 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Long, , op. cit., p. 262.Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ xiv. 183.5 ff., cf. xiii. 182.16 ff.; Long, , op. cit., pp. 262Google Scholar f., Problems, 196, n. 26.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ xiii. 181.14, 182.12 ff. (quoted below, p. 258); cf. also 182.6–8, and xxxvi, 208.3, xxii. 192.7, xxxi. 203.13.

¹¹⁷ xiv. 183.21–185.7; Long, , Arch. Gesch Philos. 52 (1970), 263 ff.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ xxv. 744 a ff. (SVF 2.991); with the example of the plant (SVF 2, p. 290.26 f.) cf. Alexander, , de fato xxxvi. 208.16 (above, n. 109).Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ comm. ed. sec. 195.10 f.

¹²⁰ 3.1, 7.14 ff.

¹²¹ It may be noted, however, that Aristotle regards the downwards movement of a stone as due to necessity in accordance with (An. Post. 2.11,94^b37 ff.). Seneca nat. quaest. 2.24.2 f. and 6.17.1 speaks of fire rising as going where it wishes (Voelke, A.-J., L' Idée de volonté dans le stoícisme (Paris, 1973), p. 107, n. 4).Google Scholar

¹²² SVF 2.991, p. 290.41 ff.; one might as well say that burning is because fire burns by nature. Nemesius says that Philopator seems to suggest this in his de fato (cf. n. 132); the suggestion was presumably unintentional.

¹²³ xxxiv. 745 b (only partly in SVF).

¹²⁴ Ibid. Theiler attributes the formulation with to Philopator himself (above, n. 6), p. 66; it may rather be his libertarian critics' way of putting the point.

¹²⁵ Calcidius clxi. 194.23 ff.; ‘siquidem necesse sit agi per nos agente fato’. The parallel between Alexander, Calcidius, and Nemesius is noted by Theiler, , op. cit., p. 66Google Scholar and n. 2; cf. den Boeft (above, n. 4), pp. 51 f.

¹²⁶ SVF 2.991, p. 290.29, cf. 34; Sambursky (above, n. 110), pp. 63 f. That men's actions being in accordance with their impulse is a reason for holding them responsible is asserted by Chrysippus ap. Gellius SVF 2.1000, p. 294.27; Theiler (above, n. 6), p. 63 n. 5. The freedom of the Stoic sage (rather than responsibility) consists in having a will conformed to fate and hence never thwarted, cf. SVF 3.355, 356, 544, Epictet. Diss. 1.12.9, 2.23.42, 4.1.28 ff. Long, , Problems, pp. 189 ff. and nn.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ xiii. 181.21, 29, 182.5; cf. in 181.27.

¹²⁸ Above, n. 115.

¹²⁹ SVF 2.991, p. 290.33, 39.

¹³⁰ xiii. 182.13–16.

¹³¹ SVF 2.991, p. 290.43, 28 respectively; for fire rising cf. Aristot. An. Post. 2.11, 94^b37 ff. (n. 121), Etb. Nic. 2.1 1103^a19; also Marcus Aurelius 10.32.2 f. For Alexander cf. n. 109.

¹³² Galen, , an. pass. 31.24Google Scholar Marquardt (Leipzig, Teubner, 1884); Theiler, , op. cit., pp. 66 f.Google Scholar Cf. Gercke, , Jahrb. für klass. Philol. Supplbd. 14 (1885), 692, 695;Google Scholar Pohlenz (above, n. 41), 2.26, n. 30, 2.160 and n. 3; Telfer (above, n. 8), p. 398 n. 4.,

¹³³ Long, , Arch. Gesch. Philos. 52 (1970), 247 n. 2, 266.Google Scholar

¹³⁴ Theiler concluded that Philopator was the target of a common source followed by both Alexander and Nemesius (pp. 66 f.). If the formulation with is not Philopator's (above, n. 124) its presence in both Alexander and Nemesius may suggest an antideterminist common source. (Calcisius, above, n. 125, could have derived it from Alexander, while not taking over argument ‘A’.) Alternatively, Alexander and Nemesius (or his source) could have formulated their objection in a similar way independently. Cf. below, § VIII and n. 237; also n. 148.

¹³⁵ Contrast de fato xiii. 181.19, 182.8, xiv. 185.3 with xi. 179.15, xix. 189.21, xxxvi. 208.23.

¹³⁶ Above, n. 113.

¹³⁷ SVF 2.1000, p. 294.16. Cf. in general Vollgraff, G., ‘De lapide cylindro’, Mnemosyne 2.52 (1924), 207–11.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ Alexander, , de fato xiii. 181.19 etc.;Google Scholar Nemesius SVF 2.991, p. 290.27. Cf. Gercke, , op. cit. (n. 132), p. 694.Google Scholar

¹³⁹ xxxvi. 208.23; cf. xv. 185.17 ff. (where the text is correct; cf. Rodier, G., ‘Conjectures sur le texte du de fato d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise’, Rev. Phil. 25 (1901), 67Google Scholar as against Hackforth, R., ‘Notes on some passages of Alexander Aphrodisiensis de fato’, CQ 40 (1946), 38).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴⁰ Cf. turbinem, Cicero, de fato 42 fin.; Yon, A., Cicéron: traité du destin (Paris, Budé, 1950), pp. 22, 41 f.; Donini (above, n. 110), p. 4.Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ 398^b28 ff; Lorimer, W. L., ‘Some notes on the text of pseudo-Aristotle de mundo’ (St. Andrews University Publications 21, 1925), pp. 63–5,Google ScholarMaguire, J. P., ‘The sources of pseudo-Aristotle de mundo’, YCS 6 (1939), 151 f,Google Scholar comparing with the present passage of Alexander the following example of the different behaviour of different types of creatures when released (de mundo 6, 398^b30 ff.).Google Scholar

¹⁴² Cf. n. 116; SVF 2.1000, p. 294.2 f., 20 f. Donini, , op. cit., pp. 12–15.Google Scholar Cf. also Marcus Aurelius 10.33.2 f. (Vollgraff, (above, n. 137), p. 211.)

¹⁴³ Cf. Moraux, P., ‘Alexander von Aphrodisias Quaest. 2.3’, Hermes 95 (1967), 160 n. 2, 163.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ xxii. 192.22 ff.: … Cf. also xv. 185.7–10, mantissa 170.2 ff., 174.3 ff., Sharpies, , Phronesis 20 (1975), 250, 262 f. and n. 39.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ SVF 2.991, p. 290.36–8: …

¹⁴⁶ 3.1, 2.30ff. (SVF 2.946, p. 273.42–4): … Cf. Alexander, , de fato xxii. 192.1–15.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ So of the latter Bruns, I., Interpretationsvariae (Kiel, 1893) 12.Google Scholar Cf. Porphyry, , Life of Plotinus 14 (though this refers to Alexander's commentaries, not explicitly to the independent treatises).Google ScholarArmstrong, A. H., Cambridge History of Later Creek and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1967), p. 212;CrossRefGoogle ScholarWallis, R. T., Neoplatonism (London, 1972), p. 29;Google ScholarVerbeke, , Arch. Gesch. Philos. 50 (1978), 74.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ Cf. in general on this Long, , Arch. Gesch. Philos. 52 (1970), 268 n. 54,Google Scholar and Problems, p. 196 n. 27.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁹ SVF 2.1000, p. 293.30–2:

¹⁵⁰ SVF 2.921–2. Cf. also Cicero, , de fato 19–21,Google ScholarSVF 2.917 (Aétius), 973 (Plutarch).

¹⁵¹ Comm. ed. sec. 195.21 ff., 217.25 ff.

¹⁵² Ibid. 195.15–21, 217.23–25; cf. above, n. 113. (Cf., however, ‘quod ipsa voluntas ex nobis est et secundum animalis naturam’, 196.2 f.).

¹⁵³ 196.3–197.4;above, n. 117. (At 218.8 ff. Boethius objects that if our will is subject to fate it cannot be free; but he does not explicitly make the point that the Stoic theory does away with any meaningful difference between living creatures and inanimate objects, at least from a libertarian point of view.)

¹⁵⁴ For the contrast between and cf. also Alexander, , quaest. iii. 13, 107.6 ff., etc.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁵ Cf. above, nn. 116, 124.

¹⁵⁶ For the complaint that the Stoics interpret in their own idiosyn cratic sense cf. Alexander, , de fato xiv. 182.29, also xxxviii. 211.31; Plotinus 3.1, 7.15 (above, n. 120).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁷ Zeller, E., A History of Eclecticism in Greek Philosophy, tr. Alleyne, S. F. (London, 1883), pp. 319 f. n. 1; cf. below, n. 224.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁸ That Ammonius and Boethius knew Alexander's de interpretatione commentary through that of Porphyry is argued by Beutler, R., art. ‘Porphyrios (21)’, RE 22.1 (1953), 284;Google Scholar for the influence of Porphyry on Ammonius and Boethius cf. Merlan, P., ‘Ammonius Hermiae, Zacharias Scholasticus and Boethius’, GRBS 9 (1978), 199 f.;Google Scholar also den Boeft, , op. cit., p. 134,Google ScholarFrede, , op. cit. (n. 79), p. 26 n. 1. J. Shiel,Google Scholar‘Boethius' commentaries on Aristotle’, Med. and Renaissance Studies 4 (1958), 217–44,Google Scholar argues that Porphyry was the intermediary between Alexander and Boethius' commentaries on de int. (231) but holds that Boethius' knowledge of Porphyry was not direct but from scholia combining Porphyrian with later material (pp. 231–4, cf. pp. 227, 242–4).

¹⁵⁹ Théry, G. (above, n. 22) p. 17 and n. 2.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁰ Cf. the comment of Proclus, , in Tim. 3.272.7 ff.Google Scholar Diehl that Alexander's doctrine of fate is not in accord with the common notions of men on the subject (cf. mantissa 186.9–13); and above, n. 76.

¹⁶¹ loc. cit.

¹⁶² xi. 178.12; for the term cf. SVF 2.1156–7, Epictetus, diss. 2.8.6.Google ScholarVerbeke, , Arch. Gesch. Philos. 50 (1978), 87 n. 47.Google Scholar Alexander allows that there are some things that are not ‘for the sake of anything' ( cf. v. 169.2): iv. 167.22–168.2, V. 168.26 f.

¹⁶³ xi. 178.8–180.2. For nature doing nothing in vain cf. Aristotle, , de caelo 1.4, 271^a33,Google ScholarPolitics 1.2, 1253^a9, 1.8, 1256^b20.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁴ xi. 179.24; cf. Verbeke, , loc. cit. So also at Ammonius, in de int. 148.19 (below, n. 166).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁵ mantissa 183.15 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁶ in de int. 148.11 ff.Google Scholar For another parallel between Alexander and Ammonius cf. Ammonius 150.23 f., though the general idea is admittedly a commonplace (cf. Amand (above, n. 8), pp. 573 f., and especially Chrysostom, John, horn. 8, Patr. Gr. 63.510.33. f.Google Scholar (ibid. 517)).

¹⁶⁷ comm. ed. sec. 220.8 ff.

¹⁶⁸ Alexander, , de fato xi. 178.12,Google Scholarmantissa 183.25–9 (cf. also ibid. 172.19 ff., 173.6 ff.); Ammonius, , in de int. 142.17–20.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁹ Boethius, , comm. ed. sec. 196.26 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁰ xxxix. 764 b.

¹⁷¹ loc. cit.; cf. xli. 773 c-776 a. For the parallel with Alexander cf. Domański, (above, n. 20), pp. 152 f. and n. 1;Google ScholarSiclari, A., L 'antropologia di Nemesio de Emesa, (Padua, 1974), p. 244 and n. 33.Google Scholar

¹⁷² Calcidius clxiii. 196.3, compared with Alexander, , de fato xi. 178.8 ff.Google Scholar by Switalski, (above, n. 17), p. 96.Google Scholar

¹⁷³ Above, nn. 117,154; Verbeke (above, n. 162), p. 90 n. 57. Nemesius xli. 773 b-776 a; Doma–ski, , op. cit., pp. 166 f.Google Scholar Calcidius, clvi. 190.12 f., compared with Alexander, , de fato xi. 178.17 ff., xiv. 183.30 ff., xv. 186.3 ff.Google Scholar by Switalski, , p. 95,Google Scholar Waszink, p. 190.13n.; however, the point preceding this passage in Calcidius, the link between re sponsibility and that sub-class of the contin gent that can equally well happen or not, is absent from Alexander (cf. n. 84).

¹⁷⁴ mantissa 184.14–18.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁵ comm. ed. sec. 236.11–16;Google Scholarcf. Sharpies, , Pbronesis 20 (1975), 248 n. 3.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁶ Alexander, , de fato xi. 178.11 (n. 162),Google Scholarmantissa 183.26;Google ScholarBoethius, , comm. ed. sec. 236.16 (proprium).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁷ mantissa 184.18 ff.,Google ScholarBoethius, , comm. ed. sec. 236.5 ff., cf. 237.24 f.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁸ Hintikka, J., Time and Necessity (Oxford, 1973), pp. 100, 171 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁹ comm. ed. pr. 120.1, ed. sec. 190.1, 14, 203.4, 240.5.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁰ Chs. viii, ix-x, and xi ff. respectively.

¹⁸¹ de fato xxiv. 194.23–5;Google Scholar cf. also mantissa 184.27 ff. (coming just after a discussion of the contingent), 183.1–8. Contrast de fato vii. 172.4 ff. where only chance and the contingent are mentioned.

¹⁸¹ Pseudo-Plutarch 570 f; Dillon, (above, n. 7), p. 323.Google Scholar

¹⁸³ Above, nn. 79, 101; cf. pseudo-Plutarch 570 f. The threefold division of the contingent (n. 79) does also appear in Boethius, ; cf. comm. ed. pr. 120.24 ff., ed. sec. 188.4, 192.16, 240.8, 248.20.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁴ xxx. 200.28–201.6, 201.21–4. Cf. Cicero, , de div. 2.15 ff., 25, de fato 32;Google ScholarPease, A. S., Cicero: de divinatione (Chicago, 1920-1923), pp. 372 ff.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁵ xxx. 201.24–9. With Alexander's strategy in this argument cf. Boethius, , comm. ed. sec. 225.17 ff.Google Scholar, 21 ff.; but his position is in fact different (cf. n. 193). On Alexander's argument cf. Huber, P., Die Vereinbarkeit von göttlicber Vorsehung und menschlicber Freiheit in der Consolatio Philosophiae des Boethius (Zurich, 1976), pp. 13 f.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁶ xxx. 201.13–18, cf. 201.28 ff., and 200.25–7 where the possibility that there is a type of foreknowledge that is compatible with contingency is perhaps kept open

¹⁸⁷ de prov. 63.8 ff., dec. dub. q.2, 7.28, 8.9 (these works cited by reference to the Latin translation by William of Moerbeke in Boese, H., Procli Diadochi Tria Opuscula, Berlin 1960Google Scholar (Quell, u. Stud, zur Gesch. der. Philos. 1)), El. Theol. 93, 124, in Tim. 1.352.5–27Google ScholarDiehl, , in Parm. 1.956.10 ff.Google Scholar especially 957.18 ff. Cousin; cf. Iamblichus ap. Ammonius in de int. 9, 135.12 ff., Boethius, , comm. ed. sec. 225.21 ff.Google Scholar, 226.12 f., cons. phil. 5.3–6,Google ScholarPsellus, , de omnif. doctr. 17.7,Google ScholarAquinas, St. Thomas, Summ. Theol. la q. 14 art. 13,Google ScholarSumma contra Gentiles 1.67. Patch, H. R., ‘Necessity in Boethius and the Neoplatonists’, Speculum 10 (1935), 399;CrossRefGoogle ScholarTheiler, , op. cit., pp. 51 f.Google Scholar; Dodds, E. R., Proclus: The Elements of Theology ² (Oxford, 1963), pp. 266 f.Google Scholar; den Boeft (above, n. 4), pp. 53–6; Wallis (above, n. 147), p. 149; Huber (above, n. 185), pp. 45 ff. In Proclus himself, however, the emphasis is not on foreknowledge and the problem of freedom so much as on that of divine knowledge of what is indefinite, subject to change and infinite, except in de prov. On the relation between the solutions of Proclus, Ammonius and Boethius cf. Huber, pp. 20–59.

¹⁸⁸ Proclus, , de prov. 64,Google Scholardec. dub. q.2, 7.10 ff., El. Tbeol. 124, in Tim. 1.352.15, in Parm. 1.956.10 ff.; Iamblichus ap. Iamblichus ap. Ammonius 135.15 ff., 136.1 ff. especially 11, Boethius cons. phil. 5pr.4.72ff., pr.6.1ff., 59 ff., Psellus, , op. cit. 17.1 ff.Google Scholar, Aquinas, , Summ. Theol. la q.14 art.13 ad 2. Patch (above, n. 187), p. 399 and n. 4, Frede (above, n. 79), pp. 122 f., Huber (above, n. 185), pp. 40 ff,Google Scholar

¹⁸⁹ de prov. 63.1–5, cf. dec. dub. q.2, 6.3 ff. Theiler (above, n. 6), pp. 51 f. n. 4; Hager, F. P., ‘Proklos und Alexander von Aphrodisias uber ein Problem der Vorsehung’, Kephalaion: Studies … presented to C. J. de Vogel (Assen, 1975), pp. 171–82.Google ScholarHuber, , op. cit., pp. 22 f.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁰ So Theiler, (above, n. 6), pp. 51 f. n. 4;Google ScholarHager, op. cit., pp. 175–8;Google ScholarHuber, , op. cit., 22 and n. 8 (but cf. below, n. 193).Google ScholarCf. Wallis, (above, n. 147), p. 149.Google Scholar

¹⁹¹ Above, n. 184; cf. Huber, , p. 42 n. 18.Google Scholar

¹⁹² de fato xxx. 201.12–16.Google Scholar

¹⁹³ Proclus dec. dub. q.2, 8.10 ff., Boethius comm. ed. sec. 225.25 ff. (wrongly assimilated to (1) by Huber, p. 18 n. 45, who fails to observe that it is explicitly stated that God does know the outcome (226.12 f.) – that is, it would seem from the context, bow men will choose, not just what will happen if they choose in a certain way). Cf. also cons. phil. 5 pr.6.93; and for the application to a view of type (1), Calcidius clxii. 195.6 (below, n. 194).

¹⁹⁴ So Huber, , p. 14.Google Scholar View (2) is after all paradoxical (ibid., pp. 45, 59) and is only naturally advanced as a reaction to (1). Cf. especially Alexander, , de fato xxx. 201.18–21.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁵ clxii. 195.2 ff.; den Boeft (above, 1.4), pp. 53 ff., Huber, , pp. 18 f.Google Scholar The parallel with Alexander is also noted by Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 96, Theiler (above, n. 6), p. 50 n. 3.

¹⁹⁶ Porphyry, ap. Proclus, in Tim. 1.352.12.Google ScholarDen Boeft, and Huber, , locc. citt.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁷ Waszink, introduction to edition of Calcidius, pp. xxxviii-lxxxii; on fate cf. especially lviii-lxii. (However, cf. above, n. 6).

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. lxii f., lxxx f. For Calcidius' use of Porphyry cf. ibid., pp. xc-xcv; van Winden, J. C. M., Calcidius on Matter (Pbilosopbia antiqua 9, Leiden, 1959), p. 247;CrossRefGoogle Scholar den Boeft (above, n.4), pp. 131–7; Waszink, , ‘Calcidius: Nachträge zum Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum’, Jahrb. für Antike und Cbristentum 15 (1972), 240 f.Google ScholarContra, Dillon, (above, n. 7), pp. 401–4.Google Scholar

²⁰⁰ Waszink, , introduction to edition of Calcidius, pp. lxiii, lxxxvi, xc, cii;Google Scholar cf. den Boeft, , p. 134.Google Scholar

²⁰⁰ Waszink, pp. lx f.; Calcidius clxxi. 200.14 ff., clvii. 191.12 respectively. For Old Testament references as a sign of Numenian influence cf. Waszink, pp. xlii-xliv, lxviii f., lxxxvii; Dillon, p. 405. Waszinkat first argued tht they could not come through Porphyry, (pp. xlii n. 2, cv) but later revised his position (Entretiens Hardt 12 (1965), 61. f.Google Scholar and n. 1; den Boeft, p. 135). Cf. how ever below, n. 202.

²⁰¹ Waszink, introduction to edition of Calcidius, p. lxi. Cf. den Boeft, pp. 71 and 128 f. Den Boeft himself connects the doctrine of foreknowledge of the contingent as contingent, both in Calcidius and in Porphyry, with Timaeus 29 be and Porphyry's commentary on that work, rather than with Alexander (den Boeft, pp. 53–6); it is true that this might seem to be supported by the absence of any specific reference to foreknowledge in the Porphyry passage, but this might only reflect its being reported by Proclus (cf. above, n. 187).

²⁰² Den Boeft, , pp. 135 f.;Google ScholarWaszink, , Jahrh. für Antike und Christentum 15 (1972), 236–44.Google Scholar

²⁰³ Albinus, , Didasc. xxvi. 179.28,Google Scholar pseudo-Plutarch 570 F (above, n. 79). Theiler, , op. cit., p. 74 and n. 6: followed in the attribution to Gaius by Huber (above, n. 185), p. 18 n. 44.Google Scholar

²⁰⁴ Above, n. 83.

²⁰⁵ Cf. also Albinus 179.29. Above, n. 84.

²⁰⁶ Theiler (above, n. 6), p. 50 n. 3; above, n. 78.

²⁰⁷ Above, pp. 250–1.

²⁰⁸ Ammonius, , in de int. 131.2–4,138.16 f., 139.14 f., etc.;Google ScholarBoethius, , comm. ed. pr. 106.30, 115.5, etc.,Google Scholarcomm. ed. sec. 191.5, 208.11 ff., 215.21 ff., 245.9, 246.12, 219.29. Cf. Lukasiewicz, J., ‘Philosophical remarks on many-valued systems of prepositional logic’, in Polish Logic 1920–1939 (ed. McCall, S., Oxford, 1967), p. 64;Google ScholarW., and Kneale, M., The Development of Logic (Oxford, 1963), p. 190 n. 3;Google Scholar Frede (above, n. 79) pp. 24–7, 69; Huber (above, n. 185), pp. 38 f. and n. 6.

²⁰⁹ de fato 21, 28, 31; Ac. Pr. 97. Cf. also de not. deorum 1.70.Google ScholarLukasiewicz, , loc. cit.;Google ScholarVerbeke, , Arch. Gesch. Philos. 50 (1978), 86 n. 42;Google ScholarRist, , Stoic Philosophy p. 116 n. 1.Google Scholar

²¹⁰ comm. ed. sec. 208.1; cf. 215.6. Lukasiewicz, , loc. cit.Google Scholar It is clear that Aristotle did hold that the disjunction ‘either there will be a sea-battle or there won't be’ is true; de int. 9 19 a 28, Ammonius, , in de int. 154.7 ff. CompareGoogle ScholarCicero, , de fato 37, Ac. Pr. 97 (last n.).Google Scholar

²¹¹ Simplicius, , in cat. 406.6 ff.;Google ScholarLukasiewicz, , loc. cit. I am grateful to Dr. R. Sorabji for this reference.Google Scholar

²¹² 407.7 and 407.12 suggest the latter; but 407.6 f. implies that the future-tense disjuncts do already have truth values, and the contrast drawn in 407.10 is with pasttense statements which are definitely true or false.

²¹³ Cf. also Frede (above, n. 79), p. 26.

²¹⁴ This is interpretation (1) in Ackrill, J., Aristotle: Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford, 1963), pp. 133, 139 f.Google Scholar, and the ‘Non-Standard Interpretation’ of McKim, V. R., ‘Fatalism and the Future: Aristotle's Way Out’, Rev. Met. 25 (1972), 83 and n. 7.Google Scholar So Linsky, L., ‘Professor David Williams on Aristotle’, Philos. Rev. 63 (1954), 250–2;CrossRefGoogle ScholarAnscombe, G. E. M., ‘Aristotle and the Sea-Battle’, in Moravcsik, J. M. E. (ed.), Aristotle (Modern Studies in Philosophy series, London, 1978), p. 24;Google ScholarStrang, C., ‘Aristotle and the Sea Battle’, Mind 69 (1960), 454, 459 ff.Google Scholar

²¹⁵ Cf. especially Ammonius, in de int. 145.9 ff., Boethius, comm. ed. sec. 212.8 ff., 213.12 (The point is not just that we cannot know and so cannot justifiably say which alternative will occur; cf. comm. ed. sec. 192.5 ff., 197.18 ff., 208.17 ff., 245.19 ff.). Contrast the position of Carneades (Cicero, de fato 19 f., 27 f., 31–3, 37 f.) and of Ryle, Gilbert (Dilemmas, Cambridge, 1954, pp. 15–35);CrossRefGoogle ScholarLong, A. A., Hellenistic Philosophy, pp. 162 f.Google Scholar

²¹⁶ Cf. Frede (above, n. 79), pp. 71 ff. Ammonius adds ‘definitely’ in commenting on 18^b4 (141.20), Boethius on 18^a34 (ed. pr. 108.23, ed. sec. 204.24); its absence is however felt at ed. sec. 232.15 and at ibid. 249.5 (19^a39). Cf. Lukasiewicz, , loc. cit.Google Scholar

²¹⁷ 12.16, 18, 13.5. Frede, p. 26.

²¹⁸ Bruns, I., ‘Studien zu Alexander von Aphrodisias – I. Der Begriff des Möglichen und die Stoa’, Rh. Mus. 44 (1889), 624 f.Google Scholar

²¹⁹ de fato x. 177.15 ff., xvi. 187.22 f., xvii. 188.3 f.Google Scholar

²²⁰ Cf. especially x. 177.28 f.: the truth of the prediction implies the event's being fated The whole discussion from 177.7 has been in the context of an argument advanced by determinists.

²²¹ Nor is xxvii. 197.11–15 necessarily decisive, for the reference is not just to the question of future truth but rather to the unalterability of a character once established (cf. nn. 53, 75). Alexander need only be asserting that it is true before the character is fixed to say ‘the man may become so-and- so’, but not afterwards; there need not be any reference to the truth or otherwise of ‘he will become so-and-so’. At the same time, it may be doubted whether Alexander would have expressed himself in precisely this way if he had held that the contingency of the event was compatible with the truth of the prediction (see below).

²²² § 2,11.10,17; cf. § 3,12.8ff. Frede (above, n. 79), p. 26. Unless the reference to physical determinism is carried over from § 1 to § 2 (contra Bruns, , loc. cit.) the reference to prevention in 11.4 f., not taken up elsewhere in § 2, seems out of place.Google Scholar

²²³ A fortiori, he would be unlikely to do this if he held that predictions of future contingents could be true or false simpliciter (cf. Carneades and Ryle cited in n. 215).

²²⁴ Boethius, , comm. ed. sec. 119.19 ff. cites Alexander with approval as saying that, in the case of things which admit of change, it is not necessary for one contradictory always to be true and the other false. Boethius at least must have understood this as asserting that it is not always the same one of a pair of contradictories that is true, rather than as saying that it is sometimes the case that neither is true or false; for he himself would reject the latter assertion (cf. above, n. 210).Google Scholar

²³⁵ In addition to those already cited in nn. 19 f., 26, 49, 63–70, 125, 173, and 195, cf. Alexander, , de fato vii. 171.18–20,Google Scholar with Calcidius. clx. 193.15–17, ‘sed quia sunt aliquanta quae contra haec e diverso dicuntur, proponenda sunt et diluenda; tunc demum enim firm is erit fundamentis locata Platonis sententia’ (Switalski (above, n. 17), p. 96, Waszink ad loc). Waszink also compares Calcidius clxiii. 195.20 ff. with Alexander, , de fato xxxiv. 206.5 ff.Google Scholar (ad loc); but it may be remarked that the latter picks up 205.29, which is part of an argument attributed by Alexander to his determinist opponents (above, n. 111).

²²⁶ Above, n. 199. Den Boeft (above, n. 4), p. 134, argues that there are Aristotelian elements in Calcidius derived from Porphyry other than those owed by the latter to Alexander.

¹²⁷ Cf. especially Koch (above, n. 21), pp. 26 f., 32 ff., and 40, pointing out that there are parallels with Aspasius and Anon. in Eth. Nic. 3Google Scholar (Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca 19/1 and 20 respectively) rather than with Aristotle himself; also Siclari (above, n. 171), p. 232 and n. 18, Amand (above, n. 8), pp. 559 f., Telfer (above, n. 8), p. 413. On Porphyry as a source for Nemesius cf. Waszink, introduction to edition of Calcidius, p. lxiii and n. 1, den Boeft, p. 98, and Jaeger, W., Nemesios von Emesa (Berlin, 1914), pp. 61 ff.Google Scholar

²²⁸ Cf. Domański (above, n. 20), pp. 133, 136,138 ff., 142–7,151 f., 158 f. nn.; Koch, pp. 24, 30–2,38–41,44.

²²⁹ Nemesius xxxiv. 737 a – 740 a seems closer to Anon, in Eth. Nic. 149.14 ff.Google Scholar than to Alexander, , de fato xi. 180.9 ff.Google Scholar and probl. eth. xxix. 160.5 ff.Google Scholar (Domański, p. 146 n. 1); cf. also Aspasius, , in Eth. Nic. 71.16 ff.Google ScholarAristotle, , Eth. Nic. 3.3, 1112^a21 ff.Google Scholar is clearly the starting-point for all these passages; and there do not seem to be any points of similarity between those in Nemesius and Alexander that cannot be explained by their ultimately deriving from this same Aristotelian original. The definition of the voluntary at Alexander, , probl. eth. xxix. 159.20 f.Google Scholar is almost exactly repeated in Nemesius xxxii. 729 b; but it is already in Aristotle Eth. Nic. 3.1, 1111^a22 ff. (to which Nemesius is slightly closer than Alexander). (Koch, , op. cit., p. 30Google Scholar). Nemesius, ibid., makes the point that the voluntary is opposed both to the involuntary through ignorance and to the involuntary through force, which is discussed as a logical problem in Alexander, , probl. eth. xi. 131.18 ff.Google Scholar (Domański, p. 138 n. 1);Google Scholar cf. however Aspasius, , in Eth. Nic. 65.33 ff.Google Scholar

²³⁰ Above, n. 134.

²³¹ Cf. n. 73; admittedly this is not a strong argument in itself, cf. text at n. 160 above.

²³² Above, n. 86.

²³³ Nemesius xliv. 797 a, contrasting providence and sublunary nature, whereas for Alexande providence, fate, and nature are identical or closely linked (Zeller, , (above, n. 157), p. 330;Google ScholarMoraux, , Alexandre d'Aphrodise, p. 198;Google ScholarTodd, , Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics, 224.Google Scholar Admittedly, Alexander's doctrine of providence does not appear in the de fato, and Nemesius' knowledge of Alexander's works may have been incomplete.). Cf. Atticus fr.3, especially 43 ff., 71 ff., and fr. 8.10 ff. Baudry (Paris, Budé, 1931); Aëtius 2.3.4, D. L. 5.32, Arius Didymus, fr. phys. 9, Critolaus fr.15 p. 52 Wehrli. Moraux, , ‘L'exposè de la philosophic d'Aristote chez Diogène Laërce’, Rev. Philos. de Louvain 47 (1949), 33 f.Google Scholar, and D'Aristote à Bessarion (Laval, 1907), pp. 54ff.;Google ScholarHapp, H., ‘Weltbild und Seinslehre bei Aristoteles’, Antike und Abendland 14 (1978), 77 ff.Google Scholar; Todd, , op. cit., p. 213.Google Scholar

²³⁴ Above, nn. 63, 64, 66; cf. n. 69.

²³⁵ Above, n. 171.

²³⁶ Above, n. 173.

²³⁷ Amand suggests (above, n. 8), p. 560) that Nemesius xxix-xli in its entirety is derived from a Peripatetic commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics which incorporated an attack on various theories of fate, chs. xxxv-xxxviii being based on this. This commentary might then be the source, attacking Philopator by name, which may be reflected both in Alexander's de fato and in Nemesius (above, n. 134). Alexander might himself have named Philopator in a commentary where he did not do so in the de fato; but there is no evidence that Alexander wrote a commentary on the Ethics, though the ethica problemata suggest interest in that work in his school.