Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 July 2009
In recent years several notable studies—including those by Judith Perkins, Daniel Boyarin, and Elizabeth Castelli—have assessed the importance of martyrdom and suffering in constructions of ancient Christian identity. This essay takes as its starting point the observation by Perkins that in early Christian communities, the threat of suffering (whether real or perceived) worked to create a particular kind of self. In Perkins's view, many ancient Christians came to believe that “to be a Christian was to suffer.” Christian martyr acts, when understood as textual vehicles for the construction of culture and the articulation of Christian identities, emerge as one mechanism by which such selves were constructed. In the pages that follow I will explore how the reading and hearing of narratives about martyrdom constituted an exercise derived from Greek philosophy, adapted to inspire a largely nonliterate audience. This exercise not only trained early Christians to be ready for death and the world to come, but also worked to shape their perceptions of the Christian way of life in this world.
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4. Versions of this essay were presented at the 1999 annual meeting of the New England Region of the Society of Biblical Literature and the 2005 annual meeting of the North American Patristics Society. I am grateful to Judith Perkins for her kind words of interest and encouragement back in 1999; to David Levenson, whose careful reading saved me from some (though probably not all) grievous errors; and to Shelly Matthews and the anonymous reviewers at Church History, whose insightful comments and criticisms have greatly improved both its form and substance.
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8. As Elizabeth Clark has observed, however, situating early Christians in the more general discussion of literacy in the ancient Roman Empire “has proved a vexing question”: Clark, , Reading Renunciation, 45.Google Scholar
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13. This is certainly the case in subsequent centuries, when homilies about the martyrs were composed specifically for the occasion of the annual panèguris, or martyr festival. On this issue, see Leemans, Johan, Mayer, Wendy, Allen, Pauline, and Dehandschutter, Boudewijn, “Let Us Die that We May Live”: Greek Homilies on Christian Martyrs from Asia Minor, Palestine and Syria (c. AD 350–AD 450) (London: Routledge, 2003).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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15. It is important to remember that martyr acts are rhetorical rather than documentary in nature, which means that descriptions of the martyrs and their actions should be understood as prescriptions for how things ought to be instead of descriptions of the way things are. Nevertheless, it is still possible to use the martyr stories insofar as they work to cultivate a Christian ideal and represent that ideal to their readers and hearers.
16. M. Pol. 17. Similar athletic imagery is used to describe martyrdom in sections 18 and 19.
17. M. Carpus, Papylus and Agathonice, Recensio Graeca, 35: ὡς γ∈νναῑος ⋯θλητ⋯ς ⋯π∈δέχ∈το τ⋯ν θυμ⋯ν το⋯ ⋯ντικ∈ιμένου. Recensio Latina, 3.5: sicut fortis athleta spectabat furorem inimici multo silentio. Discussed in Stewart, , “Greek Crowns and Christian Martyrs,” 122–23.Google Scholar
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19. Text and translation in Stewart, , “Greek Crowns and Christian Martyrs,” 122.Google Scholar
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21. Origen, for example, exhorts his readers to “enter the contest” of martyrdom in Exhortation to Martyrdom, 31: Greer, Rowan A., Origen (New York: Paulist, 1979), 62.Google Scholar
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25. Seeliger, , “Martyrs,” 407.Google Scholar
26. I owe these points to the very helpful comments and criticisms of an anonymous Church History reviewer.
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28. Young, , In Procession before the World, 2, 9Google Scholar. On page 10 she poetically describes the martyrs as “like letters meant to be read by the community and the world, letters from Christ that were recognizably like Christ.”
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31. This argument—that the reading of texts produced a particular kind of self—is perhaps best known from recent studies of Christian literature on asceticism. Clark's, ElizabethReading RenunciationGoogle Scholar, and Krueger's, DerekWriting and Holiness: The Practice of Authorship in the Early Christian East (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004)Google Scholar are two noteworthy examples. On page 95 Krueger argues that “Texts played a crucial role in the promulgation of ascetic beliefs and practices. Oral traditions and written texts often served as road maps toward this new identity. Fittingly, the perfected self conformed to models embedded in writings. Exegetes drew ascetic lessons from scripture, reading patriarchs, prophets, and apostles as models of moral rectitude and self-control.” This same thing might be said of martyr texts and the construction of Christian subjectivity.
32. Perkins, , Suffering Self, 104.Google Scholar
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40. The question of whether Socrates can be considered a martyr is one element of a larger discussion about the origins of martyrdom: is it an exclusively Christian phenomenon (so G. W. Bowersock and H. von Campenhausen), or can the Christian instantiation be traced back to Jewish and Greco-Roman precedents (so W. H. C. Frend and Jan Willem van Henten)? Bowersock, G. W., Martyrdom and Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 5–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; von Campenhausen, H., Die Idee des Martyriums in der alten Kirche (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1936)Google Scholar; Frend, W. H. C., Martyrdom and Persecution in the Early Church: A Study of a Conflict from the Maccabees to Donatus (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967)Google Scholar; van Henten, Jan Willem, The Maccabean Martyrs as Saviours of the Jewish People: A Study of 2 and 4 Maccabees, Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 7Google Scholar. For a discussion of this issue, see Boyarin, , Dying for God, 93–97.Google Scholar
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43. Phaedo 83d.
44. Phaedo 83c.
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52. Ibid., 85.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
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62. M. Pol. 2.
63. M. Lyons 27.
64. M. Apoll. 27–28 (Rom. 14:8, modified).
65. Perkins, , Suffering Self, 117, 111.Google Scholar
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70. Ibid., 95.
71. A TLG search reveals that apath- words occur some 56 times in Clement of Alexandria, 78 times in Origen, 169 times in Gregory of Nyssa, 126 times in Epiphanius, 98 times in Athanasius, 94 times in John Chrysostom, 159 times in Theodoret, and 93 times in Evagrius.
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73. All translations of biblical texts are taken from the NRSV unless otherwise noted. See also Exod. 20:11; 2 Kings 19:15; Isa. 37:16; Jer. 10:11; Neh. 9:6; Acts 4:24, 14:15, 17:25; Rev. 10:6, 14:7. I thank Andrew McGowan, whose helpful comments on a very early version of this paper prompted me to refine a previous incarnation of this argument.
74. This is according to my own calculations using the citations (Exod. 20:11, 2 Kings 19:15, Jer. 10:11, and Acts 4:24) in Musurillo's index of scriptural references. According to the index, these passages are quoted a total of 16 times.
75. M. Apoll. 2. Daniel Boyarin observes that the declaration Christianus sum, seen in this text and in several other second-century martyr acts, was “an element of martyrology that had taken root firmly in the earliest Christian traditions of martyrdom itself.” He goes on to argue that this declaration of Christian identity has a functional parallel, and indeed a rabbinic “response” of sorts, in the Unification of the Name found, for example, in narratives that detail the martyrdom of Rabbi Akiva: Boyarin, , Dying for God, 121.Google Scholar
76. A. Cypr. 1.2.
77. A. Euplus, Latin Recension 2.5.
78. M. Pion. 8.3.
79. M. Pion. 16.2–3. A very similar exchange occurs in the Latin and somewhat fragmentary Greek versions of the Acts of Phileas (P. Bod. col. ix.150–col. x.157; Recensio Latina 3.4).
80. M. Fruct. 2.3–4.
81. M. Crisp. 1.7. Crispina no doubt refers to the impending sacrifice of her own body. On the sacrificial aspects of Christian martyrdom, see Young, , In Procession before the World, 1–61.Google Scholar
82. M. Agap. 5.2.
83. M. Carp., Greek Recension 10: θ∈οί, οἱ τ⋯ν οὐραν⋯ν κα⋯ τ⋯ν γ⋯ν οὐκ ⋯ποίησαν, ⋯πολέσθωσανLatin Recension 2: Dii, qui non fecerunt caelum et terram, pereant.
84. Riddle also lists the use of reward and punishment scenarios and the “discipline of church customs” (such as common worship, common liturgical meals, and other social features of Christian life) as other instruments used in the production of attitudes toward martyrdom: Riddle, , Martyrs, 29–52.Google Scholar
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90. It is at this point that the analogy breaks down a bit, since the vocabulary of apatheia does not allow (strictly speaking) for the idea that it is appropriate to fear some things (for example, God) and not other things (for example, death).
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92. Ibid., 52.
93. Ignatius, of course, developed the idea of martyrdom as imitation of Christ quite explicitly. See, for example, Ep. Rom. 6.3, where he begs, “Permit me to be an imitator of the passion of my God.”
100. Ibid., 221.
101. On Christian interpretations of Jesus' death, see Droge, and Tabor, , Noble Death, 114–19.Google Scholar
102. Ibid., 119.
103. While the connection with Jesus' death certainly served to give purpose and meaning to martyrs' deaths, the reverse is also true: “The notion of blood being exchanged for remission of sin may well have been in the Christ story prior to martyrdoms, but the value placed on martyrdom highlighted the death of Christ as a vicarious suffering for sin. … The death of martyrs brought to the fore the death of Jesus, and their sacrifice for sin enhanced the redemptive meaning of his death”: Thompson, , “Martyrdom of Polycarp,” 51.Google Scholar
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