Rectification as an approach to inner–Party discipline emphasizes persuasive methods and education, but it does not eschew coercive measures including the purge. As students of Chinese politics are well aware, this form of coercive persuasion was comprehensively developed in the early 1940s as Mao Tse–tung consolidated his leadership, rectification theories were expounded, and the first rectification campaign of 1942–44 was carried out. Official histories and much scholarly analysis identify rectification with Mao while asserting that other leaders advocated sharply contrasting approaches. Thus CCP leaders before 1935 purportedly pushed coercive disciplinary methods – dubbed “ruthless struggles and merciless blows “ – while Mao attempted to foster systematic education. Mao's undoubted contributions to rectifi cation notwithstanding, the following analysis argues that this view both overstates actual differences and overlooks the developing nature of Mao's position.

Since 1966, there have been no articles in the Chinese press about language reform and no specialist journals to provide an alternative forum for discussion. In 1972, however, the Party's leading political publication, Hung ch'i (Red Flag), carried in its April issue a letter on what had come to be seen as an almost taboo subject, by no less a personality than Kuo Mo-jo. This letter and its manner of publication are both of great interest. Language reform is clearly on the agenda for discussion once again and the letter enables one to look both at its more recent history and at its future development. Such is the importance of the letter that I have translated it in full and discuss it section by section (the text being distinguished by bold type), adding a commentary to each section, rather in the manner in which commentaries were added to classical Chinese texts.

The publication, on Mao Tse-tung's birthday, of an official text of his crucially important speech of 25 April 1956 “On the 10 great relationships” (reproduced below in the Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, pp. 221–38) adds significantly to our knowledge both of Chairman Mao and of his successor. On the one hand, it constitutes a substantial document which will be closely scrutinized by all those interested in the thought of Mao Tse-tung. On the other, the way in which the text has been edited, and the fact of its publication, provide some hints about the thinking, and perhaps even about the policy intentions of Hua Kuo-feng.

In the course of establishing an interpretative chronology of the post-1949 political and economic development of China, scholars have often assumed that in the early and mid-1950s there was a continuum in terms of the progressive application of Soviet organizational methods and strategic perspectives in China. In other words, the Chinese Communist leadership in the early 1950s not only “leaned to one s side” in international terms, it endorsed and implemented an essentially Stalinist strategy with its consequent implications of rigid hierarchical management and lop-sided investment patterns in favour of rapid heavy industrialization at the expense of agricultural production in the countryside.

Marx's interpretation of China enriched his concept of a completely Asiatic society. While dealing with England's relation to the Far East, he became aware that in imperial China, unlike in other oriental countries, land was privately held. His analysis of this seeming exception to the rule is unsatisfactory, but it is indicative of his socio-historical position. He continued to view China as a major case of “Asiatic production” even after he learned that there communal landed property had long been abolished.

“The anti-imperialist revolutionary struggles of the people in Asia, Africa and Latin America,” says the Proposal Concerning the General Line, “are pounding and undermining the foundations of the rule of imperialism and colonialism. … In a sense therefore the whole cause of the international proletarian revolution hinges on the outcome of the revolutionary struggles of the people of these areas, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the world's population.”

Coming to terms with the nascent international agency of regional powers with global intentions has become a dominant topic in the study of world affairs. This rash of attention to the emergent dynamics of international interactions has been facilitated by the break-up of the Cold War order which has allowed a number of actors to extend their international roles and outreach. India and China feature prominently among those actors and their agency in global life is subject to a growing public, policy, and scholarly scrutiny.

This article focuses on the debate surrounding constitutionalism that has been driven by a constitutionalist alliance of media reporters, intellectuals and lawyers since 2010, and follows its historical trajectory. It argues that this debate forms a discourse with a structuring absence, the roots of which can be traced back to the taboos surrounding the Cultural Revolution, the 1975 Constitution, and everything associated with them. The absence manifests itself in the silence on workers' right to strike, a right which was deleted from the 1982 Constitution in an attempt to correct the ultra-leftist anarchy of the Cultural Revolution. Previous and in contrast to that, there was a Maoist constitutional movement in the Cultural Revolution, represented by the 1975 Constitution, that aimed to protect the constituent power of the workers by legalizing their right to strike. Today, we are witnessing the rise of migrant workers as they struggle for trade union reform and collective bargaining with little support from the party-state or local trade unions. In this context, a third constitutional transformation should be considered that is not a return to the 1975 Constitution but which instead adds some elements which protect labour's right to strike to the 1982 Constitution.

This paper explores the perception and politics of air pollution in Shanghai. We present a qualitative case study based on a literature review of relevant policies and research on civil society and air pollution, in dialogue with air quality indexes and field research data. We engage with the concept of China's authoritarian environmentalism and the political context of ecological civilization. We find that discussions about air pollution are often placed in a frame that is both locally temporal (environment) and internationally developmentalist (economy). We raise questions from an example of three applications with different presentations of air quality index measures for the same time and place. This example and frame highlight the central role and connection between technology, data and evidence, and pollution visibility in the case of the perception of air pollution. Our findings then point to two gaps in authoritarian environmentalism research, revealing a need to better understand (1) the role of technology within this governance context, and (2) the tensions created from this non-participatory approach with ecological civilization, which calls for civil society participation.

Between 2009 and 2014, against the background of the Xinjiang ethnic unity education textbook reform (2009–2010), vigorous academic debate on China's ethnic policy reform took place. Two academic cliques – one championing reform and the other representing the status quo – gradually came to the fore in this debate and competed to influence policy. This research seeks to unpack the mechanisms in China's knowledge regime that allow one agent (such as a think tank or academic) to prevail over others. Agents have an impact on policymaking mainly through connections with the decision-making body. This research uses three variables (ideological connection, level and nature of the connection) to analyse the relative policy influence of different agents in the debate. This research is among the first to provide an in-depth analysis of the debate's policy impact at the local level. The reform clique prevailed in this case because of its ability to bond with and influence higher-level decision-making bodies. Beginning in 2014, the Chinese Communist Party officially adopted the reform clique's language because of its alignment with the Party's growing need to maintain security in ethnic minority areas. Furthermore, key reform clique players continue to have an impact on the national policy shift.

Taking a broader perspective to explore the relations between Taiwan's globalization, social justice issues and the DPP's political and economic nationalism, this study aims to understand the DPP's resurgence in local elections since 2008, and its defeat in the 2012 presidential election. Increasing capital flight from Taiwan to mainland China has contributed to Taiwan's rising unemployment and income inequality. Less privileged Taiwanese, having stronger nationalist sentiments and concerns about the Taiwanese government's open-door China policy, switched their support from the KMT to the DPP during the DPP administration of 2000–2008. Since 2008, the DPP's better balance between its political and economic nationalism has been instrumental in securing popular support, especially at the local level. Nevertheless, in the 2012 presidential election, the DPP failed to convince the majority of Taiwanese voters that its moderate political nationalism could maintain the significantly improved cross-Strait relations vital for Taiwan's economic revival under the current bleak world economic conditions.

The Chinese government has placed workforce upskilling at the core of its reform agenda to sustain the Chinese “economic miracle.” As such, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS) and Ministry of Education (MOE) have each launched separate apprenticeship reforms geared towards enhancing China's oft-criticized vocational education and training system. Using a self-constructed theoretical framework, this article examines the two reforms and ascribes their divergent outcomes to the two ministries’ distinct approaches to institutionalizing their central initiatives (i.e. the top-down model followed by the MOHRSS versus the collaborative model of the MOE). However, given the absence of industry-level civil society governance in China, neither of these models has delivered ideal training outcomes, although the collaborative model has satisfied more employers and apprentices. China's skills-development reforms have thus become trapped in an institutional dilemma which is likely to impede the long-term economic restructuring efforts of the central state.

Since 1989, Taipei has attempted to capitalize on the systemic changes in East Central Europe. It achieved its goal of winning diplomatic allies among the post-communist states only in 1999, when Macedonia recognized the Republic of China (ROC) hoping that Taipei's generosity would resolve its economic problems. In order to showcase the effectiveness of its assistance, Taipei resorted to economic diplomacy and offered Skopje loans, humanitarian and technical assistance. Yet, the Macedonian–Taiwanese partnership ended in 2001. This report will argue that Taipei failed to become a viable alternative to the People's Republic of China (PRC) as Skopje's economic and diplomatic partner because of China's clout in international affairs and its own reluctance to shower Macedonia with developmental assistance. Instead of showcasing Taiwan's ability to maintain a diplomatic ally through a pro-active economic foreign policy, the failed Macedonian project underlined the limited effectiveness of the ROC's economic diplomacy and the perennial problem of the ROC diplomacy: a successful international isolation by the PRC.

When, in late 1924, the Vietnamese communist Ho Chi Minh, then known as Nguyen Ai Quoc, arrived in Canton as an interpreter to the Comintern mission to the Kuomintang led by Michael Borodin, Vietnamese nationalism was at a watershed. Since the beginning of the century, armed resistance to French colonial rule had been led by the famous scholar-revolutionary Phan Boi Chau. For over two decades he and a small band of determined followers had been the only organized force in Vietnam opposed to French rule. By the mid 1920s, however, it became apparent that Phan's movement was nearing a dead end. More the activist than the theoretician, more impetuous than patient, he had given little thought to organization, ideology, and long-term planning, and after a series of serious setbacks, he was forced to watch his movement begin to disintegrate. His arrest by French authorities in Shanghai in 1925 was only symbolic of the waning influence of his movement in Vietnam.

Scholars of politics in literate and semi-literate societies must study the press for two important reasons. First, the press, as a key line of com-munication, often plays an integral part in the political process. Secondly, the press often provides important politically-relevant information not readily available elsewhere. This article begins with brief comments on the communications functions of Taiwan's press and then discusses types of newspapers, particular newspapers of special importance, reporters and the journalistic profession, and press control. It concludes with a discussion of the press as a research resource.

A comprehensive analysis of the recent past must start with an understanding of the major, interrelated issues currently confronting China's leaders. These include- a wide range of economic, national security, and cultural concerns. Another key area involves personnel management. Were the officials removed during the Cultural Revolution justly treated or ought their verdicts be reversed? If so, should all officials be returned or just some? And which ones? More generally, should a regular promotion ladder be established, or should young, exuberant but inexperienced cadres continue to be rapidly, promoted, as during 1966–69? Should service in the bureaucracy and exit from it be made more predictable? This essay focuses on vthe origins and implications of these personnel issues. For, while other issues have also been important, crucial points of debate and struggle since 1969 have been over the rehabilitation of cadres who were removed during the Cultural Revolution and over the role to be assigtfcd to those who rose to power at their expense.

The trading potential of China, with its population of some 650 million people, has for long been a subject of absorbing interest, and never more so than in recent years, with the rapid expansion of economic growth which has been brought about since the establishment of the People's Republic.

The policies of the Chinese Government have led to drastic changes in the orientation of its international trade, in its administration and to notable modifications in the nature of both imports and exports. These have all derived primarily from the change to a Communist Government and to its implementation of the corresponding political and economic systems.

As we mark the 50th anniversary of the People's Republic of China (PRC) we have the opportunity to assess China's experience over five decades in accommodating itself to the outside world. It is an opportunity to take stock and to consider in the light of this experience what is China's current international standing and what may be said to be its agenda for the future with regard to the conduct of foreign affairs.

This article is concerned with one aspect of the spatial distribution of power in the People's Republicof China – the relationship between Centre and region during 1958–66. During the past decade or so several different interpretations of the spatial distribution of power have emerged amongst western analysts of China, polarizing between centralized and decentralized models of the Chinese decision-making process. The recordof the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution certainly suggests that political power was not only decentralized but also misused in the preceding period. Between 1966 and 1968 the impact of the attack on the Party-State system fell disproportionately on the provincial level, and most first secretaries of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) provincial committees and regional bureaus were criticized and removed from office. Moreover, many ofthese were accused of having created “independent kingdoms” in the areas under their leadership.