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China's Foreign Relations: The Long March, Future Uncertain*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 February 2009

Michael Yahuda
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Extract

As we mark the 50th anniversary of the People's Republic of China (PRC) we have the opportunity to assess China's experience over five decades in accommodating itself to the outside world. It is an opportunity to take stock and to consider in the light of this experience what is China's current international standing and what may be said to be its agenda for the future with regard to the conduct of foreign affairs.

Type
Research Article
Information
The China Quarterly , Volume 159 , September 1999 , pp. 650 - 659
Copyright
Copyright © The China Quarterly 1999

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References

1. For the enormous extent of Soviet assistance that also played a significant part in the victories of the communist armies in the decisive victories of the civil war, see Goncharov, Sergei N., Lewis, John W. and Litai, Xue, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993)Google Scholar, and Sheng, Michael M., Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.)Google Scholar

2. Liangxing, Liang (ed.), China's Foreign Relations: A Chronology of Events (1949–1988) (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1989), p. 17Google Scholar

3. For a critical assessment of China's status and achievement as a great power see Kim, Samuel S., “China as a great power,” in Schell, Orville and Shambaugh, David (eds.), The China Reader (New York; Vintage Books, 1999), pp. 448–458.Google Scholar

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5. I am indebted to Lucian Pye for this point.

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7. For further elaboration see Yahuda, Michael, “The changing faces of Chinese nationalism: dimensions of statehood,” in Leifer, Michael (ed.), Nationalism in Asia (London: Routledge, forthcoming, 1999).Google Scholar

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10. See for example, the excerpts cited in “Education, media, and culture,” in Schell, and Shambaugh, , The China Reader, pp. 215–296.Google Scholar See also Gold, Thomas, “Go with your feelings: Hong Kong and Taiwan popular culture in Greater China,” The China Quarterly, No 136 (12 1993), pp. 907–925.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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14. This version of the statement issued by ITAR-TASS news agency in BBC Monitoring Service: Asia-Pacific, 25 11 1998Google Scholar, differs slightly in wording from that issued by the Chinese side in Beijing Review, 14–20 12 1998, pp. 6–8.Google Scholar But as far as I can tell the differences are insignificant.

15. See Whiting, Allen S., “ASEAN eyes China: the security dimension,” Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 4 (04 1997), pp. 299–322CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and De Castro, Renato Cruz, “The controversy in the Spratlys: exploring the limits to ASEAN's engagement policy,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 34, No. 9 (09 1998), pp. 95–123.Google Scholar

16. The idea that American alliances were a relic of the Cold War that should be set aside in favour of consultative processes was first formally put forward by officials of the PRC's Ministry of Foreign Affairs at an ARF meeting in Beijing in March 1997. For a report of Chi Haotian's speech see Richardson, Michael, “Gently, China flexes strategic muscles in Asia,” International Herald Tribune, 28 11 1998.Google Scholar The American report dated 23 November 1998 is entitled The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region.Google Scholar

17. The phrase is drawn from Leifer, Michael, “Chinese economic reform: the impact on policy in the South China Sea,” in Segal, Gerald and Yang, Richard (eds.), Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on Security (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 147.Google Scholar

18. Following evidence in October 1998 of construction activity by the Chinese on Mischief Reef (an islet within what the Philippines considers to be its territorial waters) Manila found that Beijing reacted coolly to its offer to develop the reef jointly, even though the PRC has long advocated that as a temporary way of handling the dispute. Meanwhile the ASEAN summit meeting in Hanoi, 15–16 December 1998, largely averted the issue. See “South China Sea: a weakened Asean is no match for China,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 12 1998, pp. 18–20.Google Scholar

19. International Herald Tribune, 16–17 01 1999.Google Scholar

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21. See for example the argument of Shambaugh, David in “The United States and China: cooperation or confrontation?”Google Scholar in Schell, and Shambaugh, , The China Reader, especially pp. 471–72.Google Scholar