In this article, we examine the administrative functions that have been carried out by social organizations (SOs) in China since 2013. We use evidence from Guangdong to demonstrate that the transfer of authority to SOs is selective, tends to create more burdens for local government, and generally does not lead to greater autonomy for SOs. We focus on five types of SOs that are undertaking new administrative functions with varying degrees of operational autonomy, which relates to the consultative authoritarian model proposed by Jessica Teets. Consultative authoritarianism allows for the expansion of relatively autonomous SOs and the development of indirect state control mechanisms. The model is designed to improve governance without democratization by expanding the role played by intermediaries such as SOs in public administration and service delivery. The evidence from Guangdong permits us to conclude that the transfer of authority to SOs allows for innovations in public administration, but that politics continues to motivate government decisions as to which functions are suitable for SOs to undertake, casting doubt on the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to achieve sustainable improvements in local governance and public service provision.

This article applies standard regression techniques to examine the impact of adverse weather conditions on average grain yield per sown hectare in contemporary China. By isolating the weather impact I hope (a) to quantify the possible influence of frequent policy and organizational changes which have been so characteristic of Chinese agriculture since 1949; and (b) to show to what extent grain production in China has become more “weather-proof” after three decades of massive investment in water control and other modern inputs. I shall deal mainly with the long-term trends from 1952 to 1981, with special reference to the extraordinary 1959–61 period, during which total grain output and yield declined by an average of 21 and 12 per cent respectively (or 25 and 18 per cent for the two trough years of 1960 and 1961), measured against the benchmark year of 1957.

In July 1955 Mao Tse-tung made one of his rare public policy statements when he addressed party secretaries of provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions “on the question of co-operativisation.” It proved to be one of the most important speeches in recent Chinese history, terminating a dispute about the nature and timing of agricultural socialisation which had been going on inside the Chinese Communist Party for three years. Coming from Mao, this was not merely a contribution to the debate, but the final, authoritative pronouncement on what policy should be. Its impact was swift and dramatic. At that time only 16.9 million (14·2 per cent.) of the 120 million peasant families in China were members of co-operatives, almost all of which were semi-socialist in character. Hardly any fully socialist collectives existed. But between autumn 1955 and spring 1956, a “high tide of socialism in the countryside” transformed most of Chinese agriculture, replacing the traditional small privately-owned farms by large co-operatives and collectives. By May 1956,91·2 per cent. of China's rural households had joined co-operatives, 61·9 per cent. of them collectives.

The Sino-Vietnam War of February–March 1979 marked the culmination of months of strained relations between the two neighbouring communist states. (This article explores Chinese foreign policy as it evolved before, during and after the conflict) My underlying thesis is that China's original goals were both political and military, relating to the definition and strengthening of China's role in regional (e.g. Indo-Chinese and South-east Asian) international politics, as well as China's perceived role in the global relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. Because the conflict's military goals were not fully attained, the political goals were also not met, affecting not only the relationship between various Chinese leadership factions and their views about China's economic development plans, but also the importance of military modernization costs as part of the “four modernizations” and even China's alignment vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the United States. I shall first describe the prelude to the war.

It would appear that many western observers of China, with some recent notable exceptions, have systematically underestimated the importance attached to S&T (science and technology) development by both the Maoist and post-Mao leadership. This article will argue that it is difficult to understand the complexities of Chinese affairs since 1949 within the political, economic and military spheres without direct reference to China's research and development (R&D) and education systems.

Although dissident intellectuals and students continued to be persecuted in the post-Mao Zedong regimes of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, China's intellectuals were no longer denigrated as a class, harassed, suppressed, imprisoned and persecuted to death as they had been during the Mao era. Like the 19th-century self-strengtheners, Deng and his appointed successors regarded intellectuals as essential to achieve their goal of economic modernization and make China once again “rich and powerful.” Those intellectuals involved in the sciences, technology and economics in particular enjoyed elite status as advisers to the government, similar to that which intellectuals had enjoyed throughout most of Chinese history until the 1949 revolution.

China's opening to the outside world was perhaps the most visible of its reforms of the 1980s. China's international trade volume grew dramatically, it attracted tens of billions of dollars of foreign direct investment and it became an active borrower in international financial markets. In contrast to the pre-reform era, foreign trade grew more rapidly than the domestic economy and in some regions of the country it appeared that it had become a powerful engine of growth, accelerating not only the speed of domestic development but the pace of structural and technical transformation as well.

This article examines how local resistance against government attempts to reduce poverty to a technical problem ironically reinforces the precarious state of the poor. It looks at the workings of the minimum livelihood guarantee (dibao) through mundane interactions between street-level officials and poor residents in a workers' village on the periphery of Harbin. As the party-state's primary policy for urban poverty, dibao has introduced a new rationality that poverty is calculable and flexible. Urban laid-off workers have resisted this by invoking the socialist claim that they are “the people.” I examine how this resistance has led street-level officials to be preoccupied with the old socialist norm of “an ability to work” rather than with “income” as dibao's official criterion. The new local criterion has produced the ironic effect that urban laid-off workers, who were understood to be dibao's main target, have been mostly excluded from the scheme.

In March 1995, The China Quarterly published a special issue devoted to developments in the Chinese legal system. That issue canvassed a wide range of subjects: the legislative process, the implementation of legislation via the interpretive practices of courts and administrative agencies as well as through the enforcement of civil judgements, the personnel staffing the system in the role of legal advisers, criminal law and human rights, the key area of foreign trade and investment law, and finally China's place and role in the international legal order.

The patterns of hospitals' behavioural changes in response to different insurance systems and payment arrangements have been well documented in the literature on health economics and policy. To understand these changes, it is necessary to look at the shifts in fundamental economic incentives. Meanwhile, hospital practices are also subject to adjustment when administrative tools are realigned. This article examines the dynamics of a health policy campaign started in 2005 by a Chinese provincial health administration that was committed to containing health expenditures using administrative measures. Through a combination of qualitative in-depth interviews and quantitative panel data analysis comprising 30 public hospitals in the sample, this article finds that by revising the structure of administrative measures on the supply side, the Chinese health bureaucracy is able to curb rapid cost inflation in the short term. However, while having to meet the cost control mandate imposed by the health administration, Chinese public hospitals still managed to defend their economic interests by engaging in various unintended opportunistic behaviour. This article analyses a panel database from Fujian province and reveals the strategies adopted by public hospitals and considers their implications for China's ongoing national healthcare reform.

The People's Republic of China failed to win the hearts and minds of the Hong Kong Chinese people before its resumption of the city's sovereignty on 1 July 1997. This article attempts to account for this contradiction in China's pursuit of reunification. By shifting the focus to the alternative battle to control the lives and bodies of the local population, this article demonstrates how China exploited its water and food supplies to the colony in order to control Hong Kong before and after 1997. The study pinpoints the bio-political measures used by China to secure Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong. It concludes with an analysis of the current situation in Hong Kong and the implications of China's control of water and food supplies for the relations between the ruling state and the people of Hong Kong.

What explains the course of Uyghur-related violence in Xinjiang and Central Asia since 1990? Using data derived from a variety of sources, I argue that the locations and types of violent incidents were influenced by a combination of Chinese government policies and the political geography of Xinjiang. Specifically, 1990 to 1996 were dominated by logistically complex incidents in a low-level violent campaign in Xinjiang. The Strike Hard campaign in 1996 brought about an increase in logistically simple incidents in Xinjiang and some violence in Central Asia as Uyghur separatists had trouble moving people, information and weapons across the well-guarded, difficult terrain of Xinjiang's borders. China's rapprochement with Central Asian countries in the late 1990s led after 2001 to a dramatic decrease in Uyghur-related violence in general, but also signalled the appearance of logistically creative attacks that required little planning or materials. My findings suggest that Uyghur rebels will have a difficult time mounting a large-scale violent campaign as long as China retains even minimal control of Xinjiang.

This article explores why and how the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), a PRC state research-institute, survived after its involvement with the June Fourth demonstrations in 1989 through research regulation. I show how the explicit ascription of an advisory role to CASS required an increase in freedom of research and an increase in political steering through regulation. I do this by comparing the institutional setting of CASS in the early 1990s with that during Li Tieying's leadership (1998 to 2003). The article traces a general trend in which organizational reforms at institutions of higher education increasingly entail giving political direction to the development of the social science debate. Radical political views are discouraged through regulation, guidelines, meetings, academic activities and financial, material and social encouragement. This institutional approach aims to yield insight into the functioning of CASS as producer of knowledge and as think-tank to the government.

Proponents of Western-style democracy greeted the Chinese “Democracy Movement” of 1989 with great hope and anticipation. Yet the brutal end of this wave of political protest left many in despair. The rulers of the Chinese Communist Party had made it painfully clear that they would not tolerate any movement or organization which posed a threat to their political control. At the same time, however, observers and analysts also began to question the wisdom and effectiveness of the student protesters who had participated in the movement. Perhaps, many wondered, the students' behaviour had also contributed to the movement's unfortunate finale. In particular, many noted the students' disorganization, lack of respect for democratic procedures and inability to present a united position to the government. In addition, some remarked that the students' exclusive, non-integrative mobilization strategy may have weakened their ability to successfully put pressure on the government.

On 13 April 1987, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Portugal signed a Joint Declaration on the question of Macau, agreeing that the PRC would resume the exercise of sovereignty over the territory from 20 December 1999. In the Joint Declaration, the PRC promised that the Macau Special Administrative Region (SAR) would enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except in foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of Beijing, as was to be the case for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Joint Declaration further stipulated that the government and the legislature of the Macau SAR will be composed of local inhabitants and will be vested with legislative and independent judicial power. This marked the beginning of the transition period for Macau to move from Portuguese to Chinese administration.

The nascent stock and bond markets in the People's Republic of China have received considerable attention from the international media, yet the emergence of these markets is poorly understood. China's new “limited stock companies” increasingly answer to a variety of public and private lenders and spenders, who partially own and largely manage the means of production. The government sometimes decides which companies and managers will be rewarded with the benefits of incorporation, and it grabs a lion's share of the newly issued securities. But the result is a slow, government-led move towards a more capitalist form of management and ownership. This kind of jointly funded project – companies that merge public and private ownership, management and responsibility – may become the defining characteristic of China's emerging “capitalism with Chinese characteristics.”

This article compares five leading Chinese universities with 16 other research-intensive institutions in Asia, Europe and the United States. All the universities demonstrate an increasing commitment to research, although the fastest growth between 2003 and 2007 occurred in Asian institutions. Beijing and Qinghua universities compare favourably in terms of funding, but their research output is not as highly regarded. Despite concerns about academic freedom, the international standing of at least some Chinese universities is likely to rise in the future.

This article contends that prior research on the behaviour of Chinese local cadres pays limited attention to their motivation for avoiding blame. Using qualitative data from three field studies conducted in Guangdong province, the study focuses on blame avoidance in the cadre responsibility system, which is recognized as an important instrument for state capacity building. Our analysis uncovers three major discursive strategies used by grassroots cadres to manage blame either before or after it is apportioned: de-legitimating performance standards, re-attributing blame and transferring blame risk. We find that local cadres have a role as blame makers in shifting blame and accusations. This finding challenges the conventional view, which typically sees local officials as blame takers. The article concludes by elaborating on the wider implications of this finding and proposing avenues for future research.

A number of prolonged political experiments in Chinese factories during the Cultural Revolution proved that, despite any alleged “historical” connection between the Communist Party and the “working class,” the role of the workers, lacking a deep political reinvention, was framed by a regime of subordination that was ultimately not dissimilar from that under capitalist command. This paper argues that one key point of Deng Xiaoping's reforms derived from taking these experimental results into account accurately but redirecting them towards the opposite aim, an even more stringent disciplining of wage labour. The outcome so far is a governmental discourse which plays an important role in upholding the term “working class” among the emblems of power, while at the same time nailing the workers to an unconditional obedience. The paper discusses the assumption that, while this stratagem is one factor behind the stabilization of the Chinese Communist Party, it has nonetheless affected the decline of the party systems inherited from the 20th century.