1. For the full text of the Joint Declaration, see the Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Portugal on the Question of Macau (Macau: Macau Foundation, 1997).Google Scholar

2. See Annex II of the Joint Declaration.

3. Fernandos, Moisés Silva, “Portuguese behaviour towards the political transition and the regional integration of Macau in the Pearl River Region,” in Ramos, Rufino, Dinis, José Rocha, Wilson, Rex and Yuan, D. Y. (eds.), Macau and Its Neighbours in Transition (Macau: Macau Foundation, 1997), p. 45Google Scholar lists three factors which explain the serenity that marked Macau's transition prior to the mid-1990s: “First, the few, if not insignificant, Portuguese interests both in Macau and in the region; second, both [Chinese and Portuguese] governments' considerable pragmatism and realism towards Macau; third, political and diplomatic considerations which have led the Portuguese government to adopt a foreign policy posture that emphasizes co-operation between both parties in order to distinguish Macau's transition process from that of Hong Kong, and to secure symbolically in the annals of international diplomatic history that Macau is in fact a distinct political entity from that of the neighbouring British colony of Hong Kong.”

4. Ibid.

5. Ramos, João de Deus, “A Declaração Conjunta sobre Macau no âmbito das relações Luso-Chinesas,” Political International, Vol. 1, No. 14 (1997), p. 27.Google Scholar

6. In concrete terms it must be said that Portugal appears to be giving more substance to this issue than the British government, with concerns for the considerable number of Macau ethnic Chinese who hold full Portuguese passports.

7. In this vein the Chinese have not obstructed Macau's entry or even observer status in the Association of Portuguese Speaking Countries.

8. As an example of writing on Portugal's efforts, Fernandes, , “Portuguese behaviour,” pp. 45–46Google Scholar, talks about this weakness and points out that even with investment incentives in the first half of the 1990s Portugal's own investment in Macau only reached 121 million escudos by 1995 – far short of the investment credit offered by the Portuguese government a few years earlier.

9. According to Conceição, Lourenço Maria da, Macau entre Dois Tratados com a China 1862–1887 (Macau: Instituto Cultural, 1988)Google Scholar, ch. 4, in the Treaty of 1887, the Portuguese gave in on their claims to Wanzhai Island (now part of Zhuhai) and, to a certain degree, on a Chinese fiscal post in the city, but gained sovereignty over Macau. For a concise Chinese interpretation of the history of Macau, especially the Portuguese administration's relations with China, see Chengkang, Fei, Aomen 400 nian (Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe, 1988).Google Scholar For a recent history in English see Porter, Jonathan, Macau: The Imaginary City (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996).Google Scholar For detail about Macau's international status see Keeton, George W., ‘The international status of Macao before 1887,’ Chinese Social and Political Science Review, Vol. 11, No. 3 (07 1927), pp. 404–413.Google Scholar For another Portuguese perspective see Rego, António da Silva, Macau: Perspectiva Histórica (Lisboa: Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, 1966).Google Scholar

10. Edmonds, Richard Louis, “Land use in Macau: changes between 1973 and 1983,” Land Use Policy, Vol. 3, No. 1 (01 1986), pp. 47–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar As Chengkang, Fei, Aomen 400 nian, pp. 175, 191–92, 194, 379Google Scholar, and for 1952 Zhiliang, Wu, Shengcun zhidao: lun Aomen zhengzhi zhidu yu zhengzhi fazhan (The Way of Surviving: An Analysis of Macau's Political System and Political Development) (Macau: The Macau Adult Education Society, 1988)Google Scholar point out, in the more than 400 years of the Portuguese presence in Macau, Chinese authorities have several times (1748, 1772, 1787, 1922 and 1952) imposed or threatened to impose economic sanctions against the enclave, and on each occasion the Macau government had no alternative but to yield to Chinese pressure.

11. As an example of the size constraint, in the 1980s the Portuguese had to get the Chinese to agree to the Macau International Airport construction plans as planes must cross Chinese air space to land in Macau.

12. Prior to the 20th century there were times when Portuguese made up a significant proportion of Macau's then tiny population. Macau's current population is about 425,000 (Aomen ribao (Macau Daily) 30 08 1998, p. A4).Google Scholar More than 96% of its population is ethnic Chinese; about 2% is of mixed (largely Portuguese-Chinese or Portuguese-Malayan) blood and known as Macaense; 1% are Portuguese expatriates and their families from Portugal or ex-Portuguese colonies in Africa and Goa; and 1% are from other places.

13. It is estimated that there are about 10,000 Macaense in Macau. In Macau's early history many of the Macaense were a mixture of Portuguese and Malay or Japanese. In the 20th century most of the mixture has been between Portuguese and Chinese. For more on the Macaense see Cabrai, João de Pina and Lourenço, Nelson, Em Terra de Tufões: Dinâmicas da Etnicidade Macaense (Macau: Instituto Cultural, 1993).Google Scholar An English translation was produced by the same publisher in 1994.

14. For an analysis of the 1966 riot see Dicks, Anthony J., “Macau: legal fiction and gunboat diplomacy,” in Aijmer, Göran (ed.), Leadership on the China Coast (London & Malmö: Curzon Press, 1984)Google Scholar; Zhiliang, Wu, The Way of SurvivingGoogle Scholar; and Cheong, Ng Kuok, “Aomen zhengzhi di lishi: cong ershi shiji dao ershiyi shiji” (“A political history of Macau: from the 20th century to the 21st century”), in Xinxin, Chen (Chan, Penny Y. Y.) (ed.), Liang'an si di: Zhongguo, Taiwan, Xianggang, Aomen si ge huaren shehui defazhan (Four Regions on the Two Sides of the Strait: The Development of Chinese Communities in Mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau) (Hong Kong: Guangjiao, 1997).Google Scholar For two years after the incident, Macau was without an effective government: police officers rarely ventured into the streets for fear of being attacked, the government dared not issue new decrees or policies and the machinery of the government virtually stopped functioning. Public order was maintained by the neighbourhood societies and other influential social, religious and economic organizations such as the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.

15. Yee, Herbert S., “Money politics and political mobilization in Macau: the 1996 Legislative Assembly elections,” Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 10 (10 1997), p. 946.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

16. Yee, Herbert S. and Lo, Sonny S. H., “Macau in transition: the politics of decolonization,” Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 10 (10 1991), p. 908.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17. The commercial balance of Macau registered a deficit of 247 million patacas during the first four months of 1999 which was a 29.6% improvement over the same period in 1998 with the total value of imports and exports rising.

18. Although not a sign of corruption it is interesting to note that a during the eight-year rule of Governor Rocha Vieira, 845 medals and commendations were given out, mostly to people in the Macau administration. “A bem da Nação,” Ponto Final, Sér. 2, No. 344 (25 06 1999), pp. 12–13.Google Scholar

19. For example see Edmonds, Richard Louis, Macau (Oxford: Clio Press, 1989), pp. xxiii–xxivGoogle Scholar, and Fernandes, Moisés Silva, The Chinese Cultural Revolution and Luso-Chinese Relations (forthcoming).Google Scholar

20. According to Cheong, Ng Kuok, “A political history of Macau,” p. 183Google Scholar, the government overspent by 300% and 109% respectively on the building of the Macau International Airport and the expansion of the Conde de S. Januário Hospital. In the 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1995 fiscal years, the government's expenditure exceeded the original budget by 20 to 30%.

21. Of the 23 members of the Legislative Assembly, the seven government-appointed members generally were pro-government, the indirectly elected Macaense were also inclined to support the government, while the directly elected Chinese legislators rarely spoke with one voice. In the name of Sino-Portuguese friendship, the pro-Beijing legislators rarely opposed government policies. Thus it was difficult to obtain the two-thirds majority that was required to block a government budgetary proposal.

22. From 1982 to 1995 Macau's average annual GDP growth was 7%. In 1996, Macau registered negative GDP growth of 0.5% and in 1997 negative growth of 0.1% (Aomen ribao, 27 09 1998, p. A9).Google Scholar It was projected that 1998 would be another year of negative growth (Aomen ribao, 23 09 1998, p. A1).Google Scholar According to Huaqiao bao (Journal Va Kio), 30 09 1998Google Scholar, p. A1, a record 5.1% unemployment rate was reported in June 1998.

23. The announcement that the PLA will be stationed in the Macau SAR was made at a meeting of the Macau SAR Preparation Committee held in Beijing on 18 September 1998 by Vice-Premier Qian Qichen (Aomen ribao, 19 09 1998, p. A1).Google Scholar

24. The idea of stationing PLA troops in Macau was not raised in either the Joint Declaration or the Macau Basic Law (Aomen jibenfa). The Basic Law is the “constitution” for the SAR that will replace the Macau Organic Statute on 20 December 1999. It was drafted by a committee comprising mainland and Macau members and approved by the National People's Congress on 31 March 1993. In a discussion with the leader of Portuguese Joint Liaison Group, Santana Carlos, during the summer of 1999, one of the authors was told that there was an understanding that no Chinese troops would be stationed in the Macau SAR.

25. Three days after the Chinese government's announcement, Governor Rocha Vieira responded by pointing out that the Joint Declaration of 1987 did not mention that the Chinese side will station troops in Macau after 1999 and that the Portuguese government in Lisbon would discuss the issue, particularly the PRC's new interpretation of the Joint Declaration, with the Chinese government (Huaqiao bao, 23 09 1998, p. A1).Google Scholar

26. See Huaqiao bao, 20 09 1998, p. A3.Google Scholar The Joint Committee of Democratic Development of Macau issued a statement criticizing the Chinese government's decision as a betrayal of its earlier promise not to station troops in post-1999 Macau. It also pointed out that the PLA should be responsible only for national defence and border security, while public order in Macau is the responsibility of the SAR government. Bruning, Harald, “Macau's post-hand-over PLA garrison will comprise just 900 troops, a Chinese-language news magazine says in its latest edition,” South China Morning Post Internet Edition (10 04 1999)Google Scholar quotes Yazhou zhoukan (International Chinese News Weekly) as saying the size of the Macau SAR garrison had been confirmed at 900 and would be headed by a major-general despite its small size. According to “O espaço da defesa,” Ponto Final, Sér. 2, No. 345 (2 07 1999), p. 15Google Scholar the sites for the garrison will be in two places near the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the city of Macau and another location on the island of Taipa.

27. One of the most interesting views of the transition ceremony was presented in a letter to Governor Rocha Vieira by Ng Kuok Cheong who put forward the idea that what he saw as an excessive cost for the transfer ceremony should not be borne by the people of Macau as the event was a goodbye party for the Portuguese administration and not for the government of Macau. As such Ng though it should be paid for by the Portuguese. See “Tanto dinheiro, ou tanta gente?” Ponto Final, Sér. 2, No. 345 (2 07 1999), p. 13.Google Scholar

28. Yee, , “Money politics and political mobilization in Macau,” p. 955.Google Scholar

29. The telephone survey was conducted by Herbert Yee and his assistants. A random sample of Macau citizens aged 18 and above was selected from the local telephone directory. A total of 588 interviews were completed successfully.

30. In the survey, 38.1% of respondents were dissatisfied with the government's efforts to localize the civil service while only 21.7% were satisfied. At the same time 32% were dissatisfied with the pace of localizing the enclave's legal and judicial systems while only 13% were satisfied. In terms of progress at making Chinese an official language, 33% were dissatisfied while 31% were satisfied.

31. High technology is one sector of the economy which the government has been promoting in recent years.

32. Azevedo, Paulo A., “Com medo dos espiões,” Ponto Final, Sér. 2, No. 344 (25 06 1999), p. 2Google Scholar and “Fundo de Terras atinge 9.200 milhões,” p. 10Google Scholar of the same journal. Land sales, along with the casino concession, has been the main source of revenue for the Macau government. Prior to Chinese administration, the money collected from land sales has been divided into two equal parts – one for the Portuguese Macau government and one for the future SAR government which has been put into the Land Fund.

33. The survey was conducted during the period April to October 1991. Using a random sample of house units, the study successfully visited 663 households and completed the same number of questionnaires. See Yee, Herbert S., Bo-long, Liu and Tak-wing, Ngo, Aomen huaren zhengzhi wenhua (The Political Culture of the Macau Chinese) (Macau: Aomen jijinhui, 1993), pp. 68–69.Google Scholar

34. Yee, . “Money politics and political mobilization in Macau.”Google Scholar See also Hing, Lo Shiu, Political Development in Macau (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1995).Google Scholar

35. It is estimated that the Aomen ribao has a circulation of about 65,000 and the second largest paper, Huaqiao bao, a circulation of 8,000. The views of the democratic legislator Ng Kuok Cheong, for example, can be found in Huaqiao bao and in other papers. While Huaqiao bao can be purchased at almost all newspaper stands other smaller papers can be purchased only at specialized local newspaper stands. With the exception of the Taiwan-funded weekly Xunbao (Journal Information), all local newspapers have been highly dependent on advertising from pro-Beijing companies. For a critical analysis of the role of the local Chinese press in monitoring government policies, see Zhihong, Cai, “Aomen zhongwen baozhi dui zhengfu shizheng de jiandu”Google Scholar (“The input of the local press on government policy”), in Yee, Herbert S. (ca.), Aomen zhengzhi yu gonggong zhengce chutan (An Exploratory Study of Macau's Politics and Public Administration) (Macau: Aomen jijinhui, 1994).Google Scholar

36. Macau is too small to support privately owned television and radio stations. The partly government-owned local television and radio stations refrained from criticizing government policies. Macau television and radio offer no programmes similar to “City Forum,” “The Nineties” or “A Storm in the Tea Cup” offered by the Hong Kong television and radio stations for the public to voice their opinions on public affairs. One exception was a very popular half-hour programme called “The Pulse of Macau” (“Aomen maibo”) broadcast by the Radio Macau Antenna 2 (Cantonese) in the 1980s and 1990s. It received telephone calls from the public airing their complaints about government policies and wrongdoing. The programme irritated some government officials, however, and was terminated in 1993. Unlike their Hong Kong counterparts, the local mass media rarely conduct public opinion polls on current issues or use poll results to put pressure on the government. In 1999 Macau launched a satellite television station, the only alternative to the government-operated Teledifusão de Macau. However, programmes initially are being broadcast in Mandarin and English which limits their utility to the local Cantonese and Portuguese communities.

37. Portuguese papers generally have a circulation of under 1,000 copies and can only be purchased at news stands in the centre of the city.

38. By the summer of 1999 the organization of the judicial system seemed to have become the most contentious issue for the Joint Liaison Group. In late June Governor Rocha Vieira publicly lamented the lack of support from the Chinese side for a resolution to the question of judicial organization in the Macau SAR so that the system could be tested before 20 December. Talks stalled from mid-1998. See “Organização judiciária por testar,” Ponto Final, Sér 2, No. 344 (25 06 1999), p. 7Google Scholar and “Tudo na mesma,” p. 9Google Scholar of the same journal. According to one article the governor indicated in late June 1999 “that some transition issues such as the organization of the Judiciary could not be solved before the handover,” in “Unresolved issues will straddle handover,” Ponto Final, Sér. 2, No. 345 (2 07 1999)Google Scholar, English Supplement, p. 8. However, the Preparatory Committee of the Macau SAR headed by Qian Qichen is expected to adopt its own draft resolution on the establishment of judicial departments in Macau prior to 20 December (Yang, Xu, “Patriots to lead Macao,” China Daily on line version (3 07 1999)).Google ScholarBruning, Harald in “Go-ahead to set up government,” South China Morning Post Internet Edition (9 07 1999)Google Scholar had so much confidence in China's ability to push these efforts though in five months that he wrote: “Observers expect virtually all of Macau's outstanding transition period matters, including the issues of implementing a proper judicial system and stationing a Chinese garrison in the enclave after the handover, to be solved in time for President Jiang Zemin's state visit to Portugal in October, paving the way for a cheerful Sino-Portuguese handover ceremony. Macau's handover promises to be a much happier event than Hong Kong's rather staid and somewhat gloomy transfer of sovereignty two years ago.”

39. For a more detailed analysis of the localization of Macau's civil service, see Yee, Herbert S., “Macau's civil service in transition: the politics of localization,” Hong Kong Public Administration, Vol. 2, No. 1 (03 1993), pp. 58–70Google Scholar; Hing, Lo Shiu, Political Development in MacauGoogle Scholar, chs. 4 and 5; Deming, Du. “Aomen gongwuyuan bendihua fenxi” (“An analysis of the localization of Macau's civil service”), Aomen yanjiu, No. 8 (04 1998), pp. 1–40Google Scholar; and Zhiliang, Wu, “Gongwuyuan bendihua: huigu yu qianzhan” (“The localization of the civil service: retrospect and prospects”), in Zhiliang, Wu, Wan-chong, leong and Sio-weng, Fung (eds.), Aomen 1998 (Macau: Aomen jijinhui, 1998).Google Scholar

40. Interview with Joaquim Ribeiro Madeira de Carvalho, President of the Câmara Municipal das Unas, 21 January 1999.

41. One of the under-secretaries, Jorge Hagedorn Rangel, is a Macaense.

42. Lopes, Gilberto, “Directores para o futuro,” Revista Macau, Sér. 2, No. 79 (11 1998), p. 8.Google Scholar

43. There is a rumour that some Chinese extremists plan to abolish the Portuguese language as an official language in the SAR by revising the Macau Basic Law. Some are thinking of replacing Macau's current Portuguese-based legal system with a Chinese legal system. Interview with Gary Ngai Mei Cheong, former deputy director of the Institute of Culture of Macau, 8 October 1998.

44. See Hong Kong Basic Law, Annex II.

45. See Macau Basic Law, Annex II.

46. In interviews conducted during the period from August to October 1998 the following views were often mentioned: the majority of Macau's people are poorly educated with little interest in public affairs; they have to be mobilized to vote in elections and are highly vulnerable to vote-buying and other irregular electioneering practices.

47. This view is supported by earlier studies of political culture in Macau. See for example, Yee, , Liu, and Ngo, , Political CultureGoogle Scholar; Yee, , “Money politics and political mobilization in Macau”Google Scholar; and Hing, Lo Shiu, Political Development in Macau.Google Scholar

48. Cheong, Ng Kuok, “A political history of Macau,” pp. 191–94.Google Scholar The perception of democracy amongst the people of Macau is positive. In a telephone survey conducted in January 1999, 94% of respondents indicated that democracy is the ideal political system and 75% believed that democracy is suitable for Macau. For details see Yee, Herbert S., “The mass political culture of Macau: continuity and change”Google Scholar (forthcoming).

49. Yee, , Liu, and Ngo, , Political Culture, p. 37.Google Scholar Nevertheless, it is also important to note the high percentage of “don't know” or “no opinion” in both the 1991 (39.6%) and 1999 (34.5%) surveys. This suggests that quite a significant portion of the Macau people do not know much about democracy or that they simply do not care.

50. Yee, . “The mass political culture of Macau.”Google Scholar

51. The deteriorating public order has primarily been caused by a conflict of interests between the casinos. Competition for gambling customers between the casinos in an era of economic depression and declining tourism is particularly keen. Local casino table operations have been subcontracted to triads or people who have connections with them; in the summer of 1999 the Macau Superior Tribunal of Justice of the Macau government stated that this arrangement had been going on since the late 1970s. There has been frequent fighting between rival gangs resulting in some murders. Since early 1998, the killings carried out by rival triads escalated to involve members of the police force. On 24 March 1998, the chief inspector of casinos was gunned down. Two days latera marine police officer suffered the same fate. Since then, there have been killings or attempted killings by rival gangs almost every month. See Aomen ribao, 19 10 1998, p. A1.Google Scholar

52. Planning was piecemeal in Macau. For example, conversations with members and former members of the Macau government and workers in private architectural and legal firms in Macau during 1998 revealed that the government had no overall land use plan. For more on this see Edmonds, Richard Louis and Kyle, William John, “Land use in Macau: changes between 1972 and 1994,” Land Use Policy, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1998), pp. 279–280.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

53. For details of infrastructure plans see ibid. pp. 289–291; and Lopes, Gilberto, “Empreendimentos para o século XXI,” Revista Macau, Ser. 2, No. 80 (12 1998), pp. 9–35.Google Scholar

54. Macau in the Context of EU-China Relations (unpublished European Union Eminent Persons Group Report presented in Brussels on 3 03 1999), pp. 10–13.Google Scholar As of mid-1999, Macau participated in 46 international organizations; 28 as a full member and with associate status or as part of the Portuguese delegation in the remainder. The Joint Liaison Group has approved participation of the SAR in 40 of these organizations with full membership in 25 of them.

55. Several have made the point that preservation of Portuguese cultural heritage may have positive spin-offs for Macau. Perhaps most interesting, Porter, Jonathan, “Macau 1999,” Current History (09 1997), pp. 282–86Google Scholar suggests that it may have positive spin-offs for reunification with Taiwan.